1
Analyzing and Preparing the Interpreter
A university professor wanted to illustrate the dangers of alcoholism to her science students. She set two petri dishes on the table before the class, one filled with water, the other with alcohol. She put an earthworm in the water, and within a few seconds it had wriggled out of the dish. She put a second worm in the alcohol, and it died almost instantly. Looking up at the class, the professor queried, âWhat do you learn from this experiment?â A hungover student in the back of the class raised his hand and said, âIf you drink enough alcohol, youâll never have worms.â The moral of the story? Interpretation may be influenced by the interpreterâs identity; or perhaps in this case, interpretation may be under the influence of the interpreterâs identity.
Literary critic Frank Kermode offers the startling judgment that âall interpretation proceeds from prejudice, and without prejudice there can be no interpretationâ (1979: 68). Perhaps this is just the commonplace, postmodern denial of objectivity that we have seen before, now in starker dress. Kermodeâs basic point is similar to the oft-heard claim, âAll knowledge is perspectival.â There is a truth here, although Kermodeâs formulation of it is blunt and one-sided. Over against this pessimistic assessment, one needs to place James Barrâs remark cited earlier that while complete objectivity is not attainable, a high degree of it is, and a high degree is much better than a low degree (1980: 24). If interpretation dissolves into nothing more than prejudice and opinion, then communication is thwarted, and the rationale for engaging in critical and methodical biblical study is undermined.
The partial and provisional character of our interpretations does not mean there is no truth âthere in the textâ to be disclosed, and it certainly does not constitute a denial of absolute truth. If God exists and is truth, then there is absolute truth. Human perceptions of truth may be partial and provisional (R. Brown, 1981: 4n8), but there is a huge difference between imperfect perceptions of absolute truth and a world void of absolute truth. The fact that all interpreters read from a certain location does not mean that we should despair of meaningful interpretation; nor does it mean that all interpretations are equally prejudiced and therefore equally valid (or invalid). It simply means that we must analyze the interpreter as well as the text.
Analyzing the Interpreter
Analyzing the interpreter refers to self-reflection leading to a better awareness of oneâs identity and perspective. Subjectivity is not inherently friend or foe. A personâs social location can be a blind spot or a magnifying glass: it may obscure oneâs reading of the text or enhance it. The aim, then, is neither to repress oneâs subjectivity nor to revel in it, but to understand it, be aware of its effects on interpretation, and exercise it responsibly.
Several dimensions or domains of reflection could be relevant to the readerâs self-understanding vis-Ă -vis the act of interpretation. Some aspects of a readerâs identity pertain to group identity and have a taxonomic, check-the-box quality to them; others are highly individualistic. This reflects the obvious fact that oneâs identity is a function of both personal characteristics and the groups to which one belongs. Cultural critics nowadays sometimes speak of âidentity politics,â the idea that oneâs views are a function of oneâs group, especially oneâs socioeconomic group, race, ethnicity, gender, and so forth. This is true, but only to a degree. The same critics often point out that although members of such groups may display certain trends, they seldom walk in lockstep with one another. African-Americans, for example, do not all hold the same political views, and the diversity within that group should be respected. In a similar fashion, we must recognize the limitations of âidentity hermeneutics.â Oneâs social location influences oneâs interpretation of Scripture, but not in a coercive or comprehensive fashion. It is quite possible for two white, married, college-educated, middle-class, middle-aged, heterosexual American men to have very different perspectives on biblical interpretation. In what follows, I hope that the combination of taxonomic categories and individual commitments and experiences will provide a sufficiently broad base for analyzing the interpreter.
The following three areas gather up the most important aspects of self-analysis: (1) Social location. By this I mean the basic categories of the interpreterâs social identity, the sort of information that might be asked for on a census or application form. Such factors would include oneâs age, gender, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic background, educational level, and so forth. In recent years sexual orientation has also come to be seen as an important aspect of social location. (2) Theological identity. Given the obvious and pervasive religious content of biblical literature, oneâs religious identity can clearly have an impact on interpretation. Issues involved here would include oneâs broad orientation toward religion (Jewish, Christian, Muslim, secularist, agnostic, and so on), oneâs specific religious community (e.g., a denominational heritage), the specific tenets of oneâs faith and practice, and any particular or especially distinctive religious convictions and commitments. (3) Life experiences. Whereas most of the factors already mentioned are group characteristics, this last area involves more personal and individual characteristics. Here one could consider childhood experiences (either pleasant or traumatic), career experiences, relationships, health issues, cultural phenomena, marriage/divorce, childrearing, and so forth.
To illustrate the possible influence of the readerâs identity, it may be helpful to consider some actual examples of how these factors have influenced interpretation.
Social Location
Romans 16:7 offers an example of the way gender can influence interpretation, in this case with distorting results. In verses 1â15 Paul greets friends and coworkers, among whom are several women: Phoebe, Prisca, Mary, Tryphaena and Tryphosa, the mother of Rufus, Julia, and the sister of Nereus. The New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) translates 16:7, âGreet Andronicus and Junia . . . ; they are prominent among the apostles.â The name âJuniaâ denotes a woman. But a superscript letter in the NRSV refers the reader to a note that says, âOr Junias; other ancient authorities read Julia.â The 1984 New International Version (NIV), in contrast, translates, âGreet Andronicus and Junias,â construing both names as those of men, with no explanatory note attached. Can the original Greek be so ambiguous that translators are unsure of what the name is and whether it denotes a man or a woman?
There is a minor textual question concerning what Paul originally wrote. Among the many Greek manuscripts that lie behind Romans 16:7, only two have the name âJulia.â Textual scholars rightly regard this as meager support and dismiss this reading as secondary. So the choice is between âJuniaâ and âJuniasâ because, some scholars say, depending on the accent, the name might be masculine, a shortened form of âJunianus.â Are we then left with an unsolvable dilemma? Not at all, says New Testament textual critic Bruce Metzger, who notes that âthe female Latin name Junia occurs more than 250 times in Greek and Latin inscriptions found in Rome alone, whereas the male name Junias is unattested.â Second, Metzger points out that âwhen Greek manuscripts began to be accented, scribes wrote the feminine . . . (âJuniaâ)â (1994: 475â76). What this means is that, although the earliest manuscripts of Romans had no accents and so were ambiguous, when accents began to be inserted, every extant witness construed the name as feminine.
Why then do so many modern translations of Romans 16:7 render the name âJuniasâ? It is hard to see any other reason than the translatorsâ bias against the possibility that a woman could be an apostle, especially âprominent among the apostles.â James Dunnâs comment is apt: âThe assumption that [the name] must be male is a striking indictment of male presumption regarding the character and structure of earliest Christianityâ (1988b: 894). In this case the long tradition of biblical translation and interpretation by men who held skewed views of womenâs leadership has misrepresented both Paulâs intention and the historical record. On Junia and Romans 16:7 one can now read the definitive treatment by Eldon J. Epp (2005).
Theological Identity
Oneâs religious commitments obviously have the potential to influence interpretation, either by way of heightened alertness and perception or by way of distortion and resistance to textual meaning. Sometimes religious identity overlaps with racial/ethnic identity, as in the case of Jewish readers of Scripture. When Jews read the New Testament, they often have special sensitivities, both positive and negative, from which Christians could learn. Adele Reinhartz is a scholar of ancient Judaism and early Christianity, especially the Gospel of John, which speaks of âthe Jewsâ pervasively and often negatively. âAs a Jew,â Reinhartz says, âthe word âJewsâ jumps out at me in the Gospel of Johnâ (1994: 562). Perceptive Christian readers notice this motif but would not likely feel the intensity and immediacy of its sting.
Among Christian interpreters, denominational affiliation can certainly exert an influence. The Catholic/Protestant distinction has sometimes been at the root of interpretive debates. In her commentary on the Gospel of John, Gail OâDay notes that John 6:51â58 has been variously interpreted as patently sacramental (alluding to the Eucharist) or as nonsacramental, often along denominational lines. The Catholic tradition, presumably more open to symbolic, especially liturgical, interpretations, sees a sacramental âfuller sense.â Protestant interpreters, seeing John as a more spiritual or even existential Gospel, regard the sacramental view as contrary to the whole tenor of the Fourth Gospel. OâDay rightly observes that the debate tells us more about the interpreters than about Johnâs Gospel. If our aim is to interpret the latter, we will seek the hard textual data, whether it coincides with our theological tradition or not (1995: 605â6).
A second example can be found in the meaning of the term ârighteousnessâ in Matthew 5:6. Ulrich Luz notes that the two main possibilities are (1) righteousness as human acts of virtue, or (2) righteousness as the divine act of imputed, justifying grace (1989: 237). Again the debate falls largely along religious lines: (1) Catholics prefer the notion of sanctified behavior, and (2) Protestants argue for a more judicial concept of justification. In this case, Protestant interpreters may be guilty of reading Matthew through a Pauline lens.
Needless to say, a variety of other theological commitments may influence interpretation for good or ill. Pentecostal readers will be alert to the mention of the Spirit and charismatic gifts. Evangelical readers might be keen on texts having to do with discipleship, Christology, or eschatology. Pacifist Christians will not miss references to the nonviolent ethic of Jesus. In each of these cases, religious commitments may variously be assets or liabilities. Balanced and sound interpretations are more likely when conversation among interpreters crosses such boundaries.
Life Experiences
We interpret through what we live through. Life experiences, perhaps especially difficult and unpleasant experiences, imbue our perception and thinking like tinted glasses. Such lenses may be distorting, as in the case of rose-colored glasses, but this is not necessarily so. Tinted glasses sometimes sharpen oneâs vision by filtering out harmful elements. Mark Allan Powell notes that victims of spousal and child abuse will hear Jesusâs teaching on nonretaliation differently from those of us who have never suffered physical violence. When the lector declares on a given Sunday morning, âIf anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other alsoâ (Matt. 5:39), there will almost always be people present in the sanctuary who have recently been slapped or hit, and they âwill hear the text with a poignancy you can scarcely imagineâ (2001: 18).
The same scholar elsewhere relates a cross-cultural instance of the effect of life experience on oneâs reading of the story of the prodigal son (Luke 15:11â32). Using an exercise in which a person reads the story silently and then recounts it to someone else, Powell found that only 6 percent of American readers mentioned the famine that befell the land and contributed to the prodigalâs destitution (15:14). In contrast, all of them (100 percent) recounted the prodigalâs âsquanderingâ of his property (15:13). Powell used the exercise again while on a sabbatical in Eastern Europe in 2001. He polled fifty residents of Saint Petersburg, Russia, and found that 84 percent mentioned the famine when recounting the story, but only 34 percent mentioned the squandering. Powell notes that in 1941 the army of Nazi Germany had besieged Saint Petersburg (Leningrad at that time) for about two and a half years, causing the death of 670 thousand people. The persons polled in the exercise were either survivors of the famine, their descendants, or immigrants who shared the collective memory. Presumably the American readers had never experienced a famine but were familiar with excessive, wasteful lifestyles! This does not mean that Russian readers would necessarily come up with an interpretation of the story of the prodigal son that was dramatically different from that of American readers, but it indicates that life experiences cause one to attend to the details of a text differently, and that can certainly influence interpretation (Powell, 2004: 265â68).
If a traumatic life experience can completely alienate a person from God, then such experiences can surely influence oneâs approach to and interpretation of Scripture. They may sensitize or desensitize a person to aspects of the text. They may create openness or resistance to the intended effect of the text. As Joel Green says, âPresuppositions enable our understanding, as well as disable itâ (2007b: 24â25).
In the preceding discussion I have described ways that a readerâs identity may influence interpretation, not determine it. If the readerâs identity determines interpretation, then we necessarily have as many interpretations as we do readers, and we descend into the postmodern abyss of indeterminacy. Influences, on the other hand, may be welcomed or resisted, and judicious interpreters will try to discern when influences encourage attention to the text or distract from it. This point is made by Roger Kimball about literature in general:
Interpreters should strive, therefore, to be aware of both how their subjectivity may hinder faithful interpretation and how it may enable faithful interpretation. Social location, theological identity, and life experiences influence interpretation in diverse ways, sometimes blatantly, sometimes subtly, in manners that are sometimes predictable, but sometimes unexpected. Because of this, there is not necessarily any one privileged perspective from which to interpret Scripture. Some scholars speak of the âhermeneutical advantageâ of the oppressed (Schneiders, 1991: 183), and there is reason for this. The marginalized are often able to see injustices to which others are blind, precisely because, as marginalized persons, they experience their effects. But the oppressed do not somehow escape subjectivity, and bias may afflict them as well.
There is no reason why white Euro-American male readers should produce inherently inferior interpretations of the biblical text, while minority ethnic, third-world, and feminist readers produce inherently superior ones. Social location is not bad...