Automotive Audits

Principles and Practices

D. H. Stamatis

• Éditeur: CRC Press
• Année: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000347982
• Édition: 1
• Sujet: Technologie et ingénierie
• Sous-sujet: Transport et ingénierie de l'automobile

This book addresses the essentials of an automotive audit which is required by all automotive suppliers world-wide. They are based on customer specific requirements, ISO standards, and Industry specifications. This book covers both the mandated documents and records that are necessary for compliance, with an extensive discussion on Layered Process Audits and distance auditing.

The book addresses the six standards for certification in one volume. It explains "why" and "how" an effective audit should be carried out. It identifies the key indicators for a culture change with an audit, explains the "process audit" at length, discusses the rationale for Layered Process audits and summarizes all the mandatory documents and records for all standards and requirements. The book covers the issue of risk in auditing and emphasizes the role of a "checklist" in the preparation process.

This book is for those that conduct audits, those that are interested in auditing, and those being audited. It specifically addresses automotive OEMs and their supplier base but is also of interest to anyone wanting information on auditing.

1 Legitimate Concerns about Audits

Whether we like it or not, in the last 5 years or so, we see a mistrust towards auditing and their significance of improvement to an organization. The loud noises about “no value added,” “waste of time,” and other epithets are increasing in both literature and among professionals in seminar settings as well as social events. Why is that happening? Primarily because even though the standards and requirement are increasing at an exponential level, no one is really held accountable for not following them. Quality has taken a back seat to production/profit and mediocrity seems to have become the new standard (Smith, 2019, p. 13). It has become a “routine” check with an attitude of “well, this is one more thing we have to do.” Many organizations have drop certification according to the ISO, and many more have dropped the pursuit of excellence with the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award. An excellent review on this topic is presented by De Carvalho and Sampalo (2020, pp. 43–49).

In the field of quality, as in any other profession, we do indeed have ethics that promote honesty, integrity, safety, and customer satisfaction. To all these categories, we have and continue to generate standards (international, industry, and specific organizational). However, if one looks at the data (statistics) for the last three centuries, we are going to see that as these standards, specifications, and regulations are increasing, not only similar problems are repeated but also are increasing more than ever. For a list of some of the catastrophic examples, see Stamatis (2020). For a more current list, let us see the following examples, specifically in the automotive industry:

In the auto industry we are witnessing a record number of recalls in 2016 reaching 52,985,779 in total. That’s a steep number that was plumped up in large part due to the massive Takata airbag campaign that ultimately drove the Japanese company into bankruptcy. Specifically, Howard (2019) reports that “Ford workers break their silence on faulty transmissions: ‘My hands are dirty. I feel horrible.’ Ford knew Focus, Fiesta models had flawed transmission, sold them anyway. They knew the truth and kept quiet.” In 2017, Wong (2017) reports that the number of recalls was about 28,146,661 with Fiat Chrysler, Honda, Ford, Hyundai and BMW leading the way. That’s not a small number, but it’s a far cry from the 2016 levels. [It is very interesting that even GE has issues with major quality problems to the tune of $1 billion dollars due to facing potential costs in its jet engine unit from the grounding of Boeing Co’s 737 MAX airliner (Scott and Ajmera, 2019)].

Here’s a look at some of the biggest and noteworthy auto recalls issued in 2018 as reported by Masterson (2019). In 2018, he reported 1.6 million 2015–2018 Ford F-150; 1.3 million 2014–2018 Ford Fusion, Lincoln MKZ; 1.3 million 2012–2018 Ford Focus; 807,000 2010–2014 Toyota Prius, Prius v; 507,600 2010–2013 Kia Forte, Optima, Hybrid, Sedona; 504,000 2013–2016 Ford Escape, Fusion; 343,000 2012–2017 Audi A4, A4 Allroad, A5, A6, Q5; 240,000 2017–2018 Chrysler Pacifica; 232,000 2018 Honda Accord, 2019 Insight; and 215,000 2015–2018 Nissan and Infiniti vehicles.

In 2019, Masterson (2019a) reported 556,400 2019–2020 Chevrolet Silverado 1500, HDs and GMC Sierra 1500, HDs; 528,600 2011–2013 Dodge Durangos, Jeep Grand Cherokees; 394,000 Nissan Maximas, Muranos, Pathfinders and Infiniti QX60s; 135,700 2019–2020 Ford F-150s; and 72,700 2019 Ford Rangers. For additional information on recalls, see https://www.cars.com/news/recalls/. Retrieved on December 6, 2019.

Johnson (December 19, 2019) and Johnston (2019) reported that General Motors is recalling more than 814,000 pickup trucks and cars in the United States to fix problems with electronic brake controls and battery cables. Furthermore, Isidore (2015) reported that General Motors closed the books on its epic year of recalls, saying they cost the company $4.1 billion in repair costs, victim compensation, and other expenses.

On the other hand, Selby (December 19, 2019) from Consumer Reports is more explicit of the recall reporting that the first recall covers nearly 464,000 Cadillac CT6 sedans and Chevrolet Silverado 1500 and GMC Sierra 1500 pickup trucks from 2019. The second recall covers over 350,000 2019 and 2020 Silverado and Sierra 1500 pickups. The problem? A cable connecting the battery and alternator may have too much glue on it, and the second problem is electronic brake controls which can cause stability problems with the brakes. The first problem can interrupt the electrical connection and possibly cause the trucks to stall or even catch fire. The second disables the anti-lock brake system causing the instability (Selby (2019): https://www.myarklamiss.com/news/consumer-reports/gm-recalls-814k-pickups-cars-to-fix-brake-battery-problems/. Retrieved on December 20, 2019).

To make things worse, Krisher (2020) reports that Ford has issued a recall involving 2.5 million vehicles including Focus and Fusion for door latch problem and brake fluid leaks. What is incredible about this recall is that Ford has had nagging quality troubles with the latches, some car transmissions, and other issues that have hurt its bottom line.

The company said Wednesday (August 12, 2020) the previous door latch recalls were done because of defective pawl spring tabs that could crack and fail in high temperatures. Usually the doors won’t close if there’s a failure, but if they do close, they could open again while the vehicles are in motion. The previously recalled vehicles may not have had the latches replaced, or repairs may not have been done correctly, the company said in a statement.

Obviously, these failures are system failures, and as a consequence, both of these problems should have been caught by a thorough internal audit and certainly a third-party audit and also, had a thorough design review, reliability analysis, design failure mode and effect analysis (DFMEA), advanced product quality planning (APQP), or some kind of simulation modeling. It is hard to believe that no one knew of this before launching the vehicles. One wonders with so many standards and regulations, why do we have so many problems? There are seven options:

• By far, the first and most critical and common is the manipulation of data. Wrong strategy, wrong definition, wrong selection, wrong methodology, inadequate analysis, and bias presentations.
• The second is that management knows about it, but as the workers reported in Howard (2019), “They knew the truth and kept quiet.”
• The third is that the significant tools, i.e. APQP, FMEA (failure mode and effect analysis), and appropriate (applicable) problem-solving techniques are not conducted, or if they are, they are not done correctly. They are done to have a checklist completed for “things done” and not for improvement.
• The fourth is (perhaps the predominant one) production is priority and nothing else matters. Quality and even safety are secondary considerations, although they are preached as priority. They are evaluated after the fact, rather than being evaluated up front.
• The fifth reason why things are becoming problems for the customer I believe is the “laissez-faire” attitude of organizations towards audits. The intent of “audits” is to identify weakness in a system. However, in most organizations – if not all of them – audits are taken place because some “standard” or “regulation” or “specification” calls for them. Unfortunately, as many millions of dollars are spent on audits, the benefits are questionable at best, given the problems and recalls of many products. This is verified by the amount of rejects, recalls, and issue notifications to customers. Stoop (2020) reports that according to the National Safety Council, workplace fatalities have risen 17% since 2009 after decades of steady improvement in occupational safety, outpacing workforce growth over that period. At the same time, international, industrial, and customer-specific standards/requirements have increased in both volume and complexity.
• The sixth reason is that the focus of management is short-term gains based on “quarterly earnings” and not long-term, real improvements and productivity and earnings.
• The seventh reason is that the audits – at all levels – were not effective for whatever reason.

In addition to these seven reasons, it is worth examining the multiple variables associated with safety recalls the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA, 2018) has identified as potential risks. All have to do with “some kind” of failure that could have been caught, but it did not. The variables according to NHTSA are as follows:

1. The manufacturer;
2. The age of the oldest affected vehicle;
3. The vehicle type involved (i.e. passenger cars, lights trucks, Multi-Purpose vehicles (MPVs));
4. The component category;
5. The recall safety risk description includes the word “crash”;
6. The recall safety risk description includes the word “fire”;
7. The recall safety risk description includes the word “death”;
8. The recall safety risk description includes the word “injury”;
9. The recall safety risk description includes the word “serious”;
10. The year the recall was initiated; and
11. The number of vehicles affected by the recall.

So, one can see that indeed the old adage has some truth to it. That is, figures do not lie, but liars figure. It is imperative therefore to at least mention the role of the “data handlers,” the people who handle data in our education or industrial system are expected to do many things – and do them all well. Most of these individuals are trained well and provide the appropriate and applicable studies with statistically sound results to their respective organizations. Other data handlers have non-instructional leadership or administrative support roles, and they are short on both knowledge and practical experience of statistics. Still others provide highly skilled technical or data expertise that contributes to the effective and efficient operation of their enterprise. Regardless of an individual’s job title, working in a modern organizational environment demands (a) unwavering adherence to codes of appropriate conduct, operating expectations, and professional standards and (b) some level of statistical knowledge.

A “data handler” is defined here as anyone involved or has excess in the usage of data (from data definition, selection of the methodology, analysis of the results, and reporting of the results) in any organization. Honest data handlers can be trusted to maintain objectivity and uphold an organization’s data procedures and protocols even when it requires extra effort, is not convenient, or otherwise runs counter to their own personal interests. Two horrendous examples of mishandling data (tests) recently are as follows:

1. The combination of tests to identify “a” formulating policy by Center for Disease Control (CDC) regarding the corona virus. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC&P) acknowledged on Thursday that it is combining the results from viral and antibody COVID-19 tests when reporting the country’s testing totals, despite marked differences between the tests. First reported by NPR’s WLRN station in Miami, the practice has drawn ire from the US health experts who say combining the tests inhibits the agency’s ability to discern the country’s actual testing capacity. “You’ve got to be kidding me,” Ashish Jha, director of the Harvard Global Health Institute, told The Atlantic. “How could the CDC make that mistake? This is a mess” (Johnson, 2020). Madrigal and Meyer (May 21, 2020).
2. Lancet Study (AP, 2020). One of the most prestigious health journals published a hydroxychloroquine study, even though they knew there were serious concerns about the data. The AP reported the study thusly: Concerns are mounting about studies in two influential medical journals on drugs used in people with corona virus, including one that led multiple countries to stop testing a malaria pill.
   • The New England Journal of Medicine issued an “expression of concern” on Tuesday on a study it published on May 1 (2020) that suggested widely used blood pressure medicines were not raising the risk of death for people with COVID-19. The study relied on a database with health records from hundreds of hospitals around the world. “Substantive concerns” have been raised about the quality of the information, and the journal has asked the authors to provide evidence it’s reliable, the editors wrote.
   • The same database by the Chicago company Surgisphere Corp. was used in an observational study of nearly 100,000 patients published in Lancet that tied the malaria drugs hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine to a higher risk of death in hospitalized patients with the virus. Lancet issued a similar expression of concern about its study on Tuesday, saying it was aware “important scientific questions” had been raised. For more information on the faulty data, see Ramsey (2020).

So, regardless of a data handler’s role in an organization, consistently and continuously demonstrating honesty, integrity, and professionalism are of paramount importance. These qualities, more than any other characteristic or trait, serve as the foundation of ethical behavior, not only in quality engineering but also in all disciplines and in all inquiries of furthering knowledge. Hopefully, internal and external audits will identify system gaps and “fix” them, but also as a result of these findings, the organization will develop “preventive” measures to AVOID future issues, concerns, and even problems.

2 Preassessment Preparation

I remember my Boy Scout motto of Be Ready. It has served me well over the years; however, I have added the words for the unexpected. So now the Boy Scout motto has become Be Ready for the Unexpected. For any type of audit, preparation is the foundation of excellence. The more prepared one is, the more successful the audit will be. Therefore, in this chapter, we present an example of generic questions to serve as a guide.

To be sure, one can never be 100% prepared for all combinations and expectations of a process. So, it is a good practice to have a list (a map, of sorts) that will guide the auditor to find (through probing) possible gaps in both expected and unexpected situations.

A Typical Internal Preassessment Survey

The following questions are intended to be used only as guideline in a given organization. The questions are designed to identify any shortcomings in your system and to allow you to plan accordingly. They are not meant to be used as a formal checklist for any organization, since th...