Former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerereâs description of post-colonial TanzaniaâChina relations as the âmost unequal of equal relationshipsâ could well be applied to relations between all African countries and China today.1 Indeed, since 1978 this characteristic of post-colonial ChinaâAfrica relations has been accentuated by Chinaâs economic transformation. China is now the worldâs second largest economy, and the GDP of provinces like Zhejiang dwarf even Nigeria, Africaâs largest economy. China continues to style itself as âthe largest developing countryâ in partnership with Africa, âthe continent with the most developing countriesâ. Xi Jinpingâs adoption of major power foreign policy, however, confirmed Chinaâs pre-eminence in an already existing de facto political hierarchy.
This chapter presents foundational context for the rest of the book. First, reviewing the history of ChinaâAfrica relations since 1949, it examines how Chinaâs New Era Africa relations follow but depart from deeper historical connections. Many ânew erasâ have been declared in past ChinaâAfrica relations, but that under Xi Jinping represents a historic departure beyond its formal designation. Second, it examines the changing political and institutional framework of Chinaâs Africa engagement, emphasizing CCP reassertion under Xi Jinping since 2012 and how Chinaâs fragmented party-state-military system has been evolving as it adapts to the challenges of major power diplomacy and more complex ties with Africa. Third, it considers how African states, regional organizations, the AU and other non-state actors engage with China and co-shape relations. Rather than emphasizing China at the expense of Africa, this chapter thus introduces thematic background to both.
HISTORICAL PHASES SINCE 1949
Chinaâs official historical narratives stress the continuity of Africa relations since 1949, with phrases like âenduring friendshipâ, but in practice these have been episodic.2 Chinaâs Africa relations waxed and waned after 1949 largely according to domestic Chinese politics, until the development of ties from the 1980s, and especially after 2000, saw a departure in so far as Chinaâs longer-term role was concerned. For the purposes of this book, after outlining key aspects of relations from 1949, the main focus will be on relations since around 2000.
The founding of the PRC on 1 October 1949 led to a new foreign policy under Chairman Mao Zedong. The Mao era saw politics in command of Chinaâs Africa relations. Chinaâs preoccupation with domestic affairs initially meant that it lacked the will and the means to engage meaningfully with a distant continent, much of which was still under colonial rule. At the 1955 AsianâAfrican Conference at Bandung, Chinaâs Premier Zhou Enlai affirmed the recently formed Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each otherâs internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. These have remained directly or indirectly foundational to how the CCP formally presents its Africa relations. Premier Zhou Enlai visited ten African countries over two months in 1963â64. In Ghana, he outlined Chinaâs âEight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to other Countriesâ. As well as stressing equality and mutual benefit, sovereignty and non-conditionality, these defined the nature of Chinese economic aid (long-term interest-free or low-interest loans), and Beijingâs intention to enhance âself-reliance and independent economic developmentâ. Despite domestic hardship and political convulsion, the Chinese government extended aid to African countries. It also embraced projects deemed uneconomic by Western powers but which mattered to African states. The iconic example is the TanzaniaâZambia (TAZARA) or Freedom Railway, built to connect Dar es Salaam on the Tanzanian coast and landlocked Zambiaâs Copperbelt region, thereby avoiding the land route through Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and apartheid South Africa.3
Under Mao Zedong, exporting revolution was a very real aspect of Chinaâs Africa relations, at least in terms of geopolitical strategy. Maoâs revolutionary model inspired many in a continent emerging from or still fighting against colonial rule. Concern in the West about the growing influence of China in Africa consistently overstated the nature, extent and outcomes of Beijingâs role. Revolution was prominent in Chinaâs African relations, especially from 1960 after the Sino-Soviet split, when China contended for influence not just with Taiwan or Western powers, but other communist powers as well. In practice, however, Chinaâs African relations had a more pragmatic character. Africa became the object of a concerted engagement by the Chinese government driven by a mixture of exporting revolution, self-interested strategic calculus and philanthropic purpose. Underscoring the importance of African state support at the UN, in October 1971 African votes helped the PRC enter the UN and replace Taiwan on the UN Security Council.
Chinaâs relations with Africa under Deng Xiaoping, who led China from 1978, were recalibrated away from Maoist ideology towards economic interests in keeping with Dengâs reform and opening policy. Premier Zhao Ziyang toured eleven African countries in December 1982 and January 1983. The timing was significant. From 1978, China had switched from providing to also receiving aid to serve its domestic development efforts. Premier Zhao confirmed a new realism by emphasizing the effectiveness of development projects, which would preferably not require substantial investment, and declaring Four Principles of Sino-African Economic and Technological Cooperation: equality and mutual benefit; emphasis on practical results; diversity in form; and common development. These reoriented Chinaâs engagement towards a more market-based logic that would evaluate projects according to commercial viability and value, not political solidarity. This shift demonstrated how different domestic priorities, namely reform and modernization, now informed Chinaâs development-oriented foreign policy, which was guided by the maxims âkeeping a low profileâ and âbiding time and hiding capabilitiesâ.
Following the Chinese governmentâs use of deadly force and Tiananmen bloodshed in June 1989, subsequent Western pressure on China and Taiwanâs attempts to win diplomatic recognition from African states, Africaâs role in Chinaâs foreign policy became more important again but economic drivers became central. After becoming a net oil importer in 1993, rapid domestic growth compelled China to look for energy supplies and other raw materials overseas. This contributed to growing ties with resource-endowed African economies like oil-rich Sudan from 1995. President Jiang Zemin visited six African countries in 1996 and framed a forward looking âtwenty-first-centuryâ relationship. In 1997, Premier Li Peng emphasized that Chinaâs policy of providing development aid to Africa had evolved âfrom aid donation to economic cooperation for mutual benefitâ. In 1998, a Ministry of Defence white paper cited energy security as integral to Chinaâs overall security. The âgoing globalâ strategy from 1999 ensured new state support for Chinese companies to expand overseas, including in Africa. Long ranked among the worldâs top FDI recipients, the Chinese government began actively to promote outbound investment. Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) pursued resources, markets, customers and experience in African countries, as well as pathways to global markets beyond. In 2000, Beijing hosted the first ChinaâAfrica meeting of what became FOCAC. Presided over by President Jiang Zemin, it emphasized strengthening economic co-operation.
Relations gathered momentum from 2002 under Jiangâs successor, Hu Jintao. The second FOCAC, held in Addis Ababa in December 2003, saw leaders, diplomats and business representatives meet and mingle. China was also developing regional engagements within its continental relations. In 2003, for example, Macau hosted the first Economic Forum for Co-operation between China and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries. China had created two significant policy instruments in 1994: the ExportâImport Bank of China (or China EXIM) and the China Development Bank (CDB), which became more involved. The breakthrough year, 2006, began with the release of Chinaâs first ever African Policy. President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao visited ten African countries on respective tours. In November, Beijing hosted the third ministerial FOCAC and first heads of state summit. Despite being relatively modest by subsequent standards (for instance, a $5bn ChinaâAfrica development fund), at the time Chinaâs new initiatives and financial commitments signalled ambitious intent. If the first FOCAC in 2000 passed relatively unnoticed, this summit rendered ChinaâAfrica relations visible on the world stage. A year before in Scotland, the G8 Gleneagles summit and push to âmake poverty historyâ captured global attention; China was upstaging that and implying Western aid to Africa might be history instead. The next FOCAC, held in Sharm el-Shaykh, Egypt, in 2009, came in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, which disrupted economic relations and renewed interest in the âChina modelâ as an alternative to Western politics and economics. The fifth ministerial FOCAC in Beijing in July 2012 was held in the twilight of Hu Jintaoâs administration. To the 50 African countries present, President Hu outlined five priority areas, including support for âAfrican integrationâ and â for the first time â a peace and security initiative.
The Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao period saw important trends that need to be appreciated in order to understand how things changed after 2012. First, in terms of how the Chinese government managed Africa relations, power and roles broadly reflected a prioritization of economic interests. Chinaâs Ministry of Foreign Affairs (or MFA) suffered institutional decline, even while overseeing the most extensive diplomatic presence of any foreign power in Africa. By contrast, the institutional stature of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, renamed the Ministry of Commerce (or MOFCOM) in 2003, grew as Chinaâs foreign strategy became more trade focused, including with Africa. Through its Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, MOFCOM was in charge of Chinaâs aid to Africa as part of a fragmented and poorly coordinated aid bureaucracy. Second, the number of entities involved in Chinaâs Africa relations grew sig...