Civil War Ironclads: The Dawn Of Naval Armor

Robert MacBride

• Éditeur: Golden Springs Publishing
• Année: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781786257109
• Sujet: History
• Sous-sujet: American Civil War History

Civil War expert Robert MacBride charts the history of the ironclads of the Civil War, heavily illustrated with plans and diagrams.The battle between the USS Monitor and the CSS Virginia (nee Merrimack), at Hampton Roads was neither the beginning nor the end of the story of the ironclad warships in the Civil War. Both the Union and the Confederate navies not only had other ironclad ships in commission at the time of the battle, they already had used them in combat. The months following saw the appearance of squadrons of monitors and casemate ironclads of the general design of the Virginia. It is with the sequels to the Battle of Hampton Roads that this book is primarily concerned.

PART I—IRONCLADS IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY

THE STEVENS BATTERY

At the outbreak of the war in 1861, there was not a single ironclad of any description in the United States Navy. There was, to be sure, the fantastic Stevens Battery, a truly enormous vessel 420 feet long and displacing more than 6,000 tons, which had been authorized in 1842 and, after several false starts, had been on the stocks since 1854. The death of its builder, Robert L. Stevens, in 1856, had brought construction to a halt, and the ship had remained in a half-finished condition at Hoboken, New Jersey, ever since.

Robert Stevens’ two surviving brothers, John and Edwin, offered to complete the ship at their own expense if the government would buy it when it was successfully completed. A board of naval officers was then appointed to survey the ship and decide whether it was worth finishing. The verdict was that it was not, and the offer of the Stevens brothers was declined. Upon the death of Edwin Stevens in 1868, the Stevens Battery was bequeathed to the state of New Jersey, along with the sum of one million dollars with which to complete it. General George B. McClellan was appointed to head the project, new plans for converting the battery to a turret ram were drawn up, and work actually went ahead, including the installation of new engines. Finally, the million dollars was spent, and the ship was still incomplete, although it appears that work was progressing quite favorably, and the Navy was interested again. Congress, however, was not, and neither was the state of New Jersey. The Stevens Battery was finally scrapped in 1874.

There was no lack of interest in ironclad warships in the Navy, however. In a report to a special session of Congress on July 4, 1861, the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, asked for authority to build ironclads, providing that competent investigation proved them to be feasible.

The Stevens Battery

THE MONITORS

On August 3, 1861, Congress passed a bill entitled “An Act to Provide for the Construction of One or More Armored Ships and Floating Batteries and for Other Purposes.” The Act authorized and directed the Secretary of the Navy to appoint a board of three naval officers to investigate plans and specifications for ironclad warships, and appropriated $1,500,000 for their construction.

This was the first positive response to the ominous development already taking place at the Norfolk Navy Yard, captured by the Confederates without a fight on April 20. The Confederate Navy Department had authorized an ironclad early in June, and work had already begun on the conversion of the USS Merrimack (rechristened the CSS Virginia).

The Navy Department issued a request for proposals on August 7, stating that the proposed vessel must be “either of iron or wood or of wood and iron combined, for sea or river service, to be not less than 10 nor over 16 feet draught,” armament was to be “of from 80 to 120 tons weight, with provisions and stores for from 165 to 300 persons, according to armament, for sixty days, with coal for eight days, the smaller draught of water, compatible with other requisites, to be preferred.”

The advertisement went on to request drawings of the vessel, armor, machinery, etc., as well the cost and time for completion. Twenty-five days were allowed for the completion of plans.

As authorized and directed by the Act of Congress, a reviewing board was appointed. This board, consisting of Commodore John Smith, Commodore Hiram Paulding, and Commander Charles H. Davis, proceeded to evaluate the various proposals, and on September 16 reported its conclusions.

After conceding its authors’ scant experience with the subject, the report began with some general conclusions about ironclad warships which, rightly or wrongly, were to influence United States naval policy throughout the war and even into the post-war period.

These general conclusions were as follows:

1. Ironclads are formidable adjuncts to fortifications on land, for coast and harbor defense. As cruisers, their value is questionable, primarily due to the fact that the weight of their armor cuts down on their speed and cruising range.

2. Ironclads will never be able to cope successfully with properly constructed forts, since the fort, in addition to its masonry walls, also can be armored with as much iron as necessary.

3. Armored warships will be most valuable on rivers and in harbors, and for blockading. Thus the immediate requirement is for shallow-draft vessels, invulnerable to shot.

The board also declared itself to be in favor of iron and wood construction rather than all-iron construction. The report then went on to list 16 proposals which had been received and evaluated, including one for a rubber-clad vessel. Three designs were accepted. The first was from C. S. Bushnell and Co. of New Haven, Connecticut, for the Galena. The second was from Merrick and Sons of Philadelphia for the New Ironsides. Both of these ships were more or less conventional ironclads, similar to the ironclads already in existence in the French and the British navies. They represented the conservative approach to the problem, and received the unqualified approval of the board.

The third design selected was that of the Monitor, submitted by John Ericsson.

THE MONITOR

In its evaluation of Ericsson’s design, the board was cautious. After conceding that the raft and turret arrangement would render her shot-proof, it expressed apprehension as to her seakeeping qualities. (These apprehensions were fully justified, as it turned out.) Actually, it was only after Ericsson’s good friend, Bushnell, the builder of the Galena, had prevailed upon his good friend, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, to grant Ericsson an opportunity to explain and demonstrate his plan to Welles, Lincoln, and various naval officers, that the board accepted the plan for the design of the Monitor. At that, the acceptance was conditional. The board’s recommendation was that one such floating battery be built as an experiment, with a forfeiture in case it did not measure up to its designer’s claims.

Since Ericsson had no capital of his own to finance the venture, C. S. Bushnell sought the aid of two of the leading figures in the New York iron industry who were looking for an opportunity to get in on the ground floor of the mushrooming arms business. On September 27, a contract was drawn up between Ericsson and C. S. Bushnell, John A. Griswold, and John Flack Winslow. Griswold was a partner in the Rennselaer Iron Works in Troy, New York; Winslow was a partner in the Albany Iron Works as well as the Rennselaer Iron Works. These three agreed to provide all the financial support necessary to build the Monitor and that the four parties to the contract would share equally all net profits or losses. It also was agreed that future construction of any ironclads would be handled the same way. With this kind of backing, Ericsson was able to negotiate a contract with the Navy Department to design and build the ship. The contract was signed October 4, 1862. The Navy agreed to pay the sum of $275,000 in installments of $50,000. At the same time, in view of the experimental nature of the vessel, the government would withhold 25 per cent of each payment pending satisfactory completion and performance of the vessel. Besides specifying the dimensions, speed, etc., the contract called for Ericsson to provide masts, spars, sails, and rigging capable of driving the ship at a speed of 6 knots. Ericsson completely ignored this provision, and no attempt ever was made to hold him to it. The contract further called for a delivery of the completed Monitor within 100 days. Work began immediately.

Ericsson’s backers formed a very competent team. Together they organized a far-reaching net of subcontractors: Rennselaer was to provide bar iron and rivets, Albany would produce angle iron for the framing, and armor plate; more plate was subcontracted to Holdane and Co. in New York and to H. Abbot and Co. in Baltimore. The ponderous port-stoppers were forged in Buffalo by the Charles D. Delaney Company.

The Continental Iron Works at Green Point, in Brooklyn, was subcontractor for the hull. On October 15, 11 days after the signing of the contract, the first shipment of angle iron from the Albany Iron Works arrived in New York by steamer. Thereafter, daily deliveries were made to the Continental Iron Works or to th...

Table des matières

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• DEDICATION
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• FOREWORD
• INTRODUCTION: ORIGINS OF THE IRONCLAD
• PART I-IRONCLADS IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY
• PART II-IRONCLADS IN THE CONFEDERATE STATES NAVY
• APPENDIX I-ORDNANCE
• APPENDIX II
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER