The Abilities of Man

Their Nature and Measurement

Charles E. Spearman

• Éditeur: Barakaldo Books
• Année: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781839743665
• Sujet: Psychology
• Sous-sujet: History & Theory in Psychology

DR. T. PERCY NUNN IN THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY.—"In the book before us, Prof. Spearman claims nothing less than to have supplied psychology with a body of principles comparable with the first principles of physics. It is a large claim, even though confined to the psychology of cognition, and if substantiated will secure for its author an enviable place in the history of science....A work which, whatever place it may ultimately assume, is unquestionably one of signal importance....A very remarkable and perhaps epoch-making book."THE HON. BERTRAND RUSSELL IN THE NATION AND THE ATHENAEUM.—"A sober and learned, but thoroughly readable discussion....The book is valuable for its wide knowledge, its lucid discussions, and its thoroughly scientific spirit."THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.—"The whole work is excellent, a model of lucid exposition."PROF. C. W. VALENTINE IN MIND.—"This volume gives us in convenient compass not only the essential conclusions of some of Prof. Spearman's valuable researches but a very remarkable additional contribution to the psychology of cognition."THE DAILY NEWS.—"One of the most important works on psychology we have had for some time....A sound and brilliant piece of exposition."THE SUNDAY TIMES.—"A book of the highest value."

PART I—THE RIVAL DOCTRINES

CHAPTER I—THE PROBLEM

To begin with, a few lines may be useful to mark out the topic which we are going to consider, and to indicate how this fits into the general order of things.

A person is aware of himself as existing in the midst of an external world—or at least, so it seems to him. He not only perceives this world and himself, but also thinks about both. As a single word to include the processes of both the perceiving and the thinking, modern psychology employs “cognition.”

But what he thus perceives and thinks about the world and himself, as also about the relations between the two, excites in him activities and states of another kind, such as appetites, aversions, impulses, decisions, voluntary actions, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth. All these, to distinguish them from the cognitive processes, are called “conative” and “affective,” that is to say, striving and feeling.

Take as an example the following description from Oliver Twist:

“So you wanted to get away, my dear, did you?” said the Jew, taking up a jagged and knotted club which lay in a corner of the fireplace; “Eh?” Oliver made no reply. But he watched the Jew’s motions, and breathed quickly. “Wanted to get assistance; called for the police; did you?” sneered the Jew, catching the boy by the arm. “We’ll cure you of that, my young master.” The Jew inflicted a smart blow on Oliver’s shoulders with the club; and was raising it for a second, when the girl, rushing forward, wrested it from his hand. She flung it into the fire with a force that brought some of the glowing coals whirling out into the room. “I won’t stand by and see it done, Fagin,” cried the girl. “You’ve got the boy, and what more would you have? Let him be—let him be—or I shall put that mark on some of you that will bring me to the gallows before my time.”

Here is a typical picture of human mental life in one of its most acute phases. Observe how readily and naturally it agrees with the foregoing classification of processes. Fagin sees Oliver, remembers his attempt to escape, thinks of punishing him, notices his club, marks the boy shrinking away and breathing quickly, perceives him stagger under the blow, hears his agonized whimper, foresees his better obedience in the future, and has the idea of enforcing the lesson with a second blow—all this and suchlike it is that the term “cognition” has been coined to include. But Fagin also becomes angry at what the boy has done, entertains a desire to punish him, relishes the anticipation of his writhing in pain, seizes voluntarily the club and actually uses it—all such processes as these characteristically involve conation and affection.

Now, the present volume is primarily concerned with a person’s ability to “cognise.” And we must at once demur—it is the chief reason for prefixing this little chapter—to an objection rather in vogue at the present day, which, if admitted, would cut the ground from beneath our feet. This consists in asserting that the processes of cognition cannot possibly be treated apart from those of conation and affection, seeing that all these are but inseparable aspects in the instincts and behaviour of a single individual, who himself, as the very name implies, is essentially indivisible.

To this protest—borrowed from metaphysics—we may reply that certainly an individual cannot be broken up into independent pieces. But no less certainly the various aspects of his behaviour can and must be submitted to separate consideration. Every science whatever, physical no less than psychological, is obliged to dissect its subject-matter, to deal with the different aspects of it in succession, and finally to bring each of these into relation with all the rest. Only by first dividing can the scientist eventually conquer.

In general, a person’s total cognitive ability may be regarded as an instrument or organ at the disposal of any of his conative activities. It is this organ, then, that we are principally about to examine, and with especial reference to its variations of efficiency from one individual to another. The conative activities will only be brought within our scope to the extent that is needful to explain the working of the organ. But even this much will involve treating these activities in a far more fundamental manner than is usual in books on human ability.

CHAPTER II—MONARCHIC DOCTRINE: “INTELLIGENCE.”

PRESENT DOMINANCE OF THIS DOCTRINE.

Universal Acceptance in Popular Usage. Introduction into Science by Biologists. Adoption for Mental Tests. The Brilliant Outlook.

RISE OF DOUBT AND CRITICISM.

Repeated Recourse to Symposia. Increasingly Serious Attacks.

THE WORD “INTELLIGENCE” CANKERED WITH EQUIVOCALITY.

Present Prevailing Chaos. Refuge taken in Obscurantism. Plea that the Current Procedure “Works.”

ATTEMPTS AT REMEDY BY DEFINITION.

Definitions distinguished from Mere Statements. Favourite Definition on a Biological Basis. Pedagogic and Kindred Definitions. Recent favour for “Shape-psychology.” The Call Back to Mediaeval Scholasticism.

DOUBT AS TO POSSIBILITY OF MEASUREMENT.

CONCLUSION.

PRESENT DOMINANCE OF THIS DOCTRINE

Universal acceptance in popular usage. In considering the scientific doctrines on human ability, exceptionally great importance must be attributed to the popular view of the matter. For this view has become ossified into current language, and thus has come to constitute a rigid shell within which the layman and the expert alike seem to be fixedly encased.

Now, paramount among the lay beliefs is that which assumes mental ability to lie under the sovereign rule of one great power named “intelligence.” In distinction from other doctrines which will be discussed in later chapters, this credence in a single ruling power may be characterised as “monarchic.”{2}

Judgments about intelligence conceived in this manner are made everywhere and by everyone—for the most part with much fluency and confidence. In degrees of it we habitually rate all the persons with whom we come into contact. Nothing else than such degrees do we mean when we call one man “clever,” “bright,” “sharp,” or “brainy,” whereas another is said to be “stupid,” “dull,” and so forth.

Such estimates are formed with peculiar abundance and emphasis in the sphere of education. From the kindergarten up to the university, the pupil is continually being subjected to ratings of this nature, whether set forth in official reports, or reserved for private guidance. But hardly less prominent is the part played by similar estimates in connection with industry. Hardly an employee is selected—from the office boy up to the general-manager—but that the chief motive (as regards ability) consists in an opinion as to whether he is or not intelligent.

Here, then, is an outstanding fact by which even the expert psychologist does not and cannot escape being profoundly influenced; all the more so, perhaps, when this influence remains subconscious. Any doctrine put forward will sooner or later be faced by the choice between docilely accepting this popular belief so firmly entrenched in current speech, or else hardily attempting to tilt against it.

Introduction into science by biologists. This ascendancy of popular over scientific psychology has in its support, not only the prestige always attaching to the vox populi, but even, it would seem, a priority of authorship. For at least as far back as the fifteenth century, we find that estimates were commonly made in ordinary life about a man’s “intelligyens.” Whereas in the systematic psychology of modern times, the concept does not seem to have attained to prominence earlier than the work of Herbert Spencer. By him, as might have been expected, it was brought in for the purposes of biology, at the period when this latter was being immensely stimulated by the then novel theory of evolution. Life was taken by Spencer to consist essentially in “the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations”; and to “intelligence” it was that he credited the making of such adjustments in so far as these are mental.{3}

This work of Spencer was truly a surprising achievement. Besides having deep foundations in a theory whose scope envisaged the whole universe, it could boast of a fullness of elaboration, and above all a preciseness of expression, compared with which the greater part of the biological psychology now current is apt to appear nebulous and superficial.

From Spencer, who took into consideration animals in general, it was but a short step to those authors who were interested in differentiating the human from the lower species. The essential distinction between the respective powers of these two was now declared to lie in the fact that man alone is gifted with the prerogative of being intelligent. In order to explain how, nevertheless, the lower animals manage their affairs in such an effective manner as they undoubtedly do, the further power of “instinct” was brought forward as their endowment instead. Man also, indeed, was credited with some of this instinctive kind of knowing, but only for employment in such actions as had (with the human species) become mere routine. For new and individual emergencies he has recourse, it was said, to his sovereign power of intelligence.

In truth, however, the preceding doctrine was not so much a novelty as a revival. It really represented the most ancient of all known views about cognitive ability. After long ages of neglect, it had now been rummaged out of the psychological lumber-room and hastily furbished up to meet the latest scientific requirements.

Adoption for mental tests. High as was this status attained by the concept of intelligence in biological territory, it later on became quite eclipsed by the reputation which the concept won for itself in the domain of mental tests. During a prolonged incubatory period, these had been cultivated in the seclusion of several psychological laboratories. Then, suddenly, Binet transformed such theoretical work into live practice. The success was astounding. Teachers found in tests of intelligence something that they could handle; and the public got what it believed it could understand.

In a very fe...

Table des matières

• Title page
• Table of Contents
• FOREWORD
• PART I-THE RIVAL DOCTRINES
• PART II-THE FUNDAMENTAL FACTS
• APPENDIX