Plans and the Structure of Behavior

George A. Miller, Eugene Galanter

• Éditeur: Barakaldo Books
• Année: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781839743702
• Sujet: Psicología
• Sous-sujet: Historia y teoría en psicología

By 1960, psychology had come to be dominated by behaviorism and learning theory, which emphasized the observable stimulus and response components of human and animal behavior while ignoring the cognitive processes that mediate the relationship between the stimulus and response. The cognitive phenomena occurring within the "black box" between stimulus and response were of little interest to behaviorists, as their mathematical models worked without them. In 1960, the book "Plans and the Structure of Behavior, " authored by George A. Miller, Eugene Galanter, and Karl H. Pribram, was published. In this volume, Miller and his colleagues sought to unify the behaviorists' learning theory with a cognitive model of learned behavior. Whereas the behaviorists suggested that a simple reflex arc underlies the acquisition of the stimulus-response relationship, Miller and his colleagues proposed that "some mediating organization of experience is necessary" somewhere between the stimulus and response, in effect a cognitive process which must include monitoring devices that control the acquisition of the stimulus-response relationship. They named this fundamental unit of behavior the T.O.T.E. for "Test - Operate - Test - Exit".—Print ed.

CHAPTER 1—IMAGES AND PLANS

Consider how an ordinary day is put together. You awaken, and as you lie in bed, or perhaps as you move slowly about in a protective shell of morning habits, you think about what the day will be like—it will be hot, it will be cold; there is too much to do, there is nothing to fill the time; you promised to see him, she may be there again today. If you are compulsive, you may worry about fitting it all in, you may make a list of all the things you have to do. Or you may launch yourself into the day with no clear notion of what you are going to do or how long it will take. But, whether it is crowded or empty, novel or routine, uniform or varied, your day has a structure of its own—it fits into the texture of your life. And as you think what your day will hold, you construct a plan to meet it. What you expect to happen foreshadows what you expect to do.

The authors of this book believe that the plans you make are interesting and that they probably have some relation to how you actually spend your time during the day. We call them “plans” without malice—we recognize that you do not draw out long and elaborate blueprints for every moment of the day. You do not need to. Rough, sketchy, flexible anticipations are usually sufficient. As you brush your teeth you decide that you will answer that pile of letters you have been neglecting. That is enough. You do not need to list the names of the people or to draft an outline of the contents of the letters. You think simply that today there will be time for it after lunch. After lunch, if you remember, you turn to the letters. You take one and read it. You plan your answer. You may need to check on some information, you dictate or type or scribble a reply, you address an envelope, seal the folded letter, find a stamp, drop it in a mailbox. Each of these subactivities runs off as the situation arises—you did not need to enumerate them while you were planning the day. All you need is the name of the activity that you plan for that segment of the day, and from that name you then proceed to elaborate the detailed actions involved in carrying out the plan.

You imagine what your day is going to be and you make plans to cope with it. Images and plans. What does modern psychology have to say about images and plans?

Presumably, the task of modern psychology is to make sense out of what people and animals do, to find some system for understanding their behavior. If we, as psychologists, come to this task with proper scientific caution, we must begin with what we can see and we must postulate as little as possible beyond that. What we can see are movements and environmental events. The ancient subject matter of psychology—the mind and its various manifestations—is distressingly invisible, and a science with invisible content is likely to become an invisible science. We are therefore led to underline the fundamental importance of behavior and, in particular, to try to discover recurrent patterns of stimulation and response.

What an organism does depends on what happens around it. As to the way in which this dependency should be described, however, there are, as in most matters of modern psychology, two schools of thought. On the one hand are the optimists, who claim to find the dependency simple and straightforward. They model the stimulus-response relation after the classical, physiological pattern of the reflex arc and use Pavlov’s discoveries to explain how new reflexes can be formed through experience. This approach is too simple for all but the most extreme optimists. Most psychologists quickly realize that behavior in general, and human behavior in particular, is not a chain of conditioned reflexes. So the model is complicated slightly by incorporating some of the stimuli that occur after the response in addition to the stimuli that occur before the response. Once these “reinforcing” stimuli are included in the description, it becomes possible to understand a much greater variety of behaviors and to acknowledge the apparently purposive nature of behavior. That is one school of thought.

Arrayed against the reflex theorists are the pessimists, who think that living organisms are complicated, devious, poorly designed for research purposes, and so on. They maintain that the effect an event will have upon behavior depends on how the event is represented in the organism’s picture of itself and its universe. They are quite sure that any correlations between stimulation and response must be mediated by an organized representation of the environment, a system of concepts and relations within which the organism is located. A human being—and probably other animals as well—builds up an internal representation, a model of the universe, a schema, a simulacrum, a cognitive map, an Image. Sir Frederic C. Bartlett, who uses the term “schema” for this internal representation, describes it in this way:

“Schema” refers to an active organisation of past reactions, or of past experiences, which must always be supposed to be operating in any well-adapted organic response. That is, whenever there is any order or regularity of behavior, a particular response is possible only because it is related to other similar responses which have been serially organised, yet which operate, not simply as individual members coming one after another, but as a unitary mass. Determination by schemata is the most fundamental of all the ways in which we can be influenced by reactions and experiences which occurred some time in the past. All incoming impulses of a certain kind, or mode, go together to build up an active, organised setting: visual, auditory, various types of cutaneous impulses and the like, at a relatively low level; all the experiences connected by a common interest: in sport, in literature, history, art, science, philosophy, and so on, on a higher level.{2}

The crux of the argument, as every psychologist knows, is whether anything so mysterious and inaccessible as “the organism’s picture of itself and its universe,” or “an active organisation of past reactions,” etc., is really necessary. Necessary, that is to say, as an explanation for the behavior that can be observed to occur.

The view that some mediating organization of experience is necessary has a surprisingly large number of critics among hard-headed, experimentally trained psychologists. The mediating organization is, of course, a theoretical concept and, out of respect for Occam’s Razor, one should not burden the science with unnecessary theoretical luggage. An unconditional proof that a completely consistent account of behavior cannot be formulated more economically does not exist, and until we are certain that simpler ideas have failed we should not rush to embrace more complicated ones. Indeed, there are many psychologists who think the simple stimulus-response-reinforcement models provide an adequate description of everything a psychologist should concern himself with.

For reasons that are not entirely clear, the battle between these two schools of thought has generally been waged at the level of animal behavior. Edward Tolman, for example, has based his defense of cognitive organization almost entirely on his studies of the behavior of rats—surely one of the least promising areas in which to investigate intellectual accomplishments. Perhaps he felt that if he could win the argument with the simpler animal, he would win it by default for the more complicated ones. If the description of a rodent’s cognitive structure is necessary in order to understand its behavior, then it is just that much more important for understanding the behavior of a dog, or an ape, or a man. Tolman’s position was put most simply and directly in the following paragraph:

[The brain] is far more like a map control room than it is like an old-fashioned telephone exchange. The stimuli, which are allowed in, are not connected by just simple one-to-one switches to the outgoing responses. Rather, the incoming impulses are usually worked over and elaborated in the central control room into a tentative, cognitivelike map of the environment. And it is this tentative map, indicating routes and paths and environmental relationships, which finally determines what responses, if any, the animal will finally release.{3}

We ourselves are quite sympathetic to this kind of theorizing, since it seems obvious to us that a great deal more goes on between the stimulus and the response than can be accounted for by a simple statement about associative strengths. The pros and cons cannot be reviewed here—the argument is long and other texts{4} exist in which an interested reader can pursue it—so we shall simply announce that our theoretical preferences are all on the side of the cognitive theorists. Life is complicated.

Nevertheless, there is a criticism of the cognitive position that seems quite important and that has never, so far as we know, received an adequate answer. The criticism is that the cognitive processes Tolman and others have postulated are not, in fact, sufficient to do the job they were supposed to do. Even if you admit these ghostly inner somethings, say the critics, you will not have explained anything about the animal’s behavior. Guthrie has made the point about as sharply as anyone:

Signs, in Tolman’s theory, occasion in the rat realization, or cognition, or judgment, or hypotheses, or abstraction, but they do not occasion action. In his concern with what goes on in the rat’s mind, Tolman has neglected to predict what the rat will do. So far as the theory is concerned the rat is left buried in thought; if he gets to the food-box at the end that is his concern, not the concern of the theory.{5}

Perhaps the cognitive theorists have not understood the force of this criticism. It is so transparently clear to them that if a hungry rat knows where to find food—if he has a cognitive map with the food-box located on it—he will go there and eat. What more is there to explain? The answer, of course, is that a great deal is left to be explained. The gap from knowledge to action looks smaller than the gap from stimulus to action—yet the gap is still there, still indefinitely large. Tolman, the omniscient theorist, leaps over that gap when he infers the rat’s cognitive organization from its behavior. But that leaves still outstanding the question of the rat’s ability to leap it. Apparently, cognitive theorists have assumed that their best course was to show that the reflex theories are inadequate; they seem to have been quite unprepared when the same argument—that things are even more complicated than they dared to imagine—was used against them. Yet, if Guthrie is right, more cognitive theory is needed than the cognitive theorists normally supply. That is to say, far from respecting Occam’s Razor, the cognitive theorist must ask for even more theoretical luggage to carry around. Something is needed to bridge the gap from knowledge to action.

It is unfair to single out Tolman and criticize him for leaving the cognitive representation paralytic. Other cognitive theorists could equally well be cited. Wolfgang Köhler, for example, has been subjected to the same kind of heckling. In reporting his extremely perceptive study of the chimpanzees on Tenerife Island during the First World War, Köhler wrote:

We can...distinguish sharply between the kind of behavior which from the very beginning arises out of a consideration of the structure of a situation, and one that does not. Only in the former case do we speak of insight, and only that behavior of animals definitely appears to us intelligent which takes account from the beginning of the lay of the land, and proceeds to deal with it in a single, continuous and definite course. Hence follows this criterion of insight: the appearance of a complete solution with reference to the whole lay-out of the field.{6}

Other psychologists have been less confident that they could tell the difference between behavior based on an understanding of the whole layout and behavior based on less cognitive processes, so there has been a long and rather fruitless controversy over the relative merits of trial-and-error and of insight as methods of learning. The point we wish to raise here, however, is that Köhler makes the standard cognitive assumption: once the animal has grasped the whole layout he will behave appropriately. Again, the fact that grasping the whole layout may be necessary, but is certainly not sufficient as an explanation of intelligent behavior, seems to have been ignored by Köhler. Many years later, for example, we heard Karl Lashley say this to him:

I attended the dedication, three weeks ago, of a bridge at Dyea, Alaska. The road to the bridge for nine miles was blasted along a series of cliffs. It led to a magnificent steel bridge, permanent and apparently indestructible. After the dedication ceremonies I walked across the bridge and was confronted with an impenetrable forest of shrubs and underbrush, through which only a couple of trails of bears led to indeterminate places. In a way, I feel that Professor Köhler’s position is somewhat that of ...

Table des matières

• Title page
• Table of Contents
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• PROLOGUE
• CHAPTER 1-IMAGES AND PLANS
• CHAPTER 2-THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS
• CHAPTER 3-THE SIMULATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES
• CHAPTER 4-VALUES, INTENTIONS, AND THE EXECUTION OF PLANS
• CHAPTER 5-INSTINCTS
• CHAPTER 6-MOTOR SKILLS AND HABITS
• CHAPTER 7-THE INTEGRATION OF PLANS
• CHAPTER 8-RELINQUISHING THE PLAN
• CHAPTER 9-NONDYNAMIC ASPECTS OF PERSONALITY
• CHAPTER 10-PLANS FOR REMEMBERING
• CHAPTER 11-PLANS FOR SPEAKING
• CHAPTER 12-PLANS FOR SEARCHING AND SOLVING
• CHAPTER 13-THE FORMATION OF PLANS
• CHAPTER 14-SOME NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS
• EPILOGUE