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The Rape of Nanking
A Historical Study
Zhang Sheng
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The Rape of Nanking
A Historical Study
Zhang Sheng
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The Massacre of Nanking took place in 1937, during the War of the Japanese Invasion of China. 75 years after the event, we are finally able to analyze and study what happened in Nanking on three levels: as an historical event, as a legal case, and as an object in the Chinese people's collective consciousness.
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1 The Rape of Nanking in Light of the Japanese Armyâs Overall Strategic Decisions. Observations Based in Japanese Considerations
The great massacre perpetrated by the Japanese army in Nanjing shocked the world. From then until now, there have been relentless attempts to uncover the reasons behind this tragedy. The themes that usually catch the eye are Japanese militarist education, insufficient supply in the Japanese armyâs rear, as well as the related themes of the policy of local requisitioning, the grievous casualties the army had suffered in the siege of Nanjing and their psychology of retribution, slackening of military discipline, and so on. These studies have doubtlessly added to our understanding of the Rape of Nanking.
However, other works have noted that conditions such as the policy of local requisitioning were part of the overall Japanese invasion of China, but that the massacre of the inhabitants of a captured city such as Nanjing was rare indeed (of course, wherever the tip of the spear of the Japanese army landed, it caused great loss of life and property). Why did the Rape of Nanking occur even as the Japanese army was hoisting the banners of âjust warâ? To what extent was the Rape of Nanking a random mistake or inevitable within the overall Japanese war of invasion?
Writers have come to feel, through their considerations and studies, that one cannot accurately understand the outbreak of the Rape of Nanking separately from the overall Japanese war plan for the invasion of China. That is because the conflict between Japan and China was the primary conflict in East Asian international relations of the time, and Japan was the primary party of said conflict. If we hold tightly to the Japanese sideâs thinking and decisions, we can clearly assess the strategic opportunity taken for the Japanese invasion of China.
1.1 Choosing War
The strategic reason Japan chose to launch an all-out war of invasion on China was that China had made breakthrough progress in state organization primarily to resist Japanese power; so if war hadnât been launched immediately, it would not only have been impossible to defeat China, but China may have ultimately reclaimed sovereignty of the Northeast (Manchuria).
The âMarco Polo Bridge Incidentâ was previously understood as the catalyst for mid to long-range plans for the Japanese following the Eastern Conference, as reflected in the Tanaka Memorial. Shigemitsu Mamoru, Japanâs representative at the signing of the unconditional surrender, said: âLater events in East Asia and corresponding actions taken by Japan took place exactly in accordance with the steps outlined in manuals like the Tanaka Memorial, and so it is difficult to clear up foreign suspicions regarding the Tanaka Memorialâ (Shigemitsu 1987, 20). The Marco Polo Bridge Incident was certainly one step in Japanâs overall invasion of China.
It is, however, undeniable that the there was a degree of ârandomnessâ on the surface of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Why did the Japanese launch an all-out invasion of China only six months after the âXiâan Incidentâ? Why the Japanese military resolutely push forward its all-out war of invasion while people like Ishiwara Kanji (head of the Japanese Army General Staff Office at the time of the Rape of Nanking), primary planner of the âMukden Incident,â and others opposed war at a time when Chinaâs strength was depleted, thereby creating disadvantageous conditions for Japanâs preparations for war on the Soviet Union? I will attempt to, on the basis of fragmentary evidence, attempt to assemble a complete picture departing from a few points seldom noticed previously.
Suma Yakichiro served as consul-general of Japan in Nanjing, a position he left on January 18, 1937. On March 15, he gave a speech at the Japan Industrial Association titled âPresent and Future of Japan-China Relations.â This is an important document worthy of our deep study today because it represents contemporary Japanese judgments of conditions in China at the time, and also demonstrates the logic the Japanese employed in launching their all-out war on China.
In Sumaâs estimation, the Xiâan Incident demonstrated that China was now unified, and this unity created an unprecedented situation in the history of modern China: âDuring the First Sino-Japanese War, if you went to Sichuan, Yunnan, or other mountainous provinces, most people did not know their country was currently fighting a war with Japan. Of course, this was also attributable to reasons such as poor transportation links. It was just this China with its complete lack of concern for external affairs that, upon hearing of the Suiyuan Offensive, launched into a nationwide movement of support for the Suiyuan army in all parts of the country, with some places ceasing broadcast of dancing music for three days, and even dance halls in some places sending 20 percent of their revenues in support of the Suiyuan army; you could thus see how zealous they were. Whatâs more, even the inmates of a prison in one place donated funds to the Suiyuan army; this would seem unprecedented anywhere in the world. Where does this zealousness come from? I just spoke of the two levels of Chinese feelings toward Japan â anti-Japan sentiments among the common Chinese people have become very serious, and the Suiyuan Offensive is just the yardstick for measuring that seriousness.â
As his listeners were all magnates with their hands on the levers of the Japanese economy, Suma continued in extreme earnestness, concluding that it was Japanâs actions that had led to the new conditions in China. âThere were two goals, or maybe we should say two situations, that led to this unity. The first was oppression from Japan. Of course, I should rather say that it was just this oppression that gave China an opportunity to move toward unity; I think this is a fact beyond argument. Even though the Chinese are now saying that Chinaâs strength is growing with the stabilization of the foundation [of] Chiang Kai-shekâs regime that we see today, there are actually two reasons afoot: the first is Japanâs invasion, and the second is⊠Itâs actually very interesting once you start talking about it. Iâll go ahead and say it out loud: itâs Yu Youren, director of the Control Yuan.â Suma concluded that the reason behind unification was: âThis so-called âunificationâ could not be brought about on the strength of warlords or the government alone, but was as symbolized by the student movement; it was realized only after the aspiration for unification had deeply penetrated the hearts of the people and become a movement of national unanimity.â4
According to modern theories on nationalism, external threats and feelings of hatred for an enemy constitute a basic model for the construction of a nation-state (Gellner 2002). Suma provided anecdotal evidence backing this theory: âIn 1931, that being six years ago, the nationalist government hired the German Hans von Seeckt. Chiang Kai-shek asked him two questions. The first was how to make Chinaâs army strong, and the other was what kind of policy he should adopt toward Japan. To the first question von Seeckt responded: if China wishes to become stronger than Japan, weapons are necessary, airplanes are necessary, but from my experiences in organizing and running the German Defense Force, the most pressing task for China at present is to cultivate among the military a mentality of viewing Japan as the enemy.â Here the veracity of Sumaâs evidence is not important. What is important is that this became the thread that tied his discourse together, i. e. that the unification of China was closely related to Chinese opposition to Japan, or in other words further unification of China necessarily meant intensification of anti-Japan sentiments there, in Sumaâs estimation.
Suma discussed the example of his meeting with H.H. Kung: âH.H. Kung â the actual director of the Executive Yuan â said that if I wanted to get Japan-China relations on a good track, we couldnât leave the Manchurian issue untreated. I am completely opposed to âestablishing an asideâ in the Manchurian issue, he told me. Without a solution to the Manchurian issue, it would be impossible to have a satisfactory dialogue between Japan and China. I took this opportunity to ask him what kind of a solution he hoped for. He answered that Japanese investments in Manchuria â he is a professional investor himself â seem to be nothing more than investments. If they are indeed simply investments, then we can allow them to stay but we hope that the sovereignty of Manchuria be restored to China. If it is returned to China, then we might take the initiative to either give Manchuria âdominionâ over its own affairs the way Great Britain has done with Ireland or treat it the way Great Britain has treated Canada. China will take the initiative in handling this matter. You can talk until your tongues fall out, but so long as Manchuria is not returned to China, we will have nothing to discuss with you.â Suma then commented: âChina is already dreaming about Manchuria. We must see this as proof for what I just said, proving that only after internal pacification and unification has China gradually come to notice Japanâs soft underbelly, and thus has started feeling us out.â
Since Chinese unification necessarily meant antagonism toward Japan, what then did Japan need to do? All those diplomatic documents that mention âpeace and guidanceâ at every turn are full of sparkling rhetoric, but we get a clear picture of the Japanese governmentâs attitude in the recollections of a member of the Japanese Residents in China Association who left Nanjing at the outset of war, Shoji Tokuji:
I thought of something I said to Colonel Okido shortly before the outbreak of the war: âIf the military training of the residents of Nanjing continues another two years, Japan probably wonât be a match for them.â Colonel Okido replied: âIt wonât take two years. In another half year we wonât be able to take them on.â So I donât know if it was fortunate or unfortunate that Japan launched its offensive while it still had a chance at victory. I really think this was the blessing of heaven. I deeply feel that this was the luck of the heavenly kingdom of the rising sun (Japan). At the same time I sincerely prayed that this offensive would be the last in the Japan-China conflict, that this would completely destroy the Chiang regimeâs resistance against Japan, and that this was a good chance to bring Japan and China back onto the proper course of goodwill for one another.
The idea that Japan should invade before China grew so powerful as to be unconquerable was not shared only among these Japanese residents of China, but was a âpublic opinionâ shared across the Japanese public, and was also clearly the basis of official government policy.
In March 1937, military attachĂ© to the Japanese embassy in China Kita Seiichi, Japanese China Garrison Army Staff Officer Wachi Takaji, and Ohashi Kumao reported to the Japanese Army Staff Headquarters: âThe Chiang Kai-shek regimeâs policy of resisting Japan will, weâre afraid, remain in place until Manchuria is restored. It would be an extremely great error to think that concessions in North China will eliminate the policy of resistance against Japan⊠We cannot assume that ordinary means will reverse the above-mentioned worsening of Japan-China relations.â They also tentatively raised the possibility of declaring war on the Soviet Union, noting: âBefore launching war on the Soviet Union, we should deal China a blow to damage the foundations of the Chiang regimeâ (Japanese Ministry of Defense War History Bureau 1987, 293). Thereafter news began to spread in Tokyo that âon the night of the seventh evening of the lunar calendar, something like the Mukden Incident will be reenacted in North Chinaâ (Imai Takeo n.d., 16)
On July 6, 1937, after the Japanese had admitted that âthere is the possibility for imminent crisis in the conflict between the Japanese and Chinese armies in the vicinity of the Lugou [Marco Polo] Bridge,â Japanese Prime Minister Hirota Koki proposed to a meeting of the Cabinet that it would be unlikely that rash wishes for restoration of amity between Japan and China would end in success in the current whirlpool of resistance to Japan and anti-Japan sentiments. Although this gravely dissatisfies Japan, it would nevertheless seem that we have no choice but to resolutely push forward the correct policy: âAll cabinet members expressed assentâ (Japanese Ministry of Defense War History Bureau 1987, 297). Thus the Marco Polo Bridge Incident became an inevitability amid otherwise ostensible randomness.
1.2 Choosing Nanjing
Japan chose Nanjing as its objective because at the time the Japanese believed it to be the center of Chinese resistance to Japan. Short of capturing Nanjing, the thought went, it would be impossible to punish China for its resistance to Japan and force the country to change policy.
At the outset of the war, Japanâs military focus was North China. But then tensions emerged in Shanghai, which Shigemitsu Mamoru analyzes thus: âThe sensitivity toward the Japan-China conflict in North China was reflected in Shanghai, where anti-Japan agitations immediately became widespread.â He did not mention that Chinese anti-Japan sentiments were the result of Japanâs long-term invasion, but rather said that Japan needed to invade because China was resisting Japan; this logic was common across military and political circles in Japan at the time. Shigemitsu, however, was clearly deeply versed in how the Japanese military acted, adding: âThe army will create an incident in the North, and the navy will inevitably also provoke some conflicts in Shanghaiâ (Shigemutsu 1987, 129 â 130). As a result, the warâs focus quickly shifted to the Yangtze River Delta, posing a threat to Nanjing.
When the Battle of Shanghai broke out, however, Nanjing still hadnât been listed as a target for attack. On August 15, 1937, the Japanese Shanghai Expeditionary Army was given orders to âcoordinate with the navy, annihilate all enemies in the vicinity of Shanghai, occupy Shanghai and primary battlefronts in the northern region, and protect the subjects of the empireâ (Wang and Guoshan 2006, 1). The Japanese Central China Area Army was formed on July 11 of that same year. Chinese forces in Shanghai were near collapsing at that time, but the Central China Area Army was still not commanded to advance to Nanjing: âThe Central China Area Armyâs orders were to coordinate with the navy to break the enemyâs willingness to fight and annihilate enemies in the vicinity of Shanghai to find an opportunity to end the warâ (Wang and Guoshan 2006, 4). That same day, Japanese military officials designated the combat range of the Central China Area Army as âprincipally the area to the east of the line running between Suzhou and Jiaxingâ (Wang and Guoshan 2006, 6). On November 20, the deputy commanding officer of the General Staff Headquarters telephoned Matsui Iwane to inform him that the army had exceeded its predesignated combat range (Wang and Guoshan 2006, 9). On November 24, the original combat range of the Central China Area Army was abolished (Wang and Guoshan 2006, 10), indicating that high Japanese officials had set their sights on Nanjing. That same day, the Central China Area Army issued these orders: âCoordinate with the China Area Fleet to rapidly seize Nanjingâ (Wang and Guoshan 2006, 20).
The Japanese decision to expand the goal from Shanghai to Nanjing was to a great extent related to the personal resolution of Matsui Iwane. In his diary entry from August 16, 1937, he writes: âOur forces should rapidly attack the objective of Nanjing. We must meet up with the Central China Expeditionary Army (about five divisions), and we will inevitably topple the Nanjing government in one blowâ (Wang 2005b, 23). Thereafter, he sent an unbroken chain of messages to the Japanese government and highly placed officials in the military, asking for reinforcements. On September 23, Ishiwara Kanjiâs departure and his replacement by the more radical Shimomura Sadamu must have given hope to Matsui that his wishes were going to be fulfilled. On October 14, seizing the opportunity of a visit to Shanghai by an administrative officer in the navy, he said: âWith the tenacious resistance being put up by enemy forces in the Jiangnan region, if we want to finish this war in a month or two, it will be extremely difficult to close that paragraphâ (Wang 2005b, 97). He was laying the foundations for subsequent expansion of the war. On October 20, he asked Lieutenant Colonel Suzuki of the General Staff Office, currently in Shanghai, to tell everyone important in the General Staff Office: âOur ultimate military objective is Nanjingâ and âthe crux of our strategy in the final analysis is to attack Nanjingâ (Wang 2005b, 129). He completely ignored the opinions coming from Japanese commanding authorities at the time. On November 15, Matsui used the opportunity of working under General Staff Office Strategy Department section chief Masaaki Kagesa and Ministry of the Army Military Affairs Bureau director Shibayama Kenshiro to demonstrate to his superior officers the inevitability of an attack on Nanjing, which âthey have basically come to understandâ (Wang 2005b, 103 â 104). This gave rise to pressure on all sides. At that time the Central China Area Army had broken out of its established combat range and was already fighting its way toward Nanjing. After the Japanese government and military had finally resolved to attack Nanjing, Matsui writes in his diary: âI elatedly feel that those opinions I did my utmost to stir up are finally having their effectâ (Wang 2005b, 140).
Matsuiâs unwavering opinion that Nanjing must be occupied and that the center of resistance to Japan must be cleared away was broadly shared across all walks of life in Japan at that time:
When common residents of Nanjing began military training, I thought, thatâs nothing too special, so I didnât pay much heed. But two or three years later, I noticed that the facial expressions of young adults in Nanjing had become stern, that the light of vitality overflowed from their eyes, and that they stood in powerfully erect posture when working. When I mentioned this observation to Colonel Amamiya, he said: âEveryone whoâs been through military training is like that; itâs nothing special.â Thatâs when I realized the true force of education. Thereafter I paid more attention to the results of Chinese military training, and as a result I realized that their military training was quite serious and thorough. I couldnât help but perceive a kind of threat (Shoji 1940).
This is how the Japanese consulate-general in Nanjing reported on conditions in that city following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident: âAs the extent of the war grows and expands, the mentality of resistance to Japan in Nanjing has surged to the extreme⊠radical anti-Japan-ists have begun exerting pressure on our citizens here. Scenic spots in Nanjingâs suburbs as well as some mountains in its periphery, previously open to unrestricted sightseeing, have now been forbidden to Japanese, under the pretext that they are restricted military areas. All cinemas in the city are playing anti-Japanese propaganda films, wantonly inciting the feelings of the masses, making the anti-Japan mentality grow stronger on the daily, tension rampant over every quarter of the cityâ (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Archives 2001, 205 â 207).
Staff officer Tanaka Shinichi also describes the significance of occupying Nanjing in his diary: âAn attack on Nanjing is necessitated by none other than the disregard for Japanâs efforts to put Japan and China back on the road of support and guidance. The ultimate goal behind Commander Matsuiâs inducing their surrender is also this⊠We must never relax in punishing the regime that resists Japan⊠The world is currently in a period of transformation. If we understand current world conditions, then we must see that China can only successfully organize itself as a nation on a foundation of amity toward JapanâŠThe emergency in China is a tragedy in East Asia, but to put an end to this tragedy, Japan cannot avoid performing a thorough surgery. Seen in this light, the occupation of Nanjing is merely the prelude to t...
Table des matiĂšres
- Title Page
- Copyright
- Contents
- Foreword
- Foreword by the First Author
- Foreword to the Updated and Revised Edition
- 1âThe Rape of Nanking in Light of the Japanese Armyâs Overall Strategic Decisions. Observations Based in Japanese Considerations
- 2âChanges in the Order of Life for Nanjing Residents Before and After the Massacre
- 3âWesterners in Nanjing During the Massacre
- 4âThe âGerman Perspectiveâ on the Rape of Nanking Based in German Diplomatic Documents
- 5âThe âAmerican Perspectiveâ on the Rape of Nanking
- 6âThe Rape of Nanking in Japanese Historical Sources
- 7âFood Issues During the Rape of Nanking. Focusing on the Safety Zone
- 8âProperty Losses of Nanjing Residents during the Rape of Nanking. An Initial Analysis Based on Extant Materials in China
- 9âInitial Study of PTSD Among Rape of Nanking Victims
- 10âThe Nanjing Trials
- 11âThe Rape of Nanking Cases in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East Trial Arguments and Their âLegacyâ. Based in a Study of Cross-examinations
- References
- Postscript
- Postscript to the Revised Edition
Normes de citation pour The Rape of Nanking
APA 6 Citation
Sheng, Z. (2021). The Rape of Nanking (1st ed.). De Gruyter. Retrieved from https://www.perlego.com/book/3025896/the-rape-of-nanking-a-historical-study-pdf (Original work published 2021)
Chicago Citation
Sheng, Zhang. (2021) 2021. The Rape of Nanking. 1st ed. De Gruyter. https://www.perlego.com/book/3025896/the-rape-of-nanking-a-historical-study-pdf.
Harvard Citation
Sheng, Z. (2021) The Rape of Nanking. 1st edn. De Gruyter. Available at: https://www.perlego.com/book/3025896/the-rape-of-nanking-a-historical-study-pdf (Accessed: 15 October 2022).
MLA 7 Citation
Sheng, Zhang. The Rape of Nanking. 1st ed. De Gruyter, 2021. Web. 15 Oct. 2022.