Any endeavor to expand criminological inquiry to crimes of the powerful should first begin by addressing what most students of criminology and criminal justice take for granted: the definition of crime. The concept of crime has had quite diverse meanings throughout the long history of its use, but, as we will discuss, the dominant and accepted understanding is the legalistic approach, which stipulates that crime is an act prohibited by the law. Yet, as Ray Michalowski (2013: 1) states,
Using a legalistic perspective, it is the state, not criminologists, âthat determines what behaviors are legal, which are illegal, and among those that are illegal, which will be nominated as serious crimes, which will be lesser offenses or minor infractions, and which will be treated as non-criminal administrative matters.â Orthodox criminology generally self-identifies as a scientific endeavor and is inherently biased in favor of definitions of crime that lend themselves easily to quantitative analysis. This bias inevitably privileges attention to conventional forms of crimeâcrimes committed by the powerlessâthat by their very nature lend themselves more readily to operationalization. In one sense then, criminologistsâ focus on street crime reinforces individual, rational, and even moral explanations of criminality, and in so doing impedes any persistent critique of existing social arrangements. The dominant focus on state definitions of crime has resulted in an inverted criminology where the gravest social harms receive the least attention (Michalowski 2013). Indeed, as David Friedrichs suggests, there is âan inverse relationship between the level of harms caused by some human (individual or organizational) activity and the level of criminological concernâ (Friedrichs 2009: 1). There is, however, a long-standing tradition of critique of conventional conceptions of crime that has been advanced by self-described radical or critical criminologists (see Canning and Tombs 2021; DeKeseredy 2021; DeKeseredy and Dragiewicz 2012; Hillyard and Tombs 2017; Pavlich 2019; Reiner 2016; Tifft and Sullivan 1980; Watts, Bessant, and Hill 2008).
These critical critiques of the definition of crimeâlike our approach, which is closely aligned with zemiologyâpromote attention to the crimes of the powerful rather than the crimes of the powerless. While recognizing some value to using state- and suprastate-produced definitions of crime, we propose a definition that extends to harms not recognized by the state (Canning and Tombs 2021; Friedrichs and Schwartz 2007; Hillyard, Pantazis, Tombs, and Gordon 2004; Rothe 2009). Zemiology is, essentially, the study of harms, including those caused by existing social structures that facilitate crimes of the powerful such as capitalism, materialism, and social inequality on numerous axes, from race, ethnicity, class, and gender differences to sexual identity, ability status, and nationality. As Boukli and KotzĂ© (2018: 4) note, zemiology is âboth a response to mainstream administrative criminology and an attempt to reiterate key priories for social justice.â We argue that most people, especially those studying crime and criminal justice, are more concerned with reducing harm and victimization in society and increasing true justice than what legislators decide is against the law based on their largely hegemonic and pedestrian understanding of crime and victimization and what has been studied as truly harmful to living things.
What do we mean by terms such as white-collar crime and crimes of the powerful? Conceptualizations of power vary greatly within the social sciences and in sociology and criminology in particular. Definitions range from the capacity to direct or influence others or the course of events or resources; political or social authority or control over others; or authority that is given or delegated to someone or a group (i.e., governments or police). It is generally accepted that power is tied to authority and trust. While we do not wish to spend much time debating the meaning of power and the powerful, it is important to recognize that power exists only through social relationships and is historically and culturally specific as well as always present throughout time. It is not an easily identifiable object; rather it is produced and reproduced within social structures. Power subjugates, making one subject to another or a thing. Power is exercised, obtained, legitimated, and maintained through capital accumulation of varying typesâeconomic, military, social, political, discursive, cultural, and intellectual. Perhaps the easiest way to determine power and the powerful, then, is to contest those relations by resisting legalistic definitions of crime, and in the process recognize and claim the harms of those with power as crimes. In this way, writing about the crimes of the powerful can be seen as a form of resistance (Stanley and McCulloch 2014). Vincenzo Ruggiero (2021) is helpful here: âthe crimes of the powerful are the result of the different features displayed in the exercise of power itself: coercion, legitimacy, violence, secrecy, consensus, and hegemony.â
In addition to conceptualizations of power, as this chapter proceeds, we will address the problematics of terms like white-collar crime and why we argue that the concept of crimes of the powerful is the more accurate umbrella for the harms and crimes discussed throughout this volume (excluding Chapter 5). To better understand the distinctions between white-collar crime and crimes of the powerful, we should first explore what is often referred to as the Sutherland Legacy, followed by the Yale Division.
The Sutherland Legacy
In 1939, Edwin Sutherland gave a speech at the American Sociological Association conference that revolutionized criminology by taking a very different approach to defining and studying crime. While Sutherlandâs original definition of white-collar crime was vague and left much room for interpretation, a decade later in 1949, he wrote the first book on the new concept, stating that
Sutherland examined 70 corporations, including Westinghouse, General Electric, and General Motors, using a scientific study to examine how many times the corporations violatedâand were charged for violatingâregulatory laws. However, his case studies also included âcrimesâ committed by the farmer and the shoe salesman. This was the beginning of the debate about which types of crimes should be considered white-collar crimes as well as what should be considered a crime, the distinctions of which are seen through the studies that developed over the next 50 years and their impetus, the outcome of which, as we will see, is two divisions within white-collar crime: corporate crimes and what are often referred to as occupational crimes.
While Sutherland was not the first to discuss crimes of the white-collar class, previous efforts were not especially impactful. For example, during the late 1800s, when journalists dared to critique a class of ârobber barons,â they were dismissed as âmuckrakers.â Another example is Upton Sinclairâs The Jungle, which exposed working conditions in the meat packing industry. As corporations began emerging, a progressive movement was in full swing, and there were early attempts at reform to regulate them. Yet it was Sutherland who first began studying the phenomena through a scientific lens. While Sutherland was interested in all forms of crime, which explains the form of differential association theory, he was particularly adamant about avoiding class bias in criminological theory.
After Sutherlandâs breakthrough, it may be surprising that little research and theorizing on white-collar crime took place immediately, although Marshall Clinard (1952) conducted a study on the black market during World War II, in which wartime rations were sold illegally at high profits. Donald Cressy (1953) wrote about embezzlers in federal prisons as white-collar offenders, and Geis (1968) kept Sutherlandâs original concepts alive. This period is often referred to as the Big Chill in the United States as many social changes were occurring, such as the civil rights movement and Vietnam war protests.
During the 1970s, Watergate and other political scandals led to greater recognition of white-collar crime as real crime. During this decade, the United States Justice Department âdiscoveredâ forms of white-collar crime as a top investigative priority, defining the phenomenon as âthose classes of non-violent illegal activities which principally involve traditional notions of deceit, deception, concealment, manipulation, breach of trust, subterfuge or illegal circumventionâ (Poveda 1994: 134). The stateâs transformation of white-collar crime into a legal concept resulted in the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigationsâ definition fundamentally altering Sutherlandâs concept of white-collar crime by including the criminal acts of non-elite persons within their scope. The Justice Department also adopted an offense-based, rather than offender-based, definition. The defining criterion was not who committed the act (elite or non-elite), but the nature of the act itself. Notice the explicit mention of ânonviolentâ crimes, which is a completely bankrupt element of the offense in the minds of those who study crimes of the powerful.
Nonetheless, scholars such as Herbert Edelhertz worked toward clarifying the term white-collar crime, though Edelhertzâs (1970) definition is more akin to the traditions of the Yale school of thought. Clinard and Richard Quinney bifurcated white-collar crime into occupational crimeââoffenses committed by individuals for themselves in the course of their occupations and the offenses of employees against their employersââand corporate crimeââoffenses committed by the corporate officials for their corporation and the offenses of the corporation itselfâ (Kramer 1982). In 1977, Quinneyâs book Class, State, and Crime was published, providing the early terrain of Marxist instrumentalist theories of crime and justice. American culture was changing and more radical ideas about race, class, gender, and other inequalities were entering popular culture. Further expansions of the definition of âcrimeâ continued. Laura Shill Schrager and James F. Short Jr. (1978) examined organizational crime in a major turn for white-collar crime as it returned to Sutherlandâs definition. Schrager and Short argued that the impact of illegal organizational behavior and the characteristics of crimes committed in organizational settings provide a framework for identifying a class of illegal actions as organizational crimes.
During the 1980s, putting aside Sutherlandâs original concepts and definitions, corporate crime became a subset of possible white-collar crime offenses under organizational crimes, or âcriminal acts engaged in by corporate organizations themselves as social and legal entities or by officials or employees of the corporation action, acting on behalf of or in concert with the corporate actionâ (Kramer 1982). In 1982, Ronald C. Kramer defined corporate crime as criminal acts (of omission or commission) that are the re...