Calamities and the Economy in Renaissance Italy

The Grand Tour of the Horsemen of the Apocalypse

G. Alfani

• Éditeur: Palgrave Macmillan
• Année: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781137289773
• Sujet: History
• Sous-sujet: Modern History

Italy faced a number of catastrophes in the long sixteenth century. This economic and demographic history follows the consequences of these catastrophes - the action of the Horsemen of the Apocalypse - War, Famine and Plague, all followed by Death.

1

War

For Italy the sixteenth century was certainly one spent under the sign of Mars. War had descended on the Peninsula at the end of the previous century and raged for many decades. Plague and Famine were quick to follow. Even though the interaction between the Horsemen was complex,¹ indisputably it was War that acted as a kind of link between the various types of calamitous events that tormented Italy during the first half of the sixteenth century. There is a belief among many historians and also among many chroniclers of the time that it was the passage of armies that caused the devastations that led to famine and that the troops were the carriers of contagious diseases, facilitating the spread of epidemics. This view seems essentially correct, although hardly sufficient to understand fully events whose complexity will be unravelled in the following chapters. Now though it is worth covering the main events of the wars, setting them in the intricate political, diplomatic and institutional context of the time in order to provide an essential frame of reference for the analyses that will be proposed later. It will also be an opportunity to appraise the economic-demographic consequences of the wars themselves, which are usually (but not always rightly) considered secondary to the famine and the epidemics associated with them.²

While demographers and economic historians rarely focused on the consequences of war, or at least of the wars of the medieval and Early Modern Age, many military historians have researched specifically and in considerable detail how the experience of warfare affected human communities. Especially from the 1970s onwards, adherents of the so-called ‘New Military History’ have analysed the impact of war on societies, have considered armies as social bodies, have investigated a wide range of relations between soldiers and civilians, and have studied the military as an important component of society and culture in general, and not only during wartime; an example is Joseph R. Hale’s classic War and Society in Renaissance Europe (1985). However, while the New Military History intends to explore all the variety of ways in which the experience of warfare affected individuals and society, it is also clear that the social (and, recently, cultural) aspects of war have been researched more thoroughly than its economic and demographic characteristics.³ This chapter then also provides a contribution to this literature by analysing in detail how war and the military affected the Italian economies, as well as the Italian societies.

The Italian Wars, 1494–1559: an overview of the main events

The so-called Italian Wars broke out in 1494 when Charles VIII of France invaded the Peninsula at the head of an army of 30,000 men to take possession of the Kingdom of Naples. It was the beginning of an extremely complicated period in Italian history, marked by wars, pillaging and violence that lasted, with a few interruptions, until the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis of 1559. It was also the end of the period of (relative) peace and stability that had begun with the Peace of Lodi of 1454, a period characterized by the so-called politica dell’equilibrio or ‘policy of the balance of power’, which aimed at preventing any of the five major military and strategic powers of late medieval Italy (the Republic of Venice, the Duchy of Milan, the Republic of Florence, the Kingdom of Naples and the Papacy) from becoming too powerful and able to prevail over the others.

Traditional historiography holds that the outcome of the Italian Wars marked a fundamental change in the destinies of the Peninsula; the fact that the country did not unify impeded the establishment of state entities able to oppose effectively the increasing power of the great ‘absolute’ states of Western Europe. What followed was the loss of political independence, even for those states that managed to preserve at least a semblance of autonomy. The reduced room for manoeuvre conceded to Italian princes, together with exploitation by foreign powers, in time would cancel any remaining chance of economic recovery for the Peninsula, already in trouble because of growing foreign competition and because of the devastation that they had suffered during the wars (Pugliese, 1924; Pepe, 1952; Romano, 1971).

The most recent historiography has considerably modified this view, showing, for example, that far from operating according to a logic of blatant exploitation, foreign rulers treated their Italian territories with great consideration, without upsetting their forms of government or compromising their economic activities.⁴ Furthermore, the effectiveness of the foreign policy of the principal ‘territorial’ states enabled many of them to remain independent and enjoy an enviable, and almost uninterrupted, period of peace throughout the seventeenth century (Spagnoletti, 2003). The fact remains though that the sixteenth century is usually considered a period in which the Italian economy suffered some extremely serious setbacks; recovery in the second half of the century would be flawed and partial (Cipolla, 1993). However, even from a macroeconomic point of view, this negative opinion needs to be re-examined; this is the main aim of this book. For this purpose it is necessary to evaluate not only the costs and damage, but also the benefits involved in the many catastrophic events that followed one after the other in the course of the century. The Italian Wars are the most appropriate starting point to sketch this picture.

The pretext for the appearance of the French in Italy was provided by the Angevin claim to the Kingdom of Naples, where Ferdinando I of Aragon had reigned since 1458. For some time the French Crown had identified the rich, but politically and militarily divided peninsula as the target of its eventual attempts at expansion. Dynastic claims, together with the declaration that it wished to make Naples the base for a crusade to combat Turkish expansionism, cloaked in legality an enterprise actually based on economic, strategic and political-diplomatic calculations. The death of Ferdinando I in January 1494, together with the (presumed) request for help made by the Duke of Milan, Ludovico Sforza, known as il Moro (The Moor) because of his dark complexion, supplied the pretext for military action. On 27 July, a powerful French army left Lyons and marched towards the Alpine passes. From then and until the final Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559, there were very few years of peace. Above all, in the first 35 years of conflict up until the Peace of the ‘Due Dame’ (1529), if there were any brief breaks, they were used only to build or consolidate alliances.

Initially, Charles VIII’s campaign was extremely successful. The help of Ludovico il Moro and of his father-in-law Ercole I of Este, Duke of Ferrara, ensured the French an easy passage through the northern part of the Peninsula. Both Ludovico and Ercole expected help in strengthening their position against their Italian rivals, especially the Republic of Venice, but probably neither of them ever truly intended Charles VIII to acquire the Kingdom of Naples. The Italian allies then were disconcerted by the fact that the French king decided to lead personally into Italy an army whose size was, for that time, quite exceptional (see the next section). They were also taken aback by Charles VIII’s extremely aggressive strategy, relentlessly pushing on, favouring speed of advancement to the detriment of a more diplomatic approach, and also resorting to considerable violence (including that done to civilians) in order to weaken his opponents’ resoluteness – a strategy made possible by the overwhelming military supremacy that he enjoyed from the beginning of the campaign (Pellegrini, 2009: 26–8).

The army mustered by the Kingdom of Naples together with its allies, the Papacy and the Republic of Florence, proved totally unable to stop the French in the Po Valley. The alliance itself started to crumble when in October 1494, the French reached the border of the Republic of Florence, protected by the powerful fortress of Sarzana. The fortress could probably have resisted for a long time but, after Charles VIII showed his intention of making any opponent pay dearly by conquering and sacking the less protected town of Fivizzano and massacring its inhabitants, Piero de’ Medici, the de facto ruler of Florence, made an agreement with him in which it was stipulated that the French were to be given free transit through Tuscany. In addition, Piero surrendered a number of important fortresses, including Sarzana. The Medicis paid dearly for this move, which was meant to spare the Florentine domains from the devastations threatened by the French, as Piero’s lack of resoluteness led to his ousting from power. Florence fell under the influence of the Dominican friar and religious reformer Girolamo Savonarola and Pisa rebelled against Florentine rule. The French were free to traverse Tuscany and to enter the Papacy; meanwhile they lost their ally Ludovico il Moro who, frightened by Charles VIII’s unexpected success, withdrew to Lombardy with his followers.

Charles VIII found little resistance in the Papal States, where Pope Alexander VI faced a rebellion inside his capital, Rome, whose inhabitants were unwilling to endure a French siege. The Pope surrendered and gave the French free passage. Charles VIII swiftly entered into the Kingdom of Naples, where many cities and towns declared themselves for the French, acclaimed as liberators from the rule of the House of Aragon.⁵ The king Alfonso II abdicated in favour of his son Ferrandino (Ferrante II) and fled to Sicily. Also due to rebellion in the city of Capua and in Naples itself the new king proved unable to defend the capital and consequently, on 22 February 1495, Charles VIII was able to make his regal entrance into the city of Naples.

This extraordinary success was not destined to last long. The ease with which the French had defeated (often without even the need to fight) some of the greatest Italian powers, led the most powerful of all the Italian states, the Republic of Venice, to realize that its policy of neutrality had been unwise and ineffective, alienated the support of former allies such as the Duchy of Milan, and strengthened the resoluteness of humbled opponents such as the Papacy. Consequently, on 31 March 1495, the so-called Holy League was formed. This was an alliance of Italian states (the Papacy, the Republic of Venice, the Duchy of Milan), which, however, considering the impressive show of force performed by Charles VIII’s army, to play it safe also sought the support of emerging European powers (Spain and England) interested in contrasting France’s growing geopolitical influence. Charles VIII, afraid of being trapped in Italy, decided to return to France with one half of his army, leaving the other half in Naples to keep in check the growing resentfulness of the local population against the French arrogance, as well as Ferrante II’s attempts at reconquering his kingdom with Spanish help. This time Charles VIII could not avoid military confrontation with the Italian army that was waiting for him to try and cross the Apennines. However, with the battle of Fornovo, in the territory of Parma, the French king broke the blockade set up by his adversaries and managed to take shelter beyond the Alps (see the next section).

The formation of the Holy League in 1495 is an important symbolic date, marking a turning point in Italian history as, from then on, the problems of the Italian states became part of a decidedly international scenario. In a sense, the old policy of the balance of power was re-established, but the main European powers had become key players in the game, and they tended to have an increasingly more important role compared to the Italian states (Fueter, 1932; Pellegrini, 2009): France due to its claims on the Kingdom of Naples; Spain due to kinship ties with the Aragonese dynasty of Naples; and the Empire as Maximilian of Habsburg claimed the right to decide the destiny of the Duchy of Milan, formally an Imperial fief. This European involvement prevented any easy or quick solution to the Italian dynastic and diplomatic problems and resulted in an unusually intricate and harsh series of wars, which are impossible here to trace in detail. Only the first campaign (Charles VIII’s) has been reconstructed with some precision to provide contextualization and as an example of the complexity of both the military events of the period and of the Italian diplomatic affairs. The developments of the rest of the Italian Wars will now be described only briefly, although specific episodes will be detailed in the following sections when they are relevant to the analysis of the economic, social and demographic consequences of war. In particular, it is important to distinguish the six phases into which the wars of 1494–1529 can be divided, marked by a continual shift in alliances:⁶

1 1494–95: Charles VIII’s campaign, as detailed above.

2 1499–1504: The French return to Italy to conquer the Duchy of Milan, over which the new king Louis XII has dynastic claims.⁷ Between 1499 and 1500, the duchy changes hands on various occasions, despite the help given to Ludovico il Moro by Emperor Maximilian. The French and Spanish agree to divide between them the Kingdom of Naples, which is obliged to surrender (1501), and war breaks out between the two victorious nations over the division of the territory (1502–04). The Spanish prevail and gain control of the whole of southern Italy. In the meantime, Pope Alexander VI remains neutral in exchange for political and material backing for his son Cesare Borgia, who, between 1499 and 1503, conquers the Duchy of Urbino and much of Romagna, as far as Ravenna, greatly increasing the territories under Papal control.

3 1508–09: War against Venice; defeated at Agnadello by the Cambrai League (the Papacy, France, the Empire, the Duchy of Savoy, the Duchy of Ferrara and the Marquisate of Mantua), Venice avoids disaster by negotiating separate peace treaties.

4 1510–16: Pope Julius II is the instigator of a new anti-French Holy League (the Papacy, Spain, the Republic of Venice, the Swiss Confederation). Initially, the minor allies of France are attacked (the Duchy of Ferrara and the Earldom of Mirandola). After a period of fluctating fortunes during which there are several changes of ruler in Milan and different alliances are formed, the French led by Francis I (who became king in 1515) defeat at Melegnano the Swiss troops defending Milan and remain in control of the duchy.

5 1521–25: Alliance of Charles V (who in 1519, had inherited the triple crowns of Spain, Austria and Burgundy and the Imperial Crown) with the Pope to drive the French (allies of the Republic of Venice) from the Duchy of Milan and from Genoa. Once again, the Duchy of Milan is conquered and lost on various occasions. The war ends only with the victory of the Imperial forces at Pavia (1525) and the capture of Francis I.

6 1526–29: The French form an alliance with the Papacy, the Republic of Venice, the Duchy of Milan and the Republic of Florence against the Empire; later they will be joined by Ferrara and Genoa. After an initial phase favourable to the League, which conquers numerous strongholds, Charles V once more gains the upper hand, also because Andrea Doria with the Genoese fleet abandons the French and goes over to Charles’ side. Rome is sacked by the German Landsknechts (1527). France is forced to leave Italy. The advance of the Protestant Reformation and the growing Turkish threat to the Habsburg possessions in the Balkans convince Charles V of the need to seek peace. The territories of the Kingdom of Naples and the Duchy of Milan come under Spanish–Imperial control (1529).

The Peace of the ‘Due Dame’ (‘Two Ladies’),⁸ signed in 1529, ended the first phase of the conflict, which up until then had been mainly fought in Italy. The six years that separated it from the renewal of hostilities represented the first significant truce. During the second phase of the conflict (1535–59), Italy ceased to be the principal theatre of war. The war between France and the Empire moved to Provence, northern France and the Low Countries; in Germany, it intertwined with the wars of religion following Charles V’s unsuccessful attempt to oppose the Protestant Reformation. His final failure, ratified by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, which marked the religious division of Germany, prompted him to abdicate in the same year and to divide his enormous territories, which had proved arduous to manage, between his son Philip, who received the Spanish Crown, the Low Countries and the rest of the Burgundy inheritance, the Duchy of Milan, the Kingdom of Naples and the possessions in the Americas, and his brother Maximilian, who was assigned the Habsburg inheritance, and prospectively the Imperial Crown, as well as the Kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary that he already held.

This second phase of the war involved Italy, whose territories continued to be the principal casus belli, only occasionally and almost in passing. There was though a significant exception, the Duchy of Savoy, which then extended over a large part of Piedmont, including important cities like Turin (not yet its capital), Vercelli and Cuneo, but was still far from having completed its expansion di qua dai monti or ‘on this side of the mountains’. In October 1535, on the death of Francesco, the last of the Sforzas, Francis I once again claimed the Duchy of Milan. However, instead of pushing forward into Lombardy, he confined himself to occupying almost all the territories of the Dukes of Savoy. Charles V reacted to the threat to his Italian territories by taking the war directly into France (Menéndez Pidal, 1999). With this manoeuvre he forced the French to halt their advance and actually to withdraw from some of the strongholds already conquered in Piedmont (among them Ivrea, whose case I will return to later). Thus, right to the end of the conflict Piedmont remained an area of attrition among the principal European powers, periodically the site of clashes of varying importance⁹ and subject to considerable damage. It was only with the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559 that the Duke of Savoy, Emanuele Filiberto (one of the principal Imperial generals, on active service – and not just by chance – in France and Flanders), was to regain his territories.

The complexity of the events of the wars and the number of players involved make ...

Table des matières

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• Acknowledgements
• Epigraph
• Introduction
• 1 War
• 2 Famine
• 3 Plague
• 4 Winners and Losers
• 5 Population and the Economy: Underlying Trends
• Conclusion: Towards the Seventeenth Century
• Appendices
• Notes
• Manuscripts and Printed Sources
• Bibliography
• Index