Eating Grass

The Making of the Pakistani Bomb

Feroz Khan

• Éditeur: Stanford Security Studies
• Année: 2012
• ISBN:
  9780804784801
• Édition: 1
• Sujet: Politics & International Relations
• Sous-sujet: Arms Control

The history of Pakistan's nuclear program is the history of Pakistan. Fascinated with the new nuclear science, the young nation's leaders launched a nuclear energy program in 1956 and consciously interwove nuclear developments into the broader narrative of Pakistani nationalism. Then, impelled first by the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan Wars, and more urgently by India's first nuclear weapon test in 1974, Pakistani senior officials tapped into the country's pool of young nuclear scientists and engineers and molded them into a motivated cadre committed to building the 'ultimate weapon.' The tenacity of this group and the central place of its mission in Pakistan's national identity allowed the program to outlast the perennial political crises of the next 20 years, culminating in the test of a nuclear device in 1998.

Written by a 30-year professional in the Pakistani Army who played a senior role formulating and advocating Pakistan's security policy on nuclear and conventional arms control, this book tells the compelling story of how and why Pakistan's government, scientists, and military, persevered in the face of a wide array of obstacles to acquire nuclear weapons. It lays out the conditions that sparked the shift from a peaceful quest to acquire nuclear energy into a full-fledged weapons program, details how the nuclear program was organized, reveals the role played by outside powers in nuclear decisions, and explains how Pakistani scientists overcome the many technical hurdles they encountered. Thanks to General Khan's unique insider perspective, it unveils and unravels the fascinating and turbulent interplay of personalities and organizations that took place and reveals how international opposition to the program only made it an even more significant issue of national resolve.

Listen to a podcast of a related presentation by Feroz Khan at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation at cisac.stanford.edu/events/recording/7458/2/765.

1
Introduction

On May 28, 1998, Pakistan announced the test of five nuclear explosive devices in the Chagai Hills in the western province of Baluchistan. A mere seventeen days after neighboring India had shocked the world with its first nuclear tests since 1974, Pakistan’s response came as a surprise to many observers. Some had doubted that Pakistan possessed the capability to construct a nuclear explosive. But even those who thought that Pakistan could test a weapon were astonished by the speed of the Pakistani reaction. Many observers wondered how a poor country recovering from catastrophic wars and national dismemberment—and struggling with national identity crises—could devote its limited state resources to acquiring such potentially destructive technology.¹

This book examines how and why Pakistan managed to overcome the wide array of obstacles that stood between it and nuclear weapons. It unravels the interplay of personalities and organizations involved in developing the bomb against a backdrop of political, security, and economic constraints, as well as opportunities. It contributes to the established tradition of academic work that examines the causes behind nuclear proliferation by telling the Pakistani nuclear story. While excellent academic accounts describe the origins of the other key nuclear weapons programs (for example, those of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Israel, and India),² existing accounts of Pakistan’s pursuit of the bomb either have been journalistic, have focused almost exclusively on the A. Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network, or have included Pakistan only in a broader discussion of nuclear weapons in South Asia.³

Pakistan’s nuclear program evolved under immensely complex and challenging security circumstances. Structural generalizations do not explain the complexities of its historical existence and evolution unless a holistic account is understood. This book examines that historical experience—a blend of cultural nuances, idiosyncrasies of personalities, and the multitudinous pulls of domestic politics, regional crises, and geographical compulsions, as well as technical challenges, global politics, and international barriers to nuclear materials and know-how. Nuclear technology is now nearing seven decades of development, but nuclear politics and technological determinism remain the quintessential factors in international relations, especially for developing states. Fascination in mastering the mystery of the atom is as much alive today as it was in the early fifties, when many of the developing world states broke free from the yoke of colonialism. Despite the many decades of the nuclear age exposing the dangers and blessings of nuclear energy, atomic weapons are considered a life-line for states like Pakistan and Israel, “orphan states” in the international system, outside the U.S. nuclear umbrella.⁴ In this sense, the story of nuclear Pakistan is sui generis among nuclear weapon–capable states in contemporary times. Although many of its compulsions and rationales are comparable to those of other nuclear powers that earlier decided to take the same path, what would cause Pakistan to fulfill almost literally its vow to “eat grass or go hungry” in its quest for the nuclear weapon? Why and how did Pakistan stand in defiance of the world to acquire a capability described by Bernard Brodie as the “absolute weapon”?⁵

To understand the heart of the Pakistani quest, this study examines these and several related questions: What conditions sparked the shift from a peaceful quest to acquire nuclear energy into a full-fledged weapons program? How was the nuclear program organized? What role did outside powers play in Pakistan’s nuclear decisions? How did Pakistan overcome the many technical hurdles encountered in the process of developing nuclear weapons?

Like the history of the Pakistan state, the story of Pakistan’s nuclear program is one of unwavering resolve and dedication. Pakistani senior officials tapped into the genius of young scientists and engineers and molded them into a motivated cadre of weaponeers. Building on this reservoir of talent, the program outlasted perennial political crises and persisted despite poor civil-military relations. The young nation’s leaders and scientists were united by their fascination with the new nuclear science and consciously interwove nuclear developments into the broader narrative of Pakistani nationalism. They were unwilling to allow India’s strategic developments to go unanswered, and the more assiduously the program was opposed by India and the West, the more precious it became. It evolved into the most significant symbol of national determination and a central element of Pakistan’s identity.

Pakistan’s enduring rivalry and strategic competition with India turned bitter over subsequent decades after a series of wars and crises. The last major war in 1971 resulted in humiliating military defeat and dismemberment of Pakistan, which simply reinforced its belief that its adversaries were determined to destroy the very existence of the new state. This perception united the nation-state into a “never again” mind-set that found succor in the acquisition of a nuclear capability. However, as this book will show, there were twin causes for its national dismemberment in 1971—external aggression and internal instability. The development of a nuclear capability and robust command system might partially address one-half of the equation—that is, deterrence against external threat from India. But Pakistan has so far failed to address the other more dangerous half that threatens national survivability—domestic dissension and internal conflict. It was Pakistan’s inability to develop a viable political system that failed to bring harmony and nationalism to a religiously homogeneous but ethnically and linguistically diverse people. Although the quest to acquire a nuclear weapons capability was fundamentally drawn from outside threats, East Pakistan’s geographical separation, with a hostile India situated between the two wings of the country, was a vulnerability waiting to be exploited.

Theory and Approach

Why do states pursue nuclear weapons, and how do they do so? What, if anything, is unique about the Pakistani case? The realists (neorealists) would suggest that states are concerned primarily with maximizing security.⁶ When faced with external threats and an unfavorable distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities with its adversaries, government officials have two fundamental options. They can either bandwagon, by accepting the dominance of the stronger state and relying on it for continued safety, or seek to “balance” against the power asymmetry and security challenge posed by the adversary. The option to bandwagon frequently requires the weaker state to compromise its national sovereignty.⁷ The second option can be achieved through the pursuit of alliances (external balancing) or through the development of military capabilities (internal balancing).⁸

According to Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt, states usually choose to balance against the most serious foreign threats to their security; rarely do they bandwagon—that is, accommodate or appease the powers making these threats.⁹ Further, defense planners generally prefer internal balancing because it leaves less to chance and less to the will of others; however, this strategy requires levels of national determination and resources that are beyond the reach of most countries, including Pakistan. While allies were crucial in the prenuclear era to help states fend off foreign aggression, realists recognize that nuclear weaponry has made internal balancing both more feasible and more urgent, especially to states such as Pakistan that face security threats from nuclear-armed neighbors.

All nuclear weapons development programs constitute a response to insecurity and a form of balancing against foreign political or military threats. States will choose to build nuclear bombs if the pursuit of other time-honored policies—such as strengthening their conventional military capabilities, acquiring different weapons of mass destruction, or aligning with foreign powers—are either not available or insufficient to provide the security for the state.¹⁰

An alternative explanation by Jacques Hymans surmises that ideas produced by national, cultural, or individual attributes and idealist approaches can explain much about worldviews, motives, and decision-making styles of specific state leaders who engage in nuclear proliferation.¹¹

To understand why some countries pursue nuclear deterrence—and certainly to understand how they operationalize that deterrent—one must understand the strategic culture of the country in question. The passion and fervor with which Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons are only partially explained by realism. What is necessary is to supplement realism with more fine grained predictions derived from Pakistan’s unique strategic culture—“a collectivity of the beliefs, norms, values, and historical experiences of the dominant elite in a polity that influences their understanding and interpretation of security issues and environment, and shapes their responses to these.”¹² This book does not make the case that strategic culture can replace the explanatory power of realism. Rather, it argues that strategic culture is important to understand how Pakistan reacted to changes in the regional balance of power. Strategic culture stands as an important intervening variable between changes in the material bases of power and state behavior.¹³

“Strategic culture” is a slippery term, which presents challenges to any study employing it. The definition used in this account, proposed by respected Pakistani scholar Hasan Askari-Rizvi, argues that historical experiences have important explanatory value in the development of beliefs and in assessing how a given state responds to a given threat to national security.¹⁴ Strategic culture is the mediating lens through which national leaders view reality, which, while not permanent, is slow to change. National elites are socialized into a strategic culture, and in the process come to share these beliefs, norms, and values. Frequently, strategic culture will be a source of constancy in the midst of a changing international environment. This study pays particular attention to assessing episodes when national leaders took decisions that would make sense only in the context of certain strategic beliefs, norms, and historical experiences.

Peter R. Lavoy has chronicled a similar narrative in his history of Indian nuclear development, where he argues that Jawaharlal Nehru and Homi Bhabha played the role of “nuclear mythmakers.”¹⁵ Lavoy defined “nuclear mythmaking” as an approach adopted by national elites (mythmakers) who want government to adopt a national security strategy of acquiring nuclear weapons by emphasizing the country’s insecurity and poor international standing; portraying this strategy as the best corrective measure; articulating political, economic, and technical feasibility; successfully associating these beliefs with existing cultural norms and political priorities; and finally convincing national decision-makers to act on these views.¹⁶

This account describes these factors as “beliefs” that grew out of existential threats in a historical narrative that was internalized through generations and that forms the inherent cognitive disposition of the people. Lavoy provides an analytical pathway as to how myths turn into strategic beliefs. He examines primary and auxiliary assertions that drive leaders to convince decision-makers and ultimately create a popular national goal.

The primary beliefs are based on two levels of relationship. The first level is the relationship between nuclear weapons acquisition and the military dimension of security, which lays the foundation on which the second level develops in terms of a state’s political status and its influence in international affairs. These levels are supplemented by four auxiliary requirements, which relate to articulating political, economic, strategic, and technological feasibilities. The state must have the developed capacity to manage political problems associated with developing nuclear weapons and their impact on relations with important states; the wherewithal to meet financial costs associated with acquisition or development of nuclear technology, including the possibility for other spin-offs such as industry, agriculture, and medicine; the capability to develop operational nuclear weapons and to devise options for their effective use in military operations; and the infrastructure and capacity to overcome the numerous technical difficulties associated with developing nuclear weapons with the possibility for industrial spin-offs. When leaders acquire the capability to articulate the six interrelated factors with panache and convincing aplomb, it is a matter of time for them to become embedded in the strategic culture of the nation-state.¹⁷

The person who spearheaded the idea of nuclear Pakistan was Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. In Pakistan’s early history there was no consensus about the desirability or utility of nuclear weapons. Only a few individuals, most notably Bhutto, believed that acquiring them was critical for Pakistan. However, following the devastating loss of East Pakistan in 1971 and the Indian nuclear test in 1974, opinions favoring nuclear weapons, held only by a minority, became national consensus—the necessity of nuclear weapons became a mainstream belief. This belief eventually determined the discourse of Pakistani nuclear thinking that evolved gradually—first into developing a nuclear weapon capability that took some twenty-five years, and later operationalizing it after being forced to demonstrate that capability.

In the Indian case, the shock of losing the 1962 war with China combined with the Chinese nuclear test at Lop Nor in 1964 eventually led to the Indian test in 1974.¹⁸ Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s and Indian Chief Scientist Homi Bhabha’s arguments became dominant, even though neither survived to see the ascendency of those beliefs. In the Pakistani case, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto played a similar role and nurtured the nuclear program throughout the important decade of the 1970s.

Today, there are three important strategic beliefs regarding nuclear weapons that were largely absent when Bhutto took power in 1971 but have since become dominant in Pakistani strategic thought. First, nuclear weapons are the only guarantee of Pakistan’s national survival in the face of both an inveterately hostile India that cannot be deterred conventionally and unreliable external allies that fail to deliver in extremis. Second, Pakistan’s nuclear program is unfairly singled out for international opposition because of its Muslim population. This feeling of victimization is accentuated by a belief that India consistently “gets away with” violating global nonproliferation norms. Third is the belief that India, Israel, or the United States might use military force to stop Pakistan’s nuclear program. Today, these three beliefs—nuclear necessity for survival, international discrimination against Pakistan, and danger of disarming attacks—form the center of Pakistani strategic thinking about nuclear weapons. Collectively, these convictions have served to reinforce the determination of Pakistan’s military, bureaucratic, and scientific establishment to pay any political, economic, or technical cost to reach their objective of a nuclear-armed Pakistan.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was able to capture this all-encompassing narrative even before there was any national consensus on the nuclear matter. As far back as 1965, he famously told the Manchester Guardian: “If India makes an atom bomb, then even if we have to feed on grass and leaves—or even if we have to starve—we shall also produce an atom bomb as we would be left with no other alternative. The answer to an atom bomb can only be an atom bomb.”¹⁹ He continued to push for nuclear developments as foreign minister in the 1960s and played a critical role during his period as national leader in the 1970s. By the time he was removed from power in 1977, his thinking on nuclear matters had been institutionalized throughout the establishment. Ample patrons in the military, bureaucracy, and scientific communities would ensure the nuclear program’s success in the 1980s and...

Table des matières

• Cover
• Copyright
• Title Page
• Contents
• Map, Tables, and Figures
• Preface
• Pakistan: Key Characters
• Abbreviations
• 1. Introduction
• Part I. The Reluctant Phase
• Part II. The Secret Nuclear R&D Program
• Part III. Covert Arsenal and Delivery Means
• Part IV. Toward an Operational Deterrent
• Part V. Meeting New Challenges
• Epilogue
• Notes
• Index