Hot Skies Over Yemen: Aerial Warfare Over the Southern Arabian Peninsula

Aerial Warfare Over Southern Arabian Peninsula, 1994-2017

Tom Cooper

• Éditeur: Helion and Company
• Année: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781913118365
• Sujet: Geschichte
• Sous-sujet: Militär- & Seefahrtsgeschichte

Following the Civil War of 1994, Yemen experienced few years of relative peace. This was rudely interrupted in 2004, when the government opened the first of six campaigns against the movement colloquially known as 'Houthis'. The Yemeni Air Force – partially re-equipped over the previous years – saw intensive involvement in this conflict, but proved insufficient. In late 2009 and through 2010, the war spread into Saudi Arabia, which reacted with its first military intervention in the country. A host of long-simmering internal conflicts culminated in the second Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen, launched in March 2015. Although run along widely accepted Western doctrine of aerial warfare, and highly effective, the campaign in question experienced a number of massive problems – primarily related to unexpected developments and extremely complex relations between multiple parties in Yemen. That the air forces of the Saudi-led alliance involved in the ongoing campaign in Yemen are operating some of most modern combat aircraft and weaponry manufactured in the West is no secret. But, exactly how, why, when, and where are they deploying weapons systems in question and for what purpose remains entirely unknown in the public. Thanks to approach to firsthand sources, this volume is providing answers to precisely these questions and thus providing an exclusive insight into the conduct of operations by such modern aircraft types like F-15S, F-16E/F, EF-2000 Typhoon, and Mirage 2000. Containing over 140 photographs, color profiles, maps and extensive tables, Hot Skies over Yemen is a richly illustrated and unique point of reference about one segment of modern aerial warfare that remains entirely unknown until today.

Addenda/Errata to Hot Skies Over Yemen. Volume 2, Volume 1

Chapter 2, Yemen Civil War, 1962-1967, sub-chapter ‘Air Combats’

In reaction to the publishing of Volume 1, Hadrian Jeffs from the UK provided the following information about a clash between Hawker Hunters of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and aircraft of the Egyptian air force (officially the ‘United Arab Republic Air Force, UARAF, as of 1958-1972) over Yemen. Correspondingly, at an unknown date in 1966, a squadron leader from No. 1 Squadron, RAF (this unit was on a temporary deployment from RAF West Raynham to RAF Khorkamsar), intercepted a ‘Russian-piloted MiG in Egyptian colours’ when this cut through the airspace of Aden Protectorate on return from an air strike on an insurgent camp. The pilot of the Hawker Hunter FGA.Mk 9 scored multiple hits with his 30mm ADEN cannons, but the ‘Russian pilot’ managed to escape into the Yemeni airspace. Correspondingly, the British pilot was not credited with a kill. No Egyptian reports on this clash are known.

Chapter 2, Yemen Civil War, 1962-1967, sub-chapter ‘Final Escalation’

Visitors of the ACIG.info forum - including Dmitry Zubkov and Jeroen Nijemeijer - drew the author’s attention to several publications indicating that Egypt began receiving Tupolev Tu-16 bombers at a much earlier date than reported in Volume 1. According to Oleg Teterin’s book ‘In Egypt and in Zanzibar’, published in 2011 in Russian, the first 12 Tu-16s reached Egypt by 6 November 1961. Correspondingly, Anatoly Nikolayevich Ivanov, one of the Soviet military interpreters involved in delivery of these bombers to the UARAF, recalled:

In the fall of 1961, a team of translators had gathered for a 10-month assignment. We were told that in Cairo we would help convert Egyptian crews [to Tu-16s; author’s note]. Captain Barannikov, who was already familiar to us, provided us with several lessons and recommended, first and foremost, to memorize the registration numbers of Tu-16s. These remained in my memory until today, as follws: ABN-75508 (more precisely: Alpha-Bravo-November 75508). We were to use these for contacting flight control in Belgrade, then Athens and Cairo while crossing borders and entering and leaving their control zones.

…we left Bila Tserkva on 6 November 1961. We made a refuelling stop in Budapest and spent the night there. The next morning, our squadron - consisting of 12 Tu-16s - t ook a course for Cairo. We quietly overflew Yugoslavia and then Greece. Whether by accident or design, we passed directly above an American military base located near Athens. Several fighters scrambled from there and they harassed us for longer, demanding us to land.

Finally, we saw the African coast, Nile Delta, Alexandria, Sahara Desert. Shortly before the noon, we landed at Cairo West Air Base, where we were expected by the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt, V. Erofeev, our Defence Attaché and a group of chief engineers and other specialists. Egyptian dignitaries were there too, including Vice-President Anwar el-Sadat, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Air Forces of Egypt, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, Chief-of-Staff of the Egyptian Army General Mohammed Fawzi, Commander-in-Chief of the air force, Mahmmoud Sidki Mahmoud and others.1

Such recollections are supported by other, independent sources. For example, document ‘The Arab-Israeli Situation’, from 6 December 1961, released by the Electronic Reading Room of the Central Intelligence Agency (henceforth ‘CIA/FOIA/ERR’), cites on page 15:

…under terms of a recently concluded agreement with the Soviet Union, the UAR will receive the Tu-16 (Badger) aircraft which can carry a 10,000 pound payload to a combat radius of 1,650 nautical miles.

British military intelligence followed in fashion. Citing the ‘Annual Report on the Armed Forces of the United Arab Republic for the year 1962’, from 29 January 1963, Foreign Office 371/172937, PRO, Jesse Ferris summarized in his book ‘Nasser’s Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power’:

Another area of close cooperation encompassed the top-secret Tu-16 bombing missions over Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia. As Egyptian pilots were still training on the Tu-16 when the intervention [in Yemen; author’s note] began, they probably continued their instruction with live ammunition over Yemen. By the beginning of 1963, two squadrons of Tu-16s were stationed at Cairo West airport.

Further citing Ivanov, Teterin added these details:

…In summer of 1962, 15 additional Tu-16s were transferred to Egypt... Around the same time, the first six Antonov An-12 transports were delivered... Their arrival radically changed the role of airborne troops, who now turned into one of most powerful levels of Cairo’s geopolitical influence in the Arab World. An-12s and paratroopers saw widespread deployment during the war in Yemen

…Except for us, there was another group of Soviet advisors in Egypt: they were teaching Egyptian pilots how to fly MiG-21F-13s and MiG-21PFs. Their primary task was the defence of possible Israeli air attacks on Cairo, Alexandria, and the Aswan hydroelectric power station…later I was sent to Ismailia, the third largest city in Egypt, located directly on the Suez Canal... where I was assigned to the Command of the Eastern District (of the United Arab Republic Air Force)….

During our stay in the UAR, Egyptian military aircraft wore markings adopted in 1958, following the merger with Syria. This consisted of red, white, and black, with two little green stars on the white field. These roundels were applied symmetrically on the wing and fuselage. A big flag of the UAR was applied on the fin. Black, four-digit numbers in Arabic numerals were placed on the nose of the fuselage, in front of the headlight. Serials were applied to all UARAF aircraft and once assigned were never changed for the duration of service. It is worth noting that this system proved very useful for Israeli intelligence during the Arab-Israeli wars: it helped them monitor the strength and deployment of Egyptian aircraft.

…The aircraft wore no camouflage colours, but retained their bare metal colour. Egyptians were reluctant to repaint their aircraft in sand colour, explaining this would rapidly fade due to the sun. Similarly, the recommendation of our experts for them to construct shelters and create mock positions for aircraft met little enthusiasm: while agreeing with our experts, the Egyptians were in no hurry to take corresponding action.2

According to the same, and two other Russian publications, it was around the same time that Hosni Mubarak, future President of Egypt, became involved in Egyptian Tu-16 program. Mubarak converted to Ilyushin Il-28 light bombers at the Kant AB, in 1959. Two years later he underwent a four-month conversion course on Tu-16s at Ryazan AB, as a member of a team of four Egyptian crews, including a total of 10 pilots, navigators, radio operators and gunners. According to retired Soviet radio operator, Colonel E. A. Aslanov, following his first tour on Tu-16s in Yemen, in the period 1962-1973 Mubarak underwent a staff course at the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow, from March 1964 until April 1965.3

According to the same source, Egyptian Tu-16s were already flying combat sorties over Yemen by that date:

From October 1962 to April 1963 I was on a special mission in the United Arab Republic Egypt. I participated in acts of war providing international aid to the Yemeni Republic. The crews of the regiment, together with crews of the UAR, performed combat flights on Tu-16 aircraft... I completed more than thirty sorties.

Ivanov specified that it was Tu-16s from the 244 Bomber Regiment, 56. ‘Bereslavskoy’ Aviation Division, that flew air strikes on targets in Yemen, by night, between October 1962 and February 1963, and that he met Mubarak at Hudaydah Air Base (AB) in Yemen, while this was in command of a Tu-16 squadron deployed there in 1964.4

Further in relation to Soviet flying operations over Yemen in this period, Teterin specified that the Soviet Union officially recognized the new government in Sana’a on 1 October 1962; however, Moscow began providing military assistance a week before. Only a day after the coup of 27 September 1962, and at the request of the Egyptian government, Soviets organized an air bridge between Cairo, Sana’a and Hudaydah. The first two aircraft – both operated by the 12th Guards Military Transport Aviation Division from Tula - flew from Cairo via Aswan to Sana’a on the evening of 28 September. Their cargo consisted of 43 barrels of kerosene (necessary for their flight back to Egypt), several tonnes of ammunition, an Egyptian delegation and a platoon of Egyptian paratroopers each. Additional Egyptian soldiers were deployed by An-12s to Sana’a and Tai’z during the night of 29 September.

An Egyptian An-12BP transport, with troops, photographed prior to deployment to Yemen. The newest publications in the Russian language indicate that the type was almost exclusively operated by Soviet crews during the first three to four years of its deployment in Yemen. (via Group73)

This air bridge was continued for months longer. Distances involved were such that on each flight to Yemen, Soviet aircraft had to haul 43 barrels of kerosene for the return flight. Other cargo usually included about 12 tonnes of ammunition or 60-70 Egyptian soldiers. Because Moscow insisted on keeping its involvement secret, Soviet aircraft were under the operational control of the Egyptians, and officially assigned to No. 14 Squadron of the 32nd Group. They wore UARAF markings and flew to Yemen – via Aswan – only by night. Indeed, Soviet pilots were strictly forbidden to speak Russian on the radio if they flew anywhere east of Aswan: whenever this was the case, interpreters (that were always on board) had to run all the radio communications. The original Soviet team was reinforced to 12 crews, including some from the Military Transport Division based in Cherkassy.

The reason for such direct Soviet involvement as of 1962-1963 was that there were no Egyptians trained to fly An-12s. The first attempt at conversion training of Egyptian crews began in the fall of1963, but ended in a failure. During a night take – off from Aswan, the aircraft carrying five tonnes of freshly minted Egyptian coins (used to finance the war in Yemen) hit a hill shortly after take-off: everybody on board – except the radio operator-including eight Soviet military personnel and two Yemenis, was killed.

It was only in 1965 that the UARAF finally had enough crews ready to convert to An-12s and their training began in earnest. Sometime in the fall of that year the Soviets lost another An-12 involved in the air bridge to Yemen. This caught fire shortly after take-off from Aswan. The pilot managed to return and make a safe landing: the crew was evacuated without injuries, but the aircraft subsequently burned out.

From all of this, the conclusion is on hand that the UARAF had placed an order for Tu-16s during bi-annual arms negotiations with Moscow in June 1961, and that the first of these-all secondhand aircraft from the Soviet Bomber Aviation-were delivered by November of the same year.5

For similar reasons – ack of UARAF crews qualified to fly the type – it was Soviet crews that began flying air strikes by Tu-16s in full Egyptian markings much earlier than known previously: by October 1962. It was only in spring or summer 1963 that the first air strikes were undertaken by mixed, Soviet-Egyptian crews. This leads to the conclusion that the build-up of the UARAF’s Tu-16 force took a while longer than previously known: officially, the service entry of the Tu-16 was reported only in summer 1966, after a large group of crews underwent conversion training in the USSR – as reported in Volume 1. Similarly, all of the An-12 related operations over Yemen in the period 1962-1965 were flown exclusively by Soviet aircrews.

Several clashes between British and/or Saudi (but British-flown) Hunters and Egyptian aircraft, prompted the UARAF to deploy a detachment of MiG-19S interceptors from its No. 20 ‘Araba’ Squadron to Sana’a Rawdah, in 1966. (Nour Bardai Collection)

A trio of Tu-16s photographed while overflying Cairo during a parade in September 1966. Notable are their ‘bort numbers’: 55, 05 and 65. (Nour Bardai Collection)

CHAPTER 1

GEO-POLITICAL BACKGROUNDS

The Republic of Yemen, the second largest country on the Arabian Peninsula, has been in a state of near-permanent political turmoil since at least 1962, and in almost permanent war since at least 2004. Nevertheless, news from Yemen rarely catches public attention, if at all, and then because of US military operations against such extremist groups as al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), or the latest developments in that country: in 2011 a political crisis erupted, including mass protests against poverty, unemployment, corruption and lack of prospects. It resulted in the Yemeni president – who used to be a favourite of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in the 1980s and 1990s – stepping down and then being replaced by another Saudi favourite. The subsequent transitional process was completely disrupted for a myriad of reasons, and resulted in an all-out war that, in March 2015, provoked a military intervention led by Saudi Arabia.

Although nearly all recent conflicts in Yemen saw intensive involvement of foreign powers, local military-affairs often remain well hidden from the public and thus very little was published on the different military campaigns – and especially aerial warfare – in this country. Ironically, because of their relations to countries like Great Britain or Sweden, meanwhile there are more (and highly authoritative) publications about history of flying in this part of the Arabian Peninsula in the period between the 1920s and 1950s, than about the same topic from the last few decades. On the contrary, except for a few articles in the local and specialized press in the West, next to nothing was published about the Yemeni Air Force.

The following account is a result of a decades-long process of collecting information on military-related aerial operations over this part of the World. After busying myself with this topic just occasionally and at enthusiast level, I began monitoring developments in Yemen more closely in 2009, and then on nearconstant basis since 2015. This proved anything other than easy: not only that establishing and maintaining contacts to local sources was hampered by extremely stringent security measures and a brutal and ongoing war, but also by ...

Table des matières

• Cover
• Title
• Contents
• List of Maps
• Map
• Copyright
• Cover Image
• Notes
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• Addenda/Errata to Hot Skies Over Yemen. Volume 2, Volume 1
• Chapter 1: Geo-Political Backgrounds
• Chapter 2: Sa’ada Wars
• Chapter 3: Beginning of the End
• Chapter 4: Storm of Resolve
• Chapter 5: Multi-Front War.xhtml
• Chapter 6: Stalemate
• Bibliography
• Notes
• About this Book
• About the Author