Global Ownership Structures
Global ownership structures refer to the various ways in which ownership of businesses and assets is distributed across different countries and entities. This can include multinational corporations, joint ventures, subsidiaries, and other forms of international ownership arrangements. Understanding global ownership structures is crucial for businesses operating across borders to navigate legal, regulatory, and tax implications.
5 Key excerpts on "Global Ownership Structures"
eBook - ePubThe Corporation
Growth, Diversification and Mergers
- Dennis Mueller(Author)
- 2020(Publication Date)
- Routledge(Publisher)
...Managers might use their discretion to pursue growth, and when they did it was the helpless and hapless individual holding a few hundred shares who suffered. An examination of companies in other countries reveals, however, that empire-building occurs everywhere. Indeed, the vast pyramidal corporate structures that one observes in countries like Italy and Turkey suggests that the families controlling these giant structures may be even more willing to sacrifice wealth to preserve their empires than are their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, and minority shareholders in these companies are even more hapless than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. 25 This chapter has reviewed the hypotheses and evidence about corporate governance structures. On the one hand, we have seen that the differences across countries are to some extent less dramatic than the literature might lead one to expect. Concentrated shareholdings in companies outside of the largest 500 are the rule not the exception in the United States, and are characteristic of the very largest companies in such Anglo-Saxon countries like Canada. Nevertheless, we did find several significant differences across countries in both patterns of ownership structure and economic performance. Many of these differences appear to be related to the type of legal system a country has. In countries where shareholders rights are better protected, more equity is issued, capital markets are better developed, new firms find it easier to raise capital, investment performance is better, and so too is economic growth. These relationships are summarized in Figure 6.1. Although there has been considerable discussion in the corporate governance literature about which variables are endogenous and which exogenous, the one variable that must clearly be assumed to be exogenous is country legal systems, for these originated decades ago and in many cases centuries ago...
eBook - ePubGlobal Strategic Responsiveness
Exploiting Frontline Information in the Adaptive Multinational Enterprise
- Torben Juul Andersen, Carina Antonia Hallin(Authors)
- 2017(Publication Date)
- Routledge(Publisher)
...So, from an economic perspective there is no difference between maintaining an organizational structure confined to a narrow physical location and one that is extended throughout the globe with activities placed in different geographical regions. This obviously provides new opportunities for more optimal multinational structures of corporate business operations. On the other hand, one must also consider the potential challenges associated with administrative and managerial demands from conducting business activities in vastly different cultural and institutional settings and the potential impact from global economic and political events. The multinational structure arguably provides a better basis for taking advantage of differences in conditions between major economic regions, thereby improving the ability to cope with various economic exposures and environmental changes. Building operational flexibilities along a global value-chain can install the possibilities to switch sourcing flows, business activities, and distribution channels between geographical locations as general demand conditions, factor prices, foreign exchange rates, etc. change over time (Kogut and Chang, 1996; Miller, 1998). Furthermore, a multinational structure gives access to diverse skills, competencies, and market insights. It constitutes a versatile knowledge reservoir that offers the possibility to enhance business development efforts (Desouza and Evaristo, 2003; Mudambi, 2002)...
eBook - ePubRethinking Corporate Governance
The Law and Economics of Control Powers
- Alessio Pacces(Author)
- 2013(Publication Date)
- Routledge(Publisher)
...At best, the empirical evidence available to date is inconclusive. This is especially true when the relationship is investigated cross-country – as it tends to be in the recent empirical work (Morck et al 2005). Different patterns of corporate ownership and control apparently bear no relationship with firm performance when (most) countries of Western Europe are compared (Faccio and Lang 2002), whereas they show a negative effect of control by large shareholders in East Asia (Claessens et al 2002) and a positive effect of ownership stakes retained by controlling shareholders in a sample of 27 wealthy economies (La Porta et al 2002). Although those results are not necessarily in contradiction with each other, they do not show any univocal path either. In addition, the same results have to be taken with extreme caution. Whether performed on a within-country or a cross-country basis, all of the available studies on the empirical relation between ownership structure and firm performance suffer from one or more of the following biases: (a) definition of ownership structure; (b) definition of corporate control; (c) reverse causality. 27 If the empirical analysis does not reject the hypothesis that the ownership structure is endogenous, and then that concentrated ownership can be as efficient as dispersed ownership, casual empiricism mildly supports this view. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, at least within most developed economies, corporate governance systems where dispersed ownership prevails (the US and the UK) do not significantly outperform those typically based on a more concentrated ownership structure (the developed countries of continental Europe). However, this does not mean that we live in the best of all possible worlds...
- Hailan Yang, Stephen Morgan(Authors)
- 2011(Publication Date)
- Chandos Publishing(Publisher)
...5 Ownership structure and the characteristics of the board in the focal companies Abstract: Although corporate governance has been a central issue in developed economies for some time, many findings from developed countries are not applicable in transition economies. Patterns of corporate governance and control differ significantly across countries because of national differences in the structure of ownership and the composition of corporate boards. This chapter aims to explore the character of corporate governance that has developed in China. The ‘China model’ is likely to embody a special role for the State, coupled with Chinese cultural aspects, while taking on some of the characteristics of the models in developed countries. The chapter achieves this by empirically examining the characteristics and transformation of corporate governance in the sample firms. Using a multi-case study method, we compare the governance, ownership structures and the role of the board in managing firms. We find there is no single optimal form of ownership or board structure that produces a better performance. We also find that the better the performance of firms, the more advanced is corporate governance. We reject the view that corporate governance necessarily has an influence on performance. This chapter gives the reader an insight into the ongoing development and reform of ownership structures and the governing boards of firms in China. Key words ownership board China case study Among the transition economies, the Chinese case is particularly intriguing. The Chinese economic reform began with decentralization rather than the development of a private ownership system, with revitalization of State firms rather than private firms. (Shaomin Li, Shuhe Li and Weiying Zhang) Introduction Corporate governance was a concept that was not high on the reform agenda in China until the late 1990s (Lu, 2002)...
eBook - ePub- Stephen Tallman(Author)
- 2010(Publication Date)
- Wiley-Blackwell(Publisher)
...The governance of individual transactions is based on relative transaction costs, to include shipping, tariff, bargaining, and opportunism costs. 6. Outsourcing and internal production are complemented by cooperative or alliance transactions, by which the complementary assets of partners are accessed, but not internalized, when neither making nor buying offers the best alternative for accumulating assets. Notes 1 “Under new management: Briefing on the semiconductor industry”, Economist, 4/4/09: 71-73. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Bartlett, C.A. and Ghoshal, S. (1989) Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution. New York: The Free Press. 5 Chandler, A.E. (1962) Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of American Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 6 Rumelt, R.P. (1974) Strategy, Structure, and Economic Performance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 7 Johanson, J. and Vahlne, J.-E. (1977) “The internationalization process of the firm: a model of knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments”, Journal of International Business Studies, 8 (Spring/Summer): 23-32. 8 Stopford, J. and Wells, L. (1972) Managing the Multinational Enterprise: Organization of the Firm and Ownership of the Subsidiaries. New York: Basic Books. 9 Levitt, T. (1983) “The globalization of markets”, Harvard Business Review, 61: 92-102. 10 Stopford, J. and Wells, L. (1872) n. 8 above. 11 Ghoshal, S. (1987) “Global strategy: an organizing framework”, Strategic Management Journal, 8: 425-440. 12 Nohria, N. and Ghoshal, S. (1997) The Differentiated Network. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 13 Birkinshaw, J. (2003) “Strategy and Management in MNE Subsidiaries”, in A.M. Rugman and T.L. Brewer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Business, pp. 381-401. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 14 Buckley, P.J. and Casson, M. (1976) The Future of the Multinational Enterprise. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan. 15 Williamson, O.E...
