Tonkin Gulf Resolution

10 Key excerpts on "Tonkin Gulf Resolution"

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  Vietnam Documents: American and Vietnamese Views

  American and Vietnamese Views

  • George Katsiaficas(Author)
  • 2016(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  had occurred and so were the American public and Congress. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was quickly and unanimously approved by the House of Representatives. By a vote of 88 to 2, it passed the Senate. Without knowing what the future would bring, Congress had given the president a blank check for military action.

  Document 12 is journalist I.F. Stone's article, "International Law and the Tonkin Bay Incidents." In 1964, Stone was one of the few people who perceived the quagmire in which the United States would find itself after the escalation of its military involvement. Hanoi's position that there was never a second incident is provided in Document 13.

  The Gulf of Tonkin resolution provided two American presidents with the constitutional authorization to wage an undeclared war against North Vietnam for over six years. It was not until June 24, 1970, after President Richard Nixon had ordered the invasion of Cambodia, that the Senate voted 88 to 10 to rescind the resolution. By then, the country was in the midst of a severe domestic crisis precipitated by the continuation of the war and the tragic killing of six students during antiwar protests at Kent State and Jackson State universities.

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  Presidential War Power

  Third Edition, Revised

  • Louis Fisher(Author)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • University Press of Kansas

    (Publisher)

  18

  During House debate, no one opposed the legislation or Johnson’s initiatives. Rep. Carl Albert (D-Okla.), the House Majority Leader, emphasized the need to set aside party differences and unite behind the President. The House Minority Leader, Charles Halleck (R-Ind.), took the same position. Edwin Adair, Republican from Indiana, responded to the concern that passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution would signal that legislators are “abdicating our congressional rights and our congressional responsibilities with respect to the declaration of war and with respect to foreign affairs generally.” He said that issue had been raised in committee, “and we were given assurance that it was the attitude of the Executive that such was not the case, that we are not impairing our congressional prerogatives.”19

  Quite an extraordinary statement! Legislators ask executive officials if there has been abdication of congressional duties and are assured that no problem exists. Legislators accepted the word and analysis of executive officials about the protection of congressional prerogatives.

  Neither House bothered to conduct independent investigations to verify Johnson’s account. Senator Mansfield believed that Johnson had acted “in the hope of restraining the dogs of war.”20 Senator Fulbright, in words he would later regret, said that the facts of the Tonkin Gulf incident “are clear.”21 One of the two opponents in the Senate, Wayne Morse, displayed an uncanny gift for prophecy: “Unpopular as it is, I am perfectly willing to make the statement for history that if we follow a course of action that bogs down thousands of American boys in Asia, the administration responsible for it will be rejected and repudiated by the American people. It should be.”22

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  Vietnam War

  A Topical Exploration and Primary Source Collection [2 volumes]

  • James H. Willbanks(Author)
  • 2017(Publication Date)
  • ABC-CLIO

    (Publisher)

  The members of Congress were given the impression that the heart of the resolution, the aspect that they should consider voting for or against, was the passage about supporting the president in repelling armed attacks on U.S. forces. The congressional members were told that they should not worry about the implications of the next paragraph that authorized the president to do whatever he felt necessary to assist South Vietnam, because the administration had no intention of escalating American involvement in the war. Most members of Congress accepted these assurances, and the resolution passed on August 7, unanimously in the House of Representatives (416 to 0) and with only two dissenting votes, by Ernest Gruening (D-Alaska) and Wayne Morse (D-Ore.), in the Senate. In voting in favor of the measure, Congress gave Johnson carte blanche to wage war in Vietnam without a formal declaration of war. There was a very brief debate on the resolution in Congress, but few serious reservations surfaced.

  After Johnson had sent U.S. combat forces to Vietnam and cited the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as his authority, many who had voted for the resolution regretted their action, and some began to investigate the circumstances. They found that the first attack (on August 2, 1964) had not been so clearly unprovoked as they had been told, that there was serious reason to doubt that the second attack (on August 4) had ever happened, and that the administration had been working on preliminary drafts of such a resolution, which it wanted precisely because it was considering an escalation of the war long before the incidents had arisen. By 1968 the resulting disillusionment had become a serious liability for the administration.

  When Senator Morse first proposed in 1966 that Congress repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, there was hardly any support. Sentiment gradually shifted, however, and the resolution was finally repealed by a vote in both houses of Congress at the end of 1970. Furthermore, in November 1973 Congress passed the War Powers Act, which very explicitly laid out the president’s authority to wage war and the role that Congress should play in future conflicts.

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  Teaching U.S. History as Mystery

  • David Gerwin, Jack Zevin(Authors)
  • 2010(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  Section 1. That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

  Section 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

  Section 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

  (http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=old&doc=98

  Tonkin Gulf Resolution; Public Law 88-408, 88th Congress, August 7, 1964; General Records of the United States Government; Record Group 11; National Archives Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Senate roll call tally sheet, 08/07/1964; SEN 88A-M1, Misc Roll Calls, 88th Congress, 2nd Session; Record Group 46, Records of the U. S. Senate; National Archives)

  Item Three: Excerpt from U.S. Senate Debate—August 5, 1964

  Mr. Morse:

  Mr. President, I rise to speak in opposition to the Joint Resolution. I do so with a very sad heart. But I consider the resolution, as I considered the resolution of 1955, known as the Formosa resolution, and the subsequent resolution, known as the Middle East resolution, to be naught but a resolution which embodies a predated declaration of war. Article I, section 8 of our Constitution does not permit the President to make war at his discretion. Therefore I stand on this issue as I have stood before the Senate, perfectly willing to take the judgment of history as to the merits of my cause . . . I am satisfied that history will render a final verdict in opposition to the joint resolution introduced today. The senior Senator from Oregon has no illusions as to the reactions which will be aroused in some quarters in this Republic. However, I make the speech because it represents the convictions of my conscience and because I consider it essential to make it in keeping the sworn trust that I undertook when I came into this body . . . pledging myself to uphold the Constitution. I have one other remark by way of preface, not contained in the manuscript. I yield to no other Senator, or to anyone else in this country in my opposition to communism and all that communism stands for. In our time a great struggle, which may very well be a deathlock struggle, is going on in the world between freedom on the one hand and the totalitarianism of communism on the other. However, I am satisfied that the struggle can never be settled by war. I am satisfied that if the hope of anyone is that the struggle between freedom and communism can be settled by war, and that course is followed, both freedom and communism will lose, for there will be no victory in that war. Because of our own deep interest in the struggle against communism, we in the United States are inclined to overlook some of the other struggles which are occupying others. We try to force every issue into the context of freedom versus communism. That is one of our great mistakes in Asia. There is much communism there, and much totalitarianism in other forms. We say we are opposing communism there, but that does not mean that we are advancing freedom, because we are not. . . . I believe the only hope for the establishment of a permanent peace in the world is to practice our oft-repeated American professing we believe in the substitution of the rule of law for the jungle law of military force as a means of settling disputes which threaten the peace of the world. . . . It makes no difference who says that our objective is peace, even if he be the President of the United States. Our actions speak louder than words; and our actions in Asia today are the actions of warmaking. As I speak on the floor of the Senate at this moment, the United States is making war in Asia. (Congressional Record

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  War and Responsibility

  Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath

  • John Hart Ely(Author)
  • 2020(Publication Date)
  • Princeton University Press

    (Publisher)

  The defense of South Vietnam, we have seen, was a project that had been congressionally authorized by the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and other statutory provisions as well. (There is no doubt that Cambodian sanctuaries were in fact being used as bases for Communist moves into Vietnam.) Thus viewed, it is difficult to understand the theory on which the president needed additional statutory authorization for the drive—any more, for example, than Franklin Roosevelt needed special congressional permission for our landings in French North Africa (at the time a neutral territory) or on various Pacific islands with which we, similarly, were not at war. 127 T HE R EPEAL OF THE T ONKIN G ULF R ESOLUTION, 1971 Congress repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on January 12, 1971. Some observers concluded that it had thereby withdrawn the authority for the American war in Indochina. 128 You will not be surprised to learn that it was not that simple. Congress threw so many anchors to windward, leeward, and every other whichward that by the time it got through it was difficult to determine what, if any, course it intended to chart. The movement for repeal was born of a desire to end the war, and many who voted for it undoubtedly hoped that it would contribute to that result. The Nixon forces were slick, however. 129 Having originally opposed repeal, the administration subsequently decided to support it, asserting that the Resolution wasn’t essential to the president’s authority

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  Vietnam

  An American Ordeal

  • George Donelson Moss(Author)
  • 2020(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  43 When Senators Gruening and Morse sought reelection, they were both defeated.

  The resolution that Johnson would later use as a congressional authorization for the U.S. Vietnam War had an Orwellian official title: The Joint Resolution to Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia. It soon became known as the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The key language in the 300-word document that granted Johnson the legal authority he later used to wage a war in Vietnam:

  The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attacks against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. The United States is therefore prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.44

  Johnson intended that the reprisal raids and the prompt congressional passage of the resolution would serve several political purposes. The administration sent General Khanh and his South Vietnamese political opponents a message that America was determined to back his government. At home, by demonstrating that the president could defend the U.S. interests in Vietnam without expanding the war, Johnson silenced Republican presidential challenger Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, who had previously urged Washington to escalate the war and send additional ground troops to South Vietnam. Goldwater had no choice but to support the air strikes and vote for the resolution. By neutralizing Goldwater, Johnson effectively removed the war issue from the upcoming election campaign. The first congressional debate on Vietnam had brought “a near-unanimous endorsement of the president’s policies and provided him an apparently solid foundation upon which to construct future policy.”45

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  The Vietnam War

  • David L. Anderson(Author)
  • 2017(Publication Date)
  • Bloomsbury Academic

    (Publisher)

  11 This Tonkin Gulf Resolution passed the House of Representatives unanimously and the Senate with only two dissenting votes and became the principal legal authority for the massive American war effort that subsequently emerged in Vietnam. In August 1964, however, Johnson wanted to keep the war limited. He calculated mistakenly that the near unanimous vote in Congress and the bombing of North Vietnamese territory would be enough to deter the DRV from its support of southern insurgency. He judged correctly that his firm but measured response to the Tonkin Gulf naval incidents would help him in his impending presidential contest with Republican candidate Barry Goldwater, who advocated widening the war. In the November 1964 election, Johnson won in a landslide. The near unanimous vote for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and Johnson’s decisive electoral victory revealed solid political support for the president’s moves in Vietnam. He had gained these successes at the expense of candor, however, and the deception would lead to loss of credibility later.

  Americanization of the War

  In South Vietnam the demonstrations of American determination did not improve the Saigon government’s prospects. In fact, the DRV and NLF interpreted the US actions as preliminary to expanded fighting and accelerated their military preparations in the South. Political instability mounted as Buddhists and Catholics continued to clash and various civilian and military leaders in Saigon jockeyed for power. Having crossed the bombing threshold in August, a majority of Johnson’s inner circle recommended the use of more American air power. Under-Secretary of State George Ball pointed out that bombing the North did not directly pressure the insurgents in the South, and he also warned that a major air campaign could force China, the USSR, or both to intervene directly to rescue their socialist allies in Hanoi. Most of the president’s aides believed, however, that bombing should be tried to bolster Southern morale, to slow infiltration, and to intimidate the North and its allies. With regard to possible reaction by the Soviets and Chinese, there was also risk if the United States did nothing. The USSR had new leaders and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had new nuclear weapons. A collapse in Saigon at this juncture could have encouraged Moscow and Beijing to challenge the United States elsewhere in the world. As a result of these discussions within the administration, in December 1964 Johnson approved a top secret plan that included the bombing of North Vietnam and the likelihood of sending US ground forces to South Vietnam.12

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  The Origins of the Vietnam War

  • A. Short(Author)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  41 His role as Senate Majority Leader during the Eisenhower presidency had however been to facilitate rather than to criticize Republican foreign policy: to the point where it was also said that his insistence on subordination to the executive on all issues of national security – even denying the right of Congress to information – seriously reduced the Senate's ability to participate in foreign policy decisions; and that by insisting that the Senate yield to the President he reduced its customary right to share in foreign policy. Having just crossed one major barrier on the road between peace and war by an open attack on North Vietnam, but with the likelihood that something more would be needed, Johnson was about to demonstrate that skill of consensus building and deployment which had been the hallmark of his political life. Of his previous Senate mobilizations it was said they were like Greek drama – most of the action had taken place off-stage – and the passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution through Congress was no exception. With minimum divulgence of detail that could throw into question the account of unprovoked aggression, and with Democrats and Republicans responding to the same patriotic feelings, the House voted unanimously in favour of the joint resolution.

  In the Senate it was to prove more difficult: even if the final score of 88-2 in favour of the resolution suggested a runaway victory. Few questions had been asked at a remarkably brief committee session but in the course of a two-day debate, apart from the poignant warnings of Senator Morse, it was obvious that many Senators had reservations about the US position and US policies in Vietnam but hardly anyone thought that was the occasion to. voice them. An unprovoked attack had been made on US ships; there had been an appropriate response; and now it was time to close ranks and support the President. Honour, integrity and vital interests were mentioned but it was a sober, responsible and dignified debate in which almost everyone agreed with Senator Fulbright that the situation had been handled in the best possible way and that the joint resolution in turn was the best way to prevent an escalation or enlargement of the war. The reassurance of Fulbright, who was steering the resolution through the Senate, with the support of Majority and Minority leaders, the more important in the case of someone like Mansfield who was known to have fundamental doubts about US policy, allowed the Senators to believe that, open-ended permission notwithstanding, they were voting to contain rather than to expand the war and the US role therein. Senator Nelson had wanted to make it absolutely explicit by introducing an amendment, part of which read: ‘Our continuing policy is to limit our role to the provision of aid, training assistance, and military advice, and it is the sense of Congress that, except when provoked to a greater response, we should continue to attempt to avoid a direct military involvement in the South-East Asian conflict.’42 On procedural grounds Fulbright regretted that he could not accept the amendment but nevertheless he gave it an endorsement which seemed just as valuable as the amendment itself: ‘I believe it is an accurate reflection of what I believe is the President's policy, judging from his own statement.’43

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  Studies in Conflict, Diplomacy, and Peace

  Belligerence, Protest, and Agony in Dixie

  • Joseph A. Fry(Author)
  • 2015(Publication Date)
  • The University Press of Kentucky

    (Publisher)

  The sum was relatively insignificant, but LBJ’s characterization of the vote portrayed congressional action as a reendorsement of his Vietnam policies, as the passage of what Undersecretary of State William P. Bundy described as a “small-scale new Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.” Johnson emphasized, “This is not a routine appropriation. For each Member of Congress who supports this request is also voting to persist in our effort to halt Communist aggression in South Vietnam.” By reiterating the administration stance that “national unity” was critical to US standing “in the world,” the president suggested that antiwar dissent undermined American foreign policy; and he added the powerful warning that opposing the requested appropriation betrayed American soldiers in the field: “To deny and delay this means to deny and to delay the fullest support of the American people and the American Congress to those brave men who are risking their lives for freedom in Vietnam.” When Congress approved the appropriation overwhelmingly, Johnson had not only forced the legislative branch to go on record again backing the war but also officially introduced the potent argument that hindering funding for the war was equivalent to abandoning the troops. 11 As the Johns Hopkins speech and the May 4 supplemental appropriation demonstrated, Johnson’s acute political sensibilities and long congressional experience went far toward limiting debate and dissent, but he could not have kept Congress so well controlled during 1965 without the assistance of fellow southerners, particularly Fulbright and Russell. Had not the chairmen of the SFRC and SASC and Mike Mansfield (D-MT), the Democratic Senate majority leader, been unwilling to oppose the president or initiate a Senate debate on Johnson’s policies through most of 1965, LBJ could not have followed his relatively low-key road to war

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  Current Intelligence

  How the CIA's Top-Secret Presidential Briefing Shaped History

  • David Charlwood(Author)
  • 2022(Publication Date)
  • The History Press

    (Publisher)

  Maddox . He cast doubt on the earlier reports of the second attack on the ships: ‘Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonar operators may have accounted for the reports,’ he admitted. It is suggested McNamara received the message but did not inform Johnson.

  Eight hours later, the President took to the airwaves to address the American people. He told them of ‘hostile actions’ against US ships in the sea off North Vietnam, asserting:

  repeated acts of violence … must be met not only with alert defense, but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations.

  He added, ‘our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict. We still seek no wider war.’ Within half an hour, US strike aircraft arrived over their targets in North Vietnam.

  Three days later, on 7 August, Johnson secured the ‘Gulf of Tonkin Resolution’ from Congress. It authorised the President ‘as Commander-in-Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression’. It would serve as the formal declaration of war for Vietnam. A decade before, Eisenhower had tried to secure a similar concession from Congress so the USA could support the French in Vietnam, but Johnson had been one of the senators most staunchly against. Ten years on and now President, he seemed comfortable ignoring his own past reservations.

  In the month leading up to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Johnson’s Daily Briefs often covered Vietnam. On 4 July, the analysts noted, ‘The Viet Cong in the central Highlands [of South Vietnam] have been especially active lately. In an attack at battalion strength on 4th July, the Communists killed 51 and 139 wounded, including four US personnel.’ The following day, Johnson’s Brief reported that a Viet Cong attack on a special forces camp had killed fifty-seven, including three US soldiers. The scale of the attacks was of significant concern, with large attacks at the ‘highest level ever’, while it was estimated that the Viet Cong force was now between 28,000 and 34,000 strong. Johnson’s Briefs in July informed him of the deaths of six US soldiers, some killed at a base where they were training South Vietnamese, others in an ambush of a convoy.

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