Britain in the Second World War

Mark Donnelly

• Editore: Routledge
• Anno: 1999
• ISBN:
  9781134687299
• Edizione: 1
• Argomento: Storia
• Categoria: Storia mondiale

Britain in the Second World War presents a new and vivid survey of politics, society, culture and military strategy between 1939 and 1945. Structured around themes such as 'Wartime Media', and 'Britain and its Allies', the book covers the major historical debates of these areas, including Britains commitment to remain in the conflict until unconditional surrender and the effect of war on the status of women.
It includes discussion of:
* politics, including Churchill's wartime strategy and the 1945 election
* the economy
* selling the war to the public
* the influence of war on British society.
Britain in the Second World War is a compact history of wartime Britain which not only provides a succinct narrative of events, but also highlights contemporary historical debate.

Chapter 1
Wartime politics

The most significant political developments in Britain during the second world war followed the formation of a new coalition government under Winston Churchill in 1940. This coalition replaced the Conservative-dominated national government which had been in power since 1931, thereby ending a decade of Conservative ascendancy. Labour returned to a share in government with fewer posts than the Conservatives, but historians have shown that the party used its place in the coalition to reshape the domestic agenda of British politics (Addison 1975; Jefferys 1991; Brooke 1992). At the administrative level, the functions of government simply grew to meet the demands of ‘total war'. The staff of central government almost doubled in wartime and new methods of economic management, industrial organisation and public administration were used, some of which lasted into the post-war period (see chapter 3). At the popular level, the common experience of war was seen by commentators to have promoted a new set of political values. It is generally agreed that the wartime ‘swing to the left' contributed to the election of the first majority Labour government in 1945; as will be shown, however, the debate continues about the strength, timing and ideological content of this shift in political opinion (Mason and Thompson 1991; Fielding 1992). More controversial still is the thesis that cross-party co-operation in wartime gave rise to a political consensus, characterised by policy convergence on areas such as welfare reform, the operation of a mixed economy, conciliation of the trade unions and a commitment to full employment (Addison 1975; Kavanagh and Morris 1994; Dutton 1997b). This chapter will assess the political impact of the war, both at Westminster and in terms of popular attitudes. First, though, a brief discussion is required of high politics in the immediate pre-war period and the factors which led to the replacement of Chamberlain's government with Churchill's coalition.

The outbreak of war and the downfall of
Chamberlain

The declaration of war on Germany on 3 September 1939 was announced by Neville Chamberlain, a forceful if uncharismatic Conservative politician who succeeded Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister in May 1937. Chamberlain's arrival at the top of the political hierarchy coincided with an acceleration in Britain's recovery from the deep and prolonged depression which had scarred parts of the country during the inter-war years. He could claim some credit for this as a former Chancellor in a government which combined low interest rates, a managed exchange rate, balanced budgets—or at worst modest budget deficits—cautious social reform and limited state intervention in industry to ease recovery. As Prime Minister, though, Chamberlain's attention was diverted away from the domestic issues which had preoccupied him at the Treasury and towards the sphere of international diplomacy.

Chamberlain had the misfortune to become premier at a time when a second major war in twenty years appeared likely. Germany had never been reconciled to the punitive conditions and territorial losses imposed in 1919 after its defeat in the first world war. When Adolf Hitler's National Socialist Party came to power in 1933 there was no longer any doubt that Germany was prepared to use force to secure a revision of the post-war settlement in its favour. Germany was joined in its rejection of the legitimacy of the 1919 settlement by Italy, ruled since 1922 by the fascist dictator Benito Mussolini. Lacking the resources to realise their own territorial ambitions in isolation, the Italians welcomed the prospect of a militarily powerful Germany challenging Britain and France, the two main guarantors of stability in the Mediterranean. Outside Europe, Japan was a third major power committed to a policy of territorial expansion. As part of its objective of increasing its economic, strategic and military power in the Pacific, Japan occupied the Chinese territory of Manchuria in 1931 and further encroached into northern China in 1937. By the time he became Prime Minister, therefore, Chamberlain was faced with three powers which were prepared to go to war in pursuit of their foreign policy goals and who threatened Britain's interests in Europe and Asia.

Chamberlain believed that he could save Britain from war by acting as a diplomatic broker, maintaining peace by redressing grievances with negotiation and compromise. In the 1930s this policy of appeasement was supported by the Chiefs of Staff who warned that Britain would lose a war against Germany, Italy and Japan unless it had the support of the United States. In addition to the strategic rationale for appeasement, supporters of the policy also used political, economic and moral arguments to justify their position. Many of these arguments are contentious, but the point remains that Chamberlain's conduct of foreign policy consolidated rather than weakened his authority before the war. Even as potentially damaging an episode as the resignation of his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, after a disagreement over policy towards Italy in February 1938, was met with broad equanimity by press and politicians. In view of the opprobrium which was later heaped on Chamberlain, Lord Halifax—Eden's successor at the Foreign Office —and his cabinet colleagues, Sir John Simon and Samuel Hoare, it should also be remembered that appeasement was accompanied by rearmament, particularly of Britain's air defences. Appeasement was not a strategy to buy time, but Chamberlain and his advisers always recognised the need to prepare the country for conflict in case negotiated settlements of international disputes proved unobtainable. The worth of this policy was proved in the aftermath of the Czech crisis of September 1938, as the realisation set in that a peaceful way of satisfying Germany's ambitions was a chimera.

It now appears that Hitler was determined to provoke war with Czechoslovakia in preparation for a later attack on the Soviet Union. But the ostensible issue in the autumn of 1938 was the fate of some three million German-speaking Sudetendeutsche within the Czech borders, whom Hitler demanded should be included within his Reich. Chamberlain took this demand at face value and began the search for a peaceful resolution of the Czech-German border dispute. Despite the fact that the Czechs could put between thirty and forty divisions in the field, had a heavily fortified mountain frontier with Germany and possessed the largest armaments factory in the world, Britain recommended that frontier areas which contained a German majority should be given full and immediate rights of self-determination. Chamberlain flew to a series of meetings with Hitler to broker a settlement, while at the same time co-ordinating policy with the French and keeping up the pressure on the Czech President Benes to sacrifice land for peace. The product of these efforts was the Munich Agreement, which transferred the Sudetenland to Germany under international supervision and averted war. The Agreement was met with public euphoria in Britain, most of the press regarded it as a triumph for Chamberlain and it was endorsed by a large majority in the Commons. Nevertheless, euphoria was soon overtaken by an awkward recognition that the Czechs had been forced to make a sacrifice which effectively destroyed their strategic integrity. Nagging doubts also remained that Hitler was far from satiated and that war had been delayed rather than averted.

The Munich Agreement and Hitler's assurances that he would respect the new Czech frontiers proved worthless in March 1939 when German forces occupied Prague and what remained of the Czech provinces of Czechoslovakia. Acknowledging that previous peaceful attempts to restrain Hitler had failed, Britain resolved to send a clear signal to Germany that it would not remain neutral if another nation's sovereignty was violated. This attempt to restrain Germany with a threat of force took the specific form of a guarantee to Poland; this was of limited value to the Poles without a concomitant agreement with the Soviet Union, but the ultimate purpose was to leave Hitler in no doubt about Britain's intentions. In the spring and summer of 1939 Britain made preparations for a war that was increasingly unavoidable; rearmament was accelerated, air-raid shelters were built and conscription began. The signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact on 23 August 1939 left Hitler with a free hand to attack Poland and cleared the way for war. After attempts to secure British neutrality had failed, the Germans attacked Poland on 1 September. Chamberlain, who had invested so much on the preservation of peace, now had to lead his country in war.

Much has been made of Chamberlain's apparent unsuitability as a wartime leader. Two of his earliest biographers argued that he was simply not the right man to lead the country in war and that his replacement was only a matter of time (Feiling 1970:419; Macleod 1961:282). Taylor argued that Chamberlain never fully recovered his authority after the abandonment of appeasement and ultimately paid the price in May 1940 (Taylor 1965). This deterministic view of Chamberlain's downfall, though, has been challenged by writers who argue that it was avoidable mistakes made by the Prime Minister after rather than before the outbreak of war which were crucial (Jefferys 1991; Corfield 1996). The failure to preserve peace was undoubtedly a blow to Chamberlain on a number of different levels, but there was nothing inevitable about his replacement by Churchill after appeasement had given way to war. Chamberlain had the opportunity to reestablish his political authority during the early phase of the war, but he spurned the chance.

Chamberlain's delay in sending an ultimatum to Germany after their attack on Poland was not without justification; careful arrangements with Britain's main ally, France, had to be agreed and whenever the announcement of war came there was no prospect of Britain lending actual military support to the Poles. Nevertheless, the fact that the ultimatum and declaration of war were held back until 3 September raised suspicions that Chamberlain was intent on a further deal with Hitler and left the impression that the Prime Minister had been reluctantly dragged into war after having seriously considered reneging on Britain's guarantee to Poland. Cabinet and parliament had both expressed strong opposition to the delay and it was no surprise when the All-Party Parliamentary Action Group was formed—chaired by the Liberal, Clement Davies—to keep a watchful eye over the government's conduct of the war.

For those at Westminster who doubted the Prime Minister's capabilities as a war leader, though, there seemed no immediate prospect of his removal. Chamberlain minimised the prospect of a revolt from within his party by including two of his most high-profile critics inside the government: Churchill came into the nine-man war cabinet as First Lord of the Admiralty and Eden was appointed to the non-cabinet post of Dominions Secretary. Chamberlain's government enjoyed a safe majority of more than 200 in parliament; the three main parties signed an electoral truce in which they agreed not to contest the previous incumbent's party at by-elections; the national press at the start of the war believed it had a patriotic duty to support the Prime Minister; and opinion polls by November 1939 showed that Chamberlain was more popular than ever. Apart from a handful of pacifists at Westminster, the Independent Labour Party (ILP) and eventually the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), there was little organised opposition to the war effort. The Labour Party, which had long advocated a more forceful stance against Hitler, refused Chamberlain's invitation to join his government and opted instead for a position of ‘patriotic opposition'. In the long term this refusal was to have profoundly damaging consequences for the Prime Minister, but in the context of September 1939 it raised more difficulties for Labour than for Chamberlain. The party reserved the right to criticise the war effort, but the line between criticism and disloyalty to the national cause at a time of emergency was a thin one which had to be walked carefully.

It was in the early months of hostilities that Chamberlain undermined his position of strength and built up the well of resentment, mistrust and dissatisfaction which was to prove crucial in May 1940. Despite Hitler's offensives against Czechoslovakia and Poland, the Prime Minister continued to believe from September 1939 that a major war could be averted in Europe; the longer the Germans delayed their attack on the west, the more convinced Chamberlain became that they had ‘missed the bus' and would not risk a war against British and French forces which had been allowed time to rearm. The navy carried the fight to the enemy, sinking German U-boats , forcing the scuttling of the German pocket battleship Graf Spee in December 1939, and seizing the Altmark in February 1940. But the army was involved in no major action on land before April 1940 and the Royal Air Force (RAF) had to be content with dropping propaganda leaflets rather than explosives over Germany. With some insensitivity to those seamen who fought and died at the time, the early months of the conflict became known as the ‘bore war', later the ‘phoney war'. As Chamberlain's conviction grew that a major campaign could be avoided, he saw no need to galvanise the country, his administration or the economy fully for war. This was the misjudgement which ultimately made his position as Prime Minister untenable.

Criticisms of Chamberlain's command of the war effort can be divided into two broad categories. The first was his handling of personnel; here he was accused of promoting known government loyalists to important posts rather than individuals with talent and ability (Addison 1975:66; Jefferys 1991:18). Chamberlain's Chief Whip, David Margesson, ensured that the old inner-ring who had dominated government in the pre-war period held on to power; with the exception of Churchill, this meant that no member of the cabinet was forceful enough to rival the authority of Chamberlain in the Commons. The Prime Minister's political instincts and the calculation that it was easier to divide and rule a larger cabinet may also help to explain why Chamberlain consistently rejected calls for a smaller, non-departmental war cabinet along the lines which Lloyd George had formed in the first world war. This refusal was blamed in part for the lacklustre organisation of the war effort in the early months. Critics hoped that as Asquith had been forced to give way to Lloyd George as premier in 1916, so too would Chamberlain be forced to stand aside for a more dynamic successor sooner rather than later.

The second major criticism of Chamberlain concerned his handling of the wartime economy. A series of measures were taken to mobilise the national resources for war: the distribution of manpower between the armed forces and key industries and services was controlled; targets were set for the expansion of war-related industries; new Ministries of Supply and Food were established; and taxes were raised to help finance the war effort and check inflation. But critics focused on the government's failure to exert more wide-ranging state direction of the economy. There was particular disappointment at Chamberlain's refusal to create a new post in the war cabinet with overall responsibility for coordinating the war economy, supported by an economic general staff. Instead, control of the war economy was diffused across a range of separate departments. Aided by some helpful leaks from sympathetic civil servants, Labour made detailed and often effective attacks on inefficient ministries and continued to demand greater drive, planning and vision from the government. The opposition's charge of administrative complacency increasingly centred on the government's failure to tackle manpower shortages in key industries. Almost a million workers remained unemployed by spring 1940, yet many factories were working well below full capacity, there was a scarcity of skilled labour in some regions such as the Midlands, and Churchill complained in cabinet that organisation of manpower had barely begun in the engineering, motor and aircraft manufacturing industries (Corfield 1996: 22–8). These manpower shortages contributed to wage inflation and poaching of labour; more significantly, they acted as a brake on the expansion of industries which were vital to the war effort. To tackle the problem effectively required a fundamental restructuring of labour-supply policy, which in turn implied close co-operation between government and trade unions. Chamberlain's administration, however, was only prepared to consult the trade unions, it was not willing to recognise a formal role for them in the management of the war effort. Ernest Bevin, the General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU), argued that the successful prosecution of the war required an effective partnership between government, employers and unions; he concluded publicly on May Day 1940 that only a new government could construct such a partnership.

Bevin was not alone in his belief that the early months of the war had demonstrated the need for a new government. Since September 1939 Labour had been willing in principle to join a coalition government, provided they were allocated a sufficient share in power, and as the war progressed their conviction grew that a government of national unity was vital; their main objection was to serving under Chamberlain, whom they regarded as having built up a charge sheet of offences against the Labour movement which was too long to be ignored (Addison 1975: 54). Members of the backbench All-Party Parliamentary Action Group shared the view that the time had come to replace an administration that had run its course. Chamberlain's most vehement critics simply had to wait for an opportunity to strike a fatal blow against his leadership; when British forces failed in their first major offensive of the war in Norway in April and May 1940 their moment had arrived.

Chamberlain was not primarily responsible for the chaos which led to the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) from Norway— Churchill had a far more direct role in its planning and execution—but the episode came to be seen as a manifestation of the deeper malaise which the Prime Minister's consistent failures of leadership since the outbreak of war had produced. Labour's response to the defeat was to initiate a two-day debate on the conduct of the war on 7 and 8 May; it was this debate which sealed Chamberlain's fate as Prime Minister.

The details of the debate have been recounted frequently elsewhere (Addison 1975:94–8; Jefferys 1991:22–4; Roberts 1976), so a brief summary will suffice here. On the first day of the debate, forceful contributions from Admiral Sir Roger Keyes and Leo Amery damaged the government and strengthened the resolve of critics, particularly on the Conservative benches, to act against Chamberlain. Amery's devastating critique carried extra force because he was a former colleague of the Prime Minister. His attack concluded with a rhetorical flourish which recalled Oliver Cromwell's injunction to the Long Parliament: ‘You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go.' At the beginning of the second day Labour announced that it would force a vote at the end of the debate; the party's initial fears that a division would persuade even critical Tories to rally behind their Prime Minister subsided as the strength of feeling against the government became apparent. Chamberlain compounded his problems by appealing to his ‘friends' to support him in the division, leading perhaps unfairly to the accusation that he was attempting to transform an issue of national importance into a test of personal loyalty; it was after all common practice for members of parliament to refer to party colleagues as ‘honourable friends'. Behind the scenes, Clement Davies and the All-Party Parliamentary Action Group cajoled and co-ordinated opposition to the Prime Minister. Finally, when the division was called on 8 May, Chamberlain fatally lacked the reservoir of goodwill and trust which Churchill was able to draw from after more serious military setbacks later in the war. The result of 281 votes for the government and 200 against was a victory for Chamberlain, but 40 members of his own party had voted against him and perhaps another 30 had abstained. After a brief and failed attempt to reconstruct his administration—during which Labour reaffirmed their refusal to serve under him—Chamberlain was forced to concede that a Prime Minister in a major war required a far greater endorsement from his colleagues than the one he had received. He resigned on 10 May, the same day that Hitler launched his attack on the west.

The myth which surrounds Churchill's role in the second world war suggests that he was the obvious and natural successor to Chamberlain. Churchill's own memoirs—which have done so much to shape and sustain the myth—put forward the view that he was ‘walking with destiny' in May 1940 (Churchill 1948:428). There can be little doubt that he was regarded in most quarters by this time as a contender for the premiership. His warnings in the 1930s about the dangers posed by Nazi Germany were now seen to be justified; he had long experience of parliament, government and high office; as First Lord of the Admiralty his dynamism, oratorical powers and flair for public relations easily eclipsed the efforts of all other ministers; and his support within Fleet Street ensured that he remained popular with the public. Against these qualities, though, had to be set obvious weaknesses which cast some doubt on his chances of succeeding Chamberlain. After crossing the floor of the House of Commons twice and alienating the Tory leadership on a range of personal and political matters, Churchill had been kept out of office in the 1930s and lacked a solid base of support within his party. His temperament was seen by many as too volatile for the position of Prime Minister—a view which was reinforced by his conduct at the Admiralty which reawakened memories of the daring but ultimately disastrous Dardanelles operation of 1915. Senior civil servants shivered at the prospect of Churchill leading a government, a sense of unease that was shared by King George VI who remembered Churchill's support for Edward VIII in the Abdication crisis (Roberts 1994:38–9). In fact, the choice of the monarchy, senior civil servants and Chamberlain himself to take over as Prime Minister' was Lord Halifax. But at a meeting with Chamberlain, Churchill and Margesson on 9 May, Halifax ruled himself out of the job, ostensibly because he was reluctant to lead a government as a peer rather than an elected member of parliament, but more likely because he believed he could best act as a restraining force on Churchill from a senior but subordinate role within the war cabinet (Roberts 1992:198–207). As a result, Churchill was asked to form a government on 10 May.

The Churchill coalition, 1940–2

Churchill had become Prime Minister largely because members of all the main parties were prepared to serve under him in a coalition, not because he was seen as a national saviour. The popularity and political authority which he enjoyed later in the war often overshadows the extent to which Churchill's position was constrained in the early months of his premiership. Although Chamberlain was now a subordinate in Churchill's war cabinet, he remained the leader of the Conservative party at Westminster, most of whom had stayed loyal during the two-day debate. Among those Tories who had deserted Chamberlain on 8 May was a number who regretted their rebellion almost immediately; their aim had been to register a protest at the government's performance, not to force the resignation of the...

Indice dei contenuti

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Britain in the Second World War
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Chronology of the war in the west
• Introduction
• Chapter 1: Wartime politics
• Chapter 2: The people's war
• Chapter 3: The wartime economy
• Chapter 4: Wartime media—press, radio and cinema
• Chapter 5: Wartime strategy—Britain and its Allies
• Bibliography