Racial Resentment in the Political Mind

Darren W. Davis,David C. Wilson

• Editore: University of Chicago Press
• Anno: 2021
• ISBN:
  9780226814704
• Argomento: Scienze sociali
• Categoria: Sociologia

A thought-provoking look at how racial resentment, rather than racial prejudice alone, motivate a growing resistance among whites to improve the circumstances faced by racial minorities. In ?Racial Resentment in the Political Mind, Darren W. Davis and David C. Wilson challenge the commonly held notion that all racial negativity, disagreements, and objections to policies that seek to help racial minorities stem from racial prejudice. They argue that racialresentment?arises?fromjust-world beliefs and appraisals of deservingness that help explain the persistence of racial inequality in America in ways more consequential than racism or racial prejudice alone.The culprits, as manyWhitepeople see it, are undeserving people of color, who are perceived to benefit unfairly from, and take advantage of, resources that come at Whites' expense—a worldview in which any attempt at modest change is seen as a challenge to the status quo and privilege. Yet, as Davis and Wilson reveal, many Whites have become racially resentful due to their perceptions that African Americans skirt the "rules of the game" and violate traditional values by taking advantage of unearned resources. Resulting attempts at racial progress leadWhites to respond in ways that retain their social advantage—opposing ameliorative policies, minority candidates, and other advancement on racial progress. Because racial resentment is rooted in beliefs about justice, fairness, and deservingness, ordinary citizens, who may not harbor racist motivations, may wind up in the same political position as racists, but for different reasons.

Chapter One

“I’m Not a Racist, but . . .”

The Problem

With the growing sentiment among Whites that they are“losing out” and “being cut in line” by African Americans and other minorities—as reflected in an emphasis on diversity and inclusion, multiculturalism, trigger warnings, and political correctness, as well as the projected majority-minority shift in the composition of the US population, anincrease in African Americans occupying powerful and prestigious positions, and the election of Barack Obama as the first African American president—there is a perception that the “American way of life” that has advantaged them is being threatened. These perceived threats come in the form ofattacks on the status quo and social hierarchy, defiance of traditional political and societal values, and a contestation of White entitlement and privilege.1 Perceptions that they are falling behind culminate in a belief in reverse discrimination. A vast majority of Whites (72 percent) believe their group is discriminated against, while substantially less (28 percent) report experiencing discrimination personally.2 The culprits, as they see it, are undeserving and contemptible African Americans, as well as other minorities, who are perceived to benefit unfairly from, and take advantage of, resources that come at Whites’ expense (Crawford et al. 2019; Mayrl and Saperstein 2013; Wilkins and Kaiser 2014).3 This perceived reallocation of unearned resources to undeserving African Americans challenges the status quo and the “rules of the game,” especially as they relate to justice and deservingness. Such reactions do not stem exclusively from racial prejudice or hatred toward African Americans; instead, they may result from threats to Whites’ sense of justice, entitlement, and status. This sentiment is occurring among everyday citizens who may not subscribe to hate-filled racial or nationalistic ideologies but rather seek to treat everyone respectfully and equally, even those who are different, and understand that rejecting others because of racial prejudice is offensive. They may not think of themselves as racially prejudiced and indeed readily insist that they are not (Dovidio and Gaertner 1986), but they adhere to beliefs that place them in the same bucket with racists.

People do not have to hate or subscribe to racist ideologies to commiserate with racists (Bonilla-Silva 2006; Federico and Sidanius 2002; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Principled and race-neutral motivations, such as political conservatism (McClosky 1958), authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1981), perceived group conflict (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999), dogmatism (Rokeach 1960), and social dominance (Sidanius and Pratto 1999),4 assert that everyday people can do and say things that produce the same outcomes as those who are racially prejudiced but without the racially demeaning rationalizations. In plain terms, race-neutral and principled people base their decisions on values, like justice, fairness, or defense of the status hierarchy, that do not require a belief in the inferiority of African Americans or antipathy toward African Americans and other minorities (Gibson 2008, 2009). Rigid and inflexible adherence to a set of values can make one virtually indistinguishable from racists, however. Conservatives may object to policies like affirmative action, like racists do, because they believe in self-reliance and that people should pull themselves up without any help from others. Authoritarians may defend the police killing of unarmed black men and women, like racists do, because they respect law and order, and obedience. And individuals high in social dominance may oppose policies designed to aid in the welfare of African Americans, like racists do, because they think the social divisions are acceptable and should be preserved.

This literature teaches us that racial prejudice is neither a necessary nor sufficient explanation for understanding racial politics. Yet, the current conceptualization and measure of classic racial resentment, the dominant analytical framework available to political scientists in understanding racial politics introduced over 30 years ago, superimposes racial prejudice and hatred on explanations of behavior (Kinder and Sanders 1996). The current conceptualization of classic racial resentment has failed on several grounds; chief among them are presumptions that its measurement reflects racial prejudice and violations of individualism. More importantly, as an analytical framework, the current conceptualization of classic racial resentment suggests that the denigration of President Obama and the rise of President Trump can be explained only in terms of racial prejudice.

Our contention parallels the arguments made by Lawrence Blum (2002), who referred to the tendency to label racial discourse as racist as “conceptual inflation.” Blum (2002) asserts,

Not every instance of racial conflict, insensitivity, discomfort, miscommunication, exclusion, injustice, or ignorance should be called “racist.” Not all racial incidents are racist incidents. We need a more varied and nuanced moral vocabulary for talking about the domain of race. We need to articulate the range of values and disvalues implicated in race-based beliefs and attitudes, actions and interactions, institutions and practices. . . . If someone displays racial insensitivity, but not racism, people should be able to see that for what it is. (p. 2)

We agree wholeheartedly with Blum (2002) on this point. We contend in this book that Whites’ resentment toward African Americans, properly conceived and measured, is not necessarily racial prejudice, but rather it may stem from a just-world motive and an appraisal of deservingness along with legitimizing racial myths (i.e., negative racial information and stereotypes). The major problem, as we see it, is that the only analytical framework available to political scientists for understanding politics today is seriously flawed and sees everything racialized as being motivated by racial prejudice or anti-Black affect. Researchers overlook so many other values among ordinary citizens and fail to hold them accountable for beliefs that have the same consequence as racial prejudice.

This book separates racial resentment from racial prejudice. Considering the recent political messaging suggesting that undeserving African Americans and minorities are threatening the status quo and the “American way of life,” this task has a special urgency. Stemming from an internal sense of justice, which we all possess, racial resentment contends that it is objectionable, discomforting, and antithetical for African Americans and other minorities to benefit from unearned resources that ultimately are perceived as disadvantaging Whites or altering the status quo. Thus, unlike racial prejudice, racial resentment is motivated by the feeling that people should get what they deserve and deserve what they get. When this fundamental expectation is disrupted, one’s sense of justice or fairness is violated, and resentment toward an “undeserving” individual ensues. By definition, resentment is anger over the unjust receipt of positive outcomes, and the sense of injustice stems from a negative appraisal of the means used to gain the outcome (Feather 1999). Injustice also occurs when deserving individuals are not rewarded.

While racial prejudice and race-neutral beliefs, like conservatism, authoritarianism, social dominance theory (SDT), and many others, are relevant in understanding recent presidential elections (Hutchings 2009; Tesler and Sears 2010; Valentino and Brader 2011), we believe that racial resentment toward African Americans is a more valid analytical framework within which to understand political sentiments today. When Whites perceive that they are losing ground to African Americans because of concerns over racial equality and amelioration, they become resentful and seek to preserve their status and privilege (Wetts and Willer 2018; Wilkins and Kaiser 2014). This has been evident throughout American history.

By raising the relevance of racial resentment as an analytical framework, we are in no way suggesting that racial prejudice is disappearing or that it is being replaced by race-neutral sentiments. We are suggesting that, at least in political science, little is known about how everyday citizens who cling to values like justice and racial resentment thus perpetuate racial inequality (Gibson 2008, 2009). Moreover, the attention devoted to racial prejudice and racists ignores other motivations that produce the same effects and that implicate a broader swath of people who think they bear no responsibility for the perpetuation of racial inequality.

Goal of the Book

We contend that racial resentment, defined as a belief that undeserving African Americans and other minorities are taking advantage of resources that challenge Whites’ status and privilege, is a prevalent and extremely potent sentiment driving political and social attitudes today. By treating racial resentment as a serious and important emotion-laden belief, this book highlights the adverse effects of just world rationalizations about African Americans. Race-neutral individuals operate under just world expectations, acquiescing to racially prejudiced arguments and appeals, but this occurs through socialization processes that most would view as normal. Thus, when Whites assert they are not racially prejudiced toward African Americans and other minorities it may actually be true because racial resentment sentiment does not stem only from racist motivations. Just world expectations, fairness, and deservingness produce adverse racial effects, just as racial prejudice does.

As we already have stated, racial prejudice, by itself, cannot explain expressions of racial intolerance today. Rather, appeals to racial resentment may be more obvious in our current political and social discourse. The notion that only racists can feel threatened by the perceived advancement of African Americans and other minorities is an extremely low standard to explain how inequality gets perpetuated, and it ignores other pathways in which individuals can arrive at the same racialized political preferences. It is quite common nowadays to attribute support for candidates who espouse a defense of the status quo and the social hierarchy as prima-facie evidence of racism and racial prejudice, but we hope to show how such a position overlooks the overwhelming majority of ordinary citizens who are racially resentful toward African Americans but do not endorse necessarily racist views.

We are not the first to question the role of racial prejudice and hatred in structuring political and social attitudes. Over 20 years ago, Sniderman and Piazza (1993) in The Scar of Race asserted:

Prejudice has not disappeared, and in particular circumstances and segments of the society it still has a major impact. But race prejudice no longer organizes and dominates the reactions of whites; it no longer leads large numbers of them to oppose public policies to assist blacks across-the-board. It is . . . simply wrong to suppose that the primary factor driving the contemporary arguments over the politics of race is white racism. (p. 5)

As a finer point, Sniderman and Piazza (1993) stated further:

Arguments over race now cut at new angles. To treat the politics of race as though it is only about race and not about politics misrepresents the nature of contemporary disagreements over issues of race. (p. 5)

It is fair to say that these provocative statements have been largely overlooked, as we cannot recall any research following up on this claim. However, as important as Sniderman and Piazza’s proposal is to our thinking about racial resentment, their argument that beliefs about the role of government dominate Whites’ racial policy attitudes does not help us very much in understanding racial resentment in this new era. Beliefs about the proper role of government will always resonate, but how helpful is such an approach when political campaigns exploit Whites’ fear of being left behind?

The questions we address are varied and straightforward. We begin by revisiting the core aspects of resentment, explaining how it stems from a justice motive and appraisals of deservingness. This is important at the outset because classic racial resentment is currently situated in much of the political science literature as a form of racial prejudice or anti-Black affect; the crux of our argument is that Whites’ resentment toward African Americans is not necessarily racial prejudice nor does it require racial hatred. Thus, we must correct a mischaracterization of racial resentment that has ensnared a generation of scholars, including us.

Following this review, we propose a new measure of Whites’ resentment toward African Americans, steeped in our own theory—as opposed to one based on symbolic racism and prejudice—and based on a rather voluminous literature. Measuring Whites’ resentment toward African American is no simple matter nowadays, as visceral, knee-jerk reactions to race and racial polarization make it difficult to distinguish among racial belief systems. Nevertheless, we assess the psychometric properties of the measure and explore its predictive validity. As it turns out, our concept and measure is quite powerful in predicting and structuring other attitudes, and explaining a host of political issues, racial and non-racial. And we don’t mean powerful in just a correlational sense—our conceptualization and measurement speak to how Whites are motivated to construct a false reality that leads them to support anti-democratic values like inequality. Our conceptualization of racial resentment performs similarly to partisanship in that it aids in deciding what is meaningful and discordant to one’s politics. Whites’ resentment toward African Americans facilitates motivated reasoning whereby individuals seek to maintain (i.e., defend) a set of system-legitimizing beliefs that align with their beliefs about justice and deservingness. The incorporation of justice provides a means for individuals to rationalize opposition to racial amelioration, minority candidates and their policies, and other issues that ostensibly call for actions that disrupt the status quo.

Because Whites’ resentment toward African Americans stems from an appraisal of deservingness based on one’s sense of justice, it is not the conclusion or end of a social psychological process, like the way scholars think about racial prejudice. It may instead be the beginning of a process in which individuals seek to resolve the injustice, at least in their minds. To the extent that a perceived injustice goes unresolved, resentment can grow and fester. Although people move on with their lives, resentment from perceived injustice produces a desire, and a certain amount of pleasure, in seeing people suffer from their transgressions. Thus, when racial groups are perceived to benefit undeservingly from resources that challenge the status quo, thereby violating notions of justice, the resulting racial resentment creates a desire to see those racial groups fail. This leads to what we will later call racial schadenfreude.

Bandura’s (2016) moral disengagement becomes relevant to our theory of racial schadenfreude because it enables people to retain their positive self-regard while doing harm. Bandura (1999, 2002) describes how individuals are able to avoid distress and self-condemnation after committing immoral acts against others. Moral disengagement further rationalizes racial schadenfreude and racial resentment with minimal self-condemnation and moral self-sanctions. According to the theory, when individuals violate moral standards of harming another individual, they typically experience self-condemnation and negative emotions such as shame. However, by using a variety of strategies to disengage moral self-sanctions, individuals are able to behave inhumanely while avoiding self-condemnation and distress. In this way, moral disengagement allows “good” people to support “cruel” deeds by making those “cruel” deeds seem acceptable or moral (Bandura 2002).

Moral disengagement has been found to be a powerful motivation in rationalizing bullying in children (Bandura et al. 1996, 2001; Gini, Pozzoli, and Hymel 2014), killing during war (Aquino et al. 2007; McAlister, Bandura, and Owen 2006), cruelty against animals (Vollum, Buffington-Vollum, and Longmire 2004), and the death penalty (Vollum and Buffington-Vollum 2010).

Figure 1.1 introduces our theoretical model of racial resentment. Most apparent is that racial resentment is neither the beginning nor the end of a theoretical process and it is not fueled by racial prejudice or hatred. Racial resentment begins with a just-world motive, which is a belief in fairness and an expectation that people get what they deserve (Hafer and Rubel 2015; Lerner 1980a, 1980b). If a just-world value system is perceived to be violated or if a group receives an unearned or unjustifiable benefit, an appraisal of deservingness ensues.

Figure 1.1. Theory of Racial Resentment

Appraisals of deservingness are shaped by legitimizing racial myths, which are widely shared beliefs and stereotypes about African Americans and other minorities that justify their mistreatment and low status. Legitimizing myths are any coherent set of socially accepted attitudes, beliefs, values, and opinions that provide moral and intellectual legitimacy to the unequal distribution of social value (Sidanius, Devereux, and Pratto 1992). Beliefs about African Americans not taking responsibility for what happens in their lives make them appear less deserving of special treatment and place more of the blame on them for their status in society. Such beliefs are hierarchy-enhancing as they help maintain or increase group-based inequalities.

With such racial myths and racial stereotypes, resentment is triggered when one perceives African Americans and other minorities have received a benefit they do not deserve. African Americans may be perceived to be unfairly advancing by circumventing the traditional values and established rules of the game to which others adhere. When people who believe in the fundamental fairness of the world are challenged by a system or African Americans whom they perceive to be acting unjustly, they aim to restore balance. Among the various solutions to restoring this balance (Darley and Pittman 2003), punishing the perpetrators becomes an obvious sanction.

African Americans also possess a strong justice motive, but experiences with racial discrimination (and their group) produce different views of justice and fairness. For African Americans, racial discrimination is perceived as unjust and unfair because it serves to protect Whites’ advantage. Resentment toward Whites arises from a belief that Whites are undeserving of their advantage because it is obtained at African Americans’ expense.

Evolution of Racial Resentment

Racial resentment is predicated on the belief that African Americans and other ethnic minorities are undeserving of equal treatment, special considerations, or special protections.5 Because African Americans historically were considered less-than-human and inferior, they were not entitled to the same rights and treatment enjoyed by Whites, as outlined in the original US Constitution. In chattel slavery, Blacks were not a threat to the status quo and therefore appraisals of deservingness did not stem from a justice motive. We identify four time periods in which intensified racial resentment toward African Americans flourished. Each period coincides with a significant identifi...

Indice dei contenuti

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Prologue
• chapter 1.   “I’m Not a Racist, but . . .”
• chapter 2.   Resentment Is Not Prejudice
• chapter 3.   Pressing Restart on Racial Resentment
• chapter 4.   The Profile and Performance of Racial Resentment
• chapter 5.   Racial Resentment and the Susceptibility to Campaign Appeals
• chapter 6.   Racial Cognitive Consistency
• chapter 7.   Racial Schadenfreude
• chapter 8.   African Americans’ Resentment toward Whites
• chapter 9.   Conclusion
• Acknowledgments
• Appendix: Description of Data
• Appendix: Chapter 8
• Appendix: Question Wording by Chapter
• Notes
• References
• Index