African Philosophy

Emancipation and Practice

Pascah Mungwini

• Editore: Bloomsbury Academic
• Anno: 2022
• ISBN:
  9781350196513
• Edizione: 1
• Argomento: Philosophy
• Categoria: Philosophy History & Theory

Choice Outstanding Academic Title 2023 Caught between the history of exclusion and the reality of the world philosophies approach, this is an introduction to African philosophy unlike any other. With distinctive insight Pascah Mungwini brings together African philosophy and the emancipative mission, introducing African thought as a practice defined by its own history and priority questions while always in dialogue with the world. He charts the controversies and contestations around the contemporary practice of philosophy as an academic enterprise in Africa, examining some of philosophy's most serious mistakes, omissions, and failures. Covering the history of African philosophy's development and trajectory, Mungwini's introduction focuses on the struggle for intellectual liberation. His compelling portrayal reveals that true liberation begins by understanding one's own world, an essential point for anyone beginning to explore another philosophical tradition on its own terms.

1

The Terrain of African Philosophy

Introduction

Over recent decades, African philosophers have recorded notable achievements in terms of advancing the discipline of philosophy theoretically and practically as an enterprise by which they sought “to affirm and assert their humanity through a vindication of their rationality” (Ramose 1999: 8). This testimony, however, does not seek to play down the challenges, disagreements, and controversies that have characterized the discipline since its inception. A brief look at the history of philosophy in general would reveal that philosophy is characterized by various challenges such as methodological and definitional controversies, including antagonistic opinions on how best to produce it. However, despite the existence of such contestations, competing positions, and disagreements on how best to proceed, philosophers have not stopped philosophizing and nor have they contemplated laying down their tools until such controversies have been resolved. In fact, if they had tried to do the latter, their tools would still be down. Philosophy has continued to flourish, to a large degree spurred on by these seemingly intractable disagreements and controversies. It is from these varied approaches and divergent opinions on how best to proceed—how to carry out the philosophical mandate—that different schools of philosophy were born. In fact, it’s probably not too far off the mark to conclude that the beauty of philosophy lies in this variety; in these contestations over how best to represent or contemplate reality and experience. A closer look at the history of Western philosophy reveals a field characterized by a variety of streams of thought, with some among them almost irreconcilable. In that cacophony, if one may call it that,

there are Kantians, Hegelians, Heideggerians; there are Kuhnians, Popperians, Wittgensteinians; there are followers of Foucault, Derrida, Ricoeur; there are neo-Aristotelians, neo-Thomists.… Most of these philosophies started as attempts to put an end to the battle of the schools. The attempts soon became schools themselves and joined the battle.… So, disconnection is the rule and harmony not just the exception- it simply does not exist.

Feyerabend 2011: 8–9

It would seem therefore, that even the most emphasized traditional divisions in Western philosophy—that is, of the Analytic versus the Continental schools of thought—is a much-simplified version of the multiplicity of views and divisions that have characterized Western philosophy as a tradition.

Given the historical evolution of academic philosophy in Africa and its connection to Western philosophy in more ways than one, the emergence of different schools—including controversies over the definition and nature of philosophy—seemed inevitable. In an effort to define both the form and content of the field called African philosophy, philosophers on the continent had to involve themselves in serious cartographic work of a special kind. In other words, they had to commit themselves to some form of boundary work in order not only to delineate the area that they thought would appropriately constitute the field called African philosophy, but to distinguish and protect it from disreputable works, charlatans, and impostors. Through this seemingly innocent but crucial academic exercise, the foundation of what we consider today as African philosophy was laid, with some of its foremost practitioners and their contributions canonized, and others conversely deprecated. In this chapter, we argue that the process of mapping the field called African philosophy may have been impacted by a self-imprisoning hesitancy and fear to experiment with available options in the progressive fashioning out of a discipline that was yet to establish its own identity. This chapter is divided into two broad sections. The first section draws on the analogy of map-making to analyse the development of African philosophy as a discipline. In the second section, particular attention is paid to the critique of ethnophilosophy, including an assessment of the potential effects it may have had on the growth and development of African philosophy. The idea is not to retrace the arguments that constitute the critique and their proponents, but to draw attention to a hidden side of this critique, to what one could call its unintended negative consequences. This is then followed by a brief conclusion.

Mapping the Terrain

In his book Cultural Boundaries of Science, Gieryn (1999) applies the geometrical metaphor of map-making—the drawing and redrawing of boundaries—to analyse contestations over epistemic authority and credibility involving science and other cognate disciplines. Just like science, the history of philosophy is characterized by similar struggles and disputes in which attempts were made to guarantee the integrity of the discipline and to protect its claim to credibility and epistemic authority against other infiltrators and pseudo-claimants to the title. In fact, it can be argued that “philosophers have given more attention to the mapping of philosophy when it comes to the jurisdiction of philosophy over some methods or content, or the assigning of methods or content to others” (Janz 2009: 29). Serious effort was taken to maintain clear boundaries between philosophy proper and other related disciplines such as religion, theology, history, poetry, and literature studies, among others. The point we wish to make is that in their history, different disciplines—not just philosophy—have involved themselves in extensive cartographic work. During this process of boundary-mapping—that is, demarcation, border-marking, inclusion and exclusion—disciplines seek not only to assert their identity but also to assert and claim unrivalled authority in particular fields of enquiry and of human and social experiences. Throughout their existence, disciplines have been locked in these relentless wars of continuity against threats to their integrity and survival. In this high-stakes game, there is therefore a permanent commitment to boundary work, a ceaseless policing of borders and a persistent epistemological vigilance, in order to contain and repel the always-imminent assaults of irrationality. Gieryn (1999: 23) describes this boundary-work as “strategic practical action,” in that ideological and epistemological positions are adopted by scientists and scholars alike to justify their own position and to maintain it while at the same time discrediting opponents or holders of opposing views. From drawing boundaries to patrolling and protecting those frontiers, disciplines remain on high alert, repelling opponents, expanding their fortunes, and making alliances where necessary as they adapt to ensure they stay ahead and remain alive. This will probably remain so until that point disciplines cease to exist as autonomous and independent fields of inquiry.

In order to establish itself as a tradition of thought and practice, African philosophy had to contend with the politics of being a philosophy whose existence had been summarily denied by demonstrating not only the fallacies of such a position, but by also establishing its own credentials as a philosophy. This is an issue which preoccupied almost everyone among the first generation of African philosophers. In other words, African philosophy needed not only to reclaim its space against the Western philosophy that constituted the philosophy of the center, but to also define itself. It was time to spell out to itself what that tradition of thought which now claimed a stake on the philosophical field should look like. A dual task was thus awaiting, namely: reclaiming the historicity of African existence through a counter-critique of the myth of modernity and Eurocentrism as the dominant ideology; and establishing itself, its own set of credentials as a practice—a contending tradition of philosophy. While there was near unanimity on the first task, the second was more contentious, in particular, on the question of method and the definition of African philosophy. And true to its nature as a philosophy, this evolution was marked by internal contradictions and dispute as the practitioners sought not only to map out the contours of the discipline, but also to distinguish its credentials as a truly philosophical enterprise. At this local level, and as individuals, African philosophers had to commit themselves to some cartographic work in order not only to establish the jurisdiction of their discipline, but also to lay out its methodological and epistemological foundations as an enterprise. In a period spanning the publication of Tempels’s Bantu Philosophy (1945) on the one hand and the debate that ensued coinciding with the publication of the famous book by Hountondji, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality on the other hand, and during the years immediately thereafter, a clear picture had begun to emerge in terms of the inspiration, the currents, and the concerns that defined the field of African philosophy. It was on the basis of this emerging picture that the late Kenyan philosopher Odera Oruka (1944–95) was able to assess the field and convince himself that there were in existence different schools, distinct trends and approaches that defined the discipline. He initially distinguished four approaches or schools, to which he later added two more to bring the total up to six. As summarized by Hallen (2002: 53):

The four trends, schools, or approaches to African philosophy he [Oruka] identifies are ethnophilosophy (Tempels, Griaule, Mbiti, and, as this category was first delimited, Gyekye, Hallen, and Sodipo); philosophical sagacity (Oruka); nationalist-ideological philosophy, which included African social-political thinkers (Fanon, Nkrumah, Nyerere); and professional philosophy, which he associates with the orthodox Western academic tradition (Bodunrin, Hountondji, and, as this category was first delimited, Wiredu and, most interestingly, Oruka himself again). [Later Oruka added two more approaches]: the hermeneutic, to more specifically accommodate those who choose a linguistic approach (Wiredu, Gyekye, Hallen, and Sodipo) and the artistic or literary, to apply to African intellectual figures in the humanities who address themselves to themes basic to Africa’s cultural identity (Okot p’Bitek, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, and Wole Soyinka).

The foregoing represents Oruka’s pioneering attempt to map out the field of African philosophy. This process was meant to designate, to demarcate, isolate, and classify the different available works that constituted the literature on African philosophy. Through this Oruka not only identifies the different approaches and schools, but he also provides a summary of each of the approaches including an example of works that fitted into each of the categories. At this point, it is not difficult to see how, through these demarcations, Oruka begins a process of mapping the field and of creating delimitations that would have a lasting effect on the perspectives and patterns of intellectual practice in African philosophy for years to come. As Janz (2009) correctly points out, this initiative to map the space of African philosophy was simultaneously the move to proclaim its borders, gatekeepers, laws, and citizenry. It is apparent that in this process of mapping, “the borders between African and non-African thought, between forms of African thought, as well as the borders between traditional and modern thought” (Janz 2009: 16) would influence the process. Oruka’s effort not only helped to lay out the difference in character among the approaches, but also it distinguished the supposedly philosophical dead ends and illusory paths from the promising routes for the development of the discipline going forward. Equally significant in this layout is the fact that right from the onset, the field and practice of African philosophy were characterized by a plurality of approaches just like in any other tradition of philosophy. Even the difficulty of having clear demarcations between the approaches becomes clear if one looks at the fact that some individuals and their works had to be reclassified on second look; interestingly, Oruka inserted himself in more than one category. While the idea here is not to debate whether or not Oruka was right with his classifications, it is significant to note that the divisions themselves implied that an inherent hierarchy of philosophicality existed among the approaches. We cannot ignore the fact that there is something pernicious in designating one of the schools “professional,” which somehow implies that all the other five approaches (and the scholars whose works fall under the other schools) are not “professional” philosophers. Even the justification that such a designation was meant solely to emphasize the fact that this was the trend to which those who shared the orthodox Western orientation belong, does not suffice. It was probably for this reason that Oruka had to include himself in two categories since he was both a professional philosopher by training, but committed to sage philosophy. The classifications themselves may point to something more than simple differences in approach. And equally interesting is the initial inclusion of some of Africa’s eminent philosophers under the enthnophilosophy trend, which is somehow revisited and then changed. The question is: What had changed? The content they published had not. Could there have been some form of prejudice against those immersing themselves fully into a domain of philosophy that required a serious study of African culture and its resources right from the start? Was such insider knowledge irrelevant to professional philosophy proper? These are questions that may arise as part of this speculative exercise which has invariably serious practical implications. One of the significant outcomes is that with this classification Oruka helped to make apparent not just the different schools, but also the implicit hierarchization through the choice of nomenclature. With the help of this schema, it is possible not only to understand the genesis but also the mechanisms through which exclusionary tendencies announced their arrival onto the field of African philosophy with significant consequences for both its future practice and outlook. It is to this and other issues that we now turn.

The Critique of Ethnophilosophy Revisited

“Fires, as forestry experts tell us, have a beneficial effect in the economy of nature: they clear the ground for new and more vigorous growth” (Serequeberhan 2015: 54). How does this opening statement relate to the topic of discussion in this section? We now turn our attention to the point we wish to make with the analogy. Notwithstanding other contending views concerning the efficacy of fire as a forest management tool, we use this analogy to draw attention to two important things in the history of African philosophy and its ascendency to the academic discipline that ...

Indice dei contenuti

• Cover
• Half-Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction: The Emancipative Mission
• 1 The Terrain of African Philosophy
• 2 African Self-Apprehension
• 3 Philosophy and Intercultural Dialogue
• 4 Recentering Africa: The Unfinished Promise of Decolonization
• 5 Africa and World Philosophies: The Emerging Realities
• Further Reading
• Notes
• References
• Index
• Copyright