SPEECH, &c.
Before we proceed to the consideration of the cases of individual boroughs included in Schedule B, I intend to discuss a preliminary question of very high importance, and one that concerns the interests of the whole class of boroughs. The decision upon the general question thus raised will be a conclusive one, and, once taken, will determine the point for each particular case, and render detailed discussion upon that point unnecessary. I propose that each of the forty boroughs included in Schedule B, instead of returning only one Member, as contemplated by the Bill, shall retain its present privilege of returning two; and I shall move, as an amendment on the motion of the Noble Lord, that the word “two” be substituted for “one.” If, therefore, the House affirm my proposition, each of the boroughs will return two Members, and will thus escape partial disfranchisement; and if, on the contrary, the Committee shall decide that the word “one” stand part of the clause, I shall abstain from raising the question in the case of each individual borough in Schedule B. I think that the course that I now propose will save the time of the House; and I entreat the most serious and impartial attention of all parties, while I state the important considerations that induce me to propose the adoption of the course that I now recommend. I am not about to recommend a discussion of the general principle of the Bill, but I shall confine myself to a statement of facts, which are as well deserving the attention of those who are friendly to the Bill, as of those who take the same view of it that I do. I would appeal to his Majesty’s Government themselves, entertaining a confident hope, that if I shall be able to adduce valid reasons for continuing to the boroughs enumerated in Schedule B the right of returning two Members, my reasons will be permitted to prevail, and will induce the Ministers again to pursue the honourable course which they took last night in the case of the borough of Saltash, and revoke a decision which subsequent consideration proved to be erroneous.
In the first place, I contend that the adoption of my proposal is not inconsistent with the principles of the Reform Bill. There is not a word in the preamble of the Bill which points to the disfranchisement of the boroughs enumerated in Schedule B. The preamble recites that —
It is expedient to take effectual measures for correcting divers abuses that have long prevailed in the choice of Members to serve in the Commons House of Parliament; to deprive many inconsiderable places of the right of returning Members; to grant such privilege to large, populous, and wealthy towns; to increase the number of knights of the shire; to extend the elective franchise to many of his Majesty’s subjects who have not heretofore enjoyed the same, and to diminish the expense of elections.
Now I cannot deny that this recital, if admitted to be correct, applies to Schedule A, and binds us to the complete disfranchisement of those boroughs; but it has no reference to the partial disfranchisement of the boroughs in Schedule B. The preamble of the Bill, therefore, leaves those who entirely assent to it at liberty to vote with me. The most determined enemy to nomination boroughs may also vote with me. There may be boroughs of that description in Schedule B, if reference be had to their present constituency, but other provisions of the Bill will destroy that constituency and will substitute for it a new and more extended one. I have a perfect right to assume, that after this Bill shall have passed, nomination will be effectually excluded in the case of every borough named in Schedule B. If it will not, why does the Government reserve for these boroughs, or any of them, even the half of their existing privilege? The question is one, not of degree, but principle. The Bill assumes nomination to be vicious and unconstitutional; but if it be so, it is so in the case where one Member is to be returned, as well as in the case where there are two. If you suspect the existence of nomination in Schedule B, your remedy clearly is, not partial disfranchisement, but complete extinction of the privilege through which it is to be effected. I repeat, therefore, that the most decided enemy to nomination is at liberty to vote with me.
Having removed out my way these preliminary difficulties, and shewn this to be a question fairly open to the consideration of all parties, whether friends or enemies to the Bill, I will now consider the intrinsic merit of the proposal. First, I contend that it is recommended by long prescription and almost uniform usage, so far as England is concerned,—and let it be remembered that we are now discussing the English representative system, and no other,—that the usages of England in respect to representation are, therefore, mainly to be relied upon. Now, in every instance in England in which the elective franchise is exercised, (with few exceptions only,) in which there is a single Member, two Members are returned. These are also the cases of the city of London and of the county of York, wherein there are severally, four. Four hundred and eighty-nine Members sit for England, and five only out of the whole number sit for boroughs having a single return. A different practice prevails, it is true, in Wales, in Scotland, and in certain cases in Ireland. In the two latter cases it was adopted at the respective periods of their union with England; but we are to consult, for present purposes, English precedent and English usage, and not to look at the necessities which might be imposed by events so peculiar as the unions of different parts of the empire.
If usage and prescription are to decide the question, the decision must be in favour of my proposal, and I contend that the appeal to reason and good sense is equally decisive in its favour, and that apart from all considerations of usage, that plan of representation which gives two Members to certain places in preference to one, ought to be adopted. If we were merely arguing à priori—if we were devising for the first time an electoral system for a new country—and if we should assume five hundred as the proper limit to the. number of representatives, it would be easy, in my opinion, to prove that it would be better to give the right of sending two Members to two hundred and fifty towns, or districts, rather than a single Member to each of five hundred. By doing so, you would ensure a more perfect representation of the feelings and sentiments of the whole people,—you would diminish the chances of the undue preponderance of one class of interests or opinions,—and you would be more likely to effect that object which ought never to be overlooked,—namely, the insuring at all times to the minority its fair share of weight and influence in the public councils. But I would rather confine myself to the circumstances of England, and to the state of society as it exists in this country. I appeal to those who have practical experience on this subject and who are conversant with the feelings and habits connected with elections in England. Surely they must know that there is an immense advantage, when contending parties are nearly balanced, in having the means of effecting an amicable compromise, and of warding off the necessity of absolute triumph and unqualified defeat. What is it that gives keenness to election contests? Not merely general politics, but local and hereditary attachments—the preference of this family to that—the influence of property newly acquired, contending against that of ancient family and long established connexion. Beware how you relinquish the only means of amicably adjusting the balance between such rival pretensions. Think of the animosity which you will engender, the more bitter as the circle is narrow within which it is confined, if there be no alternative but complete unmitigated victory on one side or the other. How certain will be the provocation to contest on every returning vacancy, and how lasting the mortification which will follow defeat! I argue from what I know, and from circumstances of which I have had experience. I represent a borough—no nomination borough—but a borough containing near four thousand inhabitants, in which every inhabitant householder, not in the poor-rate, has a vote, and is proud of his franchise. It returns two Members, one friendly to the Bill, the other hostile to it—one supporting the Government, the other opposing it—one returned through the influence of an ancient name, and of all the associations which are connected with old connexions and hereditary attachments; the other through the influence of neighbourhood-residence, property, and friendly and constant intercourse. How many instances there must be where similar divisions of opinion and interests prevail; many, perhaps, in which they are very nearly balanced; and could it, in such cases, be for the public advantage, or could it promote local peace, to leave no alternative, at all times and under all circumstances, but the complete exclusion of one party and complete triumph of the other? Even on this single ground I must contend that my amendment would be entitled to support.
But this is a narrow ground, indeed, compared with that on which I am now about to urge its adoption. I am now to consider in what manner public interests, and those of the highest concern, will be affected by its rejection. By the vote of last night, which inflicted total disfranchisement on all the boroughs in Schedule A, we have made an enormous change in the representative system—a much greater change than was expected by any reformer not a Member of the King’s Government. By that vote, fifty-six boroughs, entitled for centuries to the elective franchise, have been destroyed, and one hundred and eleven Members, being far more than one-fifth of the whole English representation, will shortly cease to exist. I cannot believe that the sober judgment of the House will affirm the decisions of the Committee—that no appeal will be permitted in such cases as those of Appleby, of Downton, and Plympton; but if that shall be the case—if our proceedings are irrevocable—let us, while we have yet time to repair, at least, in some degree, the evil of these proceedings, maturely consider the effect of them, and their bearing, not upon this borough or that, but upon those vast interests of society which are affected by them.
In this country there are two great interests—the agricultural, on the one hand, and the commercial and manufacturing on the other, having the closest ultimate connexion between their mutual prosperity, but occasionally taking very different views of the best mode of promoting their individual, and ultimately their common, welfare. Let us consider how these interests are likely to be affected by those enactments of this Bill which are already decided on,—by those we are at present considering,—and by those we shall have hereafter to consider. I hold in my hand a map of England, which has been prepared—I know not whether by a friend or an enemy of the Reform Bill—with the view of presenting, at one view, those places that are to be totally, and those which are to be partially, disfranchised; and those, also, which are to acquire the right of hereafter returning Members to Parliament.
Now, I propose to divide England into two great divisions, and to draw the line of demarcation in that manner, which will most fairly and effectually separate the purely agricultural counties of England, from those which are either chiefly manufacturing, or partly manufacturing and partly agricultural. The line must be in some degree arbitrarily drawn, and on each side of it there must be partial exceptions—as in the case of counties which do not fall exactly within the description which I wish to assign to them—but I know no line which will better effect the object I have in view, than the one which I propose to draw. It extends across England from that indenture in the coast which is made by the mouth of the Severn, to that indenture in the opposite coast which is made by the inroad of the sea called the Wash. In short, the line may be considered to be drawn from Gloucester, in the west, to Boston, on the east coast of England. To the north of this line the great coal field of England is situate, and the manufactures depending upon coal are chiefly carried on. The division to the south of the line, includes those counties of England which are almost entirely agricultural, and in which, speaking comparatively, there is little scope for manufacturing industry.
There are, I believe, eighteen counties to the north of the line, and twenty-three counties to the south of it.
The northern counties are the following:—Northumberland, Cumberland, Durham, Westmoreland, Lancashire, Yorkshire, Cheshire, Derbyshire, Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, Staffordshire, Shropshire, Monmouthshire, Herefordshire, Worcestershire, Warwickshire, ...