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Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action
Paul Henne,Samuel Murray
- 264 pagine
- English
- ePUB (disponibile sull'app)
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Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action
Paul Henne,Samuel Murray
Informazioni sul libro
What is self-control? Does a person need to be conscious to act? Are delusions always irrational? Questions such as these are fundamental for investigations into action and rationality, as well as how we assign responsibility for wrongdoing and assess clinical symptoms. Bridging the gap between philosophy and psychology, this interdisciplinary collection showcases how empirical research informs and enriches core questions in the philosophy of action. Exploring issues such as truth, moral judgement, agency, consciousness and cognitive control, chapters offer an overview of the current state of research, present new empirical findings and identify where future experimental work can further advance the frontier between philosophy and psychology. This is an essential resource for anyone looking to better understand how science and philosophy can meaningfully inform our knowledge of human agency.
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Informazioni
Indice dei contenuti
- Cover
- Half-Title
- Series
- Dedication
- Title
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Contributors
- Introduction to Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action
- 1 Consciousness, Phenomenal Consciousness, and Free Will
- 2 Skilled Action and Metacognitive Control
- 3 Bringing Self-control into the Future
- 4 Who Is Responsible?: Split Brains, Dissociative Identity Disorder, and Implicit Attitudes
- 5 The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion
- 6 Truth, Perspective, and Norms of Assertion: New Findings and Theoretical Advances
- 7 The Distinct Functions of Belief and Desire in Intentional Action Explanation
- 8 Free Enough: Human Cognition (And Cultural Interests) Warrant Responsibility
- 9 Beyond the Courtroom: Agency and the Perception of Free Will
- 10 Do Rape Cases Sit in a Moral Blindspot? The Dual-Process Theory of Moral Judgment and Rape
- 11 How People Think about Moral Excellence: The Role of Counterfactual Thoughts in Reasoning about Morally Good Actions
- 12 Why Idealized Agency Gets Animal (and Human) Agency Wrong
- Index
- Copyright