The Arctic Council represents the primary body for regional governance in the circumpolar north. Four key observations characterize the role and evolution of the AC in the broader Arctic governance framework as it has evolved over the last quarter century. First, the AC began as a limited environmental governance body created and dominated by the Arctic states. Second, there were early disagreements about its role in policy-making and the elasticity of its mandate. Third, the ACâs policy-making role and mandate have grown, assuming not only generative and catalyst functions but also a regulatory role in harmonizing national policies. While the role changed, however, the international character of the body did not. Fourth, new forums have emerged that provide space for a broad array of actors to contribute to Arctic governance discussions and, some commentators believe, challenge the pre-eminence of the AC.
Early assessments of the AC observed a weak and uncertain body. Evan Bloom, an American diplomat involved in the councilâs creation, described the AC in 1999 as:
A forum without legal personality, and thus not as an âinternational organizationâ as that term is understood under international law, was an objective of the United States and is consistent with a tendency in recent American diplomatic practice to seek an informal co-operative structure when that structure is adequate for the purposes of the issues involved.
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The year before, political scientist Huebert (1998) questioned âwhether or not this effort can be sustained, and whether Canada will maintain its leadership roleâ (57). Legal scholars Koivurova and Vanderzwaag (2006) were pessimistic, highlighting that in the ACâs work âa âstudy and talkâ mentality has prevailed with numerous projects and workshops promoted and carried outâ (191). Young (2005) offered more optimism, emphasizing that âthe momentum associated with the growth of regional co-operation in the Arctic is sufficiently strong and the emergence of an Arctic-specific agenda is sufficiently clear to provide some basis for optimism regarding the success of region building in the regionâ (14).
Various scholarly works have called for an expanded AC with a mandate broadened beyond its historic service as an environmental research forum. Byers (2012) puts forward 11 recommendations, including the creation of an oil spill prevention treaty, a black carbon treaty, and a ânegotiation of a treaty to demilitarize the surface of the Central Arctic Oceanâ (23). The Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, a policy institute associated with the University of Toronto, echoes Byersâs call and advocates that the AC mandate grow to include military security. While we do not share this view that expanding the ACâs mandate will make it stronger, we argue that it is necessary to look beyond the Council to understand the full breadth of Arctic governance bodies and embrace new non-statist institutions.
The AC began as a limited environmental governance body created and dominated by the Arctic states, emerging out of a genuine desire among the Arctic states to address regional environmental issues and to ease Cold War tensions. The superpower struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States defined international conflict throughout the second half of the 20th century. In response, some actors embraced Arctic collaboration as a mechanism to help defuse the situation. As such, the AC emerged from a late-twentieth-century international context of a growing global environmental consciousness, thawing Cold War relations, and a belief that the Arctic offered a venue to defuse tensions.
In 1983, the United States government unveiled an Arctic policy that opened the door to collaboration with the Soviet Union in the region, citing enthusiasm for âmutually beneficial international co-operation in the Arcticâ (âUnited States Arctic Policyâ). Two years later, political scientist Oran Young called on Arctic governments to declare the region as a âzone of peaceâ (174). In October 1987, following an agreement on the reduction of nuclear stockpiles, Russian Premier Mikhail Gorbachev gave a speech in Murmansk, Russia that proposed designating the Arctic region a âzone of peaceâ to follow co-operation on environmental protection (Gordon Foundation, 2010: 1).
The Murmansk speech represented a clear breakthrough. Gorbachev affirmed genuine interest in environmental protection: the 1986 nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, a meltdown that resulted in hundreds of deaths and the abandonment of a town of nearly 50,000, raised the fear that Russiaâs lax environmental standards would result in another transboundary catastrophe (English, 2013: 10). Still, officials in various governments doubted the seriousness of Gorbachevâs âzone of peaceâ proposal. If truly earnest, the Russian Premier might have proposed the closure of Murmanskâs large military base. Nevertheless, the government of Finland, a former colony of Russia, sought to use the opportunity to improve relations between its allies and former colonizer. Officials pushed for a nuclear submarine agreement (in 1983), held a peace summit (in 1987), and finally hosted a conference on Gorbachevâs idea in Rovaniemi, Finland in September 1989. This meeting led to the creation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in June 1991 (Young, 1998; Keskitalo, 2004; English, 2013), through which state scientists met bi-annually to discuss co-operation on environmental issues. The following five years saw the co-creation and exchange of new knowledge on items such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and the life expectancy of Arctic residents. The success of the AEPS naturally led to discussions to elevate it from a strategy to an institution.
Negotiations began in 1995 to create a limited environmental governance body. Although all of the Arctic countries shared a vested interest in improving the state of the environment, Russia had the weakest environmental regulations. Given the Nordic countriesâ close proximity to Russia, they strongly advocated for a Council (interviews 8 and 7) that would help keep Russia accountable (interview 10). Canadian officials agreed with the Nordic governments, and were optimistic that the AC could be a forum to give a voice to Arctic residents. Accordingly, Canadian and Nordic leaders sought a strong AC that would include representatives of Arctic Indigenous peoples as full members and that would produce binding decisions. The United States and Russia wanted a weaker, more ad-hoc body that, essentially, perpetuated the AEPS under a new name (interview 15).
During the negotiations, Russian officials seemed âextremely nonchalantâ about environmental issues, espousing the view that âRussia is a gigantic countryâ (interview 7). In the midst of a recession which saw Russiaâs economy shrink by half in the early 1990s, Russiaâs government closed half of its environmental monitoring stations (interview 18) and downgraded its Ministry of the Environment from a ministry to a âstate committeeâ (interview 10). While environmentalists (who tended to promote democracy in post-Soviet Russia) remained bitter that the Soviet system had failed to protect the environment and to prevent the Chernobyl disaster, âmajor oligarchs and industrial concernsâ opposed environmental regulation and democracy (interview 10). Nevertheless, Russian officials acknowledged that participation in an AC would provide Russia with an opportunity to join the world community and secure international funding for environmental projects (interview 16).
A persistent strain of American thought viewed multilateral institutions and agreements with suspicion; US officials worried that a strong AC would impose undue restrictions on sovereignty and would become a venue for other states to criticize the United States (interview 1). The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), for example, stridently opposed various US policies, such as the 1972 Marine Mammals Protection Act, which banned the import of seal products; and the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, which unilaterally settled outstanding Indigenous land claims in that state (interview 1). American officials feared that including Indigenous peoples as voting members in an AC, with similar status to the Arctic states, would create a precedent to do so in other forums and affect ongoing negotiations to produce a United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (interview 14). Other environmental institutions already existed, and influential US officials believed that environmental issues required a global rather than a regional approach (interview 1). Nonetheless, the United States saw benefits in information sharing through an AC (interview 9).
Given this backdrop of state interests, the ACâs creation as a limited, soft-law body, rather than a formal multilateral organization, should come as little surprise. The 1998 Iqaluit Declaration specified that its role was to âprovide a means for promoting co-operation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States ⊠with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic,â but not military security, as stated in a footnote (Arctic Council, 1998). Framers deliberately excluded traditional military security from the Councilâs mandate, but included sustainable development, thus adding a human dimension to the environmental focus of the AEPS. Environmental security became the ACâs main focus, but the Arctic statesâ foreign affairs departments would administer the institutionâs work. Although the AC was not conceived as a formal policy-making body, nothing in its founding documents forbid the future possibility. It would not have a permanent secretariat, but the chairmanship of the institution would rotate every two years. Observer states and non-governmental organizations would attend AC meetings without a formal role or weight in deliberations. Indigenous peoplesâ organizations would participate as Permanent Participants at the main table as non-voting members â lacking the status of the Arctic states, but an international breakthrough nevertheless. As a consensus-based forum, the AC would hold bi-annual meetings to oversee progress on projects and share findings.
Four major takeaways about the founding of the AC emerge:
- the AC is the major governance institution for the Arctic region because it includes all of the Arctic states as members;
- it is not an international forum, but rather a regional forum, because the role of non-Arctic states is limited, largely absent in the founding of the institution;
- the Arctic states dictate the structure and content of the institution; and,
- the AC began life as an environmental body, but the reasons for the creation of the institution were not completely environmental in nature.
In the years that followed, the AC assumed a generative role by completing monitoring projects, drafting action plans, and producing science-based assessments, such as projects on biodiversity and persistent organic pollutants.1 Disagreements arose regarding its role in policy-making and the elasticity of its mandate as states wrestled with the forumâs limitations. At the ACâs November 1999 meeting in Washington, the United States proposed to give a joint presentation with Russia on the Arctic Military Environmental Co-operation Group, which aimed to reduce the environmental impact of military vehicles in the Arctic. Canadaâs delegation vetoed the discussion immediately as falling outside the mandate of the AC because it concerned military security. At the same meeting, the delegations of Sweden and Norway proposed the creation of a formal policy to codify national commitments to mitigate PCB contamination in the Arctic Contaminant Action Plan (ACAP). The meeting minutes reported âthat delegates should be prepared to negotiate final text for the strategy component of the [ACAP] plan at the next meetingâ (with Finland, Iceland, and Denmark in support). Canada again vetoed the creation of formal policy as an intrusion on state sovereignty. âAs far as using the ACAP as a coordinated approach in international fora, Canada stated that the Council must continue to rely on individual states to take action,â the minutes noted. In support, the ICC asserted that the ACAP plan represented âa concerted effort to look after needs of indigenous people in the Arcticâ (Arctic Council, 1999). These disagreements about the ACâs role would continue.
Although the policy-making role and mandate of the AC has grown over the past two decades, the legal character of the body has not. The Council acts as a catalyst, assuming the role of convenor facilitating co-operation between member states and offering a co-operative platform to launch substantive initiatives. Global interests in the Arctic peaked in 2007, with actions by some member states spurring concerns about the prospect of...