Selfhood

Identity, Esteem, Regulation

Rick Hoyle, Michael H. Kernis, Mark R. Leary, Mark W. Baldwin

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000311235
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

This text provides an integrative survey of the burgeoning social-psychological literature on the self. By way of an introduction, the authors establish the intellectual climate that gave rise to contemporary perspectives on the self and integrate early and more recent research on the structure of the self. The core of the text surveys the literatu

1
Selfhood

The Self is a haunting problem.

—Allport (1961a, xvi)

The self is a dynamic psychological system, a tapestry of thoughts, feelings, and motives that define and direct—even destroy—us. Minus the self, there is little more to human beings than meets the eye: frail, relatively hairless creatures ruled by instinct and circumstance. But clearly there is more. It is the self that distinguishes homo sapiens from even its closest evolutionary kin. Because of humans' unique capacity for self-reflection, a complex web of emotion, intention, and evaluation gives rise to the most salient aspect of human experience—selfhood.

Much has been written about the self, most of it during the latter half of the twentieth century, a period during which citizens of the free world have embraced self-esteem and the pursuit of self-interest as fundamental entitlements. The self is a frequently featured topic in wide-circulation magazines (one is even titled Self): "High self-esteem is the greatest gift you can give yourself," boasts one article (Burns 1990); "Why Americans Should Be Wary of Self-Esteem," warns the title of another (Lasch 1992). Similarly, scholarly journals in fields as diverse as psychology, sociology, philosophy, education, and business routinely feature reports of research on the self and related phenomena.

This widespread interest in the self has produced a large amount of information—and misinformation—about the self. As the volume of scholarly work on the self has increased, so has the appearance of articles and books based on intuitive but unsubstantiated claims about the self. Such publications typically offer simplistic but palatable accounts of selfhood; however, the reader who samples more than one likely will be left with more questions than answers (e.g., the magazine articles noted earlier that, on the one hand, portray self-esteem as "the greatest gift" and, on the other, caution readers to "be wary of self-esteem"). With this book, we hope to tip the scales in favor of careful, empirically informed analyses of the self.

In particular, we feature research findings and conceptual developments relevant to an understanding of the self produced by social psychologists since the mid-1970s. As has been true of virtually all research streams in social psychology during that era, the conceptual models and research strategies we describe reflect the influence of the cognitive revolution in psychology, that is, the tendency to view human beings as active, decisionmaking information processors who shape their environment as much as they are shaped by it. Our presentation is divided into eight chapters—two that establish a context and framework for our treatment and six dedicated to the organizing themes: identity, esteem, and regulation.

We begin this chapter by elaborating on the notion of selfhood. Then we make a brief foray into the past for the purpose of documenting the evolution of intellectual inquiry regarding the self. We conclude the chapter with an overview of our coverage of selfhood in the remainder of the book.

Selfhood

The term "selfhood" is not our own, though it captures the essence of our treatment of the self better than more commonly used terms such as "self-concept," "identity," or simply "self." M. Brewster Smith (1978), in his presidential address to the American Psychological Association, used the term "selfhood" to refer rather loosely to "what it means to be human" (p. 1053). Because our focus is on aspects of the self and related phenomena that are subject to empirical scrutiny, our use of the term is somewhat narrower than Smith's. By selfhood we mean the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that arise from the awareness of self as object and agent. The object-agent distinction is an important one, and we devote considerable attention to it in the next three chapters. For now, it might be helpful to think of the object aspect of self as concerned with "being," and the agent aspect of self as concerned with "doing." "Being" refers to descriptive features of the self such as identity and self-esteem, whereas "doing" refers to behaviors and ways of thinking aimed at asserting, protecting, or repairing identity or self-esteem. A principal force that contributes to—even necessitates—these experiences and activities is the uniquely human capacity for reasoned self-reflection.

The distinction between self-as-object and self-as-agent provides a fitting segue into our brief consideration of the history of intellectual inquiry about selfhood. Intellectual interest in the self started much earlier than the discipline of psychology, within which most empirical inquiry is now done. Early intellectual treatments were largely philosophical and wrestled with profound and fundamental questions, many of which remain unanswered, such as the origin and location of the self and how it is that the self can be both object and agent. As the intellectual treatment of selfhood made its way from philosophy through sociology into psychology, the focus and methods of inquiry changed. In order to better understand why and how researchers in social psychology study selfhood, it is important to have at least a general appreciation of the history of intellectual inquiry about selfhood. Toward that end, in the next section we highlight significant contributors and schools of thought that set the stage for contemporary thinking by social psychologists about selfhood.

A Brief History

The legacy of intellectual inquiry about selfhood is long and is strewn with names that would be familiar to even the most casual student of the humanities or social sciences. Indeed, if the enduring importance of a construct or phenomenon can be judged by the amount of attention it has received throughout history from inquiring scholars, then selfhood must be considered supremely important. Philosophers Descartes (1962, 1986), Kant (1934), and Dewey (1890) wrestled with the role of self-consciousness in human emotion, will, and thinking. Sociologists Cooley (1902, 1925) and Mead (1914, 1934) attempted to integrate the individual and society by portraying the self as an internalization of social experience. And philosopher-psychologist William James (1950, 1961) described the self as rich and differentiated with emotional and motivational consequences for the individual. However, the seeds of this enduring fascination with selfhood were sown much earlier.

Scholarly interest in the self antedates the birth of most of the disciplines that now consider selfhood a fruitful topic of research. As early as the fourth century B.C., Plato (1951) described the soul, or self, as the source of all human activity (Viney 1969). Aristotle portrayed the self in much the same way and has been described as "the first to make a systematic enquiry into the nature of the ego" (Altschule 1957, 24). Perhaps as a result of the anti-intellectualism that characterized the Middle Ages, the search for the self dwindled to a minor point of occasional intellectual debate until the latter half of the seventeenth century.

The philosophers of seventeenth-century Europe shaped philosophical and scientific inquiry in major ways. As the climate grew more favorable for unrestrained intellectual pursuit, the self resurfaced as a central question—and problem—for notables such as Descartes (1962), Hobbes (1948), and Locke (1960). In many respects, the current Western view of human consciousness and will is a reflection of the great thinkers of this era.

During this period the self also became an issue of importance for the layperson in the form of a concern for individuality. The pursuit of self during this era was an attempt to distinguish the inner "true" self from the outer "apparent" self (Baumeister 1987). This distinction is particularly apparent in the introspective writings of Rene Descartes (1962, 50): "I recognized that I was a substance whose essence or nature is to be conscious. Thus, this self, that is to say the soul, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body and is even more easily known."

Soon after the appearance of Descartes' famous account of his search for self, the Englishman Hobbes (1948) published his Leviathan, in which he laid the groundwork for present-day "doctrines of self-esteem and self-regard as pivotal motives" (Allport 1954, 14). Hobbes portrayed the self in terms of sensory experience and was among the first to describe, and endorse, the basic pursuit of self-interest (Viney 1969). Hobbes's influence, particularly his concern for the sensory experience of self, can be seen clearly in the later works of James (1950) and Cooley (1902). Indeed, ideas from his treatise on self-interest are well represented in contemporary theories of self-related motivations (e.g., Greenwald 1980; Kunda 1987).

John Locke provided the clearest link between the philosophers of the seventeenth century and later thinkers who more directly influenced contemporary conceptualizations of the self. Locke (1960) described the self as a by-product of sensory experience, wholly defined by the phenomenology, or subjective experience, of the individual: "The self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance, which it cannot be sure of, but only by identity of consciousness" (p. 196).

According to Kant (1934), the self as conceived by Locke and Hobbes, the empirical self (i.e., self-as-object), was to be distinguished from the pure ego (i.e., self-as-agent). The empirical self involved a synthesis of sensory experience, perhaps encoded in memory, yet influenced by new experiences.¹ The pure ego, also known as "the knower" (Schopenhauer 1948), the "I" (Condillac 1930), "agent" (James 1950), or "experiencer" (American Psychological Association Committee 1918), was seen as the core of human existence. James (1950) grappled with the nature and function of the pure ego in his classic chapter on the self. He noted that "ever since Hume's time, it [pure ego] has been justly regarded as the most puzzling puzzle with which psychology has to deal; and whatever view one may espouse, one has to hold his position against heavy odds" (p. 330).

Contrary to James's commentary, the pure ego has, for the most part, remained the subject matter of philosophy (e.g., Popper and Eccles 1977), not psychology. It is the empirical self, "the known," that has attracted the greatest attention in psychology. Indeed, James's treatment of the empirical self has influenced much current theory and research on the self (e.g., Gergen 1971; Markus and Nurius 1986).

An Early Model of Self-Concept

James (1961) drew a sharp distinction between the "Me," the empirical ego, and the "I," the pure ego. The former he divided into three "constituents of the Self: the material self, the social self, and the spiritual self. The material self included the individual's body and possessions. Of this self James (1950) noted, "The old saying that the human person is composed of three parts—soul, body and clothes—is more than a joke" (p. 292).

An individual's social self was described by James (1950) as "the recognition which he gets from his mates" (p. 292). In essence, James argued that the individual has as many social selves as he or she has meaningful acquaintances. His description of the social self foreshadowed a number of early (Prince 1929; Ribot 1895; Sidis and Goodhart 1904) and more recent multidimensional models of the self-concept (e.g., Gergen 1972; Hoelter 1985; Markus and Kunda 1986; Marsh and Shavelson 1985).

The final constituent part of the empirical self proposed by James (1950) was the spiritual self, or consciousness—the "self of all other selves" (p. 297). According to James (1950, 298-299), "this central part of the self is felt.... It is something with which we have direct sensible acquaintance, and which is as fully present at any moment of consciousness in which it is present, as in a whole lifetime of such moments." By introducing the spiritual self, James set the stage for treating the emotions that accompanied self-awareness—"self-complacency" and "self-dissatisfaction," and activities generated by them—"self-seeking" and "self-preservation."

James (1950) devoted much intellectual effort to pursuing the agent of the activities and feelings associated with self-awareness. Conceding to the seeming futility of the search for "I," he at one point questioned whether it is better to attempt to conceptualize the "I" or simply to consider it as "a law yet unexplained." In the end, James concluded that the "I" and the "me" are conceptually inseparable—"the indecomposable unity of every pulse of thought" (p. 371). Much later, Hilgard (1949) reiterated the futility of attempts to distinguish between self-as-object and self-as-agent. According to Hilgard, it is as if the self were "between the two mirrors of a barber-shop, with each image viewing each other one, so that as the self takes a look at itself taking a look at itself, it soon gets all confused as to the self that is doing the looking and the self which is being looked at" (p. 377).

Evidence of the impact of James's (1950, 1961) clear thinking and eloquent writing about the self on contemporary models of the self is abundant. He portrayed the self as malleable, multifaceted, and conscious. The malleability, or variable experience of the self, is increasingly apparent in research inspired by cognitive psychology (e.g., Markus and Kunda 1986; Schwarz et al. 1991). It is now taken for granted that the self has many interrelated parts (e.g., Donahue et al. 1993; Markus and Kunda 1986; Markus and Nurius 1986; Linville 1985). James's idea of the self as readily accessible to the individual (i.e., conscious) is not as prevalent in contemporary models (cf. Wicklund 1979). This departure from the strictly phenomenological self portrayed by James (1950) can be traced primarily to the work of sociologists Cooley and Mead and philosopher John Dewey.

Focus on Social Experience

Dewey (1887, 1890) portrayed the self as an emergent internalization of social feedback and societal values. He proposed that "the self has no meaning except as contrasted with other persons" (1887, 327) and that "the self and the world are correlative, and have the same content" (1890, 59). Dewey's influence on self theory is seldom acknowledged, but the similar views held by his colleague Charles Cooley and, later, George Herbert Mead elevated to prominence Dewey's notion of a social self.

Cooley is perhaps most noted for introducing the concept of the "looking-glass self." "Each to each a looking-glass reflects the other that doth pass," wrote Cooley {1902, 184). Considered a champion of the symbolic interactionist school, Cooley saw the self as "totally bound up with other people" (Wicklund 1979,190). For Cooley, "a separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience, and so likewise is society when regarded as something apart from individuals" (1902, 1). In a fascinating paper, "A Study of the Early Use of Self-Words by a Child," Cooley (1908) traced the emergence of the self in a young child through analysis of the prevalence of references to self and others.

The child's first few words pertain to important others (e.g., "dada" and "mama") and presumably provide the impetus for the emergence of self. As the child matures, "the shadow on the wall and the reflection in the looking-glass" (1908, 232) become important points of focus and lead to the first signs of self-awareness; however, Cooley noted that "they are much less interesting at first than the shadows and reflections of others" (p. 232). The child soon comes to use the words "I," "me," and "mine" in an imitative fashion, then as a personal referent—the first sign of a consciousness of self.

George Herbert Mead, another member of the symbolic interactionist school, addressed more directly the social self and the evaluative implications of it. Like Cooley, Mead (1934) proposed that "the self is essentially a social structure, and it arises in social experience" (p. 140). In many respects, Mead was even more adamant in his conviction that the self cannot exist apart from the social world: "What I want particularly to emphasize is the temporal and logical pre-existence of the social process to the self-consciousness of the individual" (1934,186). "We do not assume that there is a self to begin with. Self is not presupposed as a stuff out of which the world arises. Rather the self arises in the world" (1982,107). Mead did not see the self as an internalization of the reflected appraisal of others, as did Cooley. Instead, he saw self and society as inseparable.

In Mind, Self, and Society, his most thoroughgoing treatment of the self, Mead (1934) argued that the self is "essentially a cognitive rather than an emotional phenomenon" (p. 173). He contrasted this view with that of Cooley and James, who portrayed the self in terms of sensory experience and emotions. A final statement from Mead (1934) serves to summarize his perspective on the self and to illustrate the degree to which he anticipated contemporary social-cognitive perspectives on the self: "The essence of the self, as we have said is cognitive: it lies in the internalized conversation of gestures which constitutes thinking, or in terms of which thought or reflection proceeds. And hence the origin and foundations of the self, like those of thinking, are social" (p. 173).

Resurgence of Interest in the Self

Pepitone (1968) wryly noted that "in the history of psychology the self has been in and out like the style-changes of haute couture" (p. 347). Indeed, as the influence of the symbolic interactionist waned in the decades after publication of major works by Cooley and Mead, attention to the self as a mediator of social behavior diminished. By the 1950s, the self was apparently "dead" in psychological theory (Pepitone 1968); however, the 1970s and, to an even greater extent, the 1980s saw a resurgence of interest in selfhood. In a review of research during this period of resurgence, Hales (1985) noted an increasing frequency of statements such as "social psychologists appear to have backed into a focus on the self" (Greenwald and Ronis 1978, 55); "the self has become acceptable" (Stryk...