These are now listed in a particular order for clarity. They introduce the assumptions and axioms of critical realism and also explain their implications for practice. As the name suggests, the philosophy is critical and so those implications are largely about types of critique that can be helpful in our work, as well as an invitation to think in a critical and reflective way about our theory and practice. The ordering of the guidelines is not a hierarchal checklist (i.e. with the least important points at the end). The exception to that principle is the first one on the list, because it is so axiomatic.
1) The âholy trinityâ of critical realism
We can think of the foundations of critical realism as three core axioms or premises. Like all philosophical arguments they are fundamental assumptions. In the case of critical realism these are ontological realism; epistemological relativism; and judgemental rationalism (or sometimes in critical realist texts âjudgemental rationalityâ). For emphasis I re-visit here items in the glossary:
Ontological realism is the premise that the world exists independent of what we know or think about it. Our individual existence is part of the world temporarily but the world existed before we were born and will do so after we die. Reality in large part then is mind-independent. It does matter what we think about it though, while we are around. Those thoughts, descriptions, discourses or notions are themselves part of reality but their existence emerges from an external and independent material world. Mind- or language-related aspects of reality are products of real evolutionary processes that preceded, and so were independent of, them. But now language has evolved to afford us personal agency then we as well must consider the next important premise. The assumption about ontology is primary in critical realism. Without real material conditions, we would not have evolved as a species and the next two aspects of the âholy trinityâ could not have emerged.
Epistemological relativism is the premise that we construe the world we live within and reflect upon and talk about. Those construals might be fanciful and idiosyncratic tastes and assertions (e.g. the view that heavy metal exemplifies good music) or profound and serious (e.g. the passion for proving, with evidence, the reality of global warming and campaigning about its dire consequences for the survival of humanity). Heavy metal music exists but people hold different views about its merits and its definition and range of indicative bands. Global warming exists but people debate its sources, consequences and degree of threat. Some construals might be honest and persuasive (e.g. persistent inequalities in health mean the poor will be sicker and die younger than the rich on average) or dishonest and unfounded (e.g. there are no health inequalities only âhealth variationsâ and being healthy is merely a matter of personal choice).
These examples point up that epistemological relativism is not the same as truth relativism. As Elder-Vass (2012) points out, knowledge is socially contingent but truth remains independent of âhistorical specificities in systems of beliefâ (ibid.: 231). For example, âthe world is roundâ is a statement of truth. A flat earth claim is now a minority epistemological position but the world is, as it has always been, round. When and if our species becomes extinct, the world will still be round, unless evidence is brought forward to support the flat earth position, which at the time of writing has not occurred. (See my discussion of the ontic fallacy below.)
As we are socialised in a culture, construals will change over time and they will vary from place to place. They are mind-dependent and that mind-dependency can be reflected on within, or explored at the level of, the individualâs account of their biography or collectively (in our shared cultural assumptions, ideologies, cosmologies or discourses). In the academy, some forms of knowledge are deemed to be inherently superior to those of everyday wisdom, opinion or prejudice. However, even academic construals are socially-situated and they will always reflect the context of their production to some extent and in particular ways. Their emphasis on empirical evidence, theoretical coherence or methodological transparency and rigour might improve their claim to superior knowledge but the latter can still be addressed sceptically; a cue for the next premise.
Judgemental rationalism is the premise that in light of the first two above we are able to weigh up truths and likelihoods. Those judgements might be made cautiously because all knowledge is fallible; but they can, and sometimes must, be made. This can be distinguished from judgemental relativism, whereby we tolerate the merits of all construals and abandon adjudicating criteria. More will be said about this in Chapter 3 when querying the tendency of judgemental relativism within the theoretical traditions of metaphysical idealism in general, and postmodern psychology in particular.
A good example of judgemental rationalism is given by Porpora (2015). If we are faced with discerning the truth when faced with closely competing knowledge claims, as critical realists we would opt for the third of these statements as the best fit:
- Six million Jews died in the Nazi holocaust.
- Six million Jews were killed in the Nazi holocaust.
- Six million Jews were murdered in the Nazi holocaust.
The first is true but is incomplete because it omits the reality of mass homicide. The second is true but killings might have accrued for a range of intentional or unintentional motives and so may mislead us about the context of the deaths. Only the third captures the full picture: mass murder planned and executed by the Nazi state in its âFinal Solutionâ for the âJewish problemâ. There was the deliberate industrial destruction of an ethnic group blamed by Hitler for undermining Germany and its vaunted master race.
When asked about these options, people may opt for the first or second statements, possibly in the belief that the last is emotive and others more neutral and considered. Positivism may help that slide in thinking (by claiming to remove values from facts). Postmodernism offers us only perspectives and so are all three statements of equal value? If not, then how is one account better than another, without recourse to a complex description of how the Holocaust came into being as a fact, not merely as a set of narratives? This would mean postmodernists taking reality seriously and not with a wan smile putting it in speech marks (see Chapter 3).
The above three core premises are aligned with common sense and critical realism has been described as its âenlightenedâ version (Bhaskar, 2016). Professional philosophers have given common sense a mixed press. For example, Bertrand Russell called it âthe metaphysics of the savageâ but Thomas Huxley called science âcommon sense at its bestâ. What common sense does do is provide us with the cognitive capacity for judgemental rationality, which is the basis for both dealing with everyday life and pursuing intelligent forms of academic activity. For this reason, the closeted academic has grounds for envying the street-wise teenager and vice versa.
Academic enquiry is predicated on a shared starting point and that entails us learning the difference between words and things, as well as being aware of our inner and outer reality. From a young age we recognise the reality of the world around us and within us. We learn that a flame hurts our hand but also that what we desire is not always achieved and our dreams are not the same as our waking thoughts. We might wake up to a bird singing or a bomb bursting. Cars on the road might injure or kill us. Our parents are usually more trustworthy than strangers. Adults have power over children. Food and drink are necessary and enjoyable. Rules apply to what is wise and permissible and what is not. We feel our way into this rule-bound world. Bit by bit we learn about the world, but also how to make good (or bad) judgements about it and what others expect of us.
Our capacity to use judgemental rationality in our lives can be directed at matters which are interpersonal and subjective (the centrality of attachments and relational expectations in our developing life) and others which seem to be about the natural world more generally (the dangers of flames and cars and the importance of eating and drinking for survival). Common sense tells us that this is a both/and not an either/or real world. Relationships are important but so is everything beyond people per se. Our primary preoccupation, understandably, may be with our personal attachments and support from others. But if we were lost alone in a forest we would take the reality of our immediate natural environment very seriously in order to survive. An unpeopled world with no conversations is still the world. None of us require a training in philosophy or science to come to these conclusions about our shared personal and impersonal contexts.
Also, as time progresses, we become aware that we do not know everything and life is often mysterious. We are in a state of constant ignorance but know enough to cope with the messy reality of our lives much of the time. We are thrown into a world not of our making but slowly make decisions about that world and how to act upon it (or not) in a state of partial knowledge. Life is sort of predictable (the seasons guide our clothing expectations) but exceptions constantly prove rules to be wrong (the mild day in mid-winter or the surprise of the âIndian summerâ). Nothing is certain but some things seem to have stronger patterns that connect through time than others. These generalisations about the contingencies and flux of being human are the bread and butter of a critical realist approach and so it is aligned with everyday common sense and, as I have just argued, the latter provides us with judgemental rationality.