CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The Life and Work of Genius
On First Looking into a Manuscript by Goffman
⌠You sloughed
Methodologies, set out to tell what oft
Is done, but neâer well expressed. And until
Well expressed, well christened, ill seen. Gentle
GOFFMAN, so much of such seeing we owe, we know,
To thy quick quirky quizzing of our status quo.
Dell Hymes (1984)
THIS CHAPTER BEGINS WITH A REVIEW of the scholarly response to Goffmanâs work, and also considers his personal reputation. I include his life for two reasons. First, because I think one part of that reputation, as an obnoxious character, casts a shadow on his work. Second, because I believe that a dispassionate consideration of links between an authorâs life and work can be valuable in themselves. In earlier studies, I have tried to show that the work of a brilliant author, Goethe, for example, can be used to understand his or her own life, and that knowledge of the authorâs life can help us better understand the work.1 It can also help us understand an authorâs reputation among his colleagues.
Goffmanâs work has a large and appreciative following among scholars. Many of them seem to believe, as I do, that his work bears the stamp of genius, and that it contains a legacy that could lead to revolutionary changes in social science. However, there is also a mass of critical opinion, some of which finds its way into the commentary of even his most loyal admirers.
As with his work, there are also two distinct representations of Goffmanâs life. In addition to published reviews, mostly favorable, there is also a shadow life that might be called the Goffman legend: stories and gossip about oddness. Although he died over twenty years ago, his behavior is still much referred to in private; there exists, at least among sociologists, what might be called an urban legend, Goffman the Character. Here I will attempt to make sense of the two versions of his life, and to relate them to his work.
Responses to Goffmanâs Work
The last line of the witty poem (1984) by Hymes, above, miraculously implies much of what is to be said, at, alas, great length in these chapters. However, for the sake of argument, I will quibble with one of Hymesâs three qâs: that Goffmanâs work is âquirky.â The idea that his approach is at least odd or weird is shared by a virtual army of commentators. At its most extreme, as in the case of Scheibe (2000), the widespread critique says that Goffmanâs approach is âcold-eyed and sourâ and other similar epithets. I will argue that Goffmanâs work is extremely unusual because of its originality, but not ever âquirky,â once we understand the direction that it takes. That is, if one were to set out to reach what I think might be the main goals and consequences of Goffmanâs work, one would be advised to follow an approach quite similar to his.
Erving Goffman is probably the most widely read sociologist in the history of the discipline. I say that not to take away from Durkheim, but to call attention to the diversity of his audience, which includes vast numbers of laypersons. Perhaps almost as widely cited, his work has been noted throughout the social sciences and humanities.
But the meaning of his work and therefore his legacy is by no means clear. In the 23 years since his tragically youthful death at 60, eight valuable monographs and edited volumes interpreting his work have been published in English.2 Many further mentions, some of them chapter length, can be found in other volumes. But even a quick reading suggests that there is no consensus. As a review of one of the volumes (Smith 1999) suggests (Toiskallio 2000), the contributors view Goffmanâs writings with âsimultaneous irritation and fascination.â
One can go further if one compares the offerings in these books. There is agreement between the authors about Goffmanâs felicitous style and stimulus value. But there are also grave doubts about the nature of his legacy. Most of those reviewing Goffmanâs work, even the most appreciative, are at best ambivalent. Although they find much to praise, there are also many irritations, and considerable confusion.
Goffmanâs critics are not ambivalent. Even though they find positive features, critics like Gouldner (1970), Psathas (1980), and Schegloff (1988) are largely dismissive. Gouldner was repelled by Goffmanâs miniature scale, and by what Gouldner thought was his disinterest in power and hierarchy. Psathas and Schegloff, like many of the commentators, critics and admirers alike, found Goffman unsystematic to the point of chaos. Goffmanâs approach to the main elements in social science is, to say the least, not clear.
An extended exchange on this issue can be found in the first of the four Fine and Smith (2000) volumes. Posner (Ch. 9), like many others, finds Goffmanâs work enigmatic. To back up this claim, she cites several of his critics, and considers several readings of his work that she finds to be outright misunderstandings. She concludes that although often cited, Goffmanâs work has little status, and even less application in the academic community.
But Oromaner (Ch. 10) challenges Posner. He argues that not only is Goffmanâs work massively cited, but that he also received many honors from the academic community, and that even his critics offer praise. Posnerâs response (Ch. 11) is blunt. The crucial point that Oromaner missed, she insists, is that even the praise Goffman received consisted of âleft handed compliments.â Even more to the point is Posnerâs argument that most of the commentary shows that his work is either not understood or misunderstood. Many reviews of Goffmanâs work agree: they see his work as virtually impossible to understand or apply.
There seem to be several reasons for the problem. For one, Goffmanâs prose style is incredibly involuted and complex. It is dense with meaning, innuendo, impromptu classifications, qualifications, and expansion. It is also humorous, ironic, and witty in ways that both entertain and irritate, reveal and conceal. Winkinsâs (2000, 206) comment on his epistolary style is also applicable to most of his writing: âsharp, full of humour, and yet circumvoluted, ever precieux.â
As with most readers, I want to agree that Goffmanâs style is âever precious.â Yet I have a reservation that can be expressed by a passage from Audenâs poem âThe Truest Poetry Is the Most Feigningâ:
What but tall tales, the luck of verbal playing,
Can trick his [human beingsâ] lying nature into saying
That love or truth in any serious sense,
Like orthodoxy, is a reticence.
Goffmanâs style was reticent. He seemed to sense how far he could go with an idea without completely losing the reader. Perhaps instead of blurting out everything he knew, he went only as far as he thought the reader would be ready for. In my view, this might be a valuable aid to communicating new ideas.
But there is also a difficulty more fundamental than mere style. Goffman seemed to revel in complexity. Not only ordinary people, but also most social science assumes that human conduct is simple enough that it can be understood in commonsense terms. For that reason, key concepts are often expressed in ordinary language, using vernacular words rather than concepts.
For example, there have been a large number of studies of alienation, and many more mentions, that have not provided a clear definition of the concept itself. Although there are standardized alienation scales, there have been few attempts to decide, conceptually, what it is that these scales are supposed to be measuring.
In 1975, Seeman reviewed studies of alienation based on standardized scales. His analysis revealed that the scales involve six different dimensions.
1. Powerlessness
2. Meaninglessness
3. Normlessness
4. Cultural estrangement
5. Self-estrangement
6. Social isolation: exclusion or rejection
Each of these categories, in turn, is also somewhat ambiguous. Powerlessness, for example, can mean a relational element, lack of actual power relative to other people, and a dispositional element, the feeling of powerlessness, whether grounded in comparison to others or not. Five of the six dimensions can refer to relational elements, but one, self-estrangement, cannot, since it is solely intrapersonal.
Furthermore, at least two of the six meanings imply emotional components: the exclusion or rejection of social isolation is a correlate of shame, as is the feeling of inadequacy that may accompany powerlessness. Seemanâs study demonstrates both kinds of confounds: dispositional vs. relational, and cognitive vs. emotional.3
It may be significant that although Seemanâs study was published over thirty years ago, no real inroads seem to have been made on clearly defining alienation, or creating specialized scales that measure only one of the six dimensions. Nor did his study slow down the creation of new, general alienation scales, or studies using standardized scales. For all practical purposes, his study has had no impact at all. The idea of alienation is quite central in sociology, yet when we use this word, we still donât know what it is we are talking about.
Many key concepts in social science are ambiguous in a similar way. Self-esteemâeasily the most studied topic in all of social science, with at least fifteen thousand studiesâseems to have a similar problem. A well-known study by Leary and Baumeister (2000) implies that self-esteem scales confound dispositional and relational dimensions. And I have shown, with David Fearon (2004), that these scales also confound cognitive and emotional dimensions. There are now well over 200 standardized scales for measuring self-esteem reliably. Yet there is still no agreed-upon definition of the concept. What that means is that although all the scales are reliable, there is no way of checking their validity, since we havenât agreed upon the meaning of what it is that is being measured. The tail is wagging the dog.
Some key concepts, such as alienation and self-esteem, involve potentially orthogonal meanings (such as individual, relational, cognitive, and emotional dimensions) confounded in what is usually thought of as a single idea. Emotion words, especially in English, are notoriously confusing. As indicated in Chapter 3, below, Goffman offered a carefully thought through and precise definition of embarrassment. Other important ideas, such as irrationality, and, as indicated in Chapter 5, context, are mere residual categories, conceptually empty boxes, because they encompass an enormously wide variety of different kinds of things. Goffmanâs favorite target was the idea of an individual self, standing alone, as if there were no social context. Assumptions of simplicity hide these confusions. Goffman seemed to be trying to at least expose these basic problems, and in some cases, begin the search for remedies, as will be further discussed in the next chapter.
But introducing complexity into modern social science leads to trouble with reviewers, at least in Goffmanâs case. Even his most loyal fans have complained. Two of the most detailed and appreciative commentators are Lofland (1980), reviewing the work up to and including Stigma (1963), and Manning (1980), the whole oeuvre, with special attention to a later work, Frame Analysis (1974). The overall tone of both Lofland and Manning is strongly appreciative. Yet their systematic reviews unearth features that give them pause. One that is also noted by most of the essayists is that Goffman started afresh in each book, not only not relating his new ideas to his old ones, but not even taking note of them. This practice gives rise to some confusion as to Goffmanâs intent.
In his highly appreciative essay, Lofland (1980, 29) has also pointed out that the first three pages of Goffmanâs article on face work contain:
3 types of face
4 consequences of being out of or in the wrong face
2 basic kinds of face work
5 kinds of avoidance processes
3 phases of the corrective process
5 ways an offering can be accepted (1955, pp. 213â15).
Manning (1980, 270) notes that later, in Frame Analysis, the following concepts âat leastâ are found in a nineteen-page span:
4 kinds of playful deceit
6 types of benign fabrications
3 kinds of exploitative fabrications
5 sorts of self-deception (1974, 87â116).
Perhaps Lofland and Manning are implying that so many partridges and pear trees suggest a Christmas carol more than a sociological theory.
Manning (1980, 270) goes on to complain explicitly:
Such lists of items do not always fall out so neatly in a text, they may accrue in an almost shadowy fashion. The purpose of these lists is unstated and often elusive. He does not infer or deduce from them, does not claim that these types are exhaustive, explicate the degree of kinds of possible logical interconnections between them, nor does he always relate his current efforts to previous ideas of himself or others.
It is clear from such observations that Goffmanâs work does not make much, if any, contribution to theory. Other commentators have unanimously agreed that Goffman has not contributed to method or empirical evidence as these categories have come to be understood in social science. If not to theory, method, or data, where could his contribution lie? Chapter 2 proposes three vitally important contributions, all necessary before conventional science and scholarship can be applied.
Personal Reputation
Because I have been speaking for many years about Goffmanâs work, formally and informally, I have heard many opinions expressed about both his work and his behavior. It often turns out that those who tell me about his behavior usually donât have firsthand information; they are merely repeating what they heard. I wonât repeat these stories because I canât establish the extent that they are true or false. My version of his behavior will be based on publications by Lofland and Winkin, my own encounters with Goffman, and three interviews I conducted with persons who knew him well.
In including Goffmanâs life within my purview, I am following Phillipsâs idea that self-reference or reflexiveness is an important part of all scholarship. Since Goffman himself did not self-reference at all, to the point of secrecy, perhaps I can remedy in part that omission.
Another inclination to include Goffmanâs life comes from the tradition of the most skillful of all biographers, James Boswell. He apologized for including Samuel Johnsonâs tics and odd behaviors, pleading, âLet me not be censured for mentioning such minute particulars. Everything relative to so great a man is worth observingâ (1961, p. 4 of the dedication). I am happy to follow in Boswellâs footsteps.
The information about Goffmanâs personal life that I have found most helpful, all things considered, has been provided by John Lofland (1984), John Irwin (personal correspondence), and Yves Winkins (2000). Lofland, like me, studied with Goffman in graduate school at Berkeley, but knew him longer and better than I did. Loflandâs article, written after Goffmanâs death in 1982, provides a very favorable summary of his legacy and his life. However, it repeats some of the stories that suggest that much of Goffmanâs behavior was at the very least odd or challenging, and at times cruel and wounding. Irwinâs account of the long and close relationship that he and his wife, Marsha Rosenbaum, had with Goffman makes a very similar point. Winkins published a biography in French in 1988, and is preparing an English translation and extension.
After noting that Goffmanâs remarks were often quite humorous, including humor directed against himself, Lofland interprets stories of Goffmanâs oddness or hostility as follows:
A theme of his behavior that was broader and more encompassing than his humor was his desire for candor and the use of penetrating remarks to cut through the banal and false surfaces in order to touch truth ⌠Moreover...