Britain and Europe

A Political History Since 1918

N.J. Crowson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2010
• ISBN:
  9781136891977
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia del mundo

This textbook provides a comprehensive account of Britain's uneasy relationship with continental Europe from 1918 to the present day.

Unlike other books on the subject, the author considers 'Europe' in its broadest sense and examines a wider history than just Britain's relations with the European Union (EU). This includes pre-war history and the role of key political institutions outside the EU such as the Council of Europe and the Western European Union.

Subjects covered include:

• how the experience of the inter-war years and the Second World War helped shape attitudes towards the EU
• european perspectives on Britain as well as the other way round
• key theories on European integration
• the changing nature of Britain's global role
• issues of sovereignty and legitimacy
• the role of political parties and the Europeanisation of national government
• the rise of Euroscepticism in British politics and how 'Europe' has become entwined in the ideological battles of the main political parties.

Exploring the political, diplomatic and military relationship between Britain and Europe, this accessible and wide-ranging textbook is essential core reading for students of British and European history and politics.

1
Inter-war years 1918–39

With European war imminent, the British foreign secretary, Edward Grey, observed ‘The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime.’¹ Even so, the scale and magnitude of the war could not have been envisaged. When the guns finally fell silent on 11 November 1918 the casualties suffered by the British empire alone were 908,000 killed and 2,090,000 wounded. Overall the British and their allies lost 5 million killed, 13 million wounded, and 4 million either prisoners of war or missing; whilst Germany and her allies (Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria) had 3.3 million killed, 8.3 million wounded and 3.6 million as POWs. The material damaged inflicted upon western Europe was intensive, but confined to a relatively narrow geographical strip. Although a global war, the scale of the destruction caused some to consider it a European civil war, and then the uncertainty of the new world scene owing to the Russian Revolution and the growing economic preeminence of America led to questions about the merit of the European order. The absence of any ‘European institutional’ form during the inter-war years would mean that ‘Europe’, what it was, what it meant and where it should go, shifted over time with each of the problems and proposals that emerged.

Negotiating the peace: Versailles and the new international order

Althoughthe armistice took effect from 11 a.m. on 11 November 1918, in the eyes of some, European civilisation was still under threat from revolutions and diseases – flu pandemic, cholera and typhoid – and small-scale conflicts in central and eastern Europe, such as in Poland, threatened the stability. The speed at which hostilities were concluded found the Allies unprepared for negotiating peace. The British had a special inquiry in 1917, but its conclusions had little impact on Prime Minister Lloyd George. Further more, events were unfolding at a pace that the Allied victors had little control over. Poland was recreated, whilst Finland and the Baltic states were moving towards independence and Czechoslovakia had merged itself; likewise in the Balkans Serbia appeared to be linking up with Croatia and Slovenia. The fragility of the European economies was a serious concern, and it would take until 1925 till Europe was back to its pre-war levels of production. The absence of Bolshevik Russia from the Paris conference, who had taken the ‘cowards’ peace’ and signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, meant that this dimension of the peace deal would not be satisfactorily resolved. The subjects of Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia amongst others all were issues for the peace conference, but their borders could not be finally confirmed until the future shape and status of Russia was established. For Clemenceau, the French president, this was inconsequential: Russia had betrayed the Allied cause in prematurely suing for peace and leaving France to the mercy of the Germans.²

The late entry of the USA into the First World War meant that when the peace came to be negotiated the old tripartite relationship of Germany, Britain and France, was broken open and a new more complex dimension added. Both Britain and France initially vied for ‘most preferred’ status with the USA, and it took both quite some time to appreciate that America intended to pursue its own aims and objectives.³ President Wilson had expounded his views in a speech on 8 January 1918 in which he explained his fourteen points and added four principles and five particulars. Neither the French nor the British had been asked for their views on Wilson’s points.⁴ The Germans had already successfully offended the British and French by secretly approaching the Americans to discuss ar mistice terms, and Wilson compounded the offence by conducting two weeks of negotiations before the Allies found out, and the Supreme War Council stepped into the fray.⁵ In a sense both Britain and France had similar objectives from the peace negotiations, namely a desire for security. The difference was that Britain hoped it could turn its back on Europe once this threat was neutralised (and the scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow gifted them this) and seek safety in an imperial vision, whilst France continued to crave continental security against Germany. The prospect of a reinvigorated British empire appeared a possibility given that Dominion troops had fought in both large numbers and with success in Europe. The mother country and the Dominions had cooperated with one another in the Imperial War Cabinet, and the Dominions were all to be represented at the peace conference, and the empire would be swollen by the accession of the mandated territories (the imperial possessions of the defeated nations, put under the authority of the League of Nations and passed on around the victorious powers to hold in mandate). France had no such luxury, despite a significant empire; geographical location meant she was next door to Germany, and the war had effectively removed many of her traditional allies: Tsarist Russia was now Bolshevik, and eastern Europe had been broken up into various small nations, none of whom could offer realistic defence against Germany. The problem was that the means by which security could be achieved provoked very different responses and strained the Allies’ relationship. The opening up of the French archives in the 1970s has led some historians to revise their verdict of French inflexibility during the peace negotiations – not that this meant that France was not trying to enhance her diplomatic position.⁶ Clemence au had tried to insist that French alone be the language of the Versailles conference documents, as for long periods French had been the official language of diplomacy and international congresses, but was forced to back down and accept it jointly with English – a precursor of the EEC debate in 1970. Further more within the Council of Four English was the working language.⁷ Fortunately for Clemenceau he possessed a good competency with English. At the end of the First World War, the leaders of Europe were faced with the possibilities of trying to re-establish a global order based either on a regional format or a global one. This was certainly captured in the title of an influential book by Giovanni Agnelli (the founder of Italian car manufacturer Fiat) and Attilio Cabiati (an economist), European Federation or League of Nations? (1918). Their answer was ‘a federation of European states under a central power which governs them. Any other milder version is an illusion.’⁸ They broadly argued that a League of Nations could not expect to prevent war due to its absolute sovereignty whereas federation, in which sovereignty was pooled, could because it would work better in an age of economic interdependence. In developing these ideas they were deeply influenced by writers of the liberal tradition, and drew upon the American constitutional experience as evidence for their thesis. Certainly this work, and others by the likes of Luigi Einaudi and Coudenhove-Kalergi, influenced a generation of continental politicians, but it is unclear what impact it had in Britain.⁹ The political establishment was swept up in the rhetoric of American president Woodrow Wilson and opted for his global vision of a League of Nations, but also because many in Europe were looking to America for aid and protection. The French for guarantees against a resurgent Germany, and the Germans for protection from a vengeful France. From January 1919 until August 1920 a series of peace conferences were conducted in Paris, with neither Russia nor Germany invited, during which not just the problems of Germany but also those of central Europe and the Balkans were thrashed out. Consequently, in addition to the Versailles treaty (28 June 1919) a further four treaties, complete with clauses on disarmament, reparations and ‘war guilt’, were initialised: the Treaty of St Germain with Austria (10 September 1919), the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary (4 June 1920), the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria (27 November 1919) and the Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey (10 August 1920).

Under the terms of the Versailles settlement Germany was stripped of some territories (Alsace-Lorraine to France, the Saar region placed under League of Nations control, Danzig made a free city, Posen and elements of West Prussia given to Poland) as well as her colonial empire, her overseas investments and her merchant shipping fleet. She was denied a navy and an air force and granted only a small Army. The Anschluss (union between Germany and Austria) was prohibited under the terms of the Treaty of St Germain, whilst the Sudetenland was redrawn into the borders of Czechoslovakia. The Allies inserted two clauses into the Treaty of Versailles, which would have a lasting significance. Article 231 obliged Germany and her allies to accept responsibility for the outbreak of war and became known as the ‘war guilt’ clause. Article 232 called upon Germany to compensate for specific civilian damages but recognised that Germany did not have adequate resources. This clause, although used to justify the settlement of reparations, actually carried a degree of moderation within its wording because it sought to protect Germany from the cost of the entire war. However, the settlement of reparations was to cause the most difficulty for the Allies. Lloyd George, concerned that the British electorate might not accept a relatively moderate settlement, insisted on tacking the pensions for all servicemen into the total of the UK reparations bill. Contrary to subsequent impressions the French were initially moderate in their demands, even proposing to tie up with the German iron and steel industry to mitigate the impact. The choice facing the French was ultimately one of ruining themselves or ruining their former foe. In settling on an interim reparations bill of 20 billion gold marks payable by May 1921, they chose the latter option. But in doing so the outcome of 1918 was that France risked being economically ruined by reconstruction, leaving Germany, who had experienced less material damage, with the potential to become economically dominant.¹⁰

The critics of the settlements emerged almost immediately from the British and American delegations to the Peace Conference. Maynard Keynes saw the settlement as both vindictive and disastrous whilst Harold Nicolson blamed the flawed peace on the conference’s chaotic organisation. The American, Ray Stannard Baker, who had acted as Wilson’s press secretary at the conference, criticised the European powers’ vindictiveness for the punitive peace.¹¹ Historians have subsequently reapportioned the blame. Marc Trachtenberg is critical of Wilson’s moralism which insisted upon Germany paying reparations, rather than agreeing a package that would have bundled debts, reparations and reconstruction together, and which would have seen the US cancellation of war debts and a contribution to reconstruction being made in a manner comparable to the 1947 Marshall Plan.¹² The manner in which the German delegation was obliged to unconditionally accept the terms in June 1919 also caused disquiet. It would fuel Germany’s intense sense of injustice and hatred of the terms, which helped perpetuate many of the myths that would sustain the Nazi regime in the 1930s.

Britain did not regard Versailles as a definitive settlement; rather it was a flawed peace that required renegotiation in favour of Germany. Still, it would enable Britain to refocus her attentions. As Maurice Hankey, secretary to the Cabinet, penned in 1920 ‘we should as far as possible avoid military responsibilities in Europe, and devote our main attention to development of our overseas trade’.¹³ Reviving Britain’s economy after the dislocation was paramount. The League of Nations appeared to help with Hankey’s first recommendation, as it enabled Britain to avoid specific commitments and instead shelter behind the vaguer provisions of the League’s covenant. By the 1930s British politicians would repeatedly stress that Britain had no commitments to Europe beyond those entailed in the covenant of the League of Nations.¹⁴ Consequently she wished to reduce her European role to that of impartial mediator. For now though it at least allowed Britain to physically withdraw from the continent – if one overlooks the involvement of British forces in the Russian civil war on behalf of the Whites, and the presence of an occupation force in the German Ruhr.

The League of Nations was drafted into the first chapter of each of the peace treaties. It was largely an Anglo–American work; Wilson was the intellectual force, British Conservative minister Lord Robert Cecil and General Jan Smuts of South Africa the detailed draftsmen. Consequently it carried that whiff of ‘Anglo-Saxonism’ that usually riled the French. Further, they were doubtful that it would provide the degree of security that they craved. It aspired to promote open diplomacy through a managed great power format that would oblige signatories to accept the rule of international law, to reduce ar maments and to recognise and sustain the independence and integrity of member states. All of this would be co-ordinated through a council and permanent secretariat based in Geneva, which would seek to provide international arbitration to diplomatic disputes and through the threat of collective action hope to dissuade covenant breakers and avoid a repeat of the events of 1914. Disillusionment with the League of Nations order did emerge in Europe, especially once America retreated back into isolation and refused to join the organisation its president had helped create. Some recognised that by being a voluntary association of member states it was already weakened. Others sensed the contradiction between the insistences upon the equality of members in an organisation that operated on terms dictated by the great powers. There was a danger too that the Versailles settlement had actually fragmented Europe and sown the seeds for future problems. The break-up of the old multinational empires of Turkey and Austria–Hungary now meant myriad nation states ‘created by woolly headed nationalists’ in east and central Europe which whilst proud of their nationalist roots contained substantial minority populations.¹⁵ The challenge had been to cauterise the localised wars in the region and prevent the spread of Bolshevism whilst satisfying expectations of subject nationalities that may have been promised enhanced post-war autonomy. That was one of the oddities of the several different peace treaties negotiated over eighteen months: that Germany as the principal defeated power survived largely intact (losing only 13.5 per cent of her 1914 territory, mostly to Poland) whereas Germany’s main allies, Austria–Hungary and the Ottoman empire, ceased to exist.¹⁶ Further more, the Versailles settlements had mixed idealism with revenge, and consequently failed to resolve the Franco–German problem.

Within the British establishment views of Europe there were two schools of thought. There were those who sensed that the Anglo–German rivalries of 1904–18 were an anomaly and were therefore more wary of France’s intentions in the post-war world than of Germany; and those, like Austen Chamberlain, who sensed that Britain owed more to the entente cordiale with France. Added to this was a perception that Britain remained an imperial rather than continental power. Britain repeatedly refused to commit itself to the French network of alliances in eastern Europe. There was clearly a sense immediately after Versailles that France was the dominant continental power, but suspicion of France’s interchangeable use of terms like security and hegemony persisted. A contradiction wryly observed by foreign secretary Arthur Balfour that the French ‘were so dreadfully afraid of being swallowed up by the tiger, but would spend their time poking it’.¹⁷ Yet the British failed to appreciate that with France now acting as arbiter to the European balance of power, her presence on the continent was required to nurture a Franco– German rapprochement. But withdrawal from continental commitments was the British intention. The French had failed to notice that during the Versailles negotiation Lloyd George had duplicitously downgraded the scale of commitment that Britain would offer France under the Agreement of Assistance. He inserted a clause that would ‘only’ make this valid if the USA ratified the Treaty of Versailles and the appended Agreement of Assistance. So when on 19 March 1920 the Americans failed to do so, the commitment to France was null and void in British eyes.

The reparations problem

Whilst Versailles had agreed that a payment of reparations was necessary it did not define the sum Germany should pay, rather this was left to a series of reparations conferences in the early 1920s. The problem was that without a settlement there was little hope of developing a lasting European peace, but also it meant that economics, foreign policy and politics were intimately entwined.¹⁸ By now Britain was suffering an economic recession. The Treasury sought to pursue a policy that would ensure Germany was forced to pay equitable sums that would not damage her purchasing power for British goods whilst seeking to ensure American resources continued to be inwardly invested in Europe at a time when the Americans were insisting on the repayment of war debts. Entwined in this complex web of negotiation was the need of the British to appear unified with the French whilst trying to pacify the French desire for revenge and the need to understand the complexities of the German economy as it teetered on the verge of hyperinflation and collapse. Matters were further complicated by the intra-Whitehall rivalries between the Foreign Office and the Treasury over whether this was a matter for diplomacy or commercial policy. The Foreign Office’s abilities in the economic sphere were hindered by the Treasury controlling expenditure, the Board of Trade overseeing trade policy and the Bank of England regulating fiscal policy. As for commercial policy, this was distasteful to the professional diplomats of the Foreign Office. It would not be until 1931 that the Foreign Office created an economic intelligence unit, but even then it only afforded it one desk officer.¹⁹ During the 1920 negotiations, the British foreign secretary, Curzon, had been seeking to encourage the Germans to resist the agreeing of a final fixed total in preference for a flexible scheme that would take account of Germany’s ability to pay reparations in light of her economic position . It appears that in the December 1920 Brussels conference this position was under mined by D’Abernon, the British ambassador to Berlin, and then exacerbated by subsequent disagreements between himself and Sir John Bradbury, who had the ear of the Treasury, and was Britain’s representative on the Reparations Comm...