Evolution and Social Psychology

Mark Schaller, Jeffry A. Simpson, Douglas T. Kenrick, Mark Schaller, Jeffry A. Simpson, Douglas T. Kenrick

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781134952496
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psicologia
• Subtopic: Storia e teoria della psicologia

Why do we think about and interact with other people in the particular ways that we do? Might these thoughts and actions be contemporary products of our long-ago evolutionary past? If so, how might this be, and what are the implications? Research generated by an evolutionary approach to social psychology issues profound insights into self-concept, impression formation, prejudice, group dynamics, helping, aggression, social influence, culture, and every other topic that is fundamental to social psychology.

Evolution and Social Psychology is the first book to review and discuss this broad range of social psychological phenomena from an evolutionary perspective. It does so with a critical and constructive eye. Readers will emerge with a clear sense of the intellectual challenges, as well as the scientific benefits, of an evolutionarily-informed social psychology.

The world-renowned contributors identify new questions, new theories, and new hypotheses—many of which are only now beginning to be tested. Thus, this book not only summarizes the current status of the field, it also sets an agenda for the next generation of research on evolution and social psychology. Evolution and Social Psychology is essential reading for evolutionary psychologists and social psychologists alike.

1

Evolution is the New Cognition

DOUGLAS T. KENRICK, MARK SCHALLER,
and JEFFRY A. SIMPSON

If there had been a Frontiers in Social Psychology series 30 years ago, it would surely have included a volume on the exciting new developments at the interface of cognitive and social psychology. In the mid-1970s, a growing number of social psychologists were exploring the subtle effects of cognitive processes on social behavior. At that time, many social psychologists viewed these developments with skepticism and concern. To some, the study of cognition seemed an arid exercise outside the disciplinary boundaries of social psychology. To others, it seemed plain unnecessary to posit invisible mental processes in order to predict and explain behaviors.

That latter form of skepticism echoed the behaviorist critiques of cognitive psychology, which had dotted the psychological landscape for years (e.g., Skinner, 1950). Behaviorist warnings about the futility of the cognitive approach appeared in prominent places even into the mid-1970s. On the pages of American Psychologist, Ebel (1974) colorfully likened “attention, perception, memory, reasoning, will power, and the like” (p. 486) to dryads—fanciful nymphs that were once believed to animate the personalities of trees. Ebel dismissed these cognitive constructs as “ad hoc, imprecise, unverifiable” (p. 487), and concluded that these “dryads of the mind” are “useless…in our search for understanding of behavioral phenomena” (p. 491).

Today, these criticisms seem quaint. The ostensibly useless study of cognition has proven to be indispensable in the advancement of the psychological sciences in general and of social psychology in particular. The cognitive revolution in social psychology has been a huge success. By explicitly including this additional level of conceptual analysis in social psychological inquiry, our theories are more sophisticated, our empirical database is much richer, and we now have a much more coherent and integrative understanding of social behavior.

So what does all this have to do with a book on Evolution and Social Psychology? This: There are remarkable parallels between the status of cognitive social psychology 30 years ago and the status of evolutionary social psychology today. Indeed, there is an eerie similarity in the flavor of the critiques initially lodged against the cognitive perspective and those that are still commonly lodged against the evolutionary perspective today. And there is a striking resemblance in the scientific trajectories of these two perspectives as well—indicating, among other things, that those common criticisms are largely irrelevant to the scientific utility that these perspectives offer. Despite many reactionary critiques, the cognitive approach to social psychology revolutionized the field, and social psychologists who ignored these developments did so at their own intellectual peril. Today, the conceptual utility of the evolutionary perspective is just as unignorable. More and more social psychologists are drawing on an evolutionary perspective to inform their research—with salutary effects on our collective understanding of social cognition and behavior.

EVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IS EVERYWHERE

Once upon a time, social cognition represented a relatively small and austere little niche in the study of social behavior. Today, it hardly makes sense to treat social cognition as a specialized domain of inquiry or to separate the study of social cognition from the study of social psychology more broadly. No longer is cognition relevant merely to, say, the study of person perception and impression formation; it is fundamental to our understanding of aggression, altruism, close relationships, intergroup prejudice, social influence, and every other form of interpersonal or group behavior discussed in any introductory social psychology textbook.

The same trajectory now characterizes the evolutionary perspective on social psychology. Although an evolutionary perspective had been lurking on the fringes of certain social psychological topics for several decades—during which time biological scientists of all kinds were embracing evolutionary analyses to elucidate the behavior of animal species (see Alcock, 2001)—the power of evolutionary models was not at first widely recognized by scientists who studied human beings. Early explorations in evolutionary social psychology focused on a few specific domains of behavior—especially altruism, aggression, and interpersonal attraction—for which the implications of evolutionary principles were most immediate and obvious (e.g., Buss, 1989; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Sadalla, Kenrick, & Vershure, 1987). Until quite recently, though, social psychologists working on most other topics found the evolutionary perspective easy to ignore. Well, things have changed. This book is a testament to how much has changed in a very short period of time: The logical tools of evolutionary psychology now inspire insights into myriad aspects of human social behavior.

As this book demonstrates, the evolutionary perspective has remarkably fecund implications for generating hypotheses about topics that cover the entire range of social psychology. There are, of course, chapters in this volume that revisit topics that have appealed to evolutionary theorists for years—aggression, prosocial behavior, and interpersonal relationships (see, for example, the chapters by Buss & Duntley; Fletcher, Simpson, & Boyes; Taylor & Gonzaga; and Van Vugt & Van Lange). Each of these chapters offers new insights on these traditional evolutionary psychological topics. Other chapters explore evolutionary insights into a whole range of basic intrapersonal processes, including emotional experiences and self-concept (e.g., the chapters by Keltner, Haidt & Shiota; Kurzban & Aktipis; and Sedikides, Skowronski, & Dunbar), as well as impression formation, stereotyping, and other classic topics in person perception (e.g., the chapters by Haselton & Funder; Neuberg & Cottrell; and Zebrowitz & Montepare). There are additional chapters that apply evolutionary theorizing to the study of interpersonal influence (Sundie, Cialdini, Griskevicius, & Kenrick), group processes (Brewer & Caporael; Kameda & Tindale), and human culture (Norenzayan, Schaller, & Heine). Just as no domain of social psychology has been untouched by the insights of cognitive science, these chapters demonstrate that the same is fast becoming true regarding the insights of evolutionary psychology.

UNVERIFIABLE, UNNECESSARY, AND UNDENIABLY USEFUL

Evolutionary thinking may be increasingly ubiquitous across social psychological topic areas, but that does not mean that its ascendance is accepted uncritically. Of the many different kinds of criticisms that have been—and sometimes still are—leveled against evolutionary explanations for social psychological phenomena, perhaps the two most common are exactly those that were lodged against cognitive explanations years ago—the hypothesized processes are unverifiable and unnecessary.

Whether applied to cognitive psychology or to evolutionary psychology, the charge of unverifiability is both logically valid and largely irrelevant to scientific progress. Cognitive constructs reside in an abstract conceptual space and cannot be observed directly; they must be inferred from more superficial forms of measurable data, such as verbal self-reports, reaction times, and blood-oxygen levels assessed by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Despite these limitations, the study of social cognition has been hugely successful, mainly because hypotheses about the nature of relations between constructs are eminently testable (and subject to falsifiability). The same is true of evolutionary psychology (see Conway & Sehaller, 2002). Evolutionary processes—operating on whole populations, rather than mere individuals, over vast stretches of prehistoric time—are also inaccessible to direct observation. Their operation must also be inferred from other forms of data. And as with the cognitive perspective, evolutionary speculations can yield eminently falsifiable hypotheses and have resulted in numerous useful empirical strategies for testing their unique implications (see Ketelaar & Ellis, 2000; Öhman & Mineka, 2003; Schmitt & Pilcher, 2004; Simpson & Campbell, 2005).

Critiques based on explanatory necessity are also valid in a very limited sense, but they are also irrelevant to scientific progress. The case of cognitive psychology is again illustrative. If our goal is merely to predict outcomes in the most parsimonious manner, it may be subjectively unnecessary to consider additional or deeper cognitive levels of analysis. But this is a very timid goal. Science progresses not from the mere prediction of empirical facts, but from the deeper explanation of those facts, from the discovery of new facts, and from the development of richer theoretical structures that coherently link facts together (see Lakatos, 1970; Thagard, 1992).

The cognitive perspective has proven indispensable to social psychological inquiry not because it offers satisfactory explanations for behavioral data, but because it offers a deeper and richer understanding of these findings and, most importantly, suggests vast new domains of scientific discovery.

The same is true of the evolutionary perspective. Social psychological data are almost always limited to observations in the here-and-now, and social psychologists in particular tend to be skeptical of explanations that go beyond the given data. But, as a science, the epistemic objective of social psychology is not to explain data in the most minimally satisfactory way. The objective is to explain social psychological phenomena as completely as possible and, in the process, to discover new phenomena. An evolutionary perspective thus serves as a powerful intellectual tool for prediction and discovery (see Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998; Ketelaar & Ellis, 2000; Schaller, 2002), a fact that is highlighted by every chapter in this volume. If judged by its ability to stimulate new discoveries, an evolutionary approach to social psychology is much more than necessary; it is indispensable.

HERE'S WHY

That last point demands a bit of elaboration. Why is an evolutionary approach indispensable? Exactly what does an evolutionary perspective bring to the scientific discipline of social psychology? The chapters that follow articulate at least four partially overlapping answers to these questions. An evolutionary perspective offers (1) a unique set of powerful logical tools for deducing social psychological theories and hypotheses; (2) unique hypotheses about both general processes and specific contents of social cognition; (3) clues about the specific kinds of social situations that have especially important influences on human cognition and behavior; and (4) a unique, meta-theoretical framework within which many superficially different phenomena can be coherently integrated.

Tools for Theory-Building

Social psychologists are trained to cherish and celebrate theories. But good theories are hard to come by. Indeed, there is growing concern about the state of theory in contemporary social psychology, and there have been concerted attempts to rededicate the discipline to serious theory-building (see Kruglanski, 2001; Kruglanski & Higgins, 2004).

When it comes to theory-building, there is nothing so practical as a rigorous meta-theoretical framework. Cognitive science provided one such framework. Evolutionary theory provides another (Brewer, 2004). The literature in evolutionary biology is replete with theoretical concepts that have been remarkably generative. For example, the concept of sexual selection (Darwin, 1859) has helped biologists understand the function of certain features of animals that exact a clear cost to survival (such as a peacock's feathers or an elk's antlers). Similarly, the concept of differential parental investment (Trivers, 1972) has helped biologists understand why such costly features are more likely to be found in males rather than females. When applied to human psychology, these same ideas have had tremendous heuristic value in generating novel theories that have predicted a wide variety of sex differences in cognition and behavior (see, for example, Archer, 1996; Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Geary, 1998; Kenrick, Trost, & Sundie, 2004). Even more impressively, these same theories have generated dozens of novel hypotheses—and hosts of empirical discoveries—that specify the circumstances under which these effects are more or less likely to occur (e.g., Gangestad & Simpson, 2000; Li, Bailey, Kenrick, & Linsenmeier, 2002; Maner et al., 2005; Simpson & Gangestad, 1991). These concepts have contributed to the meta-theoretical framework within which new theories are being deduced—theories not only about sexual behavior, but also about many other forms of social behavior (for examples in this volume, see the chapters by Buss & Duntley, Fletcher et al., and Sundie et al.).

Similarly, the evolutionary concepts of inclusive fitness and kin selection have had enormous impact on biologists' understanding of animal behavior. These ideas have been imported into social psychology to derive novel theoretical perspectives, hypotheses, and discoveries, especially in the domains of helping behavior and aggression (e.g., Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Laham, Gonsalkorale, & Von Hippel, 2005). Recent research has begun to apply these concepts to social cognition and person perception, with implications extending to interactions involving both strangers and kin (e.g., DeBruine, 2005; Park & Schaller, 2005). More generally, an evolutionary perspective brings into sharper focus the social importance of kin relations of all kinds—sibling relations, parent-child relations, etc. In this volume, for instance, Taylor and Gonzaga unravel several subtle implications of specific types of kin relations on social support, stress, and health. Sundie et al. identify a series of new and intriguing hypotheses about the ways in which kinship moderates social influence. The fact that many of these hypotheses still await empirical scrutiny attests to the heuristic value that evolutionary concepts offer in terms of novel theory-building and hypothesis generation. Several years ago, Daly, Salmon, and Wilson (1997) referred to the psychology of kinship as a “conceptual hole” in our field. It is only through the rigorous application of evolutionary principles that this huge conceptual gap is now beginning to be filled with the development of new theories, new hypotheses, and new empirical findings.

In addition to these and other core concepts, an evolutionary framework brings with it a toolbox full of logical tools that can be applied profitably to social psychological theorizing. The assumption of functional modularity that is so central to evolutionary psychology (see Barrett, 2005; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992) has begun to lead to new models and insights into the complexities of social cognition, as illustrated in the chapter by Kurzban and Aktipis. An evolutionary cost-benefit analysis (in which the costs and benefits of thoughts, feelings, and actions are defined not by their immediate consequences on the resources of individual organisms, but by their long-term consequences on reproductive fitness) has emerged as an invaluable tool in the development of novel theories about human cognition and behavior (see, for example, Gangestad & Simpson, 2000; Nesse, 2005). The chapter by Haselton and Funder is especially illustrative of the heuristic power of this kind of cost—benefit analysis. An evolutionary perspective, which demands that on...