What do Muslims conceptualize as the ideal international government? What factors shape Muslim public opinion toward the international order ? Do international organizations have enough social legitimacy among Muslim publics to be able to exert their authority, or do Muslims have other models in mind? Perceptions of legitimacy among the public are crucial for institutions wishing to implement their respective goals1; however, the factors that shape public opinion toward international organizations remain an under-researched topicâespecially public opinion on international organizations in the Muslim world . These, I believe, are critical questions for global governance in the world today, and I try to answer them through this book.
I analyze and investigate the determinants of public opinion among Muslims in Muslim -majority countries toward international order , focusing on several types of international organizations , both existing (e.g., the UN, Arab League , and the Gulf Cooperation Council ) and theoretical (e.g., the Caliphate ). This work supports the assertion of Acharya (2014) that research in the field of International Relations has not been representative of ideas ad findings from the vast majority of countries. Hence, this book is an effort to fill in this gap and provide perspectives from the Muslim world . My book was initially motivated by the empirical puzzle of Muslim populationsâ relatively low favorability toward international and regional organizations, paired with high support for the idea of a global Caliphate . To explore these populationsâ views in a deep and multifaceted way, this book examines the puzzle not only through large-n survey data from the Arab Barometer , Pew Global Attitudes , World Values Survey , and Program on International Policy Attitudes , but also through original survey and field research data from Pakistan , Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. The general argument of the book is that the difference between âunder-performanceâ of current international actors and the perceived ideal type causes Muslim dissatisfaction in current international and regional institutions. Muslims would like an effective international order in which they have an impactful voice and which fulfills their basic needs. This does not necessarily mean that the support for international organizations is only based on economic utilitarian considerations but rather for a general need for justice , stability, welfare , and development, exigencies that the populations in the Muslim world crave for.
Background and Context
This chapter paints the picture of the caliphate being the institution beyond the national or local levels that for long has dominated the Muslim perception of how international order should look like. With its disappearance in the early twentieth century with the fall of the Ottoman empire and therefore the Caliphate , I argue that Muslims felt that it created a vacuum to represent a united Muslim voice at the international level.
Where Do Muslims Fit in the World Order?
On June 29, 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) announced the establishment of a Caliphate under which the global Muslim ummah (nation) is to be united, provoking a collective shudder of anxiety from the international community.2 Though the ISIS vision of a global Muslim ummah and its interaction with international partners are a scant minority view within the Muslim public and some scholarly circles,3 the rise of such movements points to the continuous contestation of todayâs international order in the minds of Muslim populations.
The aftermath of September 11 has left growing concern as to whether Muslims feel part of a global community that genuinely represents all populations (Roy 2004). However, the question of whether international organizations (IOs) adequately represent and serve Muslim values and concerns predates even that historical moment. Many scholars see that IOs have a democratic deficit and problems of transparency, accountability, and representation (see, e.g., Moravcsik 2014). In the Muslim world in particular, the inability of the UN to solve disputes concerning Muslim states such as Kashmir, Palestine, and Chechnya casts doubt on the ability of IOs to solve their problems. Hence, some scholars worry that, disillusioned by the global governing order, Muslim individuals might seek to establish a parallel world order as an alternative.4 The many historical movements to re-establish a Caliphate , including the very recent ISIS , provide a case in point.
It is clear that Muslims are not a monolithic group5; they belong to different sects, regions, and nationalities, speak different languages, perceive international organizations differently, and hold different ideals regarding an international world order. Furthermore, international organizations are not a monolith either; some, like the United Nations , do not have Muslim -majority states as major actors, while others, like the Arab League , are composed of majority Muslim states. Can Muslims be analyzed as a whole, even if they live in different countries and have different ethnicities and cultures? And how to establish Muslimsâ public opinion on IOs when IOs exhibit such great variety in turn? To answer these questions, it is necessary, first, to review the history of governance among Muslim populations. This history provides important context regarding the evolution of Muslim thought with respect to global governance .
History of the Threat to the Muslim Place in the International Order
To contextualize the empirical work of this book, this section briefly discusses the political history of the Muslim international order . In this section, I argue that there have been three major instances in history whereupon Muslims felt great need to restore central religious and political authorityâone of these being the era in which we live today. The vacuum felt on previous occasions had been filled by successor regimes, with some establishment or other seeming to emerge as the central political and religious authority; however, in the current order of many nation-states, no single state has been able to assume central Muslim authority or leadership credibility. The three major historical instances I discuss in this section are:
- 1.Crisis following the death of the Prophet Muhammad .
- 2.The overthrow of the Abbasid dynasty by the Mongols.
- 3.The Fall of the Ottoman Empire (after which no central political and religious authority emerged).
Evidence of public opinion toward the international order in the aftermath of all these three instances remains scant (for various historical reasons). The best evidence we have comprises elite writings from scholars, poets, and intellectuals of the time; these texts provide a sense of the prevailing mood among the authorsâ respective, contemporary publics. That said, with the paucity of data on public opinion throughout Muslim history, this section of the book considers Brownâs (2012, 13) take on elite discourse:
The word âelit...