The Maritime Dimension of European Security

Seapower and the European Union

B. Germond

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781137017819
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In an age of uncertainties influenced by information technologies and the networking of societies, the maritime domain remains the main global lane of communication, vital for trade and security. The European Union has become a maritime actor, carrying out counter-piracy and maritime capacity-building operations and actively dealing with maritime safety, fisheries protection, port security, maritime surveillance and counter-immigration at sea. The Union's policies, mechanisms and activities related to the maritime domain are now backed by a Maritime Security Strategy, adopted by the Council in June 2014.This cutting edge book accounts for the trends in maritime strategy and seapower politics as well as the recent developments in the field, both at the conceptual and practical level. It discusses the significance of the maritime domain for European security in general and for the EU in particular. Readers are provided with the necessary tools to critically assess the EU's potential as a global maritime actor and evaluate why Europe's prosperity and security rests on its capacity to shape events at sea.

1

Seapower and International Relations

Since its popularisation by US Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan at the end of the 19th century, the concept of seapower has been used indiscriminately and has also given rise to many debates. Indeed, this concept is particularly difficult to delineate and to use accurately, for it can be understood in many different ways. Although Mahan developed a proper ‘philosophy of sea power’ (Sempa, 2002: 105) destined to explain, advocate and justify naval programmes and naval militarism in the US, he did not precisely define the concept of seapower as such. His Influence of Sea Power identifies six conditions affecting the seapower of nations: the geographical position, the physical conformation, the extent of territory, the number of population, the national character, and the character of the government. Thus, Mahan explains how seapower is constituted, but not what seapower practically is (or means), except the connection between a flourishing maritime trade that generates the nation’s wealth and a powerful navy to protect it (Mahan, 2007: 589). Geoffrey Till pointed out that we can interpret seapower in two different ways: either as an input, that is to say the sum of various naval and maritime-related assets, or as an output, that is to say ‘the capacity to influence the behaviour of other people or things by what one does at or from the sea’. Seapower can be understood as a means or as an end (Till, 2004: 4). In the post-War and post-Cold War era, seapower has been discussed in academia through the prism of strategic studies (e.g. Gray, 1992, 1994; Luttwak, 1974; Till, 1987, 1994, 2004), history (e.g. Grove, 1990; Speller, 2014), and diplomacy and foreign policy (e.g. Booth, 1979; Cable, 1985). The concept of seapower and its relevance for international relations can, nevertheless, also be examined through the lens of competing approaches in the discipline of International Relations (IR), whose purpose is after all to explain, understand, improve, guide, or change the practice of international relations.

Navies and power politics

The traditional conception of security is mainly framed within the realist approach to international relations. The realist school of thought puts the emphasis on the centrality of states, which are unitary actors and constitute the main unit of analysis (or referent object). Like human beings, states are depicted by realists as self-interested and diffident, and thus motivated by national interest and driven by power. Within the anarchical international system, each unit/actor/state must put itself in a position to be able to take care of itself and to ensure its own security, since no one else can be counted on to do so. Thus, the function of every state is the same, namely power maximisation, and every state’s highest goal is survival. Consequently, security does matter at the level of the states (national security), which are both the threatening subjects and the threatened objects in international relations. In other words, the main threats realists are talking about are military capabilities of foreign states. Considering the world as a zero-sum game and placing the emphasis on relative gains, the realists suggest (in a nutshell) two main options to respond to the threats posed by foreign states: states can either build up their own national military forces (self-help capabilities) or take part in coalition building so as to balance potential enemies. Strategic alliances and coalitions are the product of specific interests at a specific time, not of ideology or any feeling of a common belonging. In both options the idea is to remain in a position of force and be ready to face any foreign threat, which corresponds to the Latin adage Si vis pacem para bellum (If you want peace, prepare for war). In sum, (structural) realists explain the world by looking at the material forces and their distribution within the structure of the international system. They explain power politics and the development of military forces as well as their use (or the threat to use) as a result of ‘national interest and cost–benefit analysis’ by states (Devetak et al., 2012: 164).

Until the end of the Cold War, with security being reduced to the questions of war and peace, international security was primarily the subject matter of strategic studies, where the realist vision dominated. In this context, the question of seapower was mainly discussed by scholars in the field of naval studies (both naval historians and strategists). Their focus was not so much on the sea as a milieu but on the naval forces as instruments of the states. From a realist perspective, seapower is understood as a sum of assets, that is to say a powerful navy, an efficient merchant fleet (although today the states that possess the most powerful navies are no longer those that possess the largest merchant navies), and some invariable geographical factors which contribute to states’ power. According to this vision, the importance of seapower mainly comes from what navies can do at sea, or from the sea, to contribute to states’ national and economic security. Seapower is about power maximisation and navies are tools at states’ disposal for fulfilling their national interest and pursuing power politics. Their main role is to secure the control or command of the sea, and then to exercise this command. Navies and states’ power are intimately linked. Navies have traditionally been an indicator of states’ power and, as mentioned by Till, have contributed to their prestige (2004: 116). Scholars and practitioners have ranked navies according to quantitative indicators, such as the number of ships, their tonnage, the type and power of weapon systems, and ultimately the type of missions they can fulfil (the ideal situation from a power politics perspective being a balanced fleet that allows fulfilling any type of missions). However, from a realist perspective, more than the navies’ capabilities in absolute terms, ‘what is [. . .] important is the position of each navy relative to the others’ (Jackson, 2010: 12), or in other words the naval balance between states. Traditional naval scholars have mainly focused on the technical, tactical, operational, and strategic aspects of naval warfare. As pointed out by Rear Admiral J. Richard Hill, classical writers such as Mahan, Colomb, Corbett, or Castex were all interested in war and dominance; their focus was on the command of the sea and the importance of the decisive battle (Hill, 1986: 34–35). Accordingly, in his Future of Sea Power, Eric Grove basically defines seapower as a ‘form of military power that is deployed at or from the sea’ (Grove, 1990: 3).

Naval build-up before the First World War and the naval arms race during the Cold War illustrate the realist vision of seapower. In both cases, powerful states developed their navies so as to be in a position of strength in comparison with their competitors in case of hostilities – the more ships the better and the more powerful weapon systems the better. Since the 1960s, despite the huge effort put in by the Soviets in developing their navy, the US and NATO member states had kept a favourable balance of power at sea, which was an important factor that contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union – the cost of developing and maintaining an operational navy of that size eventually became an economic burden for the Soviet Union. Despite the recent resurgence of a potential ‘Russia threat’, in the post-Cold War era, the realist vision has been challenged by the expansion of the security agenda, notably the taking into account of various so-called ‘new threats’, which mainly result from the growth of non-state actors (e.g. terrorism at sea, piracy), as well as the increasing occurrence of foreign interventions (mainly humanitarian and peace support operations) not always motivated by pure considerations of power. Accordingly, the European Union’s involvement at sea in the 21st century cannot be grasped through the single lens of realism as will be discussed in the second part of the book.

Seapower and the liberal order

The liberal school of thought refutes the inherent selfishness of states and argues that liberal democratic states (in particular) have a strong interest in cooperating, as they share common goals beyond survival. Anarchy still prevails at the international level but cooperation is, nonetheless, possible since states understand that it is in their (economic) interests to cooperate with like-minded partners. If states’ security is indeed crucial, the survival of states is not permanently at stake. In other words, states have various interests beyond national security, and one of the most important is economic wealth. Liberals believe in market economy and free trade, so states should naturally develop peaceful relations with those adopting a free market and create institutions and regimes that can help enforce liberal norms all over the world and promote economic globalisation. International military cooperation (including naval multilateralism) is a natural by-product of liberal principles and further contributes to the stability and prosperity of the international liberal order. In addition, some correlation has been drawn between liberalism and maritime politics, with some authors arguing that liberal democratic elites have historically had a tendency to favour the development of navies and to elaborate national policies towards the sea (Grygiel, 2012: 33), which echoes Hew Strachan’s point about the ‘symbiotic link between sea power, liberal democracy and ideas of grand strategy’ (2005: 39).

From a liberal perspective, seapower should be understood as a collective final cause (i.e. the promotion of liberal norms) and should not (only) be seen through individual/national material lenses (i.e. national security). This vision better corresponds to the second definition of seapower proposed by Till, that is, seapower as an output. Seapower offers the capacity to influence others’ behaviour and to shape the international system. It is a way for Western liberal democracies to safeguard maritime commons and more broadly to secure control of the sea and promote free trade and liberalism. In the extensively debated 2007 document ‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’, the US Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps produced a manifesto for linking seapower and liberalism: ‘Seapower protects the American way of life’ (3) and the US seapower ‘joins with others to promote security and prosperity across the globe’ (19). In other words, what matters is the order of effect, not the order of battle (Lindley-French and van Straten, 2008: 67). As opposed to realism, naval multilateralism is a natural means to an end, and not a stopgap solution for not having sufficient national naval capabilities. As free trade is paramount to the liberal project, the freedom of the seas is crucial, and naval forces contribute to securing the seas. For example, the US, NATO, the EU, and their partners operate forces off the Horn of Africa, in the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Persian Gulf to counter piracy, to prevent potential terrorist activities at sea, or to deter so-called ‘rogue’ states such as Iran. It is interesting to note that even the Chinese navy has collaborated with Western counterparts at the Horn of Africa. Promoting the liberal world order implies dealing with non-liberal states and non-state actors, which includes conducting foreign interventions aiming at regional stability and the promotion of liberal norms (including good governance at sea). Thus, naval forces contribute to power and forces projection; they are a crucial component of expeditionary forces, as illustrated by recent foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) operations such as in Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and Libya (2011). The liberal vision of seapower is thus more comprehensive at the level of both its goal (not only national security but also the stability of the liberal order in general and the promotion of liberal values) and its missions (not only combat missions in case of war and deterrence and naval diplomacy in peacetime but also a variety of ‘lower key’ activities such as counter-piracy under the banner of maritime ...