1 | THE CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF INTERVENTION IN LIBYA
On 17 March 2011, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, giving authorisation for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to use all necessary measures short of a foreign occupation to protect the people of Libya from potential bloodshed. It was the first time that the Security Council had authorised military intervention against the wishes of a recognised sovereign ruler for the explicit purpose of protecting people. For supporters, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was a decisive factor in enabling the intervention (Bellamy, 2015a). Moreover, intervention in Libya was âa textbook case of the R2P norm working exactly as it was supposed toâ (Evans, 2012). It was a âspectacular step forwardâ (Evans, 2012), making it âclear to all that the R2P has arrivedâ (ki-Moon, 2011). It should be met with a sense of âsuccess, vindication, satisfaction, optimismâ, for in Libya, R2P âunquestionably workedâ (Heinbecker, 2011; Evans, 2012). Similar claims were made long after NATOâs intervention. Ramesh Thakur (2013, 69), a member of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) that gave birth to the R2P, claimed in 2013 that the outcome in Libya was âa triumph for R2Pâ. Two years later still, Alex Bellamy (2015a, 94) argued that the intervention dealt âan apparently decisive blow to the claim that R2P has changed nothingâ.
In this chapter, we show that such analysis flies in the face of what actually happened in Libya. We begin by looking at the emergence of civil war, juxtaposing the reasons given for intervention with evidence of what was happening on the ground. We then look at the effects of the UN-authorised NATO intervention, showing how regime change quickly became the central aim of the intervention. Subsequently, we examine the overall effects of this purportedly triumphant intervention, looking at death tolls before and after the conflict, the effects of the intervention in prolonging it, the war crimes that were committed on all sides and regional spill-over effects. Finally, we outline the legacy of intervention: a legacy that has left Libya divided and rife with conflict.
The outbreak of civil war
NATOâs intervention in Libya occurred in the context of the Arab Spring. After non-violent civil disobedience had unseated long-standing dictators in Tunisia and Egypt, protest spread to Libya. Citizens in the eastern city of Benghazi rose up against the 42-year rule of Colonel Qaddafi on 15 February 2011. The uprising spread, changing very quickly from protest to full-blown civil war. Rebels gained ground rapidly, taking a number of key Libyan cities and controlling, by 5 March, at least half of the countryâs populated areas. But Qaddafiâs forces responded, pushing back the rebels and leaving them isolated in their initial stronghold in Benghazi. It was in this context that the UN Security Council agreed Resolution 1973, authorising the use of âall necessary measuresâ short of foreign military occupation to protect civilians in Libya (UNSC, 2011).
Narratives of the Libyan intervention often take the following form. Peaceful protest spread to Libya only to be repressed by Colonel Qaddafiâs security forces. The repression was violent and indiscriminate. Indeed, some stories â repeated by then International Criminal Court prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo â suggested that Qaddafi had provided Viagra to soldiers in order to use rape as a weapon of war. Speaking to the UN, Navi Pillay, High Commissioner for Human Rights, said that reports indicated that âthousands may have been killed or injuredâ (UN News, 2011). Worse yet, as Qaddafi was fighting back against the rebels, he (cited in BBC, 2011a) referred to the protestors as âcockroachesâ; a word previously used in extremist Hutu radio broadcasting to describe Tutsis ahead of and during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Qaddafi promised to âcleanse Libya house by houseâ to rid the country of rebellion. In the context of these emerging crimes against humanity, and with worries that there would be a bloodbath in Benghazi similar to those in Rwanda and at Srebrenica in 1995, the international community â with the support of regional organisations including the League of Arab States and the Organisation of Islamic Co-Operation â intervened.
This simple narrative of brutal killers, peaceful victims and humanitarian saviours was questioned at the time and does not stand the test of even the slightest scrutiny. First, the infamous Viagra rape claim turned out to be a fabrication developed by rebels in the hopes of inciting external military support (Cockburn, 2011; Kuperman, 2013).1 Second, the rebels were not solely or exclusively innocent civilian victims. The Libya uprising, despite starting with peaceful protest Ă la rebellion in Tunisia and Egypt, swiftly turned into an armed uprising, with armed Islamists making up a substantial part of the rebellion. Third, whilst Qaddafiâs words were chilling, they were spoken on 22 February, almost a month before Resolution 1973 and the NATO intervention. In the time between these comments and the NATO intervention, Qaddafiâs forces had retaken a number of cities including Brega and Misrata (Kuperman, 2013). Reclaiming these cities was far from bloodless, but the death toll was significantly lower than Pillay had intimated. In Misrata, for instance, medical facilities documented a total of 257 people killed, including rebels and government forces (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Whilst it is true that weapons were also fired at unarmed protestors, this does not justify the comparisons that were made between Libya and the mass killings that took place in Srebrenica and Rwanda.2 Finally, the simple narrative was based on a selective hearing of Qaddafiâs words. When on the verge of launching an offensive to retake Benghazi, Qaddafi (cited in HCFAC, 2016, 14) also said:
In sum, there were not grounds to think that a Rwanda- or Srebrenica-like genocide was about to occur (HCFAC, 2016, 14â15). Such perceptions arose only through the âvery one-sided view of the logic of eventsâ that had been presented; a view which mistakenly portrayed âthe protest movement as entirely peacefulâ, ârepeatedlyâ suggested âthat the regimeâs security forces were unaccountably massacring armed demonstrators who presented no security challengeâ, and picked up, without questioning, âfalse claims or manufactured evidenceâ and large exaggerations of the numbers of casualties (International Crisis Group, 2011, 4; Cockburn, 2011).
NATO intervention
In the context of these sensationalised reports, the international community authorised all necessary measures to protect civilians. NATO was to take charge of the intervention. It quickly became clear that this was a mission aiming to reverse Qaddafiâs gains and help the rebels â then on the verge of defeat â to an overall victory. NATO began an intensive bombing campaign against Qaddafiâs forces and military infrastructure, bombing troops even as they were retreating and hence not providing an immediate threat to civilians. Very quickly, the dynamics of the war changed. Rebels â with further assistance from ground troops supplied in the âhundreds in every regionâ by Qatar, expertise and intelligence provided by British officials, and weapons supplied by France â fought back and gained territory, only to be pushed back in turn by Qaddafiâs forces (Qatarâs military chief of staff, cited in Al Arabiya, 2011; HCFAC, 2016, 16â17; Kuperman, 2013).
NATO repeatedly rejected offers of a ceasefire from the Libyan government. Even before the intervention, Qaddafi had embraced Venezuelaâs offer of mediation but Jalil, the leader of the rebel forces, rejected the idea of holding talks (Al Jazeera, 2011). As the UN were discussing military intervention, the African Union was active in seeking to foster peace talks. It had arranged a meeting on 19 March, only for French President Sarkozy to arrange a summit for Libyan people on the same day in a clear snub to the African Union. African Union officials were told that their safety could not be guaranteed if they flew to Libya â by then a no-fly zone â to hold the meeting. Moreover, when the African Union did negotiate a ceasefire to which Qaddafi reluctantly agreed on 31 March, NATO offered no support to the plan, making it clear to the rebels that they could rely on NATOâs backing even in the absence of any willingness to negotiate (De Waal, 2013). Emboldened by this seemingly unconditional support, the rebels continued to reject peace talks.
NATOâs refusal to embrace peace talks led to accusations of âmission creepâ. Far from fulfilling a mandate to protect civilians â a mandate that would be be...