British Boer War And The French Algerian Conflict: Counterinsurgency For Today

Major Michael J. Lackman

• Publisher: Normanby Press
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781782895121
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: British History
• Index: History

Military historical case studies provide insight for military planners. Military planners cannot afford to ignore history when planning in today's complex environment. This thesis analyzes military doctrinal changes and adaptation during Britain's Boer War and the French counterinsurgency war in Algeria. The Boer War serves as an example of doctrinal change during a counterinsurgency campaign. The French experience demonstrates the difficult task of fighting against an ambiguous enemy who uses terrorism as its primary tactic. A counterinsurgency comparison and analysis focuses on three issues present in both case studies: population control measures, operational tactics, and the civil military operations. The conclusion offers solutions to the military situation today based on the British and French counterinsurgency. This thesis argues history provides US military planners with the background to develop a successful counterinsurgency strategy for today's environment.

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION

But the conditions of small wars are so diversified, the enemy’s mode of fighting is often so peculiar, and the theatres of operations present such singular features, that irregular warfare must generally be carried out on a method totally different from the stereotyped system. The art of war, as generally understood, must be modified to suit the circumstances of each particular case.{1} — Colonel C. E. Callwell, Small Wars

Colonel Callwell began his service to the British army in 1878 and participated in England’s Imperial wars during his tenure. His book stands among the classic military writings about small war tactics. He understood the nature of counterinsurgency operations. Small wars require adaptability, flexibility, and initiative from leaders and planners. Conventional doctrine fails to provide a suitable model from which to develop a counterinsurgency strategy. Callwell understood the diversity and unique nature of small wars. Also, he discerned the importance of incorporating the lessons from past wars into current and future operations.

Military historical case studies provide a level of knowledge for military planners. Case studies provoke discussion, aid staff training, and provide lessons learned. Military planners cannot afford to ignore the lessons of history when planning operations in today’s complex environment. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the change in doctrine of the British in the Boer War of 1899 and the French counterinsurgency operations in Algeria. This thesis uses the government’s perspective to derive the doctrinal changes and lessons learned in each case. A model helps explain the relationship between opposing forces. A counterinsurgency model serves as the framework for the analysis, explanations, and conclusions.

The Counterinsurgency Model

War affects society. The action or inaction of military or paramilitary force influences popular support. The public bears the consequences or reaps the benefits of military action. Counterinsurgency strategy balances the requirements of civil rights and security. Clausewitz’s described three factors of war in his book, On War, “These three tendencies are like three codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another.”{2} Although Clausewitz’s comments referred to commanders, governments, and people, the trinity applies to a counterinsurgency war. The model provides a simple framework to discuss the interaction among the forces of an insurgency. Mao understood the importance of the winning the support of the people in a revolutionary war. He said, “The political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to inhabitants of guerilla zones and their national consciousness awakened.”{3} A successful counterinsurgency campaign accounts for each leg of the triangle with the goal of creating legitimacy and building the support of the population. Figure 1 depicts the counterinsurgency (COIN) model.

Governmental actions represent the most significant force during counterinsurgency operations. If the government can effectively synchronize the elements of national power, the insurgency usually fails. As Bard O’Neill wrote in Insurgency and Terrorism, “Of all the variables that have a bearing on the progress and outcome of insurgencies, none is more important than government response.”{4} The government possesses the most assets and strengths. Yet, bureaucracies hinder decision-making and implementation of strategy.

Time is on the side of the insurgent. An insurgency gains momentum and legitimacy with the population over time. Early decisive government action can stop an insurgency before it matures and the cost of government victory increases. Government forces must temper their response with cultural and religion realities. Many times the government responds with inappropriate control measures, kinetic targeting and operations blind to culture and religion, which adds to the preexisting conditions that fostered the original insurgency. Every insurgency offers a different problem set to military planners. Therefore, it is important to study past counterinsurgencies to build a foundation and apply critical thinking and reasoning skills to develop a counterinsurgency doctrine and strategy for current operations. The next two chapters discuss the British and French counterinsurgency campaigns.

Chapter 2 discusses the British experience in the Boer War of 1899-1902. The Boer War proves useful as a historical example for developing a counterinsurgency campaign plan for contemporary military thinkers. The purpose of this chapter is to use the British experience in South Africa to conduct an analysis of the doctrine, policies, and programs used by the British to fight the Boer commandos. There are many parallels between the British experiences and the US military’s current operations in the Middle East. The chapter explores how the Boer War started, describes the early military engagements, and discusses how British doctrine changed to defeat the Boers. The Boer War demonstrates how a world power misjudged the enemy’s purpose and intent, but, adapted and modified its doctrine to achieve peace on politically acceptable terms. The next chapter examines a counterinsurgency campaign conducted fifty years ago.

Chapter 3 looks at the French experience during the Algerian War for Independence from 1954 to 1962. The Algerian War demonstrates the difficult task of fighting against an ambiguous enemy who used terrorism as its primary tactic. The French fought a culture vastly different from their society. The French military entered the conflict with doctrine designed to defend against a Soviet attack in Europe. As the counterinsurgency grew in Algeria, the military adapted its doctrine and won the battles, but they ultimately lost the war. France changed its military doctrine to put down the insurgency but the Algerian political, cultural, and religion forces defeated the military. The next chapter compares the British and French counterinsurgency operations.

Chapter 4 focuses on three issues found in counterinsurgency conflicts in both case studies: population control measures, operational tactics, and civil military operations. There are several reasons for choosing the three topics. Each specific topic resides in most counterinsurgency campaigns throughout the world. Military forces relocate civilians to enable freedom of maneuver during counterinsurgency operations. The military gains legitimacy with successful resettlement operations while mishandled operations cause resentment towards the government. Counterinsurgency operations require flexible tactics and adaptable doctrine. The British and the French conducted population control operations, changed their doctrines, and used civil military action to defeat the insurgents. Each government found different ways to solve similar problems. The COIN model in Figure 1 provides a common framework for analysis. Chapter 4 discusses how and why the British and French changed their doctrine. The final chapter explores how the British and French lessons learned apply today.

Chapter 5 offers recommendations to the US military based on the British and French counterinsurgency wars. Counterinsurgency conflicts offer an array of complex problems due to environmental considerations, technological advancements, social change, and political realities. History provides US military planners with the background to build an integrated counterinsurgency strategy for today’s environment. In his book, US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, Andrew Birtle described the factors of success as coordination between political, diplomatic, and military measures and the interactions between soldiers and the native populations.{5} In other words, successful counterinsurgency operations occur when strategic vision incorporates the elements of national power and competent civilian and military personnel execute the strategy. The British in South Africa and the French in Algeria approached their problem with varying degrees of coordination between the civilian officials and military officers. The British and French cases offer two examples of civilian military cooperation and the relationship between the combatants and the civilian populations.

The Literature Review

Several books form the basis of research and analysis of each case study. Two important works are David Galula’s, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice and Roger Trinquier’s, Modern Warfare A French View of Counterinsurgency. Although both works are by Frenchmen written around the time of the conflict in Algeria, they provide insights that apply to all counterinsurgency wars. Both works cross borders and reach out to a much larger audience than just the French in Algeria.

Bard O’Neill’s Insurgency and Terrorism and Robert Taber’s War of the Flea are classic studies on insurgency. O’Neill provides a framework of insurgency researched from theoretical and historical writings. His insurgency framework provides a standard for discussion and analysis. Taber gives a classic study of a communist guerilla insurgency. He is critical of government forces and romanticizes the guerillas, but his work identifies and describes key topics such as popular support, political objectives, and terrorism. Each works gives common characteristics, phases, and patterns to insurgent operations and government responses. Their works emphasize the importance of the political environment. As the British and French case studies prove, political victory is equally, if not more vital, than military victory.

Colonel C. E. Callwell’s book, Small War: Their Principles and Practice, provides a common operational baseline from which to draw conclusions. Colonel Callwell wrote his book around the turn of the century. He was involved in nearly every British imperial conflict of his time. He fought in the Afghan War of 1890, the First Boer War, the Turko-Greek conflict, and the Second Boer War in 1899-1902. His book is relevant today because he provides clear advice to a commander during a low intensity conflict.

The US Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual and Mao’s On Guerilla Warfare provide two exceptional references on the conduct of a small war from different perspectives. Each work provides a foundation of knowledge and experience. The USMC’s Manual gives classic military definitions, while recognizing the ambiguities of small wars. The Marine Corps developed the manual in response to the Banana War period of 1900 to 1930s. The Marine Corps learned a successful small war campaign must coordinate and synchronize the elements of national power. The Manual provides the counterinsurgency planner with a foundation. On Guerilla Warfare gives the insurgent’s view of warfare.

Mao’s work, On Guerilla Warfare, documents his views of warfare. Students of counterinsurgency war should read On Guerilla Warfare. Mao and his followers waged a twenty-year struggle against the Japanese and Nationalist Chinese Armies. Mao described the nature, tactics, history, and logistics of guerilla warfare. By understanding the guerilla fighter, it is more likely the government forces will develop a successful strategy. The Small Wars Manual and On Guerilla Warfare approach war from different perspectives, but they offer characteristics, patterns, strategies, tactics, and rules for conducting both the insurgency and the counterinsurgency side of the conflict. The aforementioned works provide the principles and standards for analyzing counterinsurgency operations. Books, journal articles, and monographs provide the specific details to analyze the success or failure of the British and French counterinsurgent campaigns.

A large body of literature exists for both the Boer War in South Africa and the war in Algeria. Journal and newspaper articles of the day document both topics in depth. Works of history and monographs provide insight into each conflict. Capstone books for the Boer War are Thomas Pakenham’s The Boer War and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Great Boer War. Doyle finished his book at the end of the Boer War in 1902, while Pakenham’s book was published in 1979 after extensive research and several remarkable discoveries of original documents from the era. Both works provide the detailed history of the conflict.

Informative books on the French Algerian War are Alistair Horne’s A Savage War of Peace and John Talbott’s The War Without a Name. Horne was in France in 1960 conducting other research when the conflict in Algeria spilled over into France itself. Paris braced for an assault launched from Algeria by the elite paratroopers. General de Galle’s new government wavered and nearly fell and only de Gaulle personal appeal and strength saved his government. Talbott’s book provides a readable narrative to a conflict that divided France, destroyed the Algerian economy and killed thousands of French soldiers, Algerian insurgents and civilians.

The two case studies offer similarities to the present day insurgent conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Boer War exemplifies how a world power forced an independent republic to comply with its national interests. The Boer War advanced Britain’s political and economic agenda. The French conflict in Algeria offers many similarities to the conflict today in the Middle East. The population, demographics, religion, and geography of Algeria are similar to Iraq. Many consider the French military action in Algeria as the model to pattern other counterinsurgency strategies. However, the French lost in spite of its military success. The intent of this thesis is to analyze the British and French campaigns in order to help the US military plan, execute, and win current and future counterinsurgency wars.

CHAPTER 2 — A CASE STUDY OF THE BOER WAR, 1899-1902

Let us admit it fairly, as a business people should, We have had no end of lesson; it will do us no end of good.{6}—Rudyard Kipling, “The Lesson”

Rudyard Kipling wrote “The Lesson” during the Boer War. Kipling’s verse urged Britain’s politicians and soldiers to remember the high cost of fighting a war against a determined enemy. The stubborn Boer fighters refused to surrender the right to self-rule and their independence to the British Empire. Historical case studies present a valuable resource to military planners. However, fatal dangers exist if planners apply the wrong historical lessons. Case studies provoke discussion, aid staff training, and provide lessons learned. Military planners cannot afford to ignore the past when planning operations in today’s complex environment. History does not provide a checklist to follow. It offers insights, patterns and cycles of behavior that give a start point to begin planning. Historical case studies provide knowledge to ask the right questions.

The British experience in the Boer War of 1899-1902 proves useful as a historical example for...