State Formation in Italy and Greece

Questioning the Neoevolutionist Paradigm

Donald Haggis, Nicola Terrenato, Nicola Terrenato

• Publisher: Oxbow Books
• Year: 2011
• ISBN:
  9781842175583
• Topic: Storia
• Subtopic: Storia antica

State Formation in Italy and Greece offers an up-to-date and comprehensive sampler of the current discourse concerning state formation in the central Mediterranean. While comparative approaches to the emergence of political complexity have been applied since the 1950s to Mesopotamia, Mesoamerica, Peru, Egypt and many other contexts, Classical Archaeology as a whole has not played a particularly active role in this debate. Here, for the first time, state formation processes occurring in the Bronze Age Aegean as well as in Iron Age Greece and Italy are explicitly juxtaposed, revealing a complex interplay between similar dynamics and differing local factors. Building upon recent theoretical developments in the origins and functioning of early states, the papers in this volume experiment with a variety of new approaches to old problems. Dual-processual theory, heterarchy, agency theory and weak state theory figure very prominently in the book and offer innovative, context-sensitive comparative frameworks that match the richness of the archaeological and historical record in the Mediterranean. Contributors include scholars working in Etruscan and early Roman archaeology and history, in Aegean archaeology and on the emergence of the Greek polis. A full analytical index further facilitates the cross-referencing of common themes across the geographic scope of the book.

1

Introduction

Nicola Terrenato and Donald C. Haggis

In the past two decades, traditional developmental and gradualist paradigms for the emergence of complexity and of state societies, in Old World archaeology and beyond, have been challenged by the development of new theoretical frameworks as well as by new approaches to archaeological and environmental contexts. Our definitions of the state, our methods of interpretation – and, to a certain extent, even the recovery and analysis of data – have been transformed in a number of important ways. The debate has, however, tended to become mired in an increasingly sterile opposition between evolutionist frameworks and critiques steeped in postmodern thought (for a review, see e.g. Yoffee, 2004). The former did not stray far from reductive and fairly stilted models, which were almost always met with radical accusations of political incorrectness and colonialist sympathies by the latter. While there is an increasing need to have more context-sensitive interpretations than the classic ones, originally formulated in the 1960s and 70s, many are reluctant to abandon the concept of state formation (and urbanization) altogether, as a hopelessly value-laden formulation (see also the papers in Haas, 2001; e.g. the critique in Patterson, 1991). In other words, there is an evident tension between the need to go beyond the reductionist framework that has long prevailed in the scholarship and the uneasiness that a radical abandonment of the very concept of state involves.

Now some space for a discussion that transcends these fossilized positions seems finally in the process of being carved out. The epistemological stance that characterizes the new approaches is based on a more discerning form of critical thinking, one that evaluates the individual elements of the traditional doctrine rather than accepting or discarding it in toto. The credit for this development goes to those who are trying to take on board recent theoretical developments but are at the same time refusing to declare ipso facto any comparative analysis of state formation pointless and ideologically suspect (see for instance Feinman and Manzanilla, 2000). It is being recognized that there are many different ways of conceptualizing early states and not all of them are based on the same set of assumptions. In order to fruitfully discuss state formation processes in different cultural contexts, you do not need to assume either the existence of a unilinear developmental sequence for human societies or any etic, objective status for the concept of state. It is sufficient that enough participants in the discourse, for whatever reason, agree on a working definition of state to have, if this really is what is needed, a perfectly relativist and yet locally valid discussion of its formation.

Another important theoretical underpinning of the new discourse is the radical deconstruction of the teleological component that has long been implicit in state formation theories (see Terrenato, below). The transition to statehood can be seen as a process that is neither natural nor spontaneous, neither linear nor necessarily positive. An approach of this kind opens up new research paths into the complexity of hierarchical levels, the role of pre-, non- and anti-state structures and the motivations of the agents in the process. In such as context-sensitive and bottom-up framework, the state as a comparative concept may still prove useful in a very different kind of discourse from that in which it was originally conceived.

In parallel with the new developments, we finally see Mediterranean specialists showing a serious and sustained interest for state formation. It is no coincidence that the debate concerning the Aegean and Greek world, for example, has been particularly active, with the publication of a wealth of important new evidence and interpretative syntheses (see the wealth of references in the Aegean section below). Yet, it is undeniable that the position of these key geographic contexts in the wider field of state formation studies remains peculiar. Greek and Roman archaeologists and historians in particular have entered the debate very late and most are still extremely wary of generalizations or simplifications. As a result, there has been no sustained attempt at adopting an explicitly comparative approach and at integrating data-sets from a wide range of neighboring geographical contexts. This is undoubtedly at least in part connected with the general reluctance to broad-based comparisons exhibited by most classicists. Moreover, Mediterranean studies in general missed out (in terms of intellectual history) on the great comparativist wave of the 1960s and 70s and they now do not possess a large body of existing literature that can be taken as a baseline or even reaction against such an approach.

Having said all this, Greek and Roman archaeologists maybe able turn their status of latecomers to the debate to their advantage. Precisely because very few of them, if any, have any vested interests in classic state formation theory, their scholarship can range more widely and explore new directions more freely, with no danger of running afoul of their own earlier stances (or of those of eminent figures in the field). Even more importantly, they operate in contexts that are dense with historical information and detail, where more nuanced and subtle approaches can be built and evaluated within a much more precise chronological framework. Finally, the abundant ethnohistorical sources are nowadays paralleled by a wealth of high-quality archaeological information, coming from surveys, necropoleis, early cities, as well as from pottery and environmental studies. A critical mass of data, models and cases of study seems to have been reached, so that Mediterranean archaeologists may finally be able to sit at the some theoretical table as the specialists in traditionally strong areas, such as Mesoamerica, Mesopotamia or, more recently, China, especially at a time when the pace of fieldwork in some of these regions has considerably slowed down.

However, before a new era in Mediterranean state formation studies can begin, there are some fundamental problems that need to be addressed. There is first and foremost a vastly underestimated reflexive issue, which is still very far from being properly explored. The unique position of Greece and Rome in the makeup of modern western culture clearly plays a role in the traditional difficulty of establishing any form of comparison with other cultures and contexts. The twin myths of Greek democracy and Roman citizenship are a very cumbersome baggage when trying to place these two cases of state formation in a broader (even if not normative) perspective. In other words, it is particularly hard for classicists to take a fresh look at the available evidence without sharing at some level in the deep-seated assumptions that were laid down by nationalist historians in the early 1800s and that have not been fully metabolized yet (Terrenato, 2005). Then there is arguably a substantive issue, having to do with the popularity, longevity and variability of city-states (as opposed to larger territorial empires; see the references in van der Vliet, below). Compared to other more homogeneous regions, its exceedingly complex system of interactions between different kinds of social entities across long distances is much harder to box into a simple flowchart diagram. This latter aspect, though certainly challenging, may in the end prove beneficial, now that the broader theorizing is shifting towards more sophisticated and context-sensitive frameworks. Precisely the richness and diversity of the cultures involved and of the surviving evidence (including an unparalleled wealth of textual material) may bring the central Mediterranean from the margins to the center of the discussion of state formation (Osborne and Cunliffe, 2005). The central Mediterranean in particular, with its unparalleled large cast of characters and richness of narratives and events, may eventually turn out to be an ideal case of study to try out new models and ideas (Small, 2009).

The course that needs to be charted is thus one that steers clear of the epistemological pitfalls of social Darwinism and teleology, while still maintaining a useful place for state as a broad conceptualization. What may be needed is a new body of theories that can work without the normative, positivistic and reductionist assumptions that have been effectively criticized in recent years. The new models must be sophisticated and rich enough to be relevant in the analysis of complex case-studies, rather than dictating a top-down unilinear developmental line. Some useful tools are already in the literature. Heterarchy, for instance, makes room for a complex network of shifting and contextdependent power relationships. This may turn out to be a useful descriptor of the intricate interplay among the plurality of relevant subjects that are identifiable in state formation contexts in Greece and Italy. Precisely this multiplicity of agents, having a variety of different agendas and priorities, brings up the issue of the relationship between the emerging state structure and the other existing foci of power in the community. Kin groups, clans, corporate entities, cultic societies are only some of the possible players in the state formation game.

Also, once the teleological component is removed, another related issue emerges: what are the motivations and rationales behind the individual actions leading towards state formation? Agency theory may perhaps be of help in unraveling the tangle of diverging and often conflicting behaviors within incipient states (Blanton and Fargher, 2008). Furthermore, consideration of the nature of state organization once some kind of equilibrium is reached, generations after the event, may also throw light on the original desired outcomes and on the balance of forces at play. The key role of clearly pre-state entities such as the gens still had many centuries after the formation of the Roman state could indicate that early states were not as omnipotent as misleading modern analogies suggest. The state can turn out to be a much more fragile result than the sum of its supposedly constituent parts. Such a ‘weak’ definition of the state allows us to leave most of the traditional related ideological baggage behind and may open up new bottom-up ways of describing and interpreting the process.

As recent intensive archaeological surveys reach publication stage, their results have generated vast amounts of new archaeological and environmental data, as well as regional perspectives that allow us to analyze the changing physical structure of pre-state and state territories, and to recognize scale and environment as two crucial variables in the evaluation of the origin and ultimately the form and function of the state. Environmental studies, regional ceramic studies, and the analysis of floral and faunal remains from excavation contexts have offered insights into the nature of pre-state societies, as well as the changing character of human-landscape interaction and the nature of regional integration during periods of state formation. While all of this data clearly has a bearing on the issue of state formation, theories that allow connecting it with state formation processes have not progressed as far as they could have. There is clearly the need for more and more sophisticated thinking on how archaeological data can be used to study the process. With the obsolescence of systems theory approaches and the realization of multilinearity and local variability, we need much more flexible and context-specific tools. All this takes on particular relevance in the case of environmental and productive evidence. General ecological models have been often advanced, but there is a marked scarcity of middle range theorizing on how ecofactual evidence should be integrated in specific historical reconstructions. More case-studies are required, investigating if and how is food production affected by political change. The environmental evidence is also key to a realistic view of what sustains state structures and of their relationship with underlying long-term subsistence activities.

The Aegean

In the last generation of scholarship, the conceptualization of the problem of state formation in the Aegean has changed, especially among those working on Crete, progressing beyond the polarizing opposition of developmental perspectives – independent, gradualist, and largely evolutionary models on the one hand (Branigan 1988; Warren 1987), and punctuated, discontinuous or neo-diffusionist trajectories (Cherry 1983; Watrous 1987) on the other. While cross-cultural interactions (Watrous 2001; Rutter 2001; cf. Schoep 2006; Parkinson and Galaty 2007) are still seen as important variables affecting the formation and structure of state-level societies in both Crete and mainland Greece, recent approaches have largely abandoned the construction of explicitly developmental and causal hypotheses – models of state-formation per se – realizing not only the inherently reductive tendencies in those constructs, but that the societies in question represent culturally diverse and chronologically and regionally varied manifestations of sociopolitical elaboration. Discussion has shifted to questions of complexity – and ways of defining and measuring complexity – effective scales of analysis, and definitions of integration and organization within definable archaeological contexts and data sets. Theoretical frameworks and diachronic perspectives on culture change have not been utterly left behind, but methodologies tend to be ground-up in their interest in reexamining and redefining cultural context as well as new data sets. New approaches to the problem of the state-formation have effectively caused us to back up a bit, recentering the discourse on the data themselves, the definition of the state, the operative social and political interactions that make it work, and critical reevaluation of concepts of “state” and “pre-state” society. Rather than assuming a dominant economic or political function of the center – the dependence on notional frameworks derived from essentially economic-redistributive models of staple finance, agro-literate structure, and social storage (for a review, see Haggis 1999b) – recent approaches explore the diverse social mechanisms evident in material patterns, using methods derived from parallel sets of problems outside of the Aegean sphere. This crosscultural and even comparative trend has encouraged the adaptation and integration of concepts of heterarchy (Small 1995; 1997; 1998; Schoep 2002; Haggis 1999a; 1999b; 2002; 2007); factionalism (Schoep 2002); segmentary states (Knappett 1999); and applications such as Marcus’s dynamic model and Blanton and colleagues’ dual processual theory (Parkinson and Galaty 2007).

To speak of Aegean state-formation is of course to encompass three very different forms of state and very likely three different processes of formation in three different culture periods: Minoan Crete (c. 2000–1800 BCE), the Mycenaean mainland (c. 1600–1400 BCE), and the Greek Aegean (c. 700 BCE). And while it is generally acknowledged that Minoan and Mycenaean palaces represent very different culture groups and forms of state-level societies, it is becoming clear that on even on Crete, where we assume a degree of continuity, the emergence of palaces was an uneven and inconsistent phenomenon operating on various spatial scales; even changes between Protopalatial (c. 2000–1680 BCE) and Neopalatial (1680–1450 BCE) phases suggest different forms of palatial organization (Knappett and Schoep 2000; Haggis 2002). Similarly, in the Greek Aegean, not only are diverse forms of state apparent (Morgan 2003; Hansen 2006), but even among city-states and polis-like varieties, there are apparently diverse chronologies and patterns of formation. Our understanding of the development of ancient city-states has been improved in recent years by these crosscultural perspectives that emphasize agricultural specialization, the establishment of new political roles and patron-client relationships, and changing patterns of socioeconomic interaction between city and countryside (e.g., Smith 2003; Nichols and Charlton 1997; Schwartz and Falconer 1994). And while the emergence of Minoan and Mycenaean palace states was apparently neither uniform nor consistent geographically or culturally, the Greek city-state follows a similarly complex and uneven trajectory. The polis, however defined, is recognized as a new kind of polity, demonstrating a level of sociopolitical elaboration very different from its Early Iron Age village roots, while its emergence can be seen to involve a “phase transition,” an increase in complexity, in which new urban and rural relationships were formed, and in which local kinship systems were not suppressed or controverted, but restructured in new venues of economic interaction and social competition (cf. Yoffee 1997).

The seven papers in this section represent strands of this current discourse, dealing with questions of centralization, hierarchy and integration on various spatial scales, regions, culture groups, and periods in the Aegean, from the Early Bronze Age to the classical period. Daniel Pullen focuses on Early Bronze 2 in central and southern Greece, looking at the first indications of emerging state-level complexity in the Aegean sphere. The period has long been characterized as a “proto-urban” phase of cultural development (cf. Cosmopoulos 1991), encompassing a chiefdom-like political organization, evinced by a three-tiered settlement hierarchy; primary centers with fortifications and distinctive architectural forms such as the so-called corridor houses – exceptionally large buildings with regular design features and presumably semi-public and administrative functions. In Pullen’s analysis regional studies are brought to bear on the distribution of certain artifacts that correlate to elite building types, and a potential structure, creating an overlay of qualitative as well as quantitative indices of integration. In the south Argolid, artifacts (such as terracotta roof tiles and impressed hearth rims), site location (proximity to coastal and arable zones), and site sizes (distinctively large primary centers), inform our understanding of relational hierarchies in the region. The continuity of occupation at large sites throughout the Bronze Age emphasizes the importance of the developed settlement hierarchy in EB 2. What is interesting here is that the distribution of certain artifacts...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• Preface
• Chapter 1. Introduction
• Part 1: The Aegean
• Part 2: Italy
• Index