Market Sense and Nonsense

How the Markets Really Work (and How They Don't)

Jack D. Schwager

• Publisher: Wiley
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781118523162
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Investments & Securities
• Index: Business

Bestselling author, Jack Schwager, challenges the assumptions at the core of investment theory and practice and exposes common investor mistakes, missteps, myths, and misreads

When it comes to investment models and theories of how markets work, convenience usually trumps reality. The simple fact is that many revered investment theories and market models are flatly wrong—that is, if we insist that they work in the real world. Unfounded assumptions, erroneous theories, unrealistic models, cognitive biases, emotional foibles, and unsubstantiated beliefs all combine to lead investors astray—professionals as well as novices. In this engaging new book, Jack Schwager, bestselling author of Market Wizards and The New Market Wizards, takes aim at the most perniciously pervasive academic precepts, money management canards, market myths and investor errors. Like so many ducks in a shooting gallery, Schwager picks them off, one at a time, revealing the truth about many of the fallacious assumptions, theories, and beliefs at the core of investment theory and practice.

• A compilation of the most insidious, fundamental investment errors the author has observed over his long and distinguished career in the markets
• Brings to light the fallacies underlying many widely held academic precepts, professional money management methodologies, and investment behaviors
• A sobering dose of real-world insight for investment professionals and a highly readable source of information and guidance for general readers interested in investment, trading, and finance
• Spans both traditional and alternative investment classes, covering both basic and advanced topics
• As in his best-selling Market Wizard series, Schwager manages the trick of covering material that is pertinent to professionals, yet writing in a style that is clear and accessible to the layman

PART ONE

MARKETS, RETURN, AND RISK

Chapter 1

Expert Advice

Comedy Central versus CNBC

On March 4, 2009, Jon Stewart, the host of The Daily Show, a satirical news program, lambasted CNBC for a string of poor prognostications. The catalyst for the segment was Rick Santelli’s famous rant from the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, in which he railed against subsidizing “losers’ mortgages,” a clip that went viral and is widely credited with igniting the Tea Party movement. Stewart’s point was that while Santelli was criticizing irresponsible homeowners who missed all the signs, CNBC was in no position to be sitting in judgment.

Stewart then proceeded to play a sequence of CNBC clips highlighting some of the most embarrassingly erroneous forecasts and advice made by multiple CNBC commentators, each followed by a white type on black screen update. The segments included:

• Jim Cramer, the host of Mad Money, answering a viewer’s question by emphatically declaring, “Bear Stearns is fine! Keep your money where it is.” A black screen followed: “Bear Stearns went under six days later.”
• A Power Lunch commentator extolling the financial strength of Lehman Brothers saying, “Lehman is no Bear Stearns.” Black screen: “Lehman Brothers went under three months later.”
• Jim Cramer on October 4, 2007, enthusiastically recommending, “Bank of America is going to $60 in a heartbeat.” Black screen: “Today Bank of America trades under $4.”
• Charlie Gasparino saying that American International Group (AIG) as the biggest insurance company was obviously not going bankrupt, which was followed by a black screen listing the staggeringly large AIG bailout installments to date and counting.
• Jim Cramer’s late 2007 bullish assessment, “You should be buying things. Accept that they are overvalued. . . . I know that sounds irresponsible, but that’s how you make the money.” The black screen followed: “October 31, 2007, Dow 13,930.”
• Larry Kudlow exclaiming, “The worst of this subprime business is over.” Black screen: “April 16, 2008, Dow 12,619.”
• Jim Cramer again in mid-2008 exhorting, “It’s time to buy, buy, buy!” Black screen: “June 13, 2008, Dow 12,307.”
• A final clip from Fast Money talking about “people starting to get their confidence back” was followed by a final black screen message: “November 4, 2008, Dow 9,625.”

Stewart concluded, “If I had only followed CNBC’s advice, I’d have a $1 million today—provided I started with $100 million.”

Stewart’s clear target was the network, CNBC, which, while promoting its financial expertise under the slogan “knowledge is power,” was clueless in spotting the signs of the impending greatest financial crisis in nearly a century. Although Stewart did not personalize his satiric barrage, Jim Cramer, whose frenetic presentation style makes late-night infomercial promoters appear sedated in comparison, seemed to come in for a disproportionate share of the ridicule. A widely publicized media exchange ensued between Cramer and Stewart in the following days, with each responding to the other, both on their own shows and as guests on other programs, and culminating with Cramer’s appearance as an interview guest on The Daily Show on March 12. Stewart was on the attack for most of the interview, primarily chastising CNBC for taking corporate representatives at their word rather than doing any investigative reporting—in effect, for acting like corporate shills rather than reporters. Cramer did not try to defend against the charge, saying that company CEOs had openly lied to him, which was something he too regretted and wished he’d had the power to prevent.

The program unleashed an avalanche of media coverage, with most writers and commentators seeming to focus on the question of who won the “debate.” (The broad consensus was Stewart.) What interests us here is not the substance or outcome of the so-called debate, but rather Stewart’s original insinuation that Cramer and other financial pundits at CNBC had provided the public with poor financial advice. Is this criticism valid? Although the sequence of clips Stewart played on his March 4 program was damning, Cramer had made thousands of recommendations on his Mad Money program. Anyone making that many recommendations could be made to look horrendously inept by cherry-picking the worst forecasts or advice. To be fair, one would have to examine the entire record, not just a handful of samples chosen for their maximum comedic impact.

That is exactly what three academic researchers did. In their study, Joseph Engelberg, Caroline Sasseville, and Jared Williams (ESW) surveyed and analyzed the accuracy and impact of 1,149 first-time buy recommendations made by Cramer on Mad Money.1 Their analysis covered the period from July 28, 2005 (about four months after the program’s launch) through February 9, 2009—an end date that conveniently was just three weeks prior to The Daily Show episode mocking CNBC’s market calls.

ESW began by examining a portfolio formed by the stocks recommended on Mad Money, assuming each stock was entered on the close before the evening airing of the program on which it was recommended—a point in time deliberately chosen to reflect the market’s valuation prior to the program’s price impact. They assumed an equal dollar allocation among recommended stocks and tested the results for a variety of holding periods, ranging from 50 to 250 trading days. The differences in returns between these recommendation-based portfolios and the market were statistically insignificant across all holding periods and net negative for most.

ESW then looked at the overnight price impact (percentage change from previous close to next day’s open) of Cramer’s recommendations and found an extremely large 2.4 percent average abnormal return—that is, return in excess of the average price change of similar stocks for the same overnight interval. As might be expected based on the mediocre results of existing investors in the same stocks and the large overnight influence of Cramer’s recommendations, using entries on the day after the program, the recommendation-based portfolios underperformed the market across all the holding periods. The annualized underperformance was substantial, ranging from 3 percent to 10 percent. The worst performance was for the shortest holding period (50 days), suggesting a strong bias for stocks to surrender their “Cramer bump” in the ensuing period. The bottom line seems to be that investors would be better off buying and holding an index than buying the Mad Money recommendations—although, admittedly, there is much less entertainment value in buying an index.

I don’t mean to pick on Cramer. There is no intention to paint Cramer as a showman with no investment skill. On the contrary, according to an October 2005 BusinessWeek article, Cramer achieved a 24 percent net compounded return during his 14-year tenure as a hedge fund manager—a very impressive performance record. But regardless of Cramer’s investment skills and considerable market knowledge, the fact remains that, on average, viewers following his recommendations would have been better off throwing darts to pick stocks.

The Elves Index

The study that examined the Mad Money recommendations represented the track record of only a single market expert for a four-year time period. Next we examine an index that was based on the input of 10 experts and was reported for a period of over 12 years.

The most famous, longest-running, and most widely watched stock-market-focused program ever was Wall Street Week with Louis Rukeyser, which aired for over 30 years. One feature of the show was the Elves Index. The Elves Index was launched in 1989 and was based on the net market opinion of 10 expert market analysts selected by Rukeyser. Each analyst opinion was scored as +1 for bullish, 0 for neutral, and −1 for bearish. The index had a theoretical range from −10 (all analysts bearish) to +10 (all analysts bullish). The concept was that when a significant majority of these experts were bullish, the market was a buy (+5 was the official buy signal), and if there was a bearish consensus, the market was a sell (–5 was the official sell signal). That is not how it worked out, though.

In October 1990 the Elves Index reached its most negative level since its launch, a −4 reading, which was just shy of an official sell signal. This bearish consensus coincided with a major market bottom and the start of an extended bull market. The index then registered lows of −6 in April 1994 and −5 in November 1994, coinciding with the relative lows of the major bottom pattern formed in 1994. The index subsequently reached a bullish extreme of +6 in May 1996 right near a major relative high. The index again reached +6 in July 1998 shortly before a 19 percent plunge in the S&P 500 index. A sequence of the highest readings ever recorded for the index occurred in the late 1999 to early 2000 period, with the index reaching an all-time high (up to then) of +8 in December 1999. The Elves Index remained at high levels as the equity indexes peaked in the first quarter of 2000 and then plunged. At one point, still early in the bear market, the Elves Index even reached an all-time high of +9. Rukeyser finally retired the index shortly after 9/11, when presumably, if kept intact, it would have provided a strong sell signal.2

Rukeyser no doubt terminated the Elves Index as an embarrassment. Although he didn’t comment on the timing of the decision, it is reasonable to assume he couldn’t tolerate another major sell signal in the index coinciding with what would probably prove to be a relative low (as it was). Although the Elves Index had compiled a terrible record—never right, but often wrong—its demise was deeply regretted by many market observers. The index was so bad that many had come to view it as a useful contrarian indicator. In other words, listening to the consensus of the experts as reflected by the index was useful—as long as you were willing to do the exact opposite.

Paid Advice

In this final section, we expand our analysis to encompass a group that includes hundreds of market experts. If there is one group of experts that might be expected to generate recommendations that beat the market averages, it is those who earn a living selling their advice—that is, financial newsletter writers. After all, if a newsletter’s advice failed to generate any excess return, presumably it would find it difficult to attract and retain readers willing to pay for subscriptions.

Do the financial newsletters do better than a market index? To find the answer, I sought out the data compiled by the Hulbert Financial Digest, a publication that has been tracking financial newsletter recommendations for over 30 years. In 1979, the editor, Mark Hulbert, attended a financial conference and heard many presentations in which investment advisers claimed their recommendations earned over 100 percent a year, and in some cases much more. Hulbert was skeptical about these claims and decided to tra...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Contents
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Foreword
• Prologue
• Part One: Markets, Return, and Risk
• Part Two: Hedge Funds as an Investment
• Postscript to Part Two: Are Hedge Fund Returns a Mirage?
• Part Three: Portfolio Matters
• Epilogue: 32 Investment Observations
• Appendix A: Options—Understanding the Basics
• Appendix B: Formulas for Risk-Adjusted Return Measures
• Acknowledgments
• About the Author
• Index