Spain

From Dictatorship to Democracy

Javier Tusell

• Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
• Year: 2011
• ISBN:
  9781444342727
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: History

This comprehensive survey of Spain's history looks at the major political, social, and economic changes that took place from the end of the Civil War to the beginning of the twenty-first century.

• A thorough introduction to post-Civil War Spain, from its development under Franco and subsequent transition to democracy up to the present day
• Tusell was a celebrated public figure and historian. During his lifetime he negotiated the return to Spain of Picasso's Guernica, was elected UCD councillor for Madrid, and became a respected media commentator before his untimely death in 2005
• Includes a biography and political assessment of Francisco Franco
• Covers a number of pertinent topics, including fascism, isolationism, political opposition, economic development, decolonization, terrorism, foreign policy, and democracy
• Provides a context for understanding the continuing tensions between democracy and terrorism, including the effects of the 2004 Madrid Bombings

Chapter 1

The Temptation of Fascism and the Will to Survive (1939–51)

If we view Francoism as a single period, we see that the year 1959 was crucial, not just economically as a result of the change that occurred at that moment, but also politically because that year saw a blurring of any identification with the fascist model and the dictatorship became more bureaucratic in style. It was no mere chance that the emphasis on politics in the period immediately following 1939 coincided with an economic situation that had become disastrous through mismanagement by those in power.

Dividing the Franco years into 5-year periods also makes sense. If 1959 is taken to be a pivotal year, the two decades preceding it can be seen as leading up to it while the following 15 years show the consequences of the change that occurred in that year. The first decade of the Franco regime was characterized by internal unity. During the early years of the dictatorship every effort was made to align the victorious Spain that had won the war with the powers that had been its allies during the conflict. That effort provides the key to the entire period and explains why Spain was later ostracized.

What happened in effect was that there was an attempt to rebuild Spain according to a model that was the complete antithesis of what had gone before. The attempt to establish fascism within the country was closely linked to an expansionist policy outside, in the same way as survival, thanks to cosmetic changes from 1945 onwards, focused Spain’s foreign policy entirely on the need simply to survive. As for political opposition to the regime, during World War II and afterwards it kept going by remaining focused on how the Civil War had ended. One can even go so far as to say that Spanish culture of the period was deeply marked by the immediate impact of the recent conflict.

If it makes sense to view the period as a single chronological unit, it also makes just as much sense to divide it up. The World War II years were not only marked by Spain’s foreign policy but were also the first moments in the new regime’s political journey. Furthermore, it was the period in which Franco served his apprenticeship and learned his political skills. In the period that followed, one might say that this apprenticeship was completed, and what became central to life in Spain was its ability to resist outside pressure.

A Failed Attempt to Make Spain Fascist

In the months following the Civil War Spain seemed to move towards an alignment with the Axis, more in terms of political institutions than foreign policy. Concerning the latter, the fact that Spain joined the anti-Komintern pact and left the League of Nations (Sociedad de Naciones) was proof of its ideological tendencies.

Visits by Spanish leaders to Germany and Italy confirm that this desire for alignment existed, especially the talks that took place in Rome in May 1939 between the fascist leaders and Serrano Suñer. This rising star in Franco’s government enjoyed a close relationship with Ciano and even with Mussolini, and it was this that earned him a reputation as the representative of fascist politics in Spain. Nor was Serrano’s reputation derived solely from the regime’s international alignment; it came also from its internal politics. Mussolini, by advising Franco not to proclaim Spain a monarchy and by emphasizing the need to “talk to the people,” was in effect suggesting that the regime become more fascist. Ciano’s visit to Spain in July confirmed this sense of there being an alignment with Italy. Discussions in the Spanish Council of Ministers – Franco’s cabinet – now revealed clear tension between those who were ready to follow the rising star, Serrano, and those who were not.

Although crisis had been brewing for some time, it finally erupted in August; by then Franco had already done away with the monarchist Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez. The change in government signaled victory for Serrano, who from that moment until 1942 was the key figure in Spanish politics. A cultured and intelligent lawyer, Serrano was superior to the rest of the regime’s emerging political class, though he by no means lacked faults, being megalomaniac, ambitious, tending to foster a personality cult, intemperate, and secretive. As well as keeping his government portfolio, Serrano also managed to take on the presidency of the party’s Political Junta; from then on he was addressed as “Minister President” by a press that he himself controlled. It is even perfectly possible that the young generals serving in various ministries for the Armed Services at that time (Juan Yagüe, Agustín Muñoz Grandes, and José Enrique Varela) were there not only because Franco trusted them more than those who had brought him to power but because from Serrano’s point of view they were more susceptible to his own influence. There were in the new government personalities from the traditional Catholic right, but only as technical advisers or because they were close to Serrano (José Ibáñez Martín and José Larraz); the monarchist presence was much less evident – a clear sign that Franco saw it as potentially dangerous. The Carlist presence (Esteban Bilbao) was manageable.

The all-powerful Franco–Serrano duo was strengthened by a number of measures. Shortly before the governmental crisis, General Queipo de Llano was sent to Italy; in practice, he was exiled. At the same time, legislation was passed on the position of the Chief of State who, from then onwards, “on a permanent basis,” would be able to exercise the functions of government without need of prior consultation with the cabinet. In fact, thanks to measures such as these, Franco acquired more absolute power than even Stalin – who had, at least in theory, to obey a Constitution – or Hitler, who was answerable to a parliament. The ratification of the party statutes, praised by Mussolini, took on characteristics that made them virtually identical to those of the fascists. Not only were the National Council and its Political Junta endowed with decisive political importance but also provision was made for controlling trade unions and armed militias. The economic plan approved in October 1939 was notable for its tendency towards autarchy.

If there was indeed a will to make Spain more fascist, one must ask why fascism never came anywhere near gaining control there. The reply to this question may be found in what actually happened in a situation in which internal politics were closely bound up with the international situation. In brief, it would only have been possible for the regime to become fascist if Franco’s Spain had decided to join in World War II on the side of the Axis. In 1939 and 1940 any attempt to increase fascist influence would have been in its earliest stages and was unlikely to mature, and if the intention had been clear it nonetheless had fundamental weaknesses from the start.

The role of the army in the Spain that emerged victorious from the Civil War was of supreme importance and there was never the slightest doubt that it would have to be a major player were conflict to arise, in contrast to what happened in, say, Romania. One must bear in mind that in 1939, 80 percent of posts in the Administration were reserved for ex-combatants (and not, for example, for party militants) and that at least 25 percent of all political posts were given to men with an Army background. We have already noted that during the Civil War the military dominated the Administration in the rearguard and that in the wake of the conflict they took on the task of repression. Even in the Party’s National Council, if 24 percent of its members were party veterans, about another 20 percent were from the Armed Services. As late as 1951, 27 percent of mayors and local councilors were Civil War ex-combatants. Any victory of the Party over the army could only have been possible if the Party had managed to establish for itself a more influential role in Spanish society.

The early years of the post-Civil War period illustrate clearly just how limited any growth in fascist influence actually was. The Party published figures which seemed to show its strength: in 1939 it had 650,000 members, and in 1945 1,000,000, in addition to 2,000 government employees and another 10,000 in the union organization, and it was no doubt monopolized by the most orthodox Falangists. The role of Carlism decreased: the position it occupied allowed it to retain some influence but it was marginalized and limited in the impact it might have. As regards the Party, the Carlist attitude can be summed up in what an ex-minister, the Conde de Rodezno, told Franco: it would not have been openly hostile but it certainly lacked solidarity. It was only in Navarre that Carlism had any real influence. Membership of the Party varied according to regions. In Catalonia it was tiny before the outbreak of the Civil War; it could only draw members from the anti-Catalanist right and a few local notables. In the Basque Country the Party managed to gain the support of traditionalists at a municipal level and of those linked to Falange in positions of power in the provinces. Over a large part of the Iberian Peninsula traditional elites were of the right. It is possible to discern a limited achievement of the aim of “nationalizing the masses” in the incorporation into the Party of former left-wing militants: A study of the Aljarafe district in the province of Seville shows that 15 percent of Party members came from left-wing militias and expressed radical opinions with uncompromising directness. This explains why it embarked on a mission of social action which went so far as to include speaking out strongly against monopolies. At the same time, the fact that it was a leading force in society meant that it could also play a policing role. Whatever the situation, its powers of coercion and its propaganda against its opponents had a far greater impact than any willingness to sign up to its ideas. Despite censorship, only sections of the press and the media could ever be considered tools of “fascist expansion” at the time. By around 1940 it was obvious that the result of the Party’s attempt to influence society would remain ambiguous: in practice it fostered fear and passive acceptance rather than whole-hearted commitment.

Nor did the institutions that governed the Party work well. The National Council remained a divided body that in fact did very little, so much so that there is not much to be gained by discussing it further. More or less the same could be said of the Political Junta. The Institute of Political Studies (Instituto de Estudios Políticos), which was supposedly the intellectual breeding-ground of fascism, never matched up to its reputation. It might initially have been thought that in organizations aimed at young people there might have been a will to see fascism spread. However, the revolutionary Spanish Students’ Union (Sindicato Español Universitario or SEU) finally lost its battle for life in 1941 with the disappearance in Russia of its principal radical leader, Enrique Sotomayor. Although the SEU had more than 50,000 members, there were always obvious gaps in its coverage of Spanish territory, the most obvious being in Catalonia and the Basque Country. In 1943, compulsory membership became the rule for all students. The Youth Front (Frente de Juventudes) created in December 1940 never had more than 13 percent of young people on its lists, and the percentage of women was even lower. Unlike what had been on offer in Germany, training was traditional, being run by soldiers and primary school teachers who had left their 20s far behind them, so without ever entirely losing its Falangist character, the Youth Front drifted towards educational and sporting activities. A parallel voluntary organization, Franco’s Falange Youth Groups (Falanges Juveniles de Franco) – whose identification with the leader is itself significant – barely attracted 18 percent of young men and 8 percent of women. Last of all, the section of the Party aimed at women favored the domestic ideal of the model housewife that typified the traditional Spanish right. The Sección Femenina of Falange offered the mother as its role model rather than the young revolutionary. Its leader, Pilar Primo de Rivera, left no one in any doubt that “the real duty of women to their Fatherland is to bring up families on firm foundations of austerity and cheerfulness where all that is traditional can flourish.” Nothing was so worthy of praise as a woman’s “submissiveness” to men. Numbers of members never even reached a third of those in equivalent organizations in Italy; women barely took part in mass processions and could rarely be photographed doing gymnastics.

The Party quickly lost the political battle in two areas. In the summer of 1940 militias were set up but not much was achieved beyond laying down very elementary guidelines for mobilization. The military makes militias superfluous and in Franco’s Spain the initial victory that had laid the foundations for the regime belonged unequivocally to the Army. Falangist union organizations did not play a major role in the national economy either. According to the Law on the Bases of Union Organization (Ley de Bases de Organización Sindical) of December 1940, although unions claimed to represent “the entire people organized as a working militia” the law did not include chambers of commerce or members of the professional classes. There is nothing of greater significance in the blocking of the revolutionary aims of the Falangist union organization than the fact that it was an army general, Andrés Saliquet, who denounced the man in charge of it, Merino, as a former Freemason. In Mussolini’s Italy, the Party controlled and put blocks on union activity; in Spain, the force that exercised the greatest power – the Army – closed the door on Merino by denouncing him.

Mention of the Party takes us on into World War II. For Franco’s Spain the invasion of Poland was not welcome news but it responded by aligning itself with its Civil War allies. For the first months of World War II Franco’s Spain was closely aligned with fascist Italy but was in no state to think of taking part in the conflict, not even to the limited extent that the Duce considered his own country able to participate. In the event, in April 1940, when Mussolini decided to enter the war, he told Franco first, and when in May it became clear that France had been defeated, the Falangist press began to demand the return of Gibraltar. The spectacular defeat of France – Spain’s traditional enemy in Morocco – immediately meant that Spain was tempted to join in the war in an attempt to gain some benefit in a radically new European order. Two days after Mussolini joined the war, Franco and Serrano modified Spain’s position and put it on a footing of “non-belligerence,” which in Italy’s case had meant “prebelligerence.” The fact that over those same days Italian warplanes were allowed to overfly Spanish territory to bomb the British made participation seem more likely.

For Spain actually to take part in World War II it would have needed its economic situation to be better than it was and for there to be a greater degree of internal cohesion. By December 1939 there was already discontent among the highest-ranking military officers directed at Franco and strong reservations concerning Serrano who, in the eyes of many, had too much power concentrated in his person, gave too much support to a Falange that was too revolutionary, was dominant, megalomaniac, and even seemed not to get on well with those who had helped to bring him to power. In January 1940, General Muñoz Grandes was replaced as Minister Secretary General of the Movimiento after only a few months in the position. It is worth underlining the fact that a regime that prided itself on following the model of fascist Italy should have appointed a soldier as leader of the Party when it was in fact a soldier who would replace Mussolini in 1943.

The Temptation to Intervene and Internal Conflict (1940–2)

It has been written that a triumphant Germany immediately put pressure on Spain to join in World War II and that this pressure was insistent and lasting even if it never succeeded in breaking down Franco’s resistance. What actually happened, however, was that after Germany’s victory in France, the Spanish leadership identified totally with the Axis and this situation lasted, with different nuances and some hesitations, until well on into 1944. German pressure to induce Spain to intervene in the war, though strong for several months, did not last very long. The initiative concerning Spain’s possible entry into the conflict was taken not by Germany but by the leaders of Franco’s Spain. In mid June 1940, the caudillo sent General Jorge Vigón to hold talks with Hitler and express Spain’s willingness to become a participant in the conflict. On this occasion Spain for the first time made substantial territorial demands. These consisted – and remained so for some months – of the extension of its possessions in the Sahara and Guinea and, above all, of the occupation of the whole of Morocco and the part of Algeria that had been colonized by Spaniards. There was not a single section of the Franco regime that was not in favor of these imperialist ambitions. If for Falange Spain’s imperial destiny seemed likely to be fulfilled by this process, for Africanists who had fought in North Africa long-cherished ambitions would be realized. The Falangists, nonetheless, were the most ambitious (and least realistic) and at times demanded Spanish expansion into the south of France and Portugal too.

There was never the slightest chance that the Franco regime’s aims would ever be achieved because the position of Hitler’s Germany on the issue was a far cry from what was widely desired in Madrid. The Führer was never a strong advocate of a historical justice that would allow Spain to fulfill its aspirations; for Hitler Spain was a not very important country that he expected to follow his lead of its own free will and be ready to furnish him with raw materials and strategic advantages in return for almost nothing. In Hitler’s view, not even the Mediterranean was of any importance. Once France was defeated, he hesitated briefly over where Germany should next expand, finally deciding on eastern Europe with the result that Spain was no longer of any interest to him.

Having outlined the German position, we can now return to the events that were now unfolding. In July 1940, the Spanish Foreign Minister Juan Luis Beigbeder suggested occupying part of French Morocco on the pretext of controlling disturbances there. The operation never took place, probably because the French kept up a high level of military presence in the area and because Germany was never likely to authorize it. There was, however, an attempt to replicate this kind of spectacular decision in the style of Mussolini which, although it was somewhat of a caricature, did not, unlike the Italian model, end in a fiasco. At the very moment when German troops were entering Paris, Spanish troops occupied Tangiers, announcing the move as irreversible. The French representative was expelled from the city and a German consulate was set up there, whose actual aim was espionage. In practice it would be as late as 1944, when the war seemed to be turning decisively in favor of the Allies, that Spain would come round to considering the zone it controlled as international once more.

Shortly afterwards in 1940 Spain made concessions of considerable strategic advantage to the Germans: by July there was a German military mission in Spain preparing for an eventual retaking of Gibraltar, besides which, throughout 1940 and 1941, thanks to what was called Operation Moor, a total of 18 German submarines were re-provisioning in Spain. This allowed them to extend their radius of action considerably – so much so that they could reach as far as northern Brazil. The Germans also benefited from the information provided by the Spanish secret services, and even such people as Serrano handed over to Nazi diplomats dispatches from neutral ambassadors and anyone whose information might be interesting to them, such as, for example, the Duke of Alba, Spain’s representative in London.

The German presence on the French–Spanish border signaled imminent danger for what was to become the United Kingdom’s main base on the Old Continent: Portugal. The Portuguese might well have feared that Germany would attack through Spain with Spanish help and it was in these circumstances that negotiations took place, beginning at the end of June 1940 and ending a month later. The treaty was seen by the Spanish as a way of drawing Portugal away from the British cause and into its own camp. The British were not at all...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Note on the Author
• Introduction
• Chapter 1: The Temptation of Fascism and the Will to Survive (1939–51)
• Chapter 2: The Years of Consensus: The High Point of the Regime (1951–65)
• Chapter 3: Economic Development, Apertura, and the Late Franco Years (1966–75)
• Chapter 4: The Transition to Democracy (1975–82)
• Chapter 5: Consolidating Democracy: The Socialist Government (1982–96)
• Chapter 6: The Turn of the Right (1996–2004)
• Index