What's Good on TV?

Understanding Ethics Through Television

Jamie Carlin Watson, Robert Arp

• Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
• Year: 2011
• ISBN:
  9781444343014
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

What's Good on TV? Understanding Ethics Through Television presents an introduction to the basic theories and concepts of moral philosophy using concrete examples from classic and contemporary television shows.

• Utilizes clear examples from popular contemporary and classic television shows, such as The Office, Law and Order, Star Trek and Family Guy, to illustrate complex philosophical concepts
• Designed to be used as a stand-alone or supplementary introductory ethics text
• Features case studies, study questions, and suggested readings
• Episodes mentioned are from a wide variety of television shows, and are easily accessible
• Offers a balanced treatment of a number of controversial ethical issues including environmental ethics, animal welfare, abortion, homosexuality, capital punishment, assisted suicide, censorship and the erosion of values
• Includes acompanion website at http://whatsgoodontv.webs.com

Series III

But What's Right When . . . ? Practical Ethics

Episode 8

Environmental Ethics

Introduction

In the show Community, Dean Craig Pelton (Jim Rash), always wanting to keep Greendale Community College hip and politically correct, institutes “Green Week” to reflect the school's ongoing interest in being “Earth smart” (“Envirodale,” season 1). In honor of Green Week, he attempts to rename the school, “Envirodale.” In a twist of irony, a not-too-bright student points out, “Look, we're already called ‘Greendale.’” Embarrassed, Dean Pelton whispers to the student in charge of printing new posters, “We need to re-do these.” Although the student explains that she has already printed 5,000, Pelton responds, angrily, “Well, print 5,000 more! I'm trying to save the planet here!”

The irony, of course, is that while Dean Pelton claims to be sensitive to the planet's needs, he is wasting 5,000 large sheets of paper just to protect his image. But does it really matter that's he's wasting all that paper? Maybe environmentalism is just a social fad – a way for people to get involved in their community and deepen their relationships by working for a common cause. Today it is the environment, tomorrow it will be the penguins in Antarctica, the next day it will be scrapbooking. But it's also possible that there is more to it. To determine which is the case, we must answer some moral questions.

Do we have any moral obligations to the environment we inhabit? If not, why not? If so, what establishes them? It seems uncontroversial that there are at least practical reasons that would prevent anyone from advocating wonton destruction of the biological and chemical life on planet Earth. If for no other type of reason, we need most of it in order to survive. Therefore, we can begin this discussion recognizing that, at least practically, there are good reasons to preserve much of nature, both chemical and biological, as we now find it. Nevertheless, the questions we are most interested in are whether there are moral reasons to preserve nature, and, if so, how these moral reasons restrict our actions.

Practically, we could not survive without our environment. But is our survival a moral issue? Is there something valuable about humans that would make it wrong to eliminate us? Or is nature valuable in and of itself? Perhaps it is more valuable than any particular human or group of humans. There are two very general types of argument that defend the claim that we have moral responsibilities to nature.

The first is that nature is valuable in and of itself, that is, it has its value “intrinsically” (see Episode 5). Even if it were not valuable for anything or anyone, it is valuable. It does not derive its value from anywhere else. This view is called “biocentric,” or “life-centered” (from the Greek words “bio,” meaning “life,” and “kentrikos,” meaning “concentrated”). If this view is correct, we have an obligation to preserve nature because it is valuable irrespective of what it offers us.

The second is that nature is only valuable for something other than itself, that is, it has its value “extrinsically” (see Episode 5). It is not valuable in and of itself, but insofar as it is good for something else, and, most often, the argument is that it is good for human beings. Therefore, its moral value derives from the value that morally valuable beings give it. This view is called “anthrocentric,” or “human-centered” (from the Greek words “anthropos,” meaning “human,” and “kentrikos,” meaning, “at the center”). If this view is correct, we have an obligation to preserve those aspects of nature that are valuable to us as human beings. Any preservation beyond this is permissible, but not obligatory.

We will look at each of these views in a bit more detail, then discuss William Baxter's paper, “People or Penguins,” in which he argues that the motivation for biocentric approaches is undermined by rational considerations about the nature of moral value and practical considerations about how environmental legislation works. Finally, we will evaluate the plausibility of these arguments in light of television episodes from Northern Exposure and Family Guy.

Two Approaches to Environmental Ethics

Nature is intrinsically valuable

Biocentric approaches to environmental ethics often argue that life is intrinsically valuable, regardless of whether it is conscious or can feel pain, or whether it has any particular biological or chemical make-up. If it is alive, it is valuable. If this is correct, then it is immoral to “use” nature in ways that are inconsistent with its moral interests. This is, however, difficult, since humans require plants and chemicals in order to survive. But that is not the point; it may be necessary for our survival and yet immoral. But we are a part of nature – we are alive – so our survival is at least as important as the survival of the next plant. Therefore, biocentric philosophers defend “biological egalitarianism,” which means that all living organisms deserve the same moral consideration.

Proponents of this view, often called the “Deep Ecology Movement,” argue that anthrocentric approaches – sometimes characterized as the “Shallow Ecology Movement” (Naess 1973 ) – lose sight of humans as part of the biological community, and thus tend to perceive themselves as having some sort of moral superiority over non-human flora and fauna. They argue, in contrast to this view, that, since humans are merely products of their environment, there is no non-arbitrary way to distinguish the moral value of humans from the moral value of other living things. Therefore, if humans are valuable, so is nature.

One motivation for this perspective comes from cultures that hold nature to be divine in some sense. Pantheists believe that God is everything and in everything, and that therefore everything must be treated with divine reverence. A prominent strain of Buddhism, known as “Theravada Buddhism,” derives its respect for nature from ancient beliefs about nature as the home of divine beings: “Therefore among the Buddhists there is a reverential attitude towards specially long-standing gigantic trees. They are called vanaspati in Pali, meaning ‘lords of the forests’” (De Silva 1987: 256). Because of this reverence, practicing Theravadins must reject weapons of any kind, attempt to not deprive any being of its life, and “abstain from trading in meat” (1987: 258). And Theravadin monks are obligated to obey even stricter rules, refusing to act in ways that might even unintentionally harm a living creature.

But, unless you hold a pantheistic or Buddhist view of reality, this motivation will not be very compelling to you. In addition, Buddhists offer very few arguments that their perspective on reality is true, so it is difficult to evaluate the plausibility of its claims. And finally, it is not clear that, because everything is divine, it deserves moral respect (see Episode 3). Therefore, you will probably want to know whether there are other reasons to adopt a biocentric approach to the environment. Paul W. Taylor (2008) offers one argument along quite different lines. He defines a “life-centered ethic” as the view that “we have prima facie moral obligations that are owed to wild plants and animals themselves as members of the Earth's biotic community” (2008: 374). According to Taylor, all living things have a “well-being” that “is something to be realized as an end in itself” (2008: 374; italics in original). What does this “well-being” consist in? Taylor says it means that the organism, “without reference to any other entity . . . can be benefitted or harmed” (2008: 375). Rocks cannot be benefitted or harmed by breaking them apart. But plants and animals, on the other hand, have states toward which they tend: growing, sprouting, seeding, reproducing, producing fruit, etc. All these states can be encouraged or discouraged by our actions. This capacity for benefit or harm establishes the organism as intrinsically valuable. Therefore, according to Taylor, to discourage these states is immoral.

What reasons does Taylor give for this view? It is primarily that, since we are a part of Earth's biotic community, there is no reason to think we have any moral superiority over the natural world. We can reformulate the details of Taylor's argument as follows:

1. All living things share a common relationship to the Earth.

2. All living things are interconnected.

3. We understand the world better when we see things from all perspectives.

4. Objectively, humans are not superior to animals.

5. Therefore, however valuable humans are, living things share that degree of value.

In defense of premises (1) and (2), Taylor points out that humans are only one small part of a large biological system, which is not only interconnected in many ways, but which also produced us. Physical and biological laws apply to each member of this system equally, and we all face the same challenges of survival and reproduction. In support of premise (3), Taylor notes that we see this interconnectedness all the clearer when we step outside the anthrocentric perspective and take a more biological perspective. This new perspective can lead to a deep affection for nature. “One may become fascinated by it and even experience some involvement with its good and bad fortunes. . .” (2008: 382). In defense of (4), Taylor notes that humans are hardly superior to animals in their capacities. Although humans have a keen intellect, physically they are rather weak and vulnerable: “There is the speed of a cheetah, the vision of an eagle, the agility of a monkey. Why should not these be taken as signs of their superiority over humans” (2008: 383; italics in original). From these premises, Taylor concludes that we cannot draw a sharp distinction between our moral value and that of the rest of nature.

Is Taylor's argument conclusive? Those who defend an anthrocentric approach are not convinced. First, Taylor's argument would seem to extend moral value to viruses, hazardous bacteria, and mosquitoes. If Taylor's view prohibits humans from killing cows, it seems it would also prevent them from killing deadly bacteria. But surely this is not consistent with how the life cycle works. Much of nature is at fundamental odds with itself: lions kill wildebeest; foxes kill rabbits; bears kill fish. If this is the natural cycle of the biotic system, why can't humans kill cows and deadly bacteria?

Second, it is not clear that any of Taylor's premises establish moral value for humans or non-human nature; therefore, a primary moral question has been ignored. Next, we will discuss this objection in detail. And then, in the section that follows, we will discuss William Baxter's version of this objection and consider an anthrocentric alternative.

Nature is extrinsically valuable

Anthrocentric (also called “anthropocentric”) approaches to environmental ethics often point out that there is no “moral” state of nature independent of human considerations. For instance, is it “wrong” for the lion to kill the wildebeest, or for the fox to eat the rabbit? Surely not. Similarly, would it be a great moral “good” for natural selection to produce a species of intelligent, self-reflecting agents? It seems strange to say so. Therefore, moral considerations can only be conceived from the perspective of beings capable of recognizing and acting on moral reasons.

So, what things are valuable? From this perspective, only those things that we value have value. Why is it wrong for you to steal my car or hurt my neighbor's dog? Because I value my car, and my neighbor values his dog. Why is it permissible to eat cows? Because we value eating beef.

Does this mean we can use the environment however we want? Anthrocentrists say no. Our existence depends on our environment being a certain way: we cannot live without clear air, clean water, food plants, etc. In addition, we value more than just the minimum amount of clean air, water, and food plants. We like tranquil streams, bird-watching, scenic vistas, etc. Therefore, if we value ourselves, it is morally necessary that we preserve at least a basic minimum level of natural resources, and it is in our best interests to preserve a great deal more.

Does this mean that we will eliminate all pollution? Absolutely not, but anthrocentrists ask why it should be a goal. To achieve that goal would mean the destruction of the human species. It is precisely because we are part of Earth's biotic community that living here affects it – living impacts the environment. But our living here, we think, is a good thing – and we're the only ones who can even ask the question, so we're the only relevant source of moral concern.

Silly environmentalists, nature is for people

William Baxter, “People or Penguins”

William Baxter argues that, if it comes down to making a decision between protecting people or penguins, we should always choose people. Baxter defends an anthrocentric approach to environmental ethics, and argues that not only is it the only place to start; it is the most efficient way to resolve ethical disputes over how we affect the environment.

He acknowledges that the only way to resolve ethical disputes is to argue in such a way that appeals to as many people as possible. Therefore, Baxter begins with a principle he thinks almost everyone in the United States can agree to: “[E]very person should be free to do whatever he wishes in contexts where his actions do not interfere with the interests of other human beings” (2008: 370). Baxter calls this the “spheres of freedom criterion” – a view that already existed in an earlier form. It forms the core of the political view known as “classical liberalism,” which is defended most ably by John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Jeffers...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Preface
• The Pilot Episode: Ethics and Popular Culture
• Series I: Is Anything "Good" on Television? The Nature of Moral Value
• Series II: What's Right and Wrong? Ethical Theory
• Series III: But What's Right When . . . ? Practical Ethics
• The Epilogue: Does TV Erode Our Values?
• References
• Index