Theories in Social Psychology

Derek Chadee

• Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
• Year: 2011
• ISBN:
  9781444342093
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Social Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Theories in Social Psychology is an edited volume that identifies and discusses in-depth the important theoretical perspectives and theories that underlie the discipline of social psychology.

• The only current book focusing specifically on the theories within social psychology
• Brings together a range of distinguished scholars in the field of social psychology – including Bertram F. Malle, Paul R. Nail, Richard E. Petty, Thomas Mussweiler, Faye J. Crosby, Miles Hewstone, Richard J. Crisp and Mein Koslowsky
• Critically discusses important perspectives and theories in the discipline allowing a deeper understanding of the theoretical framework
• Allows students and academics to reflect on theories and opens up future areas of enquiry

Part I

Social Cognition

1

Toward Freedom: Reactance Theory Revisited

Derek Chadee

Reactance theory was developed by Jack W. Brehm and articulated in his Theory of Psychological Reactance (1966). Leon Festinger and Stanley Schachter were the editors of the monograph series which included Brehm’s seminal work. In fact, Brehm’s Ph.D. supervisor was Leon Festinger and his Ph.D. dissertation tested the free-choice dissonance paradigm which later appeared in 1956 in the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology as the first empirical research on cognitive dissonance. Later, Brehm systematically wrote on cognitive dissonance (e.g., Brehm, 1962; Brehm & Cohen, 1962).

The genesis of the theory of psychological reactance appears to have taken place in the womb of cognitive dissonance theory. However, the baby grew with many different characteristics from the mother. Both theories of cognitive dissonance and psychological reactance are theories of motivational arousal and reduction. In fact, Miron and Brehm (2006, p. 9) recognize that

Festinger had constructed a theory (cognitive dissonance) that assumed an inner motivational process rather than assuming that all influences between stimuli and behavior were simple and direct. It was in this context that Brehm and Cohen (1962), both in the Yale Attitude Change Program at the time, carried out an extensive program of research on persuasion, largely based on dissonance theory, but with some attention to special cases of resistance to social influence. After [Brehm] … became more interested in the occurrence of resistance to social influence, and that interest eventuated in the formulation of reactance theory.

Assumptions

The theory of psychological reactance attempts to explain people’s reactions to a perceived or actual threat to loss of their freedom(s). The concept of freedom is defined “as a belief that one can engage in a particular behavior” (Brehm & Brehm, 1981, p. 35). Brehm (1966, p. 9) defines “psychological reactance as a motivational state directed toward the reestablishment of the free behaviors which have been eliminated or threatened with elimination.” The theory makes no assumption about psychological reactance being aroused to acquire a freedom but refers solely to reinstating a threatened or eliminated freedom (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Psychological reactance, therefore, arouses an individual and motivates toward restoration of freedom. As Miron and Brehm (2006) point out, reactance is not a proactive force but is reactive to actual or perceived threats toward freedoms.

The theory makes a number of assumptions about human behavior. Brehm (1966, p. 1) notes the following about human behavior: First, freedom of behavior is pervasive. Second, it is an important aspect of human interaction and living. Third, human beings are goal-oriented and incessantly reflect on themselves and the external environment in assessing what, how, and when they will undertake particular behaviors. He states: “They consider their wants and needs, the dangers and benefits available in their surroundings, and the ways in which they can accomplish various ends” (1966, p. 1). Many times people undertake behaviors when they are not fully aware of the rationale that drives the behaviors. At other times behaviors are performed while they are fully aware of constraints and lack of freedom in the performance of the behaviors. As a fourth assumption, however, Brehm assumes that most of the time human beings feel relatively free to participate in a range of behaviors. Fifth, the theory assumes that people have a set of behaviors to engage in. These behaviors have been engaged in in the past, are engaged in in the present, and will be engaged in in the future. He refers to these behaviors as the individual’s “free behaviors” and identifies a number of criteria to define a behavior as a free behavior. These include the behaviors being practically achievable, the individual having the physical and psychological capacity to engage in these behaviors, and individuals also being fully cognizant that they can participate in these behaviors. Such awareness of engagement emerges from social norms, customs, legislations, and other kinds of formal agreement and informal interaction. Worchel (2004) elaborates on how particular actions over time are perceived as free behavior. For reactance to occur an individual must believe in the possession (perceived or actual) of a freedom (Miron & Brehm, 2006). A threat to this freedom creates the arousal – reactance.

Threat

A threat emerges from any power or force that attempts to reduce or eliminate the expression of a specific freedom (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Threats can be explicit or implicit (i.e., subtle by implication). Brehm and Brehm (1981) describe threats to freedom as either external or internal. Internal threats arise out of choices and decisions we make from alternatives, accepting and rejecting among options. On the other hand, external threats have two dimensions – impersonal versus personal and social versus nonsocial. Impersonal threats are not easily perceived, unlike personal threats in which motives and intentions of threats can be identified by the individual and have implications for perception of future threats. Specifically, personal threats will carry greater implications for future threats from the same source because of possible future interaction. Impersonal threats, however, create less reactance arousal, since they are not directly focused at the individual, and therefore no implications for future threats. However, the term personal, as Brehm and Brehm (1981) indicate not only refers to interaction with known others but can apply to infrequent interaction with an entity/person.

Impersonal threats can also be derived from persons or institutions that we interact with on a personal level, for example, working for a large corporation or governmental organization. An impersonal threat from such an organization is not directed toward a specific individual, but any threat to freedom would have consequences to individuals in the organization. The depth of future interaction with a threatening source is an important prediction of psychological reactance. Brehm and Brehm (1981) postulate that anticipation of future interaction with a threatening source is likely to increase psychological reactance as compared to anticipation that there will be minimal or no future interaction with a threatened source.

Another dimension of threat which Brehm and Brehm (1981) identify is the social versus nonsocial dimension. However, they also hold the view that nonsocial exists in degrees, since humans are social and reactance emerges out of social interaction, and there will be social interpretations of nonsocial dimensions. The source of threat can emanate from either level. Studies that consider the social dimension expose subjects to a socially threatening situation (e.g., one individual directly threatens the freedom of another). The nonsocial studies created threats via nonsocial interaction (e.g., barriers to toys, removal of choice alternatives).

Magnitude of Reactance

Psychological reactance is influenced by both threat and freedom (Wright, Greenberg, & Brehm, 2004). The theory postulates that there are a number of factors which influence the magnitude of psychological reactance. These include the strength of the threat to one’s freedom; the presence of freedom which emerges from the interruption of free behaviors or barriers preventing their expression; the importance of freedom in the realization of needs; and the extent to which the needs are core to the individual’s existence. There is a direct relationship between reactance and the importance of the threatened. For example, being forced to choose between two valueless alternatives will not create as high a psychological reactance as being forced to choose between attractive alternatives. The relative importance of the freedom, and not only the importance, is a determining factor of reactance. For example, if choice alternatives are of equal cost (e.g., the choice alternative of dining at similar kinds of restaurants), removal of one alternative or the other will lead to relatively the same degree of reactance. However, in the same example, if the choice alternative included a high-end computer and this alternative was denied, the magnitude of psychological reactance would be relatively much higher because of the relatively higher attractiveness of the computer. The proportion of freedom threatened also impacts on the magnitude of reactance and arises from the number of free behaviors that are at risk in proportion to the number of free behaviors. Threats that have implications for future threats to free behavior also arouse reactance (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Miron & Brehm, 2006; Wicklund, 1974).

Threats may be defined or arbitrary. Threats that are defined and specific have limits to the threats and are justified (e.g., the denial of entry to any vehicles other than taxis into a particular roadway). This threat has a physical limit and a rationale which allows for reduction of traffic congestion. Arbitrary threats are ill-defined (e.g., an office imposing restrictions on casual conversations during working hours). This kind of threat carries high ambiguity and leads to extrapolations and speculations about different kinds of future prohibitions and restrictions. The magnitude of reactance will, therefore, be higher for arbitrary threats than defined threats.

Brehm and Brehm (1981) discuss the aggregated impact of a number of sub-threshold threats from a source that, when collectively combined, is potent enough to be considered a threat to one’s freedom. Each sub-threat on its own does not have the efficacy to constitute a threat. Threats reach an optimum point. Brehm and Brehm (1981, p. 58) write about the threshold of freedom elimination which exists when the “perceived magnitude of threat overshadows the perceived importance of freedom,” and about the optimum point of a threat: “the point at which a threat turns into an elimination of freedom is the point at which the magnitude of reactance is greatest. Additional force (and perceived threat) beyond that point has no effect on the magnitude of reactance.”

Reactance is moderated by the importance of the freedom. In other words, the threat in itself does not produce the psychological reactance. For example, threats to freedoms of low importance, even with high-level threats, would create low levels of arousal and non- expression of the freedom. However, freedoms of high importance create high reactance and an arousal to express the threatened freedom.

The magnitude of the threat is influenced by the number of freedoms threatened by one or more factors. Time is a moderator here. Reasonable time lapses between one threat and another prime the person to a second threat, and reactance is increased as compared to two or more threats being experienced simultaneously. Primed persons are more likely to express greater psychological reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Miron & Brehm, 2006).

Wicklund (1974) postulates the hydraulic principle or summation effect of reactance. The principle states that when two freedoms are threatened, the reactance arousal of the first threat (in which there are restrictions in the expression of reactance) is channeled into the reactance arousal of the second threat to freedom. Brehm and Brehm (1981) later complemented the principle by identifying conditions under which the principle would best be applied. They identified three conditions: threats must be different, and at least two present, with some relationship between the threats or freedoms; a time lapse must exist between threats; and there is no reduction of reactance for the first threat – the reactance is still present.

Some social factors that contribute to the magnitude of psychological reactance include monetary and verbal inducements, the attractiveness of the communicator, instructions, modeling behavior, role play, and the exertion of pressure for compliance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981).

Effects of Reactance

Reactance as a motivational force pushes the individual to reduce levels of arousal. Display of reactance decreases arousal and leads to restoration of free behavior either directly, via exhibiting the threatened behavior, or indirectly, via focusing on the source (i.e., discrediting or attacking). Reactance is displayed on two levels – behavioral and nonbehavioral (subjective) – and a range of reduction options exist on these levels (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Miron & Brehm, 2006).

The individual adopts a number of behaviors to reestablish a sense of freedom, including direct behavioral reassertion of freedom; developing a greater liking for the behavior that was threatened and displaying the threatened behavior; indirect reassertion of freedom by adoption of extreme (e.g., costly, taboo, or dangerous) behaviors that imply power to display eliminated behaviors (boomerang effect); and aggressive behavior directed toward the entity threatening the freedom. There are situations in which outcomes are uncontrollable (a situation of learned helplessness) and freedoms are impossible to restore. In these situations an individual may relinquish a freedom so as to reduce or eliminate reactance (Brehm & Wortman, 1975). In situations of exposure to threats by powerful communicators reactance is reduced when there is possibility of future interaction, negative consequences to others, and negative consequences to oneself (Miron & Brehm, 2006). In group situations, individuals may comply with the group’s alternatives rather than display reactance for the eliminated alternative by the group. Consequences for future interaction within the group are considered. In both situations, the cost and benefit analysis will determine the reduction of reactance strategy (Miron & Brehm, 2006).

Reactance effects exist on a continuum from physiological arousal with no observable signs to hostility. Other reactance reduction strategies include the following:

1. Derogate and discredit threatening sources. This strategy is adopted especially if the source does not have legitimate power to threaten the freedom.

2. Display aggression and hostility toward the threatening source. Hostility is a subjective experience of reactance and should be distinguished from instrumental hostility.

3. Decrease the proportion of freedoms that were threatened.

4. Compensate by increasing other freedoms.

5. Seek opportunities to counter threatening messages/sources.

6. Increase the number of available freedoms.

7. Reduce compliance behavior.

8. Position oneself to increase future freedom behavior.

9. Increase self-direction to one’s own behavior in achieving one’s goal of reducing reactance.

10. Change cognition (e.g., reevaluate the threat and define it as not posing a threat to freedom).

11. Change behavior (e.g., engage in behaviors that would compensate for the threat).

12. Remove the threat (e.g., leave the relationship).

13. Reconcile oneself to the loss of freedom.

14. Reduce reactance by implication. Reactance by implication occurs when we observe someone’s freedom being threatened. Reactance can also be reduced vicariously in the same way by observing the restoration of the other’s freedom.

15. Seek out others who can assist in the restoration of our freedom.

16. Increase perceived available behavior.

17. Subjectively, imaginatively, seek out others who can assist in the restoration of our free behavior.

18. D...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Contents
• Halftitle Page
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Part I Social Cognition
• Part II Social Comparison
• Part III Social Reinforcement
• Part IV Self
• Author Index
• Subject Index