Europe's Uncertain Path 1814-1914

State Formation and Civil Society

R. S. Alexander

• Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
• Year: 2011
• ISBN:
  9781444347401
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Social History
• Index: History

Europe's Uncertain Path is an introduction to Europe's turbulent history from 1814 to 1914. It presents a clear narrative of the major political events, set against the backdrop of social, economic, and cultural change.

• An introduction to Europe's turbulent history from 1814 to 1914
• Provides students with a solid grounding in the main political events and social changes of the period
• Explains the causes and outcomes of major events: the effect of the emergence of mass politics; the evolution of political ideologies; and the link between foreign and domestic policy
• Offers balanced coverage of Eastern, Western, and Central Europe
• Illustrations, maps, and figures enhance student understanding

1

A World Half Restored

The Vienna Settlement and the Restoration Regimes

After the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, the treaties that constituted the Vienna Settlement redefined the borders of most European states, and in many cases determined the regimes that would rule those states. Consideration of the Settlement thus provides an opportunity to introduce nineteenth-century European politics. Domestic and foreign policies were intricately linked, and decision-making was restricted to narrow elites. Much as they might have liked to, statesmen could not, however, simply reverse all of the change that had occurred since the outbreak of the Revolution of 1789. Certain elements of the pre-1789 social and political order were so badly damaged or decayed that they could not be restored, and in some cases it was in the interests of the powers to maintain legacies of the Revolutionary-Napoleonic era. The powers thus created a new order that combined traditional elements of the ancien régime (old order) with institutions, laws, conventions and practices of more recent vintage.

When they gathered at Vienna in September 1814, delegates of the smaller states held great expectations. An article of the First Peace of Paris, signed on May 30, 1814, had called on the powers previously engaged in the Napoleonic Wars to convene for a congress that would reorganize Europe after the collapse of the French Empire. Many delegates thought they were summoned to a constituent assembly in which they could exercise influence. Although the four great powers (Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria) did want ratification by the other states, they had already agreed that they alone would make decisions as to territorial distribution. Emperor Francis I of Austria attempted to divert the delegates, sovereigns, princely families, and lobby groups of the lesser states with lavish entertainment organized by a festivals committee. Between 40 and 50 tables were set at the Hofburg Palace for banquets at which diners could plow their way through eight courses each evening. Nevertheless, frustrated dignitaries often wasted time quarreling over minor matters of precedence; given that they felt they had been invited under false pretences, endemic bickering was to be expected. They did have input in certain issues. Delegates from the minor powers participated in constitutional committees for Switzerland and a new German Confederation, and in a committee that developed new guidelines for diplomatic protocol. All the same, the great powers reserved the most vital considerations for themselves. Viewed from this perspective, the Congress of Vienna can be seen as a harbinger of a century in which regimes sought approval without accepting genuine accountability (Figure 1.1).

Map 1.1 Vienna Settlement (Europe in 1815). Charles Breunig, The Age of Revolution and Reaction, 1789–1850, 2nd edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1970), p. 132.

Figure 1.1 The Congress of Vienna. Hardenberg is seated on the far left. Metternich is standing, pointing at Castlereagh, who is seated with his legs crossed. Talleyrand is seated on the right, with his forearm on the table. © Bettmann/Corbis.

Initially there were four principal power brokers: Lord Castlereagh, the British foreign minister, Tsar Alexander I of Russia, Prince Metternich, the Austrian foreign minister, and Prince von Hardenberg, Prussian chancellor and foreign minister. Although Alexander’s mercurial temperament caused conflict, he was determined to maintain his prestige as the “liberator” of Europe and would compromise at crucial moments so as to avoid isolation. Due to the distance between Vienna and London, Castlereagh could act with considerable independence, but he adhered to broad policy outlines established well before the Congress. Given that Britain had no continental territorial ambitions, Castlereagh was well placed to play the role of “honest broker”; nevertheless his self-righteousness was irritating – Alexander disliked being told that his policies were not in the interests of the Russian people. Metternich believed that his diplomatic cunning had brought the fall of Napoleon and was convinced that “error never had access to my mind.”¹ Despite the machinations of rivals at the Austrian court, he had solid backing from his sovereign during confrontations with the Tsar. Having to contend with the devotion of King Frederick William III to Alexander, Hardenberg was more constrained in pursuing Prussian objectives. Prussia’s position as the weakest of the powers meant that while it was the most avid for gain, it was the least able to stand against the others. By January 1815 Prince Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, the French foreign minister, had wormed his way into the decision-making of the great powers. Initially Talleyrand set himself up as the spokesman of the smaller states. While the other powers politely listened to his arguments, they were not swayed; it was a squabble among the four that gained Talleyrand a say. Once the directing council of four had become a council of five, Talleyrand happily dropped the guise of representing the smaller states.

In the Final Act, the ultimate statement of the Congress signed on June 9, 1815, the principle of “legitimacy” was strongly emphasized as a foundational principle. Espoused particularly by Talleyrand, an aristocratic former clergyman who had advocated state sequestration of Church lands during the Revolution and served Napoleon in typically treacherous fashion as foreign minister, “legitimacy” loosely implied that the regimes overthrown from 1789 onward should be reconstituted. However, while statement of the principle served rhetorically to repudiate all that had been created by the Revolution and Napoleon, “legitimacy” was set aside whenever it conflicted with more fundamental objectives. Three main priorities guided the Settlement: reduction of French power, rewards for the four great powers for their part in dethroning Bonaparte, and establishment of a rough equilibrium of power.

Reduction of French power occurred in two stages. The First Peace of Paris was lenient. The French would give up claims to lands beyond their 1792 borders, but they would retain certain acquisitions made after 1789 – Avignon, the Venaisson, and parts of Savoy, the Palatinate, and Belgium. Captured French colonies would be returned, although Britain would retain Tobago and Santa Lucia in the West Indies, and Mauritius, Rodriguez, and the Seychelles in the Indian Ocean. In granting generous terms, the powers had several considerations in mind. Having reinstalled the Bourbon dynasty, they wanted to enhance the regime’s prospects for maintaining rule in France. They also wanted to reconcile the French public to the new European order they envisaged; hence King Louis XVIII was obliged to grant a constitution that included provisions for a parliament. Finally, they also wanted to maintain a French state sufficiently strong that it could play a part in maintaining equilibrium of power on the Continent. Such calculations had to be adjusted after Napoleon re-established his rule at Paris on March 20, 1815. The statesmen gathered at Vienna carried on with their deliberations, refused to deal with Bonaparte, and marshaled their forces for a second onslaught on the “usurper.” By June 18 the French army had been defeated at Waterloo, and on June 22 Napoleon was again forced to abdicate.

What to do with the French? The Second Peace of Paris, signed on November 20, 1815, fell somewhere between the leniency of the first treaty and the demands of the Prussians, who pressed for dismemberment. French borders would recede to those of 1790 and several fortresses on the northern and eastern frontiers would be yielded. The French must pay an indemnity of 700 million francs within three to five years, support an army of occupation of 150 000 men until final payment, and return previously looted art treasures. Subsequent French desire to revise the Vienna Settlement sprang partly from wounded pride, and partly from the fact that while forcing France to disgorge her acquisitions, the other powers consolidated or extended their own.

Before assessing territorial redistribution, it is instructive to note what was not on the table. The British had already ensured that there would be no discussion of their navy’s “right” to stop and search neutral shipping in times of war, and overseas colonies seized by the British would be considered only in so much as the British wished them to be. Similarly, Russian acquisition of Finland and Bessarabia were accepted as a fait accompli.

The main battles occurred over Poland and Saxony. Alexander wanted to reconstitute Napoleon’s Grand Duchy of Warsaw with himself as ruler. He did not intend to include the lands Russia had seized during the eighteenth-century partitions of Poland, although he pressed Prussia and Austria to yield the provinces they had taken. Given Russian presence in the Duchy, Alexander was strongly positioned, though he overstated the matter when he alleged “there can be no argument with six hundred thousand troops.”² The Prussians were willing to agree, provided they were compensated in Saxony, which had made the mistake of realigning with Napoleon in mid-1813. Neither Russian expansion in Poland nor Prussian expansion in Saxony appealed, however, to Metternich, and Castlereagh wanted Prussia to be compensated in the Rhineland. Clashes between former allies turned ferocious and at one point Alexander gave Metternich a dressing down that, according to Talleyrand, “would have been thought extraordinary even toward one of one’s own servants.”³ It was this dangerous rift that enabled Talleyrand to gain France an alliance with Britain and Austria in early January 1815. Whether the alliance was more than a bluff is questionable; yet news of it soon convinced Alexander to compromise, mostly by sacrificing the demands of Prussia.

The powers would create a new “Congress” Poland with Alexander as monarch. Austria would retain the province of Galicia, with Cracow constituted as a free city. Prussia would retain Danzig and the province of Posen, but yield the rest of her Polish acquisitions. Ultimately, Congress Poland amounted to about three-quarters the size of Napoleon’s Grand Duchy, itself a pale reflection of the former Polish state. The Prussians had to settle for taking roughly two-fifths of Saxony; the rest remained an independent state. Fortuitous Prussian acquisition of the former Duchy of Westphalia and of lands on the left bank of the Rhine would, however, provide the base for subsequent industrial power.

Austria made gains principally in the Italian peninsula. Austria reacquired the province of Lombardy and annexed Venetia, including a strip of territory along the Dalmatian coast. Elsewhere highly dependent regimes were established, often with Habsburgs as rulers. Marie Louise, wife of Napoleon, but more importantly daughter of Austrian Emperor Francis I, became the ruler of Parma. Archduke Ferdinand, brother of Francis, was reinstated as Grand Duke of Tuscany, and Grand Duke Francis IV, a cousin of the Austrian Emperor, was re-established as ruler of Modena. Ferdinand IV of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, a Spanish Bourbon, was tied to the Habsburgs through marriage and owed his acquisition of Naples partly to a promise to Metternich that he would not grant the Neapolitans a constitution. Moreover Ferdinand rescinded a parliament previously gained, due to British influence, by Sicilian landowners. Austria also played the principal role in the Papacy’s recovery of most of its former possessions; Metternich would have to negotiate traditional Papal antipathy to Austrian domination of Italy, but he could hope that support from the Church would help secure conservative rule throughout Austria’s sphere of influence.

British policy reflected shrewd calculation of global interests. British gains consisted partly of securing recognition of far-flung maritime acquisitions that secured naval supremacy. Bases at Heligoland in the North Sea, Malta in the Mediterranean, the Cape Colony in the southern tip of Africa, Ceylon in the Indian Ocean, and Santa Lucia, Tobago, and Trinidad in the Caribbean provided opportunities to control trade routes. British interests were also pursued by Castlereagh’s efforts to ensure that no power could dominate the continent. Re-establishment of Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch independence worked to Britain’s advantage. Conversely, Castlereagh’s advocacy of abolition of the slave trade sprang from a humanitarian impulse. Lobbying at Vienna yielded a declaration condemning the practice, and various inducements led Holland and Sweden to join Britain and Denmark in decreeing total abolition in 1815. In pursuit of liberal support, Napoleon had decreed abolition in French colonies during his brief return, and thereafter Louis XVIII felt obliged to follow suit. Although Spain and Portugal proved harder nuts to crack, cash payments, beginning in 1817, induced them to sign agreements to suppress the trade, initially north of the equator, and then totally.

For a long time historians have argued that above all the great powers sought a balance of power, but this interpretation has been challenged by Paul W. Schroeder.⁴ The term “balance of power” has a liability in that it implies a system wherein the leading states have roughly the same amount of power. Such was not the case in 1815; Britain and Russia were significantly stronger than the other powers. What in fact was achieved was an equilibrium wherein none of the powers could unilaterally dominate the continent. Such equilibrium was fostered partly by creation of intermediary states whose independence was guaranteed in law by the great powers. Intermediary states could act as buffers between the powers, and their mere existence would make any drive for hegemony more difficult. The notion of “equilibrium” is not, however, entirely novel; earlier historians tended to use the terms “balance” and “equilibrium” interchangeably, without clearly distinguishing between the two. Given this scenario, rather than eliminate use of the term “balance of power,” it seems more appropriate to employ Schroeder’s notion of equilibrium as a more precise definition of what balance of power actually meant.

Equilibrium was achieved partly by surrounding France with states better able to defend themselves. Prussian expansion in the Rhineland was directed toward this end; so too was Dutch acquisition of the southern Netherlands (Belgium), Luxembourg, and a small parcel of land along the left bank of the Rhine. Piedmont-Sardinia gained through annexation of the former Republic of Genoa. Switzerland added three cantons (Geneva, Valais and Neufchatel), and by adopting a constitution negotiated at Vienna acquired an international guarantee of her neutrality.

Arrangements in central Europe were guided by desire to provide security for the German states. There was no attempt to restore the three hundred or so states that had comprised the Holy Roman Empire; internal divisions had made the latter far too vulnerable to French expansion. Thus much of the concentration instigated by Napoleon, including significant enlargement of Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria, was retained. The remaining 38 states, including Prussia and Austria, would combine in a German Confederation headed by the Austrian Emperor. The Confederation was in essence an organization for mutual defense rather than a step toward creation of a unified German state.

The Nature of the Restored Regimes

Legitimacy thus played little part in territorial distribution. Nor did re-established regimes constitute a full-blooded reversion to the ancien régime. The latter point becomes obvious if we consider several legacies of the Revolutionary-Napoleonic era.

Although the Revolution began in France in 1789 as an attack on royal despotism, it soon extended into the realm of social relations. In their attempt to create a regime which could be held accountable, the revolutionaries started with the principle of national sovereignty. To delimit the function of the state, revolutionaries drew up a constitution that proclaimed certain “natural” rights, and divided power between the government and a legislature of elected representatives of the nation. Among these rights were freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom of opinion and expression, and freedom of association. Simultaneously, the revolutionaries also attacked social privilege. One set of laws would apply to all social groups, entry into state office would be based on merit, all would be subject to taxation, and any remaining seigniorial obligations would be abolished. Pursuit of equality often entailed a drive for uniformity and hence the Revolution brought destruction to a broad array of corporate privileges, ranging from guild monopolies to regional exemptions from taxes. It also inspired a secularizing trend that eroded the status of the Catholic Church. The ideal of equality had limited impact on gender relations; women did make gains in family law, but they were excluded from the political sphere. All the same, the Revolution enunciated a template of ideals that inspired advocates of change throughout the nineteenth century.

The Revolution also fostered increased expectations of what the state should do. Especially during the period of radical Jacobin ascendancy, governments began state provision of social services that included mass education and aid for the impoverished. Such programs collapsed under the strains of war, but their short-term existence provided examples for the future. More immediately consequential was a conservative backlash against the chaos that ensued from too much rapid change. As much of France (and a good deal of the rest of Europe) fell into virtual anarchy, desire rose for a state capable of maintaining order. Bonaparte exploited such desire to develop a state in which power was highly centralized. The Napoleonic model of government was by no means as intrusive as twentieth-century totalitarian regimes; nevertheless, a major part of Napoleonic rule lay in enhancing the repressive capacity of the state. Like his Revolutionary predecessors, Bonaparte spread French institutions and laws to conquered lands. The Revolution thus had extensive impact outside France, but in the long run political liberty advanced more as a shared ideal than as a practical reality.

Napoleon knew that prosperity served as an antidote to opposition and hence his administrators busied themselves with compiling information about society and the economy. The Imperial penchant for economic planning was far from the command economies of the twentieth century, and its inspiration...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Series page
• Title page
• Copyright page
• Maps
• Figures
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• 1 A World Half Restored
• 2 Political Contestation from the Vienna Settlement to the 1830 Revolutions, 1814–1832
• 3 Stability, Stasis or Decay?
• 4 The Underpinnings of Politics
• 5 Europe in Transition
• 6 Wars of National Unification and Revolution in the European States System, 1850s–1871
• 7 Europe from the Paris Commune to the Fall of Bismarck, 1871–1892
• 8 The Underpinnings of Politics
• 9 Toward Destruction?
• 10 Transition Re-routed
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index