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Boyleâs Baconianism
Harriet Knight
Boyle has long been understood as Francis Baconâs intellectual heir. The early Royal Society deferred to Bacon as its inspiration and made Boyle its contemporary hero with elaborate celebrations of him in print as a âNoble Searcher after Natureâ: he was presented as âthe principal exemplar of the Societyâs experimental policyâ (Hunter 2015: 53). Boyleâs correspondent John Beale suggested, as a Cambridge professor had said when reading Baconâs Advancement of Learning for the first time, âthat he must burn his old bookes & begin his newe ABC; So would Ld. Bacon now say, if he should arise to see this progresse in a single Personâ (Hall and Hall 1965â86: 13: 386). This extravagance is typical of Beale, but the sense of Boyle as Baconâs inheritor was general. The âcongratulatory poemâ to Boyle included in the Latin edition of his Forms and Qualities links the two: âheaven has blessed us with two of heavenâs greatest gifts, on the one hand Bacon, who restored and repaired everything, and on the other Boyle, whose name will forever be sacredâ (Works, 5: 489). In 1712, John Hughes, writing in The Spectator, characterized Boyle âdesigned by Nature to succeed to the Labours and Enquiriesâ of Bacon, and having âfilled up those Plans and Out-Lines of Science, which his Predecessor had sketched outâ (5 December 1712: 554). Peter Shawâs eighteenth-century systematized editions of Bacon and Boyle imply that these were the two crucial natural philosophers of their generations.
Linking Bacon and Boyle has not always been seen as complimentary, however. Graham Rees documents the changes in Baconâs intellectual reputation, and in particular the âastonishingâ and undeserved twentieth-century discredit which left his reputation âreduced to ragsâ, with the adjective âBaconianâ used by Kuhn, Popper and others to condemn much seventeenth-century work as âpre-paradigmatic, fact collecting, and natural-historicalâ (Rees and Wakely 2004: xxxvi, xxxii). For Popper, Bacon creates a âmyth of a scientific method that starts from observation and experiment and then proceeds to theoriesâ and rejects hypothesis, and in this context some mid-twentieth-century Boyle scholars attempted to separate Boyle from Bacon, in order to preserve him from charges of naĂŻve empiricism (Popper 1959: 279). Richard S. Westfall argues that Boyle exceeded Baconâs empirical âdisorganized collection of heterogeneous observationsâ, defying the âBaconianâ contention that âscientific truth would emerge almost automatically from the full collection of factsâ requiring only âa natural history, which anyone would be able to collectâ, and relying instead on hypothesis. âBoyle set reason above senseâ (1956: 70, 67). Here Boyleâs intellectual value is proved by his supposed rejection of Baconianism, understood as narrowly empirical.
Baconâs rehabilitation involved showing the complexity of his attitude to experiment and distinguishing strands of Baconianism. Hugh Trevor-Roper codified a distinction between âvulgarâ, and âpureâ Baconianism: the former, associated with Hartlib, Dury and Comenius, is characterized as âfragmentedâ and âuncontrolledâ. By contrast, members of the Royal Society, âWilkins and Petty, Boyle and Wrenâ, transform this âvulgar Baconianismâ, âelevat[e it] again into the pure Baconianism of Baconâ (1967: 258, 289). Similarly, and explicitly revising Popper, Mary Horton (1973) and Peter Urbach (1982) both document Baconâs emphasis on the factual but present this as only the preliminary phase of his work. Dorothea Krook had made a similar argument in the 1950s, suggesting that Bacon himself transcended, rather than exemplifying the expansive, disorderly empirical approach. For her, the early Royal Society had tended to reduce Baconâs philosophy to a âbare empiricism that minimizes almost out of existence its rationalist aspectâ; in which the âdiscovery of âaxiomsâ ⌠seems to matter much less than the accumulation of factsâ. Krook praises Boyle as an âhonourable exceptionâ to this and as a true Baconian, because he advocates applying reason to data (1955: 267). More recently, Lorraine Daston and Katherine Park have sought to distance Bacon from mainstream Royal Society Baconianism, claiming that in his natural history information was âimmediately put to work in the investigation of causesâ through tabulation and classification, whereas in the Royal Society, matters of fact âwere as often as not left to float free both of a motivating causal inquiry or a unifying causal explanationâ (1998: 231). The unstable definition of Baconianism has led to some scholars deeming Boyle too rational and others too empirical to be true to Baconâs work, with strong value judgements implied in making or denying the connection (Sargent 1986: 473, 469). In recent Boyle scholarship, therefore, there has been an attempt to return to the works to fully document the links themselves: taking on the topic in 2008 Anstey and Hunter explained the occasion of their essay, âNo one since Peter Shawâs treatment of the subject in 1733 ⌠has mapped the precise contours of Boyleâs Baconianismâ (2008: 86).
One of the obstacles to mapping these contours lies in the breadth of interests, methods and attitudes characterized as âBaconianâ. Rees emphasizes the range of positions held by âBaconâs supportersâ in the seventeenth century:
For Boyle, the crucial threads are the experimental natural historical approach, the pursuit of a model of planned, cooperative research and the application of technological solutions to practical problems. On the significance of the first, Anstey has called the philosophy of experiment âdeveloped in England by Francis Bacon and ⌠further elaborat[ed] at the hands of Robert Boyle and Robert Hookeâ âthe most elaborate, nuanced and influential account of experiment in the periodâ (2014: 104). The third, the beneficent application of technology, is discussed in depth in Michael Hunterâs essay in this collection, as is the question of Boyleâs use of the romance form in imitation of New Atlantis, and these will therefore not be considered in detail here, although the former is clearly a crucial strand of Boyleâs Baconian inheritance. This chapter will document Baconâs significance for Boyle and consider the impact on Boyleâs reputation of their connection, as well as showing how his manuscripts and printed books offer material evidence of his Baconian impulses.
1. Boyleâs explicit engagements with Bacon
It is firstly helpful to consider the duration and depth of Baconâs influence upon Boyle. Discussing Boyleâs early intellectual development, Hunter has shown that Boyle was engaged with ethical and religious issues before he underwent a âreal conversion experienceâ to investigating nature by experimental means in 1649 (2015: 36). Boyleâs Baconianism (certainly in its sophisticated form) is an even later development, occurring under the auspices of the Royal Society in the 1660s. Moreover, Hunter questions the assumption that Boyle was leading the Royal Society in terms of the promotion and development of Baconâs legacy. Rather, he sees the process by which Boyle and the Royal Society developed their Baconianism as a reciprocal influence or synergy (2015: 53â80).
Although it may have been a relatively late development, there is ample evidence that once acquired, Boyleâs Baconianism was profound and significant. Bacon is repeatedly referenced in early Royal Society publications: Spratâs History calls him the âone great Man, who had the true Imagination of the whole extent of this Enterprizeâ, and Royal Society secretary Henry Oldenburg regularly invokes him when explaining the remit to new correspondents, âIt is a great part of our purpose to put together such a Natural History as our illustrious Bacon designedâ (1667: 35; 1965â86, 4: 422). While Webster (1976) has seen early Royal Society invocations of Bacon as a publicity stunt, and Wood (1980) has argued that Spratâs references to him are mere polemic, Lynch has shown that his influence was crucial. Systematically named in the Societyâs charter, meeting minutes and earliest published works, âBaconâs influence was the primary touchstone for the early Royal Societyâ (2005: 173â4).
In Boyleâs works, the frequent explicit references to Bacon suggest he was a primary touchstone here too. Boyle uses a series of flattering epithets, demonstrating the connection which he sought to draw between them. Bacon is âIllustriousâ, âjudiciousâ and âjustly famousâ (Works, 3: 50; 4: 546; 8: 344). He is variously âso great and so candidâ, a âGreat and Solidâ philosopher; the âgreat Ornament and Guide of Philosophical Historians of Natureâ, âone of the first and greatest Experimental Philosophers of our Ageâ, âone of the wisest of men & solidest of Filosofersâ and âthe great Architect of Experimental Historyâ (Works, 2: 78; 3: 271; 4: 213; 11: 293; 13: 157; 11: 312). While other thinkers are praised by Boyle (e.g. he draws up two pantheons of philosophers and one of theologians, both of which feature Bacon), no other figure is referred to so frequently or in such glowing terms (Works, 13: 190, 197; 8: 88).
Boyle also uses Bacon to frame his works. Baconian epigraphs adorn the title pages of Colours (1664) and Cold (1665), Essays of Effluviums (1673) and Blood (1684) as well as Reason and Religion (1675). Boyleâs works also engage directly with Baconâs. In places his references take the form of quoted tags which prove a familiarity with the works but where the application feels commonplace: for example in Effluviums, needing the concept of universalizability, he refers the reader to Bacon: âor, in the phrase of our Verulam speaking of heat, in ordine ad Universumâ (Works, 7: 364). Similarly, he twice quotes the aphorism that little philosophy leads to atheism but a âfull draughtâ of it returns the reader to God (Works, 3: 271; 13: 157). Elsewhere, the references are more deeply engaged: for example he cites specific Baconian experiments, variously qualifying, or reauthorizing, or adding to these. In Certain Physiological Essays, he specifically presents his work as a test of Baconâs âunlikely truthâ that spirit of wine will float on oil of almonds. He first found the opposite result in various witnessed trials, but his âtenderness of the reputationâ of Bacon led to experiments with higher grade of purity and a successful replication of Baconâs result (Works, 2: 78). Much later in his career, in Salt Water Sweetenâd (1683), he records that Bacon had âLearnedlyâ claimed that there were no health problems associated with desalinated water, but that Boyleâs tests recorded here were necessary because of the scepticism of âinvidious persons, who are no well-wishers to Ingeneous Designsâ (Works, 9: 430). Elsewhere he contradicts, rather than reconfirming: in Certain Physiological Essays he records an experiment with egg, referencing Novum Organum, but contesting Baconâs analysis and suggesting a new cause, âI shall willingly confess he has assignâd the cause ingeniously, but must doubt whether he have done it trulyâ (Works, 2: 170).
Most significant are Boyleâs engagements with Baconian methodology. In both Reason and Religion (1675) and Things above Reason (1681), he summarizes Baconâs idea of âIdolsâ at considerable length (around one thousand words in the former) (Works, 8: 256â7; 9: 382). He also applies Baconian terminology: in his Defence against Linus he uses âExperimentum Crucisâ to refer to Baconâs concept of the âcrucial instanceâ, and refers it to him â(to speak with our Illustrious Verulam)â (Works, 3: 50). Similarly, in Usefulness he uses and glosses âLucriferousnessâ: those who âimpartially consider the Luciferousness (if I may speak in my Lord of St Albans Stile)â will realize that valuable remedies have been dismissed too easily, while in the post script to Blood he refers to the need for an appendix of âdesigned Experimentsâ which have not been tried but should be â(to which âtis probable our excellent Verulam would have given the title of Historia Designata)â (Works, 3: 229; 10: 96). In the second tome of Usefulness, Boyle goes further, questioning rather than simply repeating a Baconian distinction,