Dialogue in Palestine

The People-to-People Diplomacy Programme and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Nadia Naser-Najjab

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781838603861
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

Since 1993, various international donors have poured money into a People-to-People (P2P) diplomacy programme in Palestine. This grassroots initiative – still funded by prominent external donors today - seeks to foster public engagement through contact and therefore remove deeply embedded barriers.
This book examines the limited nature of this 'contact' and explains why the P2P framework, which was ostensibly concerned with the promotion of peace, ultimately served to reinforce conflict and power relations. The book is based on the author's own experience of the solidarity activities during the First Intifada and her first-hand involvement as a coordinator of the P2P projects implemented during the 1990s. It provides a much-needed critical account of the internationally-sponsored peace process and develops new theoretical analyses of settler colonialism.

1

The context of P2PP

The Oslo II Agreement envisaged that dialogue would ‘foster public debate and involvement and remove barriers to interactions’.¹ The P2PP sought to establish the basis upon which Palestinians and Israelis could engage within a neutral and non-threatening environment and participate in projects that worked towards common ends and purposes.

The P2PP emerged as a subcomponent of a wider peace project that sought to achieve a lasting resolution of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Although it initially made allowance for the direct participation of formal political actors, it became established, over time, as a micro-level initiative that sought to engage grass-roots actors on both sides of the conflict. It was grounded within an apolitical vision of contact and the belief that personal and professional affinities would encourage Palestinian and Israeli participants to set their differences aside and engage on a cooperative basis.

The P2PP was essentially the grass-roots component of the peace process (although initially it had incorporated an official dimension – see below) that would bring pressure from below.

Madeline Albright, the then US secretary of state, would later commit $8 million to P2PP projects,² in the form of the Wye River Memorandum, in support of this vision.³ During an October 1998 press conference, she observed,

The reason I think there is a desire to be more pro-active on the people-to-people activities is that if you get business people together or teachers together or children, that it helps to change the atmosphere. So you really have something coming from two directions: the mood of the leadership and then the mood of the people.⁴

Here Albright invokes participation, which can be said to be one of the defining attributes of P2PP. In the first subsection of this chapter, I engage with its features and seek to explain how the P2PP emerged as a largely externally sponsored project that ultimately developed into a grass-roots project. I then proceed to engage with theories of social psychology, which can be conceived as the conceptual or theoretical underpinning of the P2PP. The chapter’s third subsection discusses the implementation of the P2PP and therefore identifies and sets out key stages. Equally importantly, it also engages externalization as a continuity that extends from the P2PP’s inception to its later stages.

The key attributes of the P2PP

The P2PP focused upon attitudinal change – that is, upon challenging and changing negative perceptions and attitudes about the ‘other’. It was grounded within theories of social psychology and therefore sought to establish optimal conditions for contact, in the expectation that this would fundamentally alter the ways in which the two sides perceived each other. After being launched and funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it attempted to establish the principle of cooperation, further the exchange of information and contribute to the development of concrete projects.

The P2PP clearly states its intention to

promote initiatives in areas which are likely to have an impact on people’s everyday lives and welfare, including practical activities which will promote communication and understanding by demonstrating the advantages of working together for mutual benefit and tangible results. (Partnership for peace, 2014: 1)

The European Commission further clarifies,

The specific objective of [P2PP related activity] is to strengthen civil society actions aimed at promoting peace and confidence building in order to broaden the base of support [for] a negotiated solution of the conflict. The programme intends to support practical actions [thereby] building mutual trust, building capacity for conflict resolution, launching joint development initiatives [and] empowering marginalized groups. (Partnership for Peace, 2012: 4)

The origins of the P2PP can be traced back to 1994, when Uri Savir, the then director general of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one of the Israeli negotiators in the Oslo talks, suggested the idea to Jon Hanssen-Bauer, who was then Fafo’s managing director. Savir suggested that it would be beneficial to create an environment in which Israelis and Palestinians could come together and conduct peaceful dialogue (Hanssen-Bauer, 2000).

The P2PP was established by Annex XI of Oslo II (entitled ‘Protocol Concerning Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Programme’), which came into force in 1995.⁵ The Norwegian government funded the first initiatives, and other funding agencies subsequently provided further funding assistance. The term ‘P2P’ was originally used to reference Norwegian-funded initiatives and was then expanded to refer to all donor-funded activities in this field.

The P2PP was initially funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although the European Union, USAID and the Canada Fund later provided financial support. These donors set out clear funding criteria in order to ensure that joint (Israeli–Palestinian) projects functioned in accordance with the general principles set out in Article VIII (Annex VI) of Oslo II. In establishing the programme, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the Oslo-based Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science Centre for International Studies⁶ to assume various managerial functions. In addition, the Norwegian government also assisted in the formation of a ‘Standing Cooperation Committee’ (SCC).⁷ This committee would be made up of representatives from both sides,⁸ and it would be responsible for coordinating all cooperative activities and projects. Lena Endresen⁹ explains that the two-tiered organizational structure

combine[d]; governmental control and popular civic activities. One tier consisted of the governmental steering committee, made up of representatives from the Palestinian, Israeli and Norwegian authorities. On the other was the non-governmental body, which consisted of planning groups from the two parties, and a Norwegian Programme Secretariat. (2001: 9)

Day-to-day administration was implemented through Israeli and Palestinian Planning Groups,¹⁰ while Fafo assisted with coordination. The Ramallah-based Palestinian Centre for Peace (PCP), a Norwegian-funded non-governmental organization (NGO), which was established in 1997, provided administrative support and functioned as the Palestinian planning group. (The CRB Foundation¹¹ functioned as the Israeli planning group, funded the Israeli contribution to joint projects and worked closely with the Israeli Foreign Ministry.)¹²

The planning groups, PCP and CRB, along with the SCC jointly formed the hub steering committee – they contributed by screening proposals and recommending which ones should receive funding. This screening enabled both sides to control applicant access to donor funding. This had important implications for both the geographical scope and range of activities that were associated with donor funding (Endresen, 2001: 13). The guidelines that the Norwegian government set out were not always followed by other donors, and this had a substantial impact upon the structure of P2PP projects. It was relatively straightforward – subject to the usual conditions – for a joint Israeli–Palestinian application to be accepted; however, it was near-impossible for a Palestinian NGO to obtain funding without an Israeli partner.

The Planning Groups were responsible for upholding the principle of equal partnership, most notably with regard to fund distribution and implementation. They were also responsible for monitoring the political content of the project and ensuring that they did not conflict with predefined interests.

Jon Hanssen-Bauer, Fafo’s former managing director, clarifies,

The two parties run and have full control over the Programme. They have the final say and have to agree on which projects to recommend for funding. The authorities on both sides are involved in the selection of projects, and take ownership of the Programme but not the responsibility for each project. (Hanssen-Bauer, 2000: 38)

Although the P2PP was implemented by Palestinian and Israeli NGOs, it was ultimately subject to official scrutiny, in the form of the SCC. This level of official engagement distinguished the Oslo II P2PP from other people-to-people initiatives that were sponsored by other countries (Endresen, 2001; Endresen and Gillen, 2000).

A number of Israeli and Palestinian NGOs were formed and registered in response to the programme. The two main conditions were that each proposal should not exceed $20,000, and that it should be implemented jointly and at the local level. The funding limit of $20,000 was deliberately imposed in the expectation it would promote the involvement of smaller NGOs (Hanssen-Bauer, 2000: 38). Applicants were invited to apply under one of the five categories: (1) Youth; (2) Adult dialogue and seminars; (3) Culture; (4) Environment; and (5) School twinning and education.

The P2PP was advertised in local newspapers, and advertisements were presented in four languages – Arabic, English, Hebrew and Russian (in Israeli Russian newspapers).¹³ The People-to-People Guidelines for Applicants set out clear assessment criteria; projects were expected to: (i) enhance dialogue and improve Israeli–Palestinian relations; (ii) be jointly implemented by Israeli and Palestinian organizations; (iii) foster wider exposure of the two publics to the peace process, both through education and by encouraging public discussion and involvement in the peace process; (iv) increase people-to-people exchange and potentially bridge the gap between large audiences on both sides; and (v) operate in the region.¹⁴

The underpinning elements of the P2PP: Social psychology theories

The P2PP framework was foregrounded within the guiding tenets of social psychology and sought to extend the belief that attitudinal change could make a real and lasting change to local political and social conditions. In being voiced in the vernacular of conflict resolution, it sought to enable participants to ‘speak across the divide’ and ‘build bridges’. This confirmed that the Palestinian–Israeli conflict was, from the perspective of the P2PP’s designers, conceptualized in the same way as any other conflict.

The influence of social psychology was also clearly attested to by the prominence of the contact hypothesis, which is premised on the belief that contact between members of different conflict groups will, in providing knowledge and challenging stereotypes, reduce prejudice, produce positive attitudes and establish a basis for peace. The hypothesis asserts that the four conditions for a sustainable peace are common goals, equality of status, institutional support and intimate relations (Allport, 1954). The P2PP’s sponsors and participants engaged the programme with the expectation that contact would help to eliminate negative stereotypes and produce cooperative behaviour between Palestinian and Israeli participants.

The P2P-related article of the Oslo Agreement II envisaged a happy circumstance in which a consensus upon dialogue would foster public debate and remove barriers to interaction.¹⁵ If this was to be achieved, then it was a necessary precondition for these activities to be immunized from the wider context. It was therefore no coincidence that contact-based activities were envisaged and developed in closed settings.

The P2PP sought to achieve attitudinal change. Theories of social psychology have examined inter-group contact, with the intention of reducing prejudice and reinforcing positive attitudes. Contact theory is grounded in the assumption that improved knowledge will help to eliminate stereotypes. While different theories vary with regard to their approaches and the optimal conditions for effective contact, they all ultimately converge on the proposition that interaction can help to change negative att...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-title Page
• Dedication Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Contents
• Foreword to the SOAS Palestine Studies Book Series
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 The context of P2PP
• 2 The colonial context of P2PP
• 3 Contact between 1967 and 1987
• 4 Contact during the First Intifada (1987–93)
• 5 The ‘Oslo years’ and ‘facts on the ground’
• 6 ‘From Both Sides’: A case study of the programme
• 7 The P2PP – a critical assessment
• 8 The P2PP during and after the Al-Aqsa Intifada
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index
• Copyright Page