CHAPTER I.
DEVELOPMENT AND CREATION.
Nothing is more helpful for the understanding of
scientific controversies, or for the clearing of confused
conceptions, than a contrasted statement, as defined and clear as
possible, of the simplest leading propositions of the contending
doctrines. Hence it is highly favourable to the victory of our
modern doctrine of evolution that its chief problem, the question
as to the origin of species, is being more and more pressed by
these opposite alternatives: Either all organisms are naturally
evolved, and must in that case be all descended from the simplest
common parent-forms— or: That is not the case, and the distinct
species of organisms have originated independently of each other,
and in that case can only have been created in a supernatural way,
by a miracle. Natural evolution, or supernatural
creation[2] of species— we must choose one of these
two possibilities, for a third there is not.
But as Virchow, like many other opponents of the
doctrine of evolution, constantly confounds this latter proposition
with the doctrine of descent, and that again with Darwinism, it
will not be superfluous to indicate here, in a few words, the
limitation and subordination of these three great theories.
I. The general doctrine of development, the
progenesis-theory or evolution-hypothesis (in the widest sense), as
a comprehensive philosophical view of the universe, assumes that a
vast, uniform, uninterrupted and eternal process of development
obtains throughout all nature; and that all natural phenomena
without exception, from the motions of the heavenly bodies and the
fall of a rolling stone to the growth of plants and the
consciousness of men, obey one and the same great law of causation;
that all may be ultimately referred to the mechanics of atoms— the
mechanical or mechanistic, homogeneous or monistic view of the
universe; in one word, Monism.
II. The doctrine of derivation, or theory of
descent, as a comprehensive theory of the natural origin of all
organisms, assumes that all compound organisms are derived from
simple ones, all many-celled animals and plants from single-celled
ones, and these last from quite simple primary organisms— from
monads. As[3] we see the organic species, the
multiform varieties of animals and plants, vary under our eyes
through adaptation, while the similarity of their internal
structure is reasonably explicable only by inheritance from common
parent-forms, we are forced to assume common parent-forms for at
least the great main divisions of the animal and vegetable
kingdoms, and for the classes, orders, and so forth. Thus the
number of these will be very limited, and the primitive archigonian
parent-forms can be nothing else than monads. Whether we finally
assume a single common parent-form (the monophyletic hypothesis),
or several (the polyphyletic hypothesis), is wholly immaterial to
the essence of the theory of descent; and it is equally immaterial
to its fundamental idea what mechanical causes are assumed for the
transformation of the varieties. This assumption of a
transformation or metamorphosis of species is, however,
indispensable, and the theory of descent is very properly called
also the “metamorphosis hypothesis, ” or “doctrine of
transmutation; ” as well as Lamarckism, after Jean Lamarck, who
first founded it in 1809.
III. The doctrine of elimination, or the selection
theory, as the doctrine especially of “choice of breed or
selection, ” assumes that almost all, or at any rate most, organic
species have originated by a process of selection; the artificial
varieties under conditions of[4] domestication— as
the races of domestic animals and cultivated plants— through
artificial choice of breeds; and the natural varieties of animals
and plants in their wild state by natural choice of breeds: in the
first case, the will of man effects the selection to suit a
purpose; in the second, it is effected in a purposeless way by the
“struggle for existence. ” In both cases the transformation of the
organic forms takes place through the reciprocal action of the laws
of inheritance and of adaptation; in both cases it depends on the
survival or selection of the better-qualified minority. This theory
of elimination was first clearly recognised and appreciated in its
full significance by Charles Darwin in 1859, and the
selection-hypothesis which he founded on it is Darwinism properly
so called.
The relation that these three great theories, which
are frequently confounded, bear to one another may, according to
the present position of science, be simply defined as follows:— I.
Monism, the universal theory of development, or the monistic
progenesis-hypothesis, is the one only scientific theory which
affords a rational interpretation of the whole universe and
satisfies the craving of our human reason for causality, by
bringing all natural phenomena into a mechanical causal-connection
as parts of a great uniform process of evolution. II. The theory of
transmutation, or descent, is an essential and indispensable
element in[5] the monistic development hypothesis,
because it is the one only scientific theory which rationally
explains the origin of organic species— that is to say, by
transformation— and reduces it to mechanical principles. III. The
theory of Selection or Darwinism is, up to the present time, the
most important of the various theories which seek to explain the
transformation of species by mechanical principles, but it is by no
means the only one. If we assume that most species have originated
through natural elimination, we also now know, on the other hand,
that many forms distinguished as varieties are hybrids between two
different varieties, and can be propagated as such; and it is
equally well worthy of consideration that other causes are in
activity in the formation of species of which, up to the present
time, we have no conception. Thus it is left to the judgment of
individual naturalists to decide what share is to be attributed to
natural selection in the origin of species, and even at the present
day authorities differ widely on the subject. Some give it a large
share, and some a very small one in the result. Moritz Wagner, for
instance, would substitute his own migration-hypothesis for
Darwin's theory of selection; while I regard the action of
migration, which acts as isolation or separation, as merely a
special mode of selection. But these differing estimates of
Darwinism are quite independent of the absolute[6]
import of the doctrine of descent or of transformation, for the
latter is as yet the only theory which rationally explains the
origin of species. If we discard it, nothing remains but the
irrational assumption of a miracle, a supernatural creation.
In this crucial and unavoidable dilemma, Virchow has
declared himself publicly in favour of the latter, and against the
former hypothesis. Every one who has attentively followed his
occasional utterances on the theory of descent during the last
decade with an unprejudiced eye and an unbiassed judgment, must be
convinced that he fundamentally rejects it. Still, his dissent has
always been so obscured, and his judgment on Darwinism in
particular so wrapped in ambiguities, that an opportune conversion
to the opposite side seemed not impossible; and many, even among
those who stood near to Virchow— his friends and disciples— did not
know to what point he was in fact an opponent of the evolution
hypothesis in general. Virchow took the last step towards clearing
up this matter at Munich; for after his Munich address there can be
no farther doubt that he belongs to the most decided opponents of
the whole theory of evolution, including those of inheritance and
selection.
If any one still has doubts on the matter, let him
read the jubilant hymns of triumph with which Virchow's friend and
collaborator, Adolf Bastian, [7] greeted his Munich
discourse. This “enfant terrible” of the school— this
well-nicknamed “Acting privy counsellor of the board of
confusion”[10]— whose merits in involuntarily
advancing the cause of metamorphism I have already done justice to
in the preface to the third edition of my “Natural History of
Creation”[11]— expresses himself in the “Zeitschrift
für Ethnologie, ” which is edited by him and Virchow (tenth yearly
part, X. 1878, p. 66) as follows:— “At the Munich meeting of
naturalists, Virchow by a few weighty words cleared the atmosphere,
which was heavy and stifling under the pressure of the incubus
called Descent, and once more freed science from that nightmare
which it has so long— in many opinions so much too long— allowed to
weigh upon it; freed it, let us hope, once and for ever. The
forecasts of this storm were discernible many years since, and its
whole course has been a strictly normal one. When the germs planted
by Darwin, and that promised so much, were forced into growth by a
feverish, hot-house heat, and began to sprout into sterile weeds,
their small vitality was plain to our eyes. So long as the waves
run too high under the pressure of a psychical storm, it is almost
useless to protest against it, for [8]every ear is
too much deafened by the noise all round to hear the voice of
individuals. It is best to leave things to go their own way, deeper
and deeper into the mire, till they come to a stand-still there of
their own accord; for 'Quos deus vult perdere prius dementat. '
Thus it is in this case. When the extravagances of the descent
hypothesis, encouraged as they were by mutual incitement, had
reached their highest pitch in the ravings that were uttered at
Munich, the too pointed point broke in this superabundance of
absurdity almost by its own pointedness, and so we were quit of it
with one blow. Now, happily, all is over with the theory of
descent, or ascent, but natural science will not on that account
fare any the worse, for many of its adherents belong to her ablest
youth, and as they now need no longer waste their best time on
romantic schemes, they will have it to use at the orders and for
the advancement of science, so as to enrich her through real and
solid contributions. ”
Furthermore, Bastian quotes Virchow's maxim:— “The
plan of organisation is immutable within the limits of the species;
species is not produced from species. ” The fundamental
teleological idea of that school, that each species has its
constant and specific plan of structure, certainly cannot be more
emphatically expressed. Thus it is undoubtedly certain that Virchow
has become a Dualist, and[9] is as thoroughly
penetrated by the truth of his principles as I, as a Monist, am of
mine. This is undoubtedly the upshot of his Munich address, though
he is throughout careful to avoid acknowledging his chief
standpoint in all its nakedness. On the contrary, even now he still
veils his antagonism under the phrase, which is also a favourite
with the clerical papers, that the theory of descent is an
“unproved hypothesis. ” Now it is clear that this theory never will
be “proved” if the proofs that already lie before us are not
sufficient. How often has it been repeated that the scientific
certainty of the hypothesis of descent is not grounded in this or
that isolated experiment, but in the collective sum of biological
phenomena; in the causal nexus of evolution. Then what are the new
proofs of the theory of descent which Virchow demands of us?
[10]
[10] “Wirkliche Geheime
Ober-Confusionsrath. ”
[11] Translated under the supervision
of E. Ray Lankester. London: C. Kegan Paul & Co.
CHAPTER II.
CERTAIN PROOFS OF THE DOCTRINE OF DESCENT.
All the common phenomena of Morphology and Physiology, of Chorology and Œkology, of Ontology and Paleontology, can be explained by the theory of descent, and referred to simple mechanical causes. It is precisely in this, viz. , that the primary simple causes of all these complex aggregates of phenomena are common to them all, and that other mechanical causes for them are unthinkable— it is in this that, to us, the guarantee of their certainty consists. For this reason all these vast and manifold aggregates of facts are so many evidences of the doctrine of descent. This fundamental relation of facts has been so often expounded that I need dwell no farther on it in this place; those who wish for any closer discussion of it are referred to my “General Morphology” (vol. ii. chap. xix. ), or “The History of Creation, ”[12] or “The Evolution of Man” (vol. i. p. 93). [13]
And where is yet farther proof of the truth of the[11] theory of descent to be found? Neither Virchow, nor any one of the clerical opponents and the dualistic philosophers who are perpetually reiterating this cry for more certain evidence, anywhere indicate where possibly such evidence is to be sought. Where in all the world can we discover “facts” which will speak more plainly or significantly for the truth of transmutation than the facts of comparative morphology and physiology; than the facts of the rudimentary organs and of embryonic development; than the facts revealed by fossils and the geographical distribution of organisms— in short, than the collective recognised facts of the most diverse provinces of biological science?
But I am in error— the certain proof that Virchow demands in order to be perfectly satisfied with the evidence, is to be supplied by “experiment, the test as well as the highest means of evidence. ” This demand, that the doctrine of descent should be grounded on experiment, is so perverse and shows such ignorance of the very essence of our theory, that though we have never been surprised at hearing it continually repeated by ignorant laymen, from the lips of a Virchow it has positively astounded us. What can in this case be proved by experiment, and what can experiment prove?
“The variability of species, the transformation of[12] species, the transition of a species into one or more new varieties, ” is the answer. Now, so far as these facts can be proved by experiment, they actually have long since been experimentally proved in the completest manner. For what are the numberless trials of artificial selection for breeding purposes which men have practised for thousand of years in breeding domestic animals and cultivated plants, but physiological experiments which prove the transformation of species? As an example we may refer to the different races of horses and pigeons. The swift race-horse and the heavy pack-horse, the graceful carriage-horse and the sturdy cart-horse, the huge dray-horse and the dwarfed pony— these and many other “races” are so different from each other, that if we had found them wild we should certainly have described them as quite different varieties of one species, or even representatives of different species. Undoubtedly, these so-called “races” and “sports” of the horse tribe differ from each other in a much greater degree than do the zebra, the quagga, the mountain horse, and the other wild varieties of the horse, which every zoologist distinguishes as “bonæ species. ” And yet all these artificial varieties, which man has designedly produced by selection, are descended from a single common parent-form, from one wild “true variety. ” The same is the case with the numerous and highly differing[13] varieties of pigeons. Domestic pigeons and carrier-pigeons, turbits and cropper-pigeons, fantail pigeons and owls, tumblers and pouters, trumpeters and laughing pigeons (or Indian doves), and the rest, are all, as Darwin has convincingly proved, descendants of a single wild variety, the rock-pigeon (Columba livia). And how wonderfully various they are, not only in general form, size, and colouring, but in the particular form of the skull, the beak, the feet, and so forth! They differ much more in every respect each from the others than the numerous wild varieties which, in systems of ornithology, are recognised as true varieties, and even as true species. It is the same with the different artificial varieties of apples, pears, pansies, dahlias, and so on; in short, of almost all the domestic varieties of animals and plants. We would lay particular stress on the fact that these artificial species which man has produced or created by artificial breeding and through experimental transformation out of one original species, differ far more one from another in physiological as well as in morphological conditions than the natural species in a wild state. With these it is self-evident that any proof by experiment of a common origin is wholly impossible. For, so soon as we subject any wild variety of animal or plant to such an experiment, we bring it under the conditions of artificial breeding. [14]
That the morphological conception of a Species is not a positive but only a relative conception, and that it has no other absolute or positive value than those other similar system-categories— sports, varieties, races, tribes, families, classes— is now acknowledged by every systematiser who forms an honest and unprejudiced judgment of the practical systematic distinction of species. From the very nature of the case there are no limits to arbitrary discretion in this department, and there are no two systematists who are at one in every instance; this one separating forms as true varieties which that one does not. (Compare on this point “History of Creation, ” vol. i. , p. 273. ) The conception of variety or species has a different value in every small or large department of systematic Zoology and Botany.
But the conception of species has just as little any fixed physiological value. In respect to this we must especially insist that the question of hybrid offspring, the last corner of refuge of all the defenders of the constancy of species, has at present lost all significance as bearing on the conception of species. For we know now, through numerous and reliable experiences and experiments, that two different true varieties can frequently unite and produce fertile hybrids (as the hare and rabbit, lion and tiger, many different kinds of the carp and trout tribes, of willows, brambles, [15] and others); and in the second place, the fact is equally certain that descendants of one and the same species which, according to the dogma of the old schools, could always effect a fertile union under certain circumstances, either cannot effect such a union or produce only barren hybrids (the Porto-Santo rabbit, the different races of horses, dogs, roses, hyacinths, and c. ; see “History of Creation, ” vol. i. , p. 146).
For a certain proof that the conception of species rests on a subjective abstraction and has a merely relative value— like the conception of genus, family, order, class, and c. — no class of animals is of so much importance as that of the Sponges. In it the fluctuating forms vary with such unexampled indefiniteness and variability as to make all distinction of species quite illusory. Oscar Schmidt has already pointed this out in the siliceous sponges and keratose sponges; and I, in my monograph, in three volumes, on the Calcareous Sponges (the result of five years of most accurate investigations of this small animal group), have pointed out that we may at pleasure distinguish 3, or 21, or 111, or 289, or 591 different species. I also believe that I have thus convincingly demonstrated how all these different forms of the calcareous sponges may quite naturally, and without any forcing, be traced to a single common parent-form, the simple— and not hypothetical, but existing at this present day— ...