PART ONE
Overviews
The Power of God and Islamâs Regime of Power on Earth
JONATHAN BROWN
I remember as a teenager watching the movie Warlock (1991) on late-night cable television. Warlock is a terrible movie, but I do recall one thing about the plot. A warlock is trying to piece together some ancient parchments that reveal the âtrue name of God,â which the warlock can then use to undo all of creation. I remember the climactic scene, in which the warlock learns the name and screams up to the heavens âYea, I know Thee!â while clouds whirl and thunder claps loudly like someone trying to stop a college friend from telling an embarrassing story over dinner.
This movie is bad, but itâs not unusual. If Hollywood films are any indication, God would seem to have a good number of vulnerabilities, which are routinely poked at by devious fallen angels out to undo His will.1 In such films, God, the Creator and Sustainer of the universe, is often portrayed much like good King Richard in the Robin Hood tales: out of town and about to be undermined.
And here Hollywood is not entirely innovative. Some (I emphasize some) Talmudic writings speak of God as if He is in need of human aid to achieve His will. One midrash tells of God promising to destroy the children of Israel after the episode of the golden calf but then regretting His vow. Moses tells God that he can help Him out of this predicament by means of a legal ruse. Since a rabbi can grant a petitioner a release from a promise, Moses âwrapped himself in his cloak and seated himself like a Sage, and the holy one, blessed be he, stood before him like one petitioning [for the annulment of] his vow.â2 And, of course, in the Hellenic tradition there is Diomedesâs glorying in battle before Troy, raging unchecked until he even spears Ares, the god of war himself, in the bowels and sends him howling back to Olympus.3 David Hume quotes Dione from the poem, âMany ills . . . have the gods inflicted on men; and many ills, in return, have men inflicted on the gods.â4
I mention this sampler of classics and trash to make the point that a deity need not be all-powerful, invincible, or invulnerable. We see thatâin the ancient and modern heritage of the Abrahamic tradition, which French Orientalists imagined as having sprung from a desert world in which Godâs unity and omnipotence were as clear as the enveloping sky over the barren horizonâGod is not necessarily in control.5 God the Father, God the Creator, can be portrayed as vulnerable to attack, machinations, and manipulation.
But in the QurĘžan, the unmistakable desert horizon comes back into view. The theme of Godâs power and its ramifications is, without a doubt, central to the holy book and is salient in the Islamic theological tradition. One wonders if the QurĘžan, which criticizes Jews for allegedly saying, âGodâs hands are shackledâ (Q. 5:64)6 and vehemently rejects the notion that God could suffer as a human being, sees itself in a large part as a corrective. It brings Godâs power back into center view (here I am thinking of power as capacity [qadar], especially to exert oneâs will, and power as authority [sultan, essentially imperium]). And, historically, it gave birth to a worldview in which power was a main idiom of formatting society and framing relations.
In the QurĘžan, Godâs power is the superlative of all superlatives. It is total, absolute, and without exception. âTo Him belongs all that is in the heavens and in the earth; surely God, He is the All-sufficient, the All-laudableâ (Q. 22:64); âTo God belong the hosts of the heavens and the earth; God is All-mighty, All-wiseâ (Q. 48:7); and âWhosoever desires glory, the glory altogether belongs to Godâ (Q. 35:10). âHe is God; there is no god but He. He is the King, the All-holy, the All-peaceable, the All-faithful, the All-preserver, the All-mighty, the All-compeller, the All-sublime. Glory be to God, above that they associate! He is God, the Creator, the Maker, the Shaper. To Him belong the Names Most Beautiful. All that is in the heavens and the earth magnifies Him; He is the All-mighty, the All-wiseâ (Q. 59:23â24). Perhaps the most commonly recited verse of the entire QurĘžan is
God: there is no god but He, the Living, the Everlasting. Slumber seizes Him not, neither sleep; to Him belongs all that is in the heavens and the earth. Who is there that shall intercede with Him save by His leave? He knows what lies before them and what is after them, and they comprehend not anything of His knowledge save such as He wills. His Throne comprises the heavens and earth; the preserving of them oppresses Him not; He is the All-high, the All-glorious. (Q. 2:255)7
I could go on and on.
I will go on since the QurĘžan seems to do so quite on purpose. God is ânever wearied by creationâ (Q. 46:33); âHe forgives and punishes whomever He willsâ (Q. 2:284); everything prostrates to Him, willingly or unwillingly (Q. 13:15; 17:44). In the QurĘžan, the metaphors and parables of Godâs power are awesome: oceans of ink and forests of pens could not exhaust His words (Q. 18:109; 31:27); if the QurĘžan were sent down on a mountain, the very rock would be âshattered asunder out of the fear of Godâ (Q. 59:21). Nothing man can do could hurt God (Q. 3:144, 176â77; 47:32). Even when God lays down what appear to be theological red lines for Himself, His own power and will yield exceptions. No one can intercede with God, for example, âunless He wills it.â
There is no negotiating with God. Abrahamâs long pleading and bargaining with God over the fate of Sodom (Gen. 18:16â33) is crushed into two lines in the QurĘžan. Abraham voices his concern over the impending destruction of righteous folk in the town only once. âO Abraham, turn away from this,â the angelic messengers reply curtly. âTruly the command of thy Lord has come, and surely a punishment that cannot be repelled comes upon themâ (Q. 11:74). Abrahamâs worry for the fate of Lot and other pious folk merits a similarly sharp response in another telling of the episode in the QurĘžan: âWe know better who is in [the city]â (Q. 29:32). Even a common act of desperate bargaining that many Muslim scholars allowânamely, the âO God, if you do [insert request here] for me, I promise Iâll [insert promise here]â (in Arabic, this is termed nadhr al-mujÄza)âis an illusion. The Prophet informs us, âIndeed a vow, it does not hasten or ward off anything. Rather, vows just prevent one from being stingy.â8 No one can actually alter what God has decreed. One cannot buy Godâs will with the promise of some act.9
In the Hadith tradition, there is a sort of negotiation that occurs over the number of daily prayers. During Muhammadâs miraculous night journey to Jerusalem and ascension through the heavens, it is originally an obligation for fifty daily prayers that is revealed to him. On his way down, however, Muhammad meets Moses, who advises him to go back and ask God for less. Muhammad does so four times, eventually ending up with five daily prayers. But even this negotiation seems more like a stylized performance. In this report, when Moses suggests to the Prophet that he return a final time and ask for even fewer prayers, âit was called out (presumably in some sonorous voice), âI have declared what is obligatory and have lightened the burden of My slaves, and I will reward every good deed tenfold.â â10 It is no more real than a negotiation with a boss who has listened in on your every private word.
Of course, one cannot speak of Godâs power without some acknowledgment of the problem of theodicy. This question has been debated by Muslim theologians but has not generated the volume of scholarly and popular reflection that has been seen, especially in the last century, within both the Western Christian tradition and Judaism.11 In my travels in the Muslim world, I have never come across an equivalent of When Bad Things Happen to Good People by Rabbi Harold Kushner, a book that has been called âthe #1 bestselling inspirational classic from the nationally known spiritual leader; a source of solace and hope for over four-million readersâ and has been translated into fifteen languages.12
In the late eighth century two schools of thought in the debates over theodicy emerged. The first, upheld by the rationalist MuĘżtazila school, affirmed that God was constrained by justice and was unable to do evil (sharr). Everything He did thus had to be for the best (al-aᚣlaḼ, Leibniz-like13) since He was incapable of doing or commanding evil. Yet this school of thought was and remains a decidedly minority one. It is as if, in Islam, Godâs overwhelming power simply swamped anxieties over divine justice. The opposing school, that of the Sunni majority, could be called the Divine Command/Nominalist or even the âJob 38â approach:14 God is not constrained by justice, God is justice. To even ask about why bad things happen to good people is to miss the point. As the QurĘžan declares, âHe is not asked about what He does. They are askedâ (Q. 21:23).
Beyond citing the above QurĘžanic verse, the prominent nineteenth-century Muslim theologian Burhan al-Din al-Bajuri (d. 1860) saw it as sufficient to quote a poem by a scholar in the thirteenth century, which he dreamed after hearing of the destruction of Baghdad by the pagan Mongols in 1258:
Leave aside any objection, for the command is not yours,
Nor is ordaining the movements of the planets.
So, do not ask God about what He does,
Whoever wades into the depths of the ocean will perish.15
Now, it is not that Sunnis did not understand the rationalistsâ concerns over issues like theodicy. Rather, they thought that trying to quiet these concerns through speculative argument was misguided. As one Sunni scholar wrote of the rationalists, âThey wanted to describe God by His justice, but in so doing they deprived Him of his due virtue (fa-akhrajuhu min faá¸lihi )â; the virtue of His power.16 Sunni theologians over the centuries saw one of their tasks as protecting (ironically) Godâs power from heretics. For example, according to Sunni theology, God is not even required to reward good deeds and punish bad, despite His numerous statements in the QurĘžan about doing so.17 Although the QurĘžan repeats that âGod does not break promisesâ (see Q. 3:9; 13:31; and elsewhere), Sunni theologians have asserted that is it not rationally possible that God could be constrained from doing so if He wanted. It is only Godâs choice not to break His promises. Of course, Sunni theologians added that, from our mortal perspective pondering Godâs law (sharĘż), it is effectively impossible (mustaḼčl) for Him.18
This deference to Godâs power often required impressive grammatical gymnastics, for example, in the argument that fulfilling the promises and threats God had made is âobligatory for Godâ but not âobligatory upon Him.â Ultimately, God is all-powerful, and that means our mortal reason must remain apart from Him and unable to reach Him. We must trust, as the QurĘžan declares, that âGod does not wrong any of the slavesâ (i.e., the slaves of God, in other words, human beings).
The power of God, a power that we ponder as His slaves and as slaves to the medium of created human language, raises the question of how the QurĘžan envisions and possibly formats earthly power. That the QurĘžan refers over and over to human beings as âthe slavesâ or the âslaves of Godâ suggests two possibilities.
On the one hand, the absolute and unquestionable power of God and the utter helplessness of His slaves on earth could yield a framework for radical egalitarianism. Just as the French Orientalists imagined, the desert would shape a people of equals; any inkling of claimed inherent superiority between individuals would be dwarfed into nothingness by the immense vault of the sky and the omnipotent God who had raised it up. Indeed, this vision of how power plays out on earth did come about in Islamic history, although in a minority strain among the early Muslims. The Kharijites were radical egalitarians, following closely the QurĘžanic decree that âIndeed the best of you in Godâs eyes is the most piousâ (Q. 49:13). They held that only t...