Politics and the Environment

From Theory to Practice

James Connelly, Graham Smith, David Benson, Clare Saunders

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781136484599
• Edition: 3
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Politics and the Environment has established itself as one of the most comprehensive textbooks in this area. This new edition has been completely revised and updated whilst retaining the features and the theory-to-practice focus which made the first two editions so successful.

This text is designed to introduce students to the key concepts and issues which surround environmental problems and their political solutions. The authors investigate the people, movements and organisations that form and implement these policies, and explore the barriers which hinder successful introduction of international environmental politics.

The 3rd edition has been expanded to include:

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• The shift in focus in environmental politics from sustainable development to climate change governance

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• An extensive discussion on climate change: including institutional, national and global responses in the aftermath of the Kyoto protocol

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• An increased international focus with more case studies from the UK, Europe, Australia and North America

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• More discussion of global environmental social movements: including the US environmental organisations, in particular the Green Party and the environmental justice groups

This textbook is an invaluable and accessible resource for undergraduates studying environmental politics.

Part I

Environmental Thought And Action

1	Environmental philosophy
2	Green ideology
3	Environmental movements

The first part of this book explores the main ideas and actors that have been central to the development of green politics. In the Introduction we suggested that green politics can be distinguished from other forms of political thought and action because of the central place that is afforded to the ideas of limits to growth and the value placed on non-human nature. In many ways, these two ideas frame much of the discussion in the first three chapters, whether our focus is on the range of philosophical and political ideas that motivate green politics or on the variety of organisations and activities that make up environmental movements.

Chapter 1 engages with the challenging literature on environmental philosophy and ethics. Fundamental to this chapter is the question of what motivates a commitment to environmental protection. This question can be answered in two broad ways: duties to the non-human world and/or duties to humans. To a great extent it is the first answer that separates environmental ethics from other areas of moral theory. For radical greens, the driving force behind their actions is the intuition that nature has intrinsic value: a value beyond its use for human beings. However, as the chapter explores in some depth, the idea of intrinsic value raises significant philosophical concerns. In recognising the demand for a ‘new’ environmental ethic, we explore how existing moral frameworks might be extended to be more sensitive to environmental considerations.

The second half of the chapter focuses on the way in which environmental considerations intertwine with contemporary debates about justice; in other words the duties we owe to other human beings. This operates on two levels. First, questions of distributive justice have become central to international debates about climate change: who should take responsibility to act? The USA expects developing nations to take a greater role in reducing emissions; developing nations point to the historical responsibility of the USA and other highly industrialised states and their own right to develop. And both sides express their claims in terms of ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’. Principles such as common but differentiated responsibility embedded in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) suggest that justice requires the industrialised nations to take the lead. The second dimension of justice complicates the picture further, raising questions about our obligations to future generations, particularly when the impact of climate change is likely to be felt most severely long after the current generation exists. And the storage of spent nuclear fuel is certainly placing obligations on future generations. The chapter ends with some reflections on how we might balance the different obligations we face: justice across the current generation, justice to future generations and duties towards non-human nature. The case study turns our attention to a highly pertinent ethical issue within green politics: the standing of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

While Chapter 1 focuses on ethics, Chapter 2 turns our attention to green political thought. As with environmental ethics, there are various strands of political thinking that have influenced green politics. We raise the question of whether there is a specifically ‘green’ political position. Arguably the most consistent body of green thought has been that influenced by anarchism: the idea of self-reliant, small-scale communities organised along radical democratic lines. But equally, there has been systematic engagement across other traditions of thought including conservatism, liberalism, Marxism and socialism. The distinguishing factor for most (but not all) greens is the recognition of limits to growth, but this can be expressed through a number of different traditions of political thought. Arguably green political thought has taken a more ‘pragmatic’ turn in recent years in response to the emergence of ecological modernisation as the dominant discourse on sustainable development. This has led to green political theorists returning to core concepts such as citizenship, democracy and the state and offering challenging conceptions of sustainable futures based on ideas such as ecological democratisation and citizenship. The chapter ends with a case study reflecting on the nature of the political programme as laid out by Green Parties.

The final chapter moves away from the realm of ideas to those organisations and activities motivated by environmental concern: environmental movements. The chapter aims to capture the range of action that is taken in the name of the environment. Scholars have typically focused attention on explaining the ‘waves’ of environmental organisations that have aimed to influence the political process: from the more established conservation organisations, to the new wave of organisations that emerged in the 1970s such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, to Green Parties, to the more radical groups such as Earth First!, and on to local coalitions against environmentally destructive activities. We extend the analysis of environmental movements to include a greater diversity of activity that is not always focused on explicitly political action: green consumerism, alternative communes and community-focused initiatives. The case study provides an introduction to the emergence of Climate Camps in the UK and the tensions that emerged between activists in agreeing tactics and goals.

Overall, what we uncover in Chapter 3 is an impressive array of activity, but we should dispense with any idea that there is a single environmental movement which shares similar ideas and motivations. This should not surprise us. After all, Chapters 1 and 2 stress the variety of different ways in which philosophical and political ideas about the environment have been expressed. As Kate Soper argues, when viewed as a whole, environmental movements draw their force ‘from a range of arguments whose ethical underpinnings are really quite divergent and difficult to reconcile’ (Soper 1995: 245).

Chapter 1

Environmental Philosophy

Reasoning about nature and the environment

Three moral traditions and the environment

Duties to the human world

Conclusion

Case study: Modifying nature

Suggestions for further reading

Notes

Underlying environmental arguments are beliefs, not always explicitly formulated, about the relative priorities of human, animal and plant life, and the whole ecology of the planet.

(Peacocke and Hodgson 1989: 87)

Responsible environmental action requires serious reasoning about environmental issues. We need a clear grasp of the terms we use, the values we espouse, and our beliefs about what we consider it morally proper to do. Do we have responsibilities towards the environment? What might these responsibilities be? From what sources are they derived?

The chapter begins with a brief examination of some of the basic terms and concepts, such as ‘environment’ and ‘nature’, followed by a discussion of the relationship between human beings and the natural world. Next, the relationship between environmental ethics and conventional approaches in ethics is analysed in order to situate the demand for a new, environmental ethic. What possibilities and resources are offered by different philosophical approaches and traditions to re-evaluate our relationship with the nature? The discussion then turns to a consideration of the values we associate with the non-human world, analysing the idea of intrinsic value and the demand to move beyond anthropocentrism (humancentredness). It is these values that inform the way we act towards the environment, be it direct action protests or environmental policy making.

However, our considerations need to go beyond purely environmental values and the chapter concludes with an analysis of global distributive justice and justice to future generations. The contemporary challenge of climate change raises particularly demanding questions about our obligations to each other across both space and time. What becomes clear is that reasoning about environmental issues requires us to attend to our duties towards present generations, future generations and the non-human world. The case study at the end of the chapter engages with the ethical (and other) issues raised by another pressing environmental concern: the development of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

Reasoning about Nature and the Environment

Human duties to the natural world arise both from our ability to consider our place in relation to nature and also from the fact that we can exercise enormous power (for good or ill) over it. We consume resources; we pollute the environment with waste products; and we create landscapes or reclaim land from the sea. And not least it might be said that man ‘has certainly won the contest between animal species in that it is only on his sufferance that any other species exist at all, amongst species large enough to be seen at any rate’ (Quinton 1982: 217). The silver lining is perhaps that human beings not only cause environmental destruction, they are also able to develop and implement solutions to that destruction. The Buddha apparently remarked that we have responsibility towards animals because of the asymmetry between us; the fact that we are far more powerful than other species is precisely what generates our responsibilities towards them (Sen 2009: 205). This power and this responsibility extend to the environment as a whole: we are both cause and cure.

Although we are ‘natural’ in origin we cannot hide behind the ‘natural’ and deny responsibility for our actions and their consequences. Our capacity for reasoning does not lift us out of the natural world, but it enables us to do what those without this capacity cannot: to reason about the natural world and our place within it. The ability to manipulate the natural world in accordance with our own ends goes together with the ability to reason about our exercise of that power. But as it would appear that our ability to reason about our responsibilities still lags behind our ability to manipulate nature: we are currently faced with the challenge of generating an ethics suitable for our predicament. Of course, the recognition of human responsibility does not necessarily result in our doing the right thing: before we act we need to be clear about what we are trying to do.

Does this mean that we need a new environmental ethic comprehensive enough to provide a justification for all our environmental duties? The call for a comprehensive new ethic should be examined carefully. There are two reasons to be sceptical of such a demand. The first is that it may be the case that our existing moral values and traditions already provide (or could be reasonably adjusted to provide) what those who call for a new ethic are asking for. The second is to query whether a new ethic is possible even in principle. From where could a ‘new ethic’ emerge and how could people possibly be persuaded to adopt it? In what sense, that is, could a ‘new ethic’ be new? Surely if we mean something entirely other than, and independent of, our current moral traditions then this is either inconceivable; or if conceivable, it is impossible to imagine anyone being given good reasons for adopting it. On the other hand, we could perhaps translate the call for a new ethic into a demand for a fundamental shift in the focus and priorities of our existing moral concerns. As such, a new ethic would emerge from what we already have, drawing on resources implicit within our moral traditions. This move, if successful, has the merit that the moral radical would be appealing to beliefs and values we already implicitly possess. Understood as a plea for a significant shift in the focus of our moral concerns, the demand for a new environmental ethic expresses a justifiable doubt in the ability of our traditional systems of thought and belief (as they currently stand) to provide us with a satisfactory framework within which we can situate our environmental concerns. By gathering our newly emerging intuitions concerning the environment into a coherent and systematic whole, moral theory may provide us with a comprehensive environmental ethic which is both rooted in our moral traditions and sensitive to concerns they are incapable of addressing in their unrevised form. We need, then, to examine our moral traditions to see how well they are suited to (or can be adapted to) our new moral concerns: but not without considering in a little more detail some of the terms and concepts which we need to employ when talking about the ‘environment’, some of which are less obvious than might at first appear.

Terms and Concepts

The terms ‘nature’ and ‘environment’ are, of course, central to any discussion. What is ‘natural’ is usually defined as that which takes place independently of human agency; it is contrasted with the artificial, with the results of human skill or artifice. The natural, in total, constitutes a single world or system of nature (Collingwood 1945: 30). In this sense the term is broader than the term ‘natural’ in ‘natural history’; it refers not merely to natural objects as they appear to us, but to the underlying principles governing their being and organisation. However, as John Stuart Mill recognised, there is also a sense in which everything is natural:

It thus appears that we must recognize at least two principal meanings in the word nature. In one sense, it means all the powers existing in either the outer or the inner world and everything which takes place by means of those powers. In another sense, it means, not everything which happens, but only what takes place without the agency, or without the voluntary and intentional agency, of man.

(Mill 1874: 8)

John Passmore discusses a related issue in distinguishing the terms ‘nature’ and ‘environment’:

I shall, of necessity, be using [nature] in that sense in which it includes everything except man and what obviously bears the mark of man’s handiwork. For what is in question is man’s moral relationships to a nature thus defined. In another fundamental sense of the word – ‘whatever is subject to natural law’ – both man and man’s artifacts belong to nature; nature can then be contrasted, if at all, only with the supernatural. And sometimes it will be necessary to use the word in that broader sense. The word ‘environment’ is often substituted for the collective ‘nature’. But other people, their actions, their customs, their beliefs are the most important ingredient in our environment.

(Passmore 1980: 5)

Passmore here introduces the further point that ‘nature’ is not synonymous with the ‘environment’; we can, for example, contrast the ‘natural environment’ with the ‘built environment’. The term ‘environment’ in this narrow sense implies an environment for some creature or collection of creatures, whether plant or animal. Here, an ‘environment’ is an ‘environment’ for something. But we also frequently use the term ‘environment’ more broadly to refer to the whole of the natural world – from ecosystem to biosphere – within which human beings and all other parts of the plant and animal world have their being. ‘Environment’, then, is not coterminous with ‘nature’, and ‘nature’ itself has several meanings, not all of direct relevance to environmentalism.

Again, although they are often used interchangeably, we frequently need to distinguish terms such as ‘preservation’ and ‘conservation’. Preserving something implies keeping it exactly as it is without human interference; conserving something, on the other hand, might imply managing its existence through human intervention. Thus saving of natural resources for later consumption can be conveniently referred to as ‘conservation’, while saving from the adverse effects of human action might be better referred to as ‘preservation’. Passmore points out, however, that preservationists and conservationists will not necessarily see eye to eye:

On a particular issue, conservationists and preservationists can no doubt join hands, as they did to prevent the destruction of forests on the West Coast of the United States. But their motives are quite different: the conserver of forests has his eye on the fact that posterity, too, will need timber, the preserver hopes to keep large areas of forest forever untouched by human hands. They soon part company, therefore, and often with that special degree of hostility reserved for former allies. So it is as well that they should be clearly distinguished from the outs...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part I Environmental Thought and Action
• Part II The Background to Environmental Policy Making
• Part III Multi-Level Environmental Governance: From Global to Local
• Bibliography
• Index