Identity Formation, Youth, and Development

A Simplified Approach

James E. Cote, Charles Levine

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781135021900
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

The concept of identity is one of the most important ideas the social sciences have investigated in recent years, yet no introductory textbooks are available to those who want to gain a sense of this burgeoning field. The first of its kind, this text provides an introduction to the scientific study of identity formation, with a focus on youth development. The analyses of the problems and prospects faced by contemporary young people in forming identities are placed in the context of societies that themselves are in transition, further complicating identity formation and the interrelated processes of self development and moral-ethical reasoning.

In order to sort through what is now a vast literature on the various aspects of human identity, this book introduces the Simplified Identity Formation Theory. This theory cuts through much of the academic jargon that limits the accessibility of this promising field, and builds an understanding of human identity from first principles.

This book is optimized for students and instructors, featuring several useful pedagogical tools and a robust series of online resources:

Primer format: the text synthesizes the vast and disparate literature that has characterized the field of Identity Studies, with a focus on identity formation during the transition to adulthood; theory and research is discussed in plain, non-technical language, using the author's new Simplified Identity Formation Theory.

In-text pedagogy: to enhance student engagement, box insert and in-text examples from current events, popular culture, and social media are incorporated throughout the text; key terms are in bold in each chapter and combined in a glossary at the end of the text.

Online resources for instructors: A robust set of resources that, when combined with the text, provides a complete blueprint for designing an identity course; resources include PowerPoint Presentations, test bank, sample syllabi, and instructor manuals for both face-to-face and online courses that include weekly written assignment questions and discussion-forum questions along with essay topic ideas and grading rubrics.

Online resources for students: a student manual, flashcards, practice quizzes, and exercises with video links.

Part I

Philosophical and Conceptual Roots of the Identity Question

1 From Ageless Questions to Current Theories

“At his best, man is the noblest of all animals; separated from law and justice he is the worst.”

Aristotle (384–322 BC)¹

As noted in the preface, the posing of questions about human identity has a long history, dating at least to antiquity. In the above epigraph, Aristotle observed how human beings benefit from being “social animals” (in today’s language), a characteristic involving the types of identity formation examined in this book. We know about various ruminations over the possible associations between human nature and human identity mainly from the written records left by philosophers, clerics, and academics, all of whom had the luxury of engaging in these reflections and recording them in ways that would be preserved through the millennia. Presumably, throughout human history, physical survival was a paramount concern, trumping more philosophical concerns. During periods of affluence over the ages, however, as in ancient Greece and the European Enlightenment, those who were not preoccupied with their basic physical needs could ponder a new set of needs—psychological ones. Over the past century or so in the West (and apparently in many other affluent cultures), more and more of the population has similarly been freed of the necessity of spending most of their time, energy, and attention on physical necessities, and they too have turned to reflecting on their psychological needs.

Currently, these two sets of needs have become intertwined. That is, physical wellbeing has become increasingly contingent upon people’s ability to develop the psychological, or mental, capacities necessary to process information about their place in society, both in their present lives and in their possible futures.² This is in part because physical wellbeing has increasingly depended on the mental abilities and interpersonal skills necessary to establish the roles people play as “social animals” subject to norms, laws, and their own consciences. Establishing these roles often requires people to answer the fundamental identity question of “who they are” in relation to other people in their lives and, more generally, in their society. As we see, for many people, this leads to questioning “who they want to be” and “who they ought to be,” as they confront their existence as social animals in complex societies. To appreciate this point, consider that prior to the modern era, work roles tended to be simple, concrete, and acquired early in life through the observation of parents, or acquired in early adulthood through strictly structured apprenticeships. At the same time, religions provided people with answers to many of the basic questions of human existence, including the obligations of people to society. However, increasingly these existential answers derived from religions have been found to be incomplete, even for many of those who follow a faith. For the vastly increasing numbers who do not follow a faith, these answers are irrelevant. Thus, as we see, the affluent conditions of modern societies have on the one hand solved many of the problems of physical survival, but, on the other hand, they have created new problems related to perceptions of psychological survival. These problems are often related in some way to identity formation, and it is within this broad historical and cultural context that we can understand the contemporary importance of identity formation.

Ageless Questions

Pondering the identity question can lead to thoughtful answers to queries such as: “Who am I, really, deep down inside?”; “How much does the way I act in public really reflect my private self?”; and “Who are we humans, in the wider scheme of things, as sentient beings?”³ Yet we actually know little about the various answers to these queries that might have been posed over the ages, and we certainly do not know how often they were posed by common folk or how much commoners struggled with them over the millennia. As noted earlier, we do have some records from ancient Greece, with Aristotle’s ethical philosophies, and from the Enlightenment, with further philosophical speculation, but these were answers given under greatly differing historical circumstances. More recently, modern science has attempted to empirically investigate some of these earlier answers as well as some new ideas raised about the questions of identity in current societies. Accordingly, it is mainly with present and future Western societies in mind that we have written this book, characterizing the contemporary science of identity formation, but anchoring these concerns in timeless philosophical concerns about the identity question.

Figure 1.1 illustrates the three overlapping past and present approaches to identity studies. In addition to the more timeless philosophical approaches and the more recent scientific ones, political approaches have taken the identity concept into the realm of contested privileges, as Western societies have democratized in the modern era. Although preceded by the scientific approach, political approaches such as identity politics⁴ join the scientific approach in studying how the contexts of modern societies have made forming and sustaining a sense of identity more challenging. Although complementary in a number of ways, these three approaches sometimes operate under different assumptions, which result in a number of “border disputes” among them. Consistent with our goal of not belaboring the many controversies in the identity studies field, the present book focuses largely on the strongest contributions of the scientific perspective. At the same time, we draw on philosophical and political approaches to the extent that these are helpful in advancing the scientific approach to understanding identity formation during the transition to adulthood in contemporary Western societies.

Figure 1.1 Approaches to identity studies.

Based on what we now know about the three most durable aspects of human self-definition in relation to human cultural history, we begin building the Simplified Theory of Identity Formation (SIFT) by proposing three enduring principles of human identity that transcend time and place: integration, differentiation, and continuity. These three principles are rooted in “the human condition” as it relates to human nature, and how the “social animal” managed to survive as a species throughout the millennia, often against great odds. They are trans-historical principles that identify the limits and possibilities of human identity. As such, they lay the foundation for making sense of the developmental needs of young people who are in the process of forming identities in the present era with its particular socio-historical contexts.

Integration into a human group can be considered the first principle of human identity. In order to survive over their long evolutionary history, human beings had to band together in cooperative groups that saw to subsistence and safety needs. These groups were typically small, sometimes with as few as 30 people in nomadic societies,⁵ but up to 350 people in tribal societies, a size beyond which cooperation requires special political structures to contain conflict.⁶ Integration into a group has been referred to variously as sociability and relationality. When speaking of relationality, or identity relations in this case, it is important to acknowledge the enduring wisdom that “no man is an island” (Donne, 1572–1631), or in current language, no person is an island; that “who we are” is intricately connected to those around us throughout our lives; and that we could not exist physically or psychologically without these connections. Not coincidentally, this is also a basic principle of Buddhism, dating back some 2,500 years. The Buddha (circa 563–483 BC) stressed the point that people who believe they have a “self” that is completely separate from others are fooling themselves, and indeed will experience forms of suffering as a result (see box 1.1).

Box 1.1 Buddhist Views of Self and Ego

Many of the Buddhist teachings that have been translated for Westerners stress a disdain for the “ego” and “self,” suggesting that people must eradicate these ideas from their minds if they are to find happiness. Unfortunately, language can be very limiting in conveying complex ideas. In this case, writers tend to use the terms “self,” “ego,” and “identity” in their generic senses and not in more scientific ways. Social scientists often use these words to designate the basic mental processes that people use to direct their behaviors. Even the most enlightened Buddhist must employ certain mental processes to practice meditation, mindfulness, and the many other thought-driven exercises that are central to this religion/philosophy. In fact, as we see later in this book, Erik Erikson designated ego strength to represent these mental processes of self-control. What Buddhists appear to have in mind when giving their warnings are the forms of selfishness and egotism that cause suffering to people and those around them. Indeed, as anyone who has attempted to learn how to mediate will know, it takes a tremendous amount of self-control to limit our conscious thought processes and presumably experience reality independent of ourselves.

Given that religious leaders have cautioned people about selfishness for millennia, we cannot attribute egotism solely to contemporary Western culture with its high degrees of individualism. In fact, many religions discourage forms of selfishness, as in the Ten Commandments of Judaism and the Seven Deadly Sins of Christianity. In Buddhism, a similar set of “sins” is identified in the Precepts and Non-Virtuous Actions associated with karma. Still, there is much wisdom in Buddhist teachings that can benefit Westerners, and others, who have developed too many “selfish attachments” to their thoughts, emotions, possessions, and so forth. For example, Buddhist teachings can be interpreted in Western terms as rejecting the “hubristic self” associated with the Seven Deadly Sins, and in favor of nurturing a humble, compassionate, loving self that is free from egocentric attachments—a self that the mind can control and can reflexively view with detachment.⁷

Differentiation of people from each other at both the individual and group levels can be considered the second principle of human identity. It may seem paradoxical, but the differentiation principle follows from the integration one. As humans formed cooperative groups, they needed to protect themselves from other groups that were in turn protecting themselves. Because resources were scarce, intergroup conflicts over the control and consumption of these resources were very common. Humans thus appear to have developed a built-in mistrust of other humans. From this mistrust, we have a legacy of in-group/out-group thought and behavior patterns; once based on threats to physical survival, these patterns morphed into perceptions of psychological vulnerability and danger. For example, it is not uncommon for young people who live in conditions of affluence to suffer anxieties and traumas serious enough to lead them to contemplate or commit suicide because of how they perceive others’ opinions of them. Current concerns about cyber-bullying and “social media suicides” bear out how fragile people can be, even as all of their physical and survival needs are met. Previous generations handled such challenges by reminding themselves of the adage that “sticks and stones will break my bones, but names will never hurt me.” Today, name-calling has taken on an importance unheard of in the past.

Within groups, although sociability is paramount, each individual still has a unique set of experiences and needs; as the saying goes, “we come into the world alone and leave the world alone.” Although we are connected to others relationally, we still experience physical and psychological pain and pleasure as individuals, and everyone has distinct, albeit interdependent, roles to play. For instance, the person with the headache is the one actually feeling the pain, even if information about this pain is shared with another person and that person is sympathetic. At the same time, people must differentiate themselves from their parents to some extent as they mature, even as parents provide care. Parents cannot play their children’s adult roles for them; in fact, there appears to be a new set of psychological problems emerging as “helicopter parents” try to control their adult children’s lives by micromanaging their lives and in the process infantilizing them. As similar as people may be within an in-group, each person often has distinctive interests, and those distinctive interests can create conflicts. A key problem thus emerges in establishing a balance between integration (sameness) and differentiation (distinction)—between shared interests and personal interests. See box 1.2 for an approach that examines the balance people seek in establishing a sense “distinctiveness” that is “optimal” for them, given their own identity-integration needs.

Box 1.2 The Equilibrium Between Integration and Differentiation

Marilynn Brewer proposed that people’s sense of identity “is derived from the opposing forces of two universal human motives—the need for inclusion and assimilation, on the one hand, and the need for differentiation from others on the other.”Brewer’s optimal distinctiveness theory is based in part on assumptions about human evolution, similar to those identified in the present chapter with respect to the first principles of human identity. She argues that humans are innately motivated to have functional relationships with a group, and “the larger and more inclusive the grouping, the more this motive is satisfied.”⁸ However, at a certain point the need for inclusion becomes satisfied and, before the assimilation might feel overwhelming, the need for differentiation activates. If the inclusiveness into a group decreases for a person, the differentiation need becomes less pressing as the assimilation need becomes more active again. Thus, when either need is experienced as deprived, people will make efforts to restore a balance of optimal distinctiveness with which they are comfortable. Equilibrium will be sought between the sense of “we” vs. “I”—integration with, and differentiation from, others.⁹

Research has empirically supported this theory in terms of laboratory manipulations of these needs and in analyses of people experiencing competing geopolitical group influences, as when Hong Kong was ceded back to China in the 1990s. Interestingly, in contexts where their in-group is perceived as threatened, people are willing to reduce their need for distinctiveness, and even set aside their own self-esteem needs to emphasize their support for that group.¹⁰

Finally, continuity is the third basic principle of human identity. Even as we are members of a group (integration) with specific personal qualities (differentiation), a sense of identity requires experiencing these attributes over time, with memories from the past making the present meaningful, and a meaningful present providing the basis for a purposeful future. Throughout much of human history, members of well-functioning groups/societies had this sense of continuity provided for them by merit of the continuing existence of their in-group and the security associated with each person’s contributing and ascribed roles in that group. A sense of continuity, consequently, would not normally have been a problem for most people, and certainly not a problem that required personal reflection or that could even be addressed through personal reflection (i.e., there was little choice in roles, so ruminating over them would have been pointless and even dysfunctional).

Following optimal distinctiveness theory (box 1.2) as well as the proposed three enduring principles of human identity, figure 1.2 illustrates how an optimal...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• PART I Philosophical and Conceptual Roots of the Identity Question
• PART II Late Modernity: Contextual Adaptations to Individualization Processes
• PART III The Transition to Adulthood: Developmental Contextualism Applied to Late Modernity
• Glossary of SIFT Terminology
• Endnotes
• Index