Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy

Martin Heidegger, Richard Rojcewicz

• Publisher: Indiana University Press
• Year: 2007
• ISBN:
  9780253004369
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophers

The eminent German philosopher's unique analysis of Ancient Greek philosophy and its relation to his own pioneering work. Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy presents a lecture course given by Martin Heidegger in 1926 at the University of Marburg. The book provides Heidegger's most systematic history of Ancient philosophy beginning with Thales and ending with Aristotle. In this lecture, which coincides with the completion of his most important work, Being and Time, Heidegger is working out a way to sharply differentiate between beings and Being. Richard Rojcewicz's clear and accurate translation offers English-speaking readers valuable insight into Heidegger's views on Ancient thought and concepts such as principle, cause, nature, unity, multiplicity, Logos, truth, science, soul, category, and motion.

PART ONE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

1

Working out of the central concepts and questions of ancient philosophy, with the first book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics as guideline

§7. Epochs of ancient philosophy.

There is agreement regarding the main lines. But does not touch anything essential; presented merely for the sake of orientation.

We distinguish four epochs, and specifically according to the direction and the kind of questioning.

1. The question of the Being of the world, nature (Milesian philosophy of nature, up to the time of the sophists, thus 600–450. Outlying territories, colonies in Asia Minor and in Italy/Sicily).

2. The question of the Being of human Dasein and the more radical appropriation of the question of the Being of the world. Fundamental elaboration of the problems of scientific philosophy. Socrates–Plato–Aristotle, 450 to nearly 300. Athens is the center of Greek science and culture generally.

1 and 2: the norm {?} of purely productive science is worked out and fixed. All important horizons of the problematic are laid down. In the two subsequent epochs, there is a decline, weakening, and deformation of scientific philosophy through world-views and religion. Occultism, surrogates.

3. The practical/world-view philosophy of Hellenism. Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics. In the philosophical schools a certain scientific life is preserved.

4. The religious speculation of Neoplatonism. Simultaneously, a reappropriation of the scientific epoch. Commentaries without the force to radicalize the problematic. Intrusion of speculation deriving from Christian theology.

Ancient philosophy ends in AD 529. Through an edict of Justinian, the Academy in Athens is closed, its property confiscated. Study of Greek philosophy is forbidden.

The common divisions into periods diverge with regard to details. Sometimes four or three or even only two epochs are posited. Characteristically, Hegel accepts three epochs, so as to enforce his dialectical scheme. 1 and 2 are taken together as i): formation and development of the totality of the sciences. ii) (3): disintegration into oppositions and trends: Stoics (dogmatic)—Skeptics. iii) (4): re-appropriation of the oppositions in the absolute of religion. Zeller,¹ who comes out of the Hegelian school, has concretely carried out this scheme in a historiographical study, free from the violence, but also less penetrating.

§8. Methodological middle way: Aristotle as guide. Structure of the first book of the Metaphysics. Aristotle’s Metaphysics: editions and commentaries.

Scientific apex of ancient philosophy: Aristotle. He did not solve all problems, but he advanced to the limits which Greek philosophy could reach, given its general approach and its problematics. He unified in a positive way the fundamental motifs of the previous philosophy; after him, a decline.²

Met. Α 3–6:	Presentation of the earlier philosophers.
Met. Α 7:	Critical summary.
Met. Α 8–9:	Aporias: philosophers of nature, Pythagoreans, theory of Ideas.
Met. Α 10:	Double of 7, unifies Α 3–6 and leads over to Β and to the emphasis on the ἀμυδρῶς [things said “obscurely”].^3 Cf. Jaeger.^4

Commentaries:

Alexander of Aphrodisias, c. AD 200, In Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. Vol. 1, Berlin, 1891.

Thomas Aquinas, In XII libros Metaphysicorum (Aristotelis commentarium). Opera omnia. Parma, 1852ff. Vol. 20, pp. 245–654.⁵

F. Suarez, Disputationes metaphysicae. Opera omnia. Paris, 1856ff. Vol. 25. Ed. C. Berton.⁶

H. Bonitz, Aristotelis Metaphysica. Recogn. et enarr. H. Bonitz. 2 vols. (vol. 2: Commentarius). Bonn, 1848–1849.⁷

A. Schwegler, Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles. Greek and German. Text, trans., and comm., with clarificatory discussions, by A. Schwegler. 4 vols. Tübingen, 1847–1848.⁸

W. D. Ross, Ἀριστοτέλους τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά. Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Rev. text with intro. and comm. by W. D. Ross. Vols. 1–2. Oxford, 1924.⁹

Translations:

A. Lasson, Aristoteles, Metaphysik. German trans. A. Lasson. Jena, 1907.

E. Rolfes, Aristoteles’ Metaphysik. Trans. with an intro. and clarificatory notes by E. Rolfes. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1904; 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1920–1921.¹⁰

H. Bonitz, Aristoteles, Metaphysik. Trans. H. Bonitz, from his literary remains ed. E. Wellmann. Berlin, 1890.¹¹

§9. Various modes of disclosing and understanding (Met. Α, chap. 1).

Here the basic traits of a general theory of science; oriented toward the idea of the fundamental science. All essential expressions for knowing, apprehending, understanding are now terminologically stamped, specifically over and against what had been the case earlier; i.e., these expressions now differentiate the matters at issue themselves.¹²

Concept of σοφία: περί τινας ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας ἐπιστήμη¹³ [“knowledge regarding principles and causes”]. σοφία: ἐπιστήμη pure and simple; ἐπιστάτης: the one who stands [steht] before and over some matter, who can stand at the head of it [vorsteht], who understands [versteht] it.

Path of the investigation: apprehending and knowing are comportments of humans, possessions of humans. Humans are beings among others. Lifeless—living. Living beings have determinate comportments; animals—humans. The task is then to interrogate the latter with regard to their comportments having something to do with knowing, understanding, apprehending, perceiving. Manifold of possibilities and of modes of disclosing in a certain gradation: σοφώτερος [“wiser”] (cf. 982a13f.), μᾶλλον σοφός¹⁴ [“more of a wise man”], ἔνδοξον [“esteemed”]).

ἀληθεύειν:¹⁵ “to take out of concealment,” “make unconcealed,” “dis-cover” what was covered over. Living beings: human Dasein is that peculiar being which discloses other beings and itself, not simply as a supplementary faculty but, rather, φύσει [“by nature”]. By virtue of its very Being, the world and itself are already disclosed to it, though indeterminately, confusedly, uncertainly. World: what is closest, Being in the proper sense.

άληθεύειν: “to disclose,” apprehend, understand: truth; knowledge as appropriated cognition: certainty. Modes of disclosing and understanding, pre-theoretically.

Gradation,¹⁶ development of the circumspection required for free motion:

αἴσθησις

μνήμη

ἐμπειρία

τέχνη

ἐπιστήμη

σοφία (φρόνησις)

αἴσθησις (cf. 980a22):¹⁷ “sense perception,” ἴδια–κοινά–κατά συμβεβηκός [“proper–common–incidental”], because what is present is in every case enclosed in relations {?}.

μνήμη (980a29),¹⁸ “retention,” “memory,” knowledge of what is not present or, rather, is again present; to have already apprehended. Freer orientation, circumspection, to take in at a glance. More teachable, richer possibilities of taking in, not merely (perceptual) staring at, not simply bound to one and the same present {possibility}.¹⁹ A certain understanding.

φρόνιμος [“the insightful one”] (cf. 980b21)²⁰

μαθητικός [“the learned one”] (cf. 980b21)

φαντασίαι–μνήμη [“images–memory”] (cf. 980b26)

τέχνη–λογισμός (cf. 980b28),²¹ “knowing one’s way about”–“deliberation.” {τέχνη:}²² “understanding,” title for a science: medicine; not “art,” not dealing with the practical, but, instead, dealing with the theoretical, ἐπιστήμη (981a3).

ἐμπειρία (980b28)—ἀπειρία (981a5), “experience,” not in the theoretical sense, distinguished from thinking, but the difference between being inexperienced and being experienced, practiced.

ἐμπειρία and τέχνη (cf. 981a4), “being experienced in …,” “knowing one’s way about with understanding.” ἐμπειρία has ἐννοήματα (cf. 981a6), taken cognizance of, deliberated, thought over in “many considerations.” In each case: if this–then that, as often as this–so often that.

ἐμπειρία ἔχει ὑπόληψιν (cf. 981a7),²³ “also already has its anticipation.” Being experienced in what is to be done in each case, καθ’ ἕκαστον (981a9). From many experiences arises a single anticipation. καθόλου (981a6), “in general,” “on the whole,” not in each case if–then, but, rather, because–therefore. The individual cases change: always if this–then that, ὅμοιον [“something alike”] (cf. 981a7). Something always remains the same, recurs, maintains itself throughout; therefore a persistent connection remains. τέχνη is not “in every case if–then,” “as often as,” i.e., finding the right thing to do from case to case, but is knowing in advance, everywhere such experiences have “one and the same outer look,” κατ᾿ εἶδος ἕν (981a10), and specifically because. “If–then”: here the “then” is ambiguous: (1) if–then; (2) because–therefore: delineation of the εἶδος, understanding the why. Being experienc...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Translator’s Foreword
• Preliminary Remarks
• Part One: General Introduction to Ancient Philosophy
• Part Two: The Most Important Greek Thinkers: Their Questions and Answers
• Appendices
• Editor’s Afterword
• Greek-English Glossary