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Platoâs Socrates
The oddness of the integrated soul
Amber D. Carpenter
There are many other quite marvellous things one might applaud in Socrates. While some of his accomplishments may perhaps be said of others as well, still there is no one like him, not among the ancients nor among contemporaries â this is what is most amazing of all.
(SYMPOSIUM 221c)
In the Gorgias, Callicles accuses Socrates of lurking with boys in dark corners. Platoâs Socrates has been lurking in the dark corners of the European imagination ever since. He is shoeless and rumpled, bug-eyed and snub-nosed, slightly shiftless â and yet, the hero of the story. What is it about him that haunts us â and at the same time attracts us?
Athenians of the fourth century bce. were evidently equally bothered by Socrates (the man himself) â a jury of five hundred of your peers does not vote to have you executed for a non-capital offence unless you have really got under their skin. The comic poet Aristophanes mocks him in his comedy The Clouds; the historian-statesman Xenophon commits his admiring memories of Socrates to writing. Indeed, so many people wanted to have a say in drawing the definitive portrait of Socrates that a new genre of writing was born, âthe Socratic dialogueâ, in which Socrates generally appears as the unalloyed hero of civilized discourse. As Plato â one of these writers of âSocratic dialoguesâ â tells it, these diverse reactions stem from the same source â and tell us as much about ourselves as about Socrates.
This common source lies, according to Plato, in what he has taught us to call Socratesâ outstanding integrity. While there is no ancient Greek equivalent of âintegrityâ, the attribution is not merely a retrospective one. For Socrates as Plato describes him in his several dialogues is perhaps the figure more than any other that has shaped the complex resonances and tensions that virtue has in European moral thought generally.
This is not because Plato was simply the better writer â in most cases, it is impossible to judge (since rivalsâ works are lost), and about Xenophon, it is more seemly for the philosopher to acknowledge that literary style can be a matter of taste. The reason Platoâs Socrates guides and grounds our moral thought in this area is that Plato married carefully chosen details of Socratesâ life and behaviour, vivid depictions of âthe man himselfâ in conversation, to a searching diagnosis of what it is about human nature, our condition, and the good that enabled Socrates to have this extraordinary goodness, and affect those around him in the diverse ways he did.
In short, as Plato tells it, Socratesâ unfailing consistency in word and deed, his steadfastness and incorruptibility, are all inevitable expressions of his unified soul. Our complex psychÄs can be in conflict, and ordinarily are; but they can also be harmoniously unified, when governed by a commitment to truth about goodness. Note that this commitment is unifying only when it is a commitment to what is really and absolutely good â no adherence to mere partial or apparent âvaluesâ will do the trick. Such inner unity of the person can only issue in harmonious fittingness between goals, words and action; there can be no deceit or prevarication, famously no weakness of will, in the person who has unified herself and her life around an overriding commitment to the truth about goodness. The notion of the properly integrated psychÄ as grounding consistent behaviour through a steadfast commitment to truth and goodness was born of Platoâs attempt to create categories for articulating the uncanny exceptional goodness of Socrates.
What Plato captures particularly well is the way that Socrates is experienced by others as both maddening and charismatic. I use the present tense âisâ here because, as anyone who has taught Platoâs dialogues knows, Socrates continues to be experienced as both maddening and charismatic. As Plato presents it, this is no accidental feature of a peculiar man. Socrates may strike us (all âusâs, at all times and cultures) as odd; but he is not a bundle of eccentricities. His behaviour, his words, are both infuriating and inspiring for the same reason â namely, because of Socratesâ particular form of goodness, his whole self unified around love of the good and of wisdom. Our varied reactions to this reveal our own ambivalence and discomfort in the presence of this particular virtue. To come into contact with a person of outstanding integrity is demanding; as Plato shows us, it demands that one put oneself and oneâs life on the line. And that is uncomfortable.
Plato avails himself of all the tools of the dialogue form in order to convey a vivid, dynamic portrait of Socrates and the effect he had on those who came into contact with him. We are never given a full biography, which makes the carefully selected details we are given of Socratesâ character and life more telling.
Platoâs Socrates was a man of unimpeachable courage, seeing action at the battles of Potidaea and Delium, distinguished in the latter by dignity in retreating as ordered, even as others were running away around him (Symposium 219eâ221c; Laches 181b). In the line of duty he also manifested outstanding fortitude, unaffected by cold or lack of shoes (Symposium 200bâc). This courage and fortitude were conspicuous in Socratesâ civilian life. The oligarchy that seized control of Athens, trying to implicate others in their crimes, ordered Socrates to illegally arrest someone. Socrates refused, simply going home instead (Apology 32câe); in another incident, Socrates alone refused to cooperate in an illegal mass trial (Apology 32b). Both of these refusals were made at significant personal risk.
Among his friends, Platoâs Socrates is known for his indifference to drink in both senses: he neither cares whether he drinks, nor is he affected when he does drink. Nor is sex a temptation to him (Symposium 217bâ219a), though he is a well-known connoisseur of physical beauty (Charmides 154câd) and considers love to be the only thing he really knows anything about (Phaedrus 257a; Symposium 177e).
Although Socrates practically never left the confines of the city, apart from his military service (Crito 52bâc, Phaedrus 230e), he strikes his fellow Athenians as atopos â out of place, or strange â on many dimensions (Tht. 175a; Symp. 215a, 221câd; and at Phdr. 230c6, âmost strangeâ). In addition to his uncanny sobriety and steadiness of character, Socrates has a host of socially awkward habits that betray a disconcerting indifference to social judgement. Not a rich or well-born man, nor a particularl y attractive man (Symposium 215aâc, 221dâe; Theaetetus 143e), Socrates has no shame or embarrassment in his poverty or plainness. For Socrates, making a special effort with his appearance, for a celebratory occasion with fine folk, consists merely in having a wash and putting on his best sandals (Symposium 174a). Platoâs Socrates even openly declares that âone shouldnât care what all men think, but only what good men thinkâ (Crito 47a; Laches 189a; cf. Symp. 194bâc). So it is evidently nothing to him to stand stock-still if he is puzzled about something, refusing to move on until he knows which direction he ought to go in (Symposium 174dâ175c, 220câd). He does not mind that he has acquired no fame for Great Deeds (leaving him open to Calliclesâ charge that he is unmanly for pursuing philosophical conversation with teenagers, Gorgias 485dâe). And he knows that his adherence in conversation to what is best rather than what is pleasant will do him no favours in life or in the law courts (Tht. 172â7, Gorgias 521dâe). This same obliviousness or disregard for social censure means he does not hesitate to ask awkward questions of public figures as they do their morningâs shopping (e.g. Anytus at Meno 89eâ94e), or work out at the gym (Charmides 155câd). Even visiting dignitaries or celebrities are not spared from being publicly called to account by Socrates (such interrogations are the basis of both the Protagoras and the Gorgias).
This particular kind of disregard for social censure is disconcerting, for it is invariably accompanied by implicit critique of the censurer: Socrates would be receptive to the critique if it were well founded (Gorgias 487eâ488b); that he is not thus receptive implies the critic is the one who has got his values mixed up. Surely, whether virtue can be taught, and how, is more important after all than whether people watching think you âwonâ â right? This is why Socratesâ questions, as Plato describes them, are so awkward for so many interlocutors. Socrates asks about things that really matter â and he insists on treating them as if they really mattered. He asks about virtue and justice and friendship and courage and beauty â and expects his interlocutor to engage seriously with the question. Glib answers are returned to sender unopened. Indeed, he is so serious about it that he says nothing is more important than virtue, and nothing can be good without it (Apology 28bâ30b); and that what is truly good is the only thing worth knowing. Not only does he mean it, but he says it as if it were obvious that everyone agrees. Anyone at that moment concerned rather about his standing or reputation is forced to shift uncomfortably in his seat.
This discomfort is accentuated by the fact that Socrates so obviously does not just say virtue is important â he lives it, thus showing up the lives around him as lived differently, as if money or fame or pleasure were more important. In addition to Socratesâ refusal to participate in injustice, at great personal risk, he refuses to appeal (as was the norm) to the needs of his family and youth of his children when defending himself against charges of impiety (Apology 34dâe). He refuses to beg. Socrates then refuses to run away from prison when sentenced to death for a crime of which he knows himself to be innocent, even when his friends arrive with the money to bribe the guard to look the other direction. And while this looks like a formidable instance of sticking to what one knows to be right in the face of strong temptation to do otherwise, Platoâs Socrates almost perversely eschews claim to any knowledge â in particular any knowledge of good and bad, of virtue and vice, and therefore any knowledge that he is, in fact, doing right when he acts by what appears to his best reflective critical evaluation to be right. In spite of all his seeking, Socrates insists he knows nothing (Gorgias 506a, 509a; Apology 21d) and has nothing to teach (Apology 33aâb) â yet Plato shows him as adept at making anyone with pretensions to knowledge look even more ignorant and foolish.
People around him interpret this as obscene arrogance (Apology 37a; Thrasymachus in Rep. I; Alcibaides at Symp. 215c, 219c), as a mocking of others (âThatâs just Socratesâ usual ironyâ, Thrasymachus snarks at Republic 337a; cf. Symp. 216e, and Gorgias 489e), and find it absolutely infuriating. But others find it magnetic, and find in Socrates a true and reliable friend (Crito and Phaedo in the Phaedo; Nicias and Laches in the Laches), an inspiration to self-improvement through self-examination (Hippocrates in the Protagoras, Aristodemus and Alcibiades in the Symposium), and âthe best, and also the wisest and most uprightâ person they have known (Phaedo 118a).
This is the portrait Plato gives us of Socrates. It is a vivid and artfully drawn portrait of an unusual and charismatic personality â someone who is constantly searching, and whose search is necessarily a collective one, though it is not a comfortable one for his neighbours. He puts himself on the line by putting others to the test (Gorgias 467c, 487eâ488b). His unselfconscious embodying of what it is to take virtue seriously exposes those around him as merely paying lip service to virtue, and this makes him out of place, odd, even when most at home.
Platoâs masterstroke is that while drawing this portrait of Socrates he simultaneously presents an explanation of this remarkable personality. Over several dialogues, Plato develops and explores a philosophical psychology that offers an analysis of what people are like in general, what they are like when they are virtuous and do good things, and what they are like when they are vicious and do bad things. The details of the account he arrives at â both its plausibility and the reasons offered in favour of it â need not concern us here. Our focus is just the fact that this account offers an explanation of Socratesâ extraordinary and atopos goodness in terms of unity of the soul, or of the personality.
Across the dialogues, when Plato looks inside human beings, he sees a seething mess. Countless desires, wayward and wilful, struggle against each other, with no promise of practical consistency â indeed, impulses not even aiming to cooperate in forming a harmonious personality. Desire for truth jostles alongside pride and envy, and these rub up against our bare animal aversion to physical pain , and desire for pleasure. That is what human beings are like âby natureâ â tha...