Arguing from Cognitive Science of Religion

Is Religious Belief Debunked?

Hans Van Eyghen

• Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781350100312
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy of Religion

This book considers whether recent theories from Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) undermine the epistemic status of religious belief. After introducing the key theories in the growing area of CSR, Hans Van Eyghen explores some of the epistemic questions surrounding CSR, including: Is CSR incompatible with the truth of religious belief? How might CSR show that religious belief is unreliably formed? And, finally, does CSR undermine the justification of religious belief by religious experiences? In addressing these questions, he demonstrates how CSR does not undermine the epistemic bases for religious belief. This book offers a clear and concise overview of the current state of cognitive science of religion and will be of particular interest to scholars working in philosophy and epistemology of religion.

1

What Are Religious Beliefs, Supernatural Beliefs, and Religious Experiences?

1.1 Introduction

Before we can tackle the various debunking arguments, we need two things. We need a clear understanding of the science to which debunking arguments refer. I will work toward this in the next chapter. We also need a clear understanding of that which is being debunked. The literature on the epistemic implications of CSR shows a wide variety of terms. Some use the term “religious belief.”¹ Others use the terms “belief in God” or “belief in gods.”² Those who use the term “belief in God” appear to have belief in the Christian God in mind. Others are more inclusive and use the term “theistic belief,”³ or “theism.”⁴ Theism is often defined as the thesis that there exists at least one god. Therefore, “theistic belief” includes both belief in one god and belief in multiple gods. Still others use the more technical term “belief in a supernatural agent.”⁵ One author uses “supernaturalistic belief.”⁶ Some arguments also refer to religious experiences.

My goal is to assess the potential debunking of religious beliefs by CSR theories. As the wide diversity in terms used in the debate shows, some clarifications are called for. Defining what religious beliefs are and setting them apart from nonreligious beliefs is notoriously difficult. Furthermore, religious beliefs are diverse. Some are existential beliefs, like the belief that God exists, while others are more substantial, like “God is love.” Many assessments of debunking arguments limit the discussion to just existential beliefs. This does not do justice to the scientific theories. My discussion in the next chapter will make this clear. In this chapter, I will distinguish three groups of beliefs: religious beliefs, existential supernatural beliefs, and substantial supernatural beliefs.

1.2 What Are Religious Beliefs?

Religious beliefs are notoriously hard to define. A lot of definitions have been accused of suffering from a Western or even a colonial bias.⁷ Some have also been considered too broad.⁸ In later chapters, I argue that the term is used too narrowly to denote belief in the existence of God or gods. Although belief in the existence of gods certainly is a religious belief, the latter is much broader. I discuss the narrower class below under the headers “supernatural belief.” Beliefs about how rituals ought to be performed—like how to perform a baptism in Christianity or how to perform an offering in spiritualist traditions—are religious beliefs but not supernatural beliefs. These beliefs might be parasitic on supernatural beliefs,⁹ but in themselves they are not. Beliefs about proper religious behavior also fall outside the scope of supernatural beliefs. For example, the Christian belief that one ought to attend church on Sundays is not about the existence or nature of supernatural beings but can be properly called a religious belief.

Like Benson Saler, I will use the term “religious belief” as a family resemblance concept. Use of family resemblance concepts goes back to Ludwig Wittgenstein.¹⁰ It foregoes defining terms in necessary and sufficient conditions and classifies terms by looking at resemblance instead. Saler applies this approach to religion. He advocates that in order to define “religion” we should begin with a small number of uncontroversial examples. Saler calls them “prototypes.” For “religion,” Christianity or Buddhism could be prototypes. Things can be grouped in the category “religion” when they share a sufficient number of elements with the prototypes. For example, we can see that Islam shares the elements of belief in God and regular worship with Christianity, and therefore Islam can rightly be ranked as a religion. Saler notes that the family resemblance approach leads to vagueness. One borderline case is Confucianism. It shares only a small number of elements with the prototypes, and hence it is not clear whether it can be classified as a religion.¹¹

We can apply the same approach to religious beliefs. Some clear prototypes of religious beliefs are as follows:

• The belief that God exists.

• The belief that God revealed himself in Jesus of Nazareth.

• The belief that Gods demand offerings.

• The belief that spirits dwell in forests.

• The belief that a proper offering to Vishnu should use fresh fruits.

• The belief that Christians should attend religious worship at least once a week.

Beliefs can be ranked under “religious beliefs” if they resemble these prototypes to a sufficient extent. Beliefs about the existence of some supernatural being resemble the first prototype. Beliefs about what supernatural beings do resemble the second and fourth. The third, fifth, and sixth prototypes serve to include beliefs about the wishes of supernatural beings and ritual practices.

In this approach there will also be borderline cases. An example is “The universe is a living organism.” It resembles, to some extent, belief in the existence of God but is also quite different. Luckily, none of the arguments I discuss in the subsequent chapters refer to such border cases. The family resemblance approach thus suffices for my purposes.

1.3 What Are Existential Supernatural Beliefs?

Some debunking arguments target more specific religious beliefs. They are not too concerned with beliefs about proper ritual practice or historic beliefs about what God did in the past but in beliefs about God or other supernatural beings. Most theories I will discuss in the next chapter also address these more specific beliefs. I will call them “supernatural beliefs” since they are about supernatural beings. As I noted, they come in two varieties. I will first discuss existential supernatural beliefs.

Defining existential supernatural beliefs is far less difficult than defining religious beliefs in general. Supernatural beliefs are a specific subclass of religious beliefs. I define existential supernatural beliefs as

beliefs that a supernatural being exists.

Existential supernatural beliefs resemble other existential beliefs, like beliefs that human persons exist. Although supernatural beings are considered different from human persons in important ways, beliefs in the existence of both share the idea that there is some being. Existential supernatural beliefs are rather general. Just like an existential belief in human persons does not specify what human persons are like or what they do, existential supernatural beliefs only refer to the mere existence of one or more supernatural beings.

Existential supernatural beliefs can occur as monotheism, the belief that only one God exists, or polytheism, the belief that multiple gods exist. Existential beliefs are, however, not only about God or gods. The vast majority of religious traditions accept the existence of supernatural beings that are not gods. Many Christians believe in the existence of angels; many Muslims in the existence of jinn; and many adherents of animism believe in demons. Belief in the existence of all these beings is ranked among existential supernatural beliefs.

Again, we encounter a problem of vague boundaries. It is not always clear if something is to be regarded as a supernatural being. The pantheistic belief that the universe is a living organism is again such a boundary case.

Though necessary and sufficient conditions for counting something among supernatural beings is again difficult, I propose some sufficient conditions. Naturalists—adherents of the metaphysical view that only natural entities exist and nothing is supernatural—tend to be quick to categorize something as a supernatural being. Most naturalists nowadays are reluctant to limit the natural to the physical, but the nonphysical things they allow for are usually limited to things that supervene¹² on physical things or are at least very common, like social institutions or relations between people. For example, James Ladyman excludes everything that is “spooky.”¹³ He is not specific about what “spooky” amounts to, but it has an air of being strange or being out of the ordinary about it. In any case, the nonphysical things naturalists allow in their ontology are not beings,¹⁴ so it is safe to say that all nonphysical beings can be counted among the supernatural beings. Some physical beings will, however, also be considered supernatural. For example, members of the Church of Latter-Day Saints hold that God is a physical being. Since the Mormon God resembles the Christian God to a large extent, he can be counted among the supernatural beings.

Naturalists do not usually allow for invisible beings either. The range of invisible beings does not include extinct or long-deceased beings (who cannot currently be seen) but is limited to beings that because of their own nature cannot be seen by humans or have the ability of being unseeable by humans. It is hard to think of such a being that is acceptable for naturalists. Again, not all supernatural beings are invisible in this sense. For example, some Hindu gods, like the avatars of Vishnu, are believed to be visible. So invisibility is also a sufficient but not necessary condition for being a supernatural being.

A final sufficient but not necessary condition is existing outside space and time. No being that exists outside space and time or is able to do so will be acceptable for naturalists. However, many spirits are believed to be bound by space and time just like human beings are or be able to do so.¹⁵

In summary, I discussed three properties of a supernatural agent that can be considered sufficient conditions. An agent is supernatural if it is

(i) nonphysical;

(ii) invisible; or

(iii) able to exist outside of space and time.

These three sufficient conditions can get us a long way in distinguishing supernatural beings. However, since we lack necessary conditions for what counts as supernatural beings and lack conditions for the broader category of the supernatural, we cannot avoid using the supernatural as a family resemblance concept as well.¹⁶

1.4 What Are Substantial Supernatural Beliefs?

By substantial supernatural beliefs I mean

beliefs about the nature of supernatural beings.

Substantial supernatural beliefs move beyond belief in mere existence and specify certain traits of supernatural beings. Some examples are as follows:

• The belief that God is omniscient.

• The belief that God was incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth.

• The belief that spirits demand offerings.

• The belief that gods can be appeased through devotional practices.

• The belief that supernatural beings have special powers.

Some substantial beliefs, like the second and fourth, are specific for a religious tradition, in this case Christianity and Hinduism. The first and third are shared by many religious traditions. The fifth belief is almost universally share...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title
• Series
• Title
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction: Debunking Arguments against Religious Belief
• 1 What Are Religious Beliefs, Supernatural Beliefs, and Religious Experiences?
• 2 CSR: Explaining Religious Belief
• 3 CSR: Explaining Ritual Behavior and Religious Experiences
• 4 Are CSR and Religious Belief Incompatible?
• 5 Arguing for Unreliability
• 6 Arguing for Naturalistic Religious Experiences
• 7 Arguing against the Consensus Gentium Argument
• Conclusion
• Notes
• References
• Index
• Copyright