Securitization of the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong

The Rise of a Patriotocratic System

Cora Y.T. Hui

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429766589
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Asian American Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

In recent years, the city many hoped would help democratize China has instead become a research setting in which to study China's increasing intolerance of dissent. Since Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, China's treatment of Hong Kong could be divided into three stages: non-intervention, intervention, and securitization. If the July 1 march in 2003 is a watershed that marked Beijing's change from non-intervention to intervention, this book suggests that the Umbrella Movement in 2014 is another watershed that marked Beijing's change from intervention to securitization. This book is a theoretically driven case study of the Umbrella Movement, a massive sit-in that paralyzed key business and retail districts for 79 days in Hong Kong in 2014. Many Hongkongers believe that they have the right to a fair election of the chief executive, and Beijing's insistence on vetting candidates prompted the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement. Drawing insights from the securitization theory and fear appeal literature, the book proposes the framework of "security appeal." It argues that the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement resulted from a premature use of hard repression, that is, before the government convinced the general public that the Umbrella Movement was a threat. The eventual successful securitization entails a general acceptance of the threatening nature of the Umbrella Movement and agreement with its crackdown. This book concludes that one of the consequences of the securitization of the Umbrella Movement is Beijing's eventual switch to the policy of "patriotocracy" – a system that allocates power and resources based on one's professed patriotism – in lieu of One Country, Two Systems. The policy implications and theoretical and methodological contributions of this book will be of interest to scholars and students of security studies; Chinese politics; and various social science disciplines, including political science, psychology, criminology, and sociology.

1 Introduction

“One Country” or “Two Systems”?

Opposites attract, but will they last?

Hong Kong, comprising Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories, became a British Crown colony because of three unequal treaties in the 1800s.¹ The British Crown appointed a series of governors to administer Hong Kong, slowly turning it from a fishing village into one of the most prosperous economies in Asia. The British administration introduced the rule of law, a meritocratic civil service, a market economy, civil liberties, and some democratic features. Meanwhile, the mainland has been in turmoil for the last century, having experienced the collapse of the Qing dynasty, an era of warlords, Japanese invasion, a civil war between the Nationalist and Communist Parties, the great famine, Cultural Revolution, etc.

By the 1980s, Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were total opposites. The approaching expiry of the 99-year lease on the New Territories, however, forced the Chinese and British governments to confront each other regarding the future of Hong Kong. The late Deng Xiaoping rejected Britain’s request to continue its administration of Hong Kong after 1997 and assured Britain that it was “in China’s vital interest to keep Hong Kong prosperous and stable” (Deng, 1984b). Deng was confident that the “marriage” between socialist China and capitalist Hong Kong could work, and his proposal of “One Country, Two Systems” showed China’s commitment to preserving the differences of both systems in this marriage. Deng (1984a) assured Hongkongers that “the mainland with its one billion people will maintain the socialist system,” yet “Hong Kong’s current social and economic systems will remain unchanged, its legal system will remain basically unchanged, its way of life and its status as a free port and an international trade and financial centre will remain unchanged.”

Deng believed that this “marriage” of opposites would not only work but would also be desirable. First and most important, the smooth transition would set a good example for reunification with Taiwan. Even 35 years after the initial proposal of One Country Two Systems, incumbent President Xi Jinping still maintains that this formula is the best solution for Taiwan (“Highlights of Xi’s speech,” 2019). Second, the peaceful and diplomatic resolution of historical disputes would set a good example for the world. Third, Hong Kong would continue to enjoy prosperity and stability. Fourth, China’s open-door policy would benefit from Hong Kong’s capitalist economy. Hong Kong was returned to Chinese sovereignty and became a special administrative region (SAR) of the PRC on July 1, 1997.

Twenty years have passed since the return to Chinese sovereignty. Has One Country, Two Systems, a marriage of opposites, worked as planned? My argument is no. The form of One Country, Two Systems has undoubtedly been implemented successfully. Political and legal systems in the mainland and Hong Kong have remained distinct, and Hongkongers continue to enjoy a more open economy and greater degrees of Western-style liberty than their counterparts on the mainland. Since 1997, however, there have been political struggles over divergent understandings of the substance of One Country, Two Systems. Assimilation and divergence are implied in One Country, Two Systems, and the tension between the two has threatened the governance of the Hong Kong SAR since its beginning. Fong (2017) points out that the model is not sustainable in the long term because it is based on a contradictory set of nationalisms.

One Country, Two Systems seemed to be an ideal political compromise that responded to the concerns of major stakeholders, yet this arrangement is gradually losing credence in light of Beijing’s² increasingly tightened grip and more radical calls for democracy in Hong Kong. The clearest manifestation of such a contrasting interpretation, the Umbrella Movement, a massive sit-in in 2014 that paralysed retail and business centres for 79 days, sought universal suffrage in the election for chief executive.

Democrats’ interpretation: emphasis on “Two Systems”

Deng Xiaoping understood that Hong Kong and the mainland were separated by a century of ideological and institutional differences. He once said that imposing socialism on Hong Kong would lead to “turmoil,” and Hong Kong would “become a bleak city with a host of problems” (Deng, 1984b). His solution to this conundrum was to allow two distinctive political systems to coexist within the same country and ensure that Hong Kong enjoyed a high degree of autonomy as a SAR. Deng’s promise of a high degree of autonomy was institutionalized in the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s regional constitution, and the Hong Kong SAR has been vested with executive, legislative, and independent judicial power (including that of final adjudication). The Central People’s Government (CPG) could not interfere with local affairs, and Hongkongers have been ruling Hong Kong since the establishment of the SAR (Basic Law Article 22).³ An election committee, composed of elites from various sectors, elects the chief executive of Hong Kong SAR once every five years. The Basic Law also guarantees a variety of civil liberties such as freedom of speech, association, press, assembly, etc.

Pro-democracy activists have interpreted “Two Systems” as a green light for resisting interference from the mainland; in other words, “well water should not interfere with river water.” They believe that the success of Hong Kong rests on a firmly established rule of law, guarantees of freedom and human rights, and a capitalist economy – core values and institutions established before the return to Chinese sovereignty – and are determined to preserve Hong Kong’s distinctiveness and autonomy from the designs of the authoritarian regime. Pro-democracy activists have mobilized Hongkongers to resist three major pro-China policies since the handover: The enactment of a national security bill in 2003, implementation of national education in 2012, and chief executive election reform in 2014 (opposition to the policy evolved into the Umbrella Movement).

July 1, 2003, protest

The SAR government has a constitutional duty under Article 23 of the Basic Law to enact a law to codify treason, secession, sedition, and subversion against the CPG. In 2003, however, half a million Hongkongers participated in a peaceful and orderly demonstration on July 1, the anniversary day of the handover, to protest the proposed national security bill. Not since the rally in support of Tiananmen Square students in 1989 had so many Hongkongers gathered. Many feared that the bill would jeopardize much-cherished civil liberties and act as a gateway to political surveillance and policing. James Tien, chairman of the pro-establishment, pro-business Liberal Party, made it clear that his party would not support the bill in the Legislative Council (LegCo). The public outcry and loss of an important political ally forced Tung Chee-hwa, the first chief executive of Hong Kong, to shelve the proposed bill and the secretary for security to resign.

2012 protest against moral, civic, and national education

Days after Chief Executive C. Y. Leung took office, he set a three-year deadline to introduce mandatory national education in all primary schools. The Education Bureau’s curriculum guide for a course of moral and national education was widely criticized for “brainwashing” students into becoming uncritical patriots. The report stated that the course “aims to develop students’ affection for the country and enable them to connect their personal emotions to the country’s development by learning the real situation of the country and [showing] concern [for] their compatriots” (Curriculum Development Council, 2012, p. 153). To add fuel to the fire, the government-funded National Education Services Centre published and freely distributed a teaching reference booklet entitled “The China Model” to primary and secondary schools shortly before the release of the curriculum guide. The booklet praised Chinese rulers as a “progressive, selfless and united ruling group,” criticized multi-party systems such as those in the United States as a “malignant party struggle” that causes people to suffer, and made no mention of China’s darker past such as the Tiananmen Square incident or the Cultural Revolution (Chen & Leong, 2012). Parents, students, educators, and other pro-democracy individuals and groups worried that national education would be used as a tool to brainwash future generations of Hongkongers and protested the policy in various ways: Signature campaigns, petitions, class boycotts, demonstrations, sit-ins at government headquarters, and hunger strikes. Over 100,000 protesters joined the sit-in at the government headquarters on the ninth day, filling up the forecourt of the government headquarters and spilling over onto roads (Chong, Lee, Ng, Wan, & Lau, 2012). The forecourt has since been popularly termed “Civic Square.” “Occupy Tamar”⁴ forced C. Y. Leung to cancel the three-year deadline to make national education compulsory and allowed schools to decide what to do with the course. With the continuation of protests, Leung would eventually shelve the curriculum guidelines.

Fight for democratically elected chief executive

Hong Kong’s colonial constitutional setup has been described as “executive dominant,” vesting autocratic power in the hands of a Crown-appointed governor. This constitutional setup appealed to Beijing during the drafting of the Basic Law because it avoided party politics, and power was vested in the hands of a bureaucratic entity (N. Ma, 2018). As a result, the Hong Kong SAR inherited major features of the colonial-style, executive-dominant system, with dominant power vested in the hands of a non-popularly elected chief executive. The chief executive of the Hong Kong SAR holds dominant policy-making power and a wide range of appointment powers that are unconstrained by the LegCo or courts. The chief executive also holds the power to dissolve the LegCo if it refuses to pass the annual budget or any important government bills (Basic Law Article 50). Deng Xiaoping believed that the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong could be maintained as long as the constitutional setup of the Hong Kong SAR mirrored that of the colonial era. Furthermore, the chief executive of Hong Kong would be locally elected, which was a great improvement over Crown appointments during the colonial era. This arrangement might have worked well when state and local interests were aligned, yet what Deng failed to predict was the intensity and scale of tensions between state authority and local autonomy.

The role of the chief executive embodies such tensions. Constitutionally required to serve two masters, the chief executive is accountable to both the people of Hong Kong and the CPG (Basic Law Article 43). Democrats, however, had little faith that the chief executive would serve the people of Hong Kong, given that the chief executive was selected in a Beijing-engineered, “small-circle” election. The election committee is composed of 1,200 members. Chief executive contestants have to be nominated by at least 150 committee members (one eighth of the membership) to be eligible to stand for election. Candidates who receive more than 600 votes are elected. As of the election in 2017, the pro-democracy camp held around 300 seats in the election committee, while the majority of members were pro-establishment elites and business tycoons who have strong business ties with Beijing. The disparity in the number of seats between both camps means that candidates only need the votes of pro-Beijing forces to win the election. Indeed, none of the chief executives elected were approved by the pro-democracy camp – C. Y. Leung was elected as chief executive with 689 votes in 2012, and Carrie Lam was elected with 777 votes in 2017.

The pro-democracy camp believed that the ultimate safeguard against the influence and intervention from the mainland was a popularly elected chief executive who answered to the local people. The pro-democrats had legal grounds for hope. According to Article 45 of the Basic Law:

The method for selecting the chief executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the chief executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.

(emphasis added)

In early 2013, Benny Tai, an associate professor of law at the University of Hong Kong, proposed the use of civil disobedience as a last resort to demand universal suffrage, without unreasonable restrictions. Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) proposed requiring 10,000 participants in a sit-in to paralyse traffic in the financial hub. A series of events in the second half of 2014, which will be elaborated on in later chapters, transformed the initial OCLP proposal into the Umbrella Movement. A phone survey estimated that around 20% of the 7.2 million people in Hong Kong, approximately 1.4 million Hongkongers, took part in the 79-day Umbrella Movement in one form or another (Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, 2014c). Despite the scale and resilience of the crowd, the Umbrella Movement ended without winning a single concession from the Hong Kong and Beijing governments.

Beijing’s interpretation: “One Country” above “Two Systems”

Deng Xiaoping was concerned with continuing Hong Kong’s success – “the key ingredients for its success in achieving economic prosperity and political stability since the end of the WWII should be ‘deep frozen’” (Lui & Fong, 2018a, p. xviii). Deng famously promised that Hong Kong’s way of life would remain unchanged for 50 years, and the colonial institutional setting – the Executive Council, LegCo, jury, courts, the judiciary, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), etc. – was written into the Basic Law. “Other than a change of the national flag, life would continue as if nothing had happened” (Lui & Fong, 2018a, p. xviii). Indeed, nothing much happened in the first few years, as Beijing leaders exercised self-restraint and engaged in a nonintervention policy (J. Ng, 2014).

Something happened in 2003, however, that convinced Beijing to give up its nonintervention policy. Beijing saw that 500,000 people went on the streets to protest the national security bill (Cheung, 2012; J. Ng, 2014). Since then, Beijing has accelerated the assimilation of Hong Kong into “One Country” through a process of “mainlandization.” Lo (2008, pp. 42–43) defines mainlandization as

making Hong Kong politically more dependent on and similar to Beijing, economically more reliant on the mainland’s support, socially more patriotic toward the motherland, and legally more reliant on the interpretation of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.

Fong (2017) also notes that the repeated emphasis on the supreme power of the CPG, the strengthening of the role of the Central Government Liaison Office (CGLO) as the se...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Preface
• Acronyms and abbreviations
• 1 Introduction: “One Country” or “Two Systems”?
• 2 From political control to the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement
• 3 From securitization to the end of the Umbrella Movement
• 4 Brief note on methodology
• 5 Securitization context: political culture of Hong Kong
• 6 Securitizing act: a content analysis of news reports
• 7 The security appeal’s audience
• 8 Patriotocracy: Beijing’s new policy towards Hong Kong
• References
• Index