Ethics, Obligation, and the Responsibility to Protect

Contesting the Global Power Relations of Accountability

Mark Busser

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429802522
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book critically examines arguments about 'obligation' and 'responsibility' in relation to the responsibility to protect (R2P) and situates it within wider moral argumentation concerning the role of culpability, answerability, and human rights in international affairs.

It discusses the ways in which R2P has been imagined and contested in order to illuminate some possible trajectories through which its potential might be actualized. Crucial to the development of a more 'responsible' world politics will be the recognition that formal inter-state 'regimes' of responsibility will need to be embedded within wider social 'fields' of responsibility constituted by the participation of attentive and mobilized global citizens ready to hold elites accountable. This book provides novel ideas to better understand the role of rhetoric and moral argumentation in international relations. Much of the novel contribution comes in the form of its conceptual breakdown of the ambiguous concept of 'responsibility, ' which often clouds clear understanding not only in international relations, but also in the specific debates over the ethics and practice of the international responsibility to protect regime.

This book will be of much interest to students of the responsibility to protect, human rights, global governance, and international relations in general.

1
The ambiguous concept of responsibility

Introduction: ambiguous meanings

The meaning of the term “responsibility” is the subject of tremendous contestation, re-definition, and analytical hair-splitting.¹ It is easy to see why. Although its meaning seems to be a matter of common sense, the word can be used in ordinary language to describe significantly different ideas and relationships. In English, both ‘responsibility’ and its related variants (i.e. ‘responsible,’ ‘responsibly’) are what linguists call polysemes: words with multiple, related meanings. The polysemy of the term ‘responsibility’ is further complicated by the fact that even once the linguistic ambiguity has been overcome, with one sense or another separated out for focused consideration, there often remains considerable philosophical contestation about the deeper conceptual meaning of that sense itself.

This combination of terminological and philosophical confusion can pose considerable roadblocks for students of social relations studying the interpersonal dynamics of responsibility. Terminological ambiguity can make it difficult not only to read, understand, and interpret other people’s ideas and claims but also to think, compose, and express oneself clearly. In what follows, therefore, I attempt to draw a few conceptual distinctions in order to develop the toolkit necessary for a lucid examination of contending arguments about responsibility.

In this chapter, I begin to examine how ambiguities in moral language can impact the practical power relations of responsibility, considering the diversity of concepts and relationships that an actor can potentially be taken to be invoking when he or she makes an unelaborated claim about ‘responsibility.’ Developing a toolkit of analytical concepts that covers what actors could mean when they make claims about responsibility is a helpful step towards interpreting what they actually do mean to say. I do not assume, however, that actors always know exactly what they mean to say at the moment they say it. My analysis allows for the fact that actors often make responsibility-claims based on an incompletely developed set of reasons and then develop their perspective retroactively when questioned or challenged. Much of this chapter is therefore intended to differentiate between ambiguous meanings as well as to stipulate a few working definitions and terms. My hope is that these clarifying moves will serve to facilitate further interpretation, analysis, and engagement with arguments about responsibility.²

I also draw upon the significant distinction between ‘ideal’ and ‘social’ morality in order to argue in favour of an approach to the study of the politics of responsibility that emphasizes its relational modes. In my view, given the degree to which the politics of responsibility are infused with such substantial ontological, epistemological, aesthetic, and philosophical disagreement, studying responsibility as a sociologically grounded relational phenomenon is the most appropriate way to examine arguments about obligations and accountabilities and how they are translated and channelled into disagreements, conflicts, and disciplinary power relations.

The ambiguous concept of responsibility

Given the complexity of the concept of ‘responsibility’ and related ideas, which are central in our interpersonal and public discourse, it would be unreasonable to pretend to provide authoritative definitions. Yet in the interest of a clear discussion, I will venture to tease out a few of the various senses of ‘responsibility’ in the English language and link them tentatively to other, more specific terms. For example, here are two key ways the term ‘responsibility’ is commonly used:

1. Object of obligation (i.e. what must be done). We frequently speak of responsibilities in the sense roughly synonymous with a list of discrete tasks, duties, or obligations that an actor is expected to fulfil or ‘discharge.’ In this sense, the term ‘responsibility’ is used to describe the content of the performance that is required. Here an actor is responsible for something that is the object of his or her duty. For example, a member of an organization may have several responsibilities under his or her portfolio which must be performed properly. Furthermore, he or she may even jealously protect these duties from others by appealing to jurisdiction. This is worth noting because it reminds us that an actor who has been assigned a duty can, in many contexts, legitimately invoke the exclusive, or at least primary, right to perform that duty without interference.
2. Relations of oversight (i.e. to whom one is answerable and accountable). We use this sense of the term when we want to indicate the person or subject to whom an agent is answerable or accountable. In this sense, the term ‘responsibility’ is used to describe the relationships relevant to the idea that the performance is required: it is about being responsible to someone. These relationships may be formal, specific, and hierarchical, as within corporate or managerial structures, but they may also be informal, general, and egalitarian, as with the mutual accountability between co-equals. In any case, here an actor is responsible to certain other subjects.

Of course, these are two dimensions of the same phenomenon. The content of an actor’s obligation and the relationship of answerability that gives that obligation meaning are inextricable. Yet the point is simply that both dimensions can be described in and of themselves with the same word: ‘responsibility.’

These next three dimensions of ‘responsibility’ are qualitatively different from the previous two. Hans Jonas distinguishes between “substantive” and “formal” conceptions of responsibility, and the distinction may be helpful here. The former is forward-thinking and content-driven, focusing on what actors should do in the future or on an ongoing basis. The latter is backward-looking, legalistic, and focused on calling people to account for their faulty behaviour.³ Toni Erskine has similarly differentiated between ‘prospective’ (ex ante) and ‘retrospective’ (post facto) senses of responsibility.⁴ Their distinction between forward-thinking and backward-thinking conceptions of responsibility is apt. The first two meanings of ‘responsibility’ listed above are largely forward-thinking, describing the structure and content of obligations that are or should be in effect. In contrast, an equally common sense of ‘responsibility’ is notable for its backwards-looking focus:

• 3 Culpability (i.e. whose faulty action warrants redress). The idea that someone is or ought to be considered ‘responsible’ for some action they have taken, or some outcome they have caused, is a key dimension of the idea of ‘responsibility.’ Three sub-dimensions of responsibility in this backwards-looking can also be teased out:
  1. Causal attribution (i.e. who did what). We sometimes call people responsible for a phenomenon (in a non-moral sense) if they can be seen to have caused it by their actions or omissions. In principle, this sense of responsibility allows us to suggest that “she made it happen” in a detached, clinical fashion, without also judging or evaluating. In practice, however, it is exceedingly rare that such statements are made in a way that is completely non-moral and judgment-free.
  2. Evaluative blameworthiness (i.e. whether it was bad). We call people responsible when we want to add a layer of negative judgment on top of a claim to causal determinacy.⁵ To highlight the difference between causal attribution and evaluative blameworthiness, consider the fact that actors can be causally ‘responsible’ for perfectly mundane or even praiseworthy actions. In some contexts, being described as ‘responsible’ implies a transgression. In this sense, assertions of responsibility are tinged with connotations of faultiness or guiltiness.
  3. Liability (i.e. whether sanctions are appropriate). We call people responsible when we want to suggest that they are liable to criticism and social sanctions because of their actions. By this sense of ‘liable’ we typically mean that certain others may legitimately impose the appropriate sanctions. Because an actor has had blameworthy behaviour attributed to her, she “should be held responsible” by others. Culpability is therefore not just a concept that says something about the transgressing party, but also one that suggests what others may (or should) do in response to their transgression. Once again, while evaluative blameworthiness and culpability often overlap, they are not identical. In many situations an actor’s attributed actions are negatively evaluated, but it would be inappropriate for certain (or all) other actors to hold her culpable.⁶

The distinction between these issues may seem like hair-splitting, but these three different ‘backwards-looking’ conceptions of responsibility vary in slight but significant ways. They build on each other, asking of an actor and an act: (a) whether she performed it; (b) whether it was also ‘bad’; and (c) whether certain others may appropriately (or should) do something about it.⁷

For many theorists as well as for many people in everyday life, the questions surrounding ‘responsibility’ and the link between causation, blameworthiness, and liability involves a crucial further dimension of responsibility:

• 4 Degrees of empowered moral agency (i.e. whether one ought to be treated as a competent subject). We frequently discuss whether someone is responsible in the sense of having the capacity to act and/or the competence to understand the likely consequences of his or her actions. The idea of agency in this sense is the subject of very complex sociological and philosophical debates. The stakes of these debates helps us to see how this meaning of the term relates to some of the others. For example, debates over free will and determinism often broach the subject of whether or not human beings have sufficient agency to really be given causal attribution for the outcomes of their actions, and therefore whether they can really be blamed for faulty ones. Another example is common in criminal trials. A defence lawyer may argue that because her client suffers from diminished capacity, control or understanding, his diminished agency would make it inappropriate to apply the standard sanctions for holding guilty parties culpable, even if his blameworthy causal attribution is conceded. According to H.L.A. Hart, this draws on the premise that “the person to be punished should, at the time of his offence, have had a certain knowledge or intention, or possessed certain powers of understanding and control.”⁸

One further sense of ‘responsibility’ is relevant in everyday English language: the sense in which ‘responsibility’ describes an upstanding character trait. Consider:

• 5 Diligence and reliability (i.e. being characteristically dutiful). We call persons ‘responsible’ when we want to suggest something virtuous about their character or behaviour, often in the sense that they are reliable or trustworthy. In the words of Hart, “[a] responsible person is one who is disposed to take his duties seriously; to think about them, and to make serious efforts to fulfil them.”⁹ A similar sense of ‘responsibility’ is used to describe the tendency to make well-considered choices when faced with clashing obligations.¹⁰ Finally, this characteristic sense of responsibility is also used to describe actors who accept the consequences of their actions and subject themselves willingly to social scrutiny and sanctions when appropriate.

The above typology is not meant as an exhaustive list of senses of the term ‘responsibility.’ Nor are the elements entirely separable from each other. Even a disclaimer about Weberian ‘ideal types’ does not seem to apply in this case, since the elements listed are complementary dimensions of (rather than comparable varieties of) the complex notion of responsibility. Nevertheless, drawing rough distinctions between these related senses of ‘responsibility’ helps to distinguishing some of the conceptual puzzle pieces that will become increasingly relevant to the following discussion. Furthermore, having stipulated meanings for terms like ‘diligence’ and ‘blameworthiness’ will aid the present conversation by allowing these terms to be used as more precise proxy words in place of ‘responsibility.’ In situations where several of the related senses of ‘responsibility’ are at play, it is all too easy to begin tripping over the term unless careful language is employed. By substituting more precise words for the term ‘responsibility’ and its variants wherever possible, I hope to avoid the confusion (or evasion) that can result from slipping between related senses of the term.

The meta-ethics of obligation: ideal morality and social morality

As suggested above, the statement “A has a responsibility to do X” is often used interchangeably with “A has an obligation to do X.” On a practical level, we understand that such claims invoke the idea of obligation or duty, connoting a sense of ‘oughtness’ that implies that an actor should do something or other.

Yet such simple obligation statements such as “A has an obligation to do X” are in some regards ambiguous, leaving unclear what exactly the speaker means to communicate.¹¹ Quite often, the precise nature or ‘oughtness’ of the requirement that is being invoked is not articulated expressly. Claims about responsibility, like other ethical arguments, often rest on unstated (if perhaps also underdeveloped) meta-ethical assumptions about sources of obligation, ‘the good’ and ‘the right.’ Unless the speaker offers further contextual clues, her phrasing gives leeway for interpretation on this meta-ethical level. Since my intent is to offer a conceptual toolkit for examining and understanding complex arguments about responsibility, it will be helpful to briefly address these meta-ethical questions before turning to a discussion of why they matter practically in social relations.

In his book An Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations, Daniel Warner draws on work by Terry Nardin and Henry Sidgwick, among others, to invoke the distinction that is often made between social morality and ideal morality. “Ideal morality, on the one hand, focuses on the interaction between an individual and a higher, otherworldly authority. Social morality, on the other hand, deals with th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 The ambiguous concept of responsibility
• 2 Modes of responsibility and international relations theory
• 3 Fields of responsibility and the performativity of moral argument
• 4 The responsibility to protect and the reframing of sovereignty
• 5 The responsibility to protect at the UN World Summit
• 6 The politics of responsibility and balancing the R2P
• 7 R2P norm ‘competitors’ and critical norm translation
• 8 Debating the responsibility to protect
• 9 Norm contestation and the responsibility to protect
• References
• Index