The Political Economy of the Han Dynasty and Its Legacy

Cheng Lin, Terry Peach, Wang Fang, Cheng Lin, Terry Peach, Wang Fang

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781351669627
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

This book contains original essays on various aspect of the Han's political economy and its legacy, written by leading Chinese and Western scholars whose collective expertise spans Economic History, History of Economic Thought and Sinology.

1
The political economy of the Han

Introduction

Terry Peach

Introduction

The Han Dynasty has come to be seen by some as “China’s most successful empire”:¹ one that “bequeathed to China an ideal and a concept of empire that survived basically intact for two thousand years”.² Included in the bequest was “the most persistent ideal of Chinese history”, namely, the “unity of China under one leader”,³ as well as more mundane legacies “such as ‘Han characters’, meaning Chinese [written] characters, and the ‘Han race’, meaning people of northern China”.⁴ Comprising a “former” or “Western” Han period (206–9 BCE), which followed on from the bloody demise of the first imperial empire of Qin (221–206 BCE), and a “later” or “Eastern” Han period (25–220 CE), with Wang Mang’s “New” (Xin) Dynasty in between, the Han has been revered for its development of an authoritarian system of governance, a self-justifying ideology (with “Confucian” characteristics) and a hierarchical structure of administrative controls, which were (mostly) successful in crushing internal dissent and ensuring territorial integrity over a vast land mass with a population of around 50 million. Not surprisingly, scholarly attention has been lavished on subjects including Han’s politics, philosophy, literature, international relations, sociology and scientific and non-scientific beliefs, but relatively little has been written on Han’s political economy and its legacy. This book is a contribution towards remedying that deficiency.

The content of the volume is previewed in the following section, and it may suffice here to note that the discussion of Han’s political economy extends not only to policies that were devised and implemented in areas relating to the state’s production, distribution and consumption of (material) wealth, but also to debates surrounding those policies, their relationship with various “schools of thought” and the articulation and advocacy of particular visions of economic activity (i.e. activity relating to the production, distribution and consumption of wealth). While there are some exceptions, it will become apparent that most of the discussion is focused on the Former Han, as is the case with other studies of the Han, for the simple reason that this is the period for which we possess the more detailed primary resources. Yet, notwithstanding this limitation, it should also become apparent that there is an abundance of topics to discuss, and debate, arising from what was arguably the most formative and influential period of China’s history.

The contributions

The second chapter, “From contention to unification: Transformation of economic thought in the Han Dynasty and its heritage” by Cheng Lin and Zhang Shen, has the aim of tracing the development of economic thought from pre-Han times to what is identified as its “grand unification” in the reign of Emperor Zhao (87–74 BCE). According to the authors, the pre-Qin period (more specifically, 550–233 BCE) was characterised by a metaphorical “contention of a hundred schools of thought”, the principle ones being “Confucianism”, “Legalism” and “Daoism”, followed by the dominance of one single “school” – that of “Legalism” – during the Qin itself (221–206 BCE).⁵ Then, in the early years of Han during the reign of Emperor Gauzo (206/202–195 BCE), they allege the influence of “Huang-Lao” thought, a species of “Daoism” that is said to incorporate a non-interventionist approach to economic management combined with elements of “Confucianism”. In the third phase identified by Cheng and Zhang, coinciding with the reign of Emperor Wu (141–87 BCE), we are introduced to the contributions of “two outstanding intellectuals”, Dong Zhongshu (ca. 195–104 BCE)⁶ and Sima Qian (ca. 145–89 BCE),⁷ the former advancing his own variation on a “Confucian” theme, which is said to have exerted a great influence on economic thought and policy in later times, and the latter preparing “a solid theoretical foundation for laissez - faire thought” which, notwithstanding its solidity, was to exert very little influence. It was also during this third phase that “Legalism” staged a comeback under the direction of Sang Hongyang (ca. 152–80 BCE);⁸ Sang presided over the implementation of policies including state monopolies in the production and sale of salt, iron implements and alcohol, together with the so-called equitable distribution and price equalisation systems involving the government purchase, storage and sale of commodities, including but not confined to basic necessities.

Cheng and Zhang’s fourth stage of “grand unification” is dated as occurring under the reign of Emperor Zhao (87–74 BCE). As attested in the Discourses on Salt and Iron (Yantie lun),⁹ the conference held in 81 BCE and presided over by the 13-year old Emperor Zhao, this phase was marked by the rejection on the part of putative “Confucians” of Sang Hongyang’s policies, leading thereafter to a synthesis of “Legalist”, “Daoist”, “Confucian” and popular mercantile thought, characteristics of which included a privileging of collective over individual interests; an emphasis on the “Confucian” values of “benevolence and righteousness” rather than benefit (or profit); stress on ben (“root” or “primary” economic activities, especially agriculture) rather than mo (“branch” or “secondary” activities, including commerce and the production of non-essential goods); encouragement of frugality; and a reduction in inequality. According to Cheng and Zhang, this “unified system” of economic thought was applied in the discussion of several topics of pressing concern, such as the ownership and distribution of land, currency, finance and governance; and, in this process, it underwent further development and refinement. Over time, however, the privileged status that the “system” came to acquire resulted in turning what had been a mutable framework of economic thought into a fossilised orthodoxy that stifled further intellectual development until the Qing Dynasty, almost two millennia later.

The third chapter, “Dong Zhongshu and Confucian Economic Thought as State Ideology in the Western Han Dynasty” by Zhong Xiangcai, also traces the evolution of economic thought, in Zhong’s study from pre-Qin times to the reign of Wang Mang in the short-lived Xin (New) Dynasty (9 BCE–23 CE). He, too, discerns the triumph of a particular “school” of thought in the late Western Han, but rather than describing this “school” as a synthesis of previously distinct sets of ideas, Zhong awards the prize to a “Confucian school” and, more precisely, to a variant of “Confucianism” that had taken shape under the influence of Dong Zhongshu.

According to Zhong’s reconstruction, the “Confucianism” of pre-Qin times was characterised by a “laissez-faire dimension”, most evident in the teachings of Mencius (370–290 BCE), and an emphasis on “individualism”. This is said to have contrasted sharply with the pre-Qin “Legalism” espoused by Guan Zhong (ca. 723–645 BCE)¹⁰ in the Spring and Autumn Period (770–480 BCE) and Shang Yang (390–338 BCE)¹¹ and Han Fei (280–233 BCE)¹² in the Warring States period (480–221 BCE), who had advocated state intervention and control of the economy, and had framed their arguments in terms of the interests of the state rather than the interests of individuals (described by Zhong as the methodology of “holism”). Dong Zhongshu’s contribution was to absorb those characteristics of “Legalism” within “Confucianism”. The “Confucianism” that was to become the official state ideology in the Later Han (according to Zhong) was therefore radically different from its pre-Qin namesake.

As the underlying rationale for Dong’s embrace of centralised state power, Zhong singles out a radically altered conception of the role and wisdom of the “Son of Heaven” (the emperor). In pre-Qin times, he argues, the infallibility of the ruler was not taken as given; hence, the role of senior advisors (gentlemen or junzi) was to provide necessary guidance towards finding, and following, the ideal “way” (Dao) of governance. But, in Dong’s revised scheme of things, the Son of Heaven is, in virtue of his paternity, necessarily omniscient: he alone has infallible knowledge of the “way” and of the policies required to get there. If that is true, however, it must follow that the ideal polity is one in which everything of any importance is determined centrally and imposed on the “little people” below.

On Zhong’s account, it is perhaps not surprising that Dong Zhongshu’s “revised Confucianism” should have attracted the attention of a ruler – Emperor Wu – who had himself overseen the creation of a centralised and authoritarian system of governance, nor is it surprising that Wu should have accepted Dong’s proposal to abolish all “schools” of thought except for this new variant of “Confucianism”: a move that calls to mind, and is strikingly similar to, Qin’s earlier proscription of all literature that might be used to criticise a “Legalist” state.¹³ By Wang Mang’s time, Zhong reports that any distinction between “Confucian” and “Legalist” thought had evaporated, the shared objective being to pursue “national interest” and an “ideal” social and economic order, as conceived by an all-powerful, central authority that had arrogated to itself the control over people’s lives and their thought. Such was the dubious legacy of Han “Confucianism”.

As with the previous two chapters, the following two – “The Monetary and Fiscal System of the Western and Eastern Han Dynasties” by Ma Tao and Li Wei, and “Monetary Thought in the Han Dynasty and Three Kingdoms Period (220–280 BCE)” by Gavin S.H. Chiu and S.C. Kwan – also share an overlapping focus. Ma Tao and Li Wei provide a detailed account of the evolution of monetary thought and policy and, regarding fiscal policy, of the demands on resources (which became particularly onerous during the reign of Emperor Wu), the various measures adopted to meet those demands (including poll tax, land tax, business tax, property tax, income from the state monopolies of salt, iron and alcohol and income from the employment of unfree, or corvée, labour) and the administrative machinery that was erected to oversee fiscal management.¹⁴ At one level, the wide array of policies and, especially with the currency, the seemingly endless changes in policy may seem to preclude a generalised explanation. But, the authors argue, the fundamental driving force was always to meet the voracious demands of a central Han state that seemed incapable of reining in its own expenses, thus providing a legacy for future dynasties of constrained development of the private economy, long-term stagnation and a plundered population.

Among th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgements
• 1 The political economy of the Han: introduction
• 2 From contention to unification: transformation of economic thought in the Han Dynasty and its heritage
• 3 Dong Zhongshu and Confucian economic thought as state ideology in the Western Han Dynasty
• 4 The monetary and fiscal system of the Western and Eastern Han Dynasties
• 5 Monetary thought in the Han Dynasty and Three Kingdoms period (220–280 BCE)
• 6 The system of tribute equalisation in the Han
• 7 War economy during the Western Han Dynasty
• 8 The “land quota” system in the Han Dynasty and its historical influence
• 9 A Western perspective on the Yantie lun
• 10 Sima Qian and laissez-faire: satire on a “discordant and degenerate age”
• Index