Conspiracy Theories

The Philosophical Debate

David Coady

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781351949453
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Conspiracy theories have a bad reputation. In the past, most philosophers have ignored the topic, vaguely supposing that conspiracy theories are obviously irrational and that they can be easily dismissed. The current philosophical interest in the subject results from a realisation that this is not so. Some philosophers have taken up the challenge of identifying and explaining the flaws of conspiracy theories. Other philosophers have argued that conspiracy theories do not deserve their bad reputation, and that conspiracy theorists do not deserve their reputation for irrationality. This book represents both sides of this important debate. Aimed at a broad philosophical community, including epistemologists, political philosophers, and philosophers of history. It represents a significant contribution to the growing interdisciplinary debate about conspiracy theories.

Chapter 1

An Introduction to the Philosophical Debate about Conspiracy Theories

David Coady

At first glance philosophy and conspiracy theory seem like strange bed-fellows. Philosophers, like other academics, tend to have a low opinion of conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorists. Philosophy is often associated with rationality, at least by those engaged in it, whereas conspiracy theories are often thought of as paradigmatically irrational. Like creation scientists, conspiracy theorists are often dismissed as purveyors of error and confusion. Some of the philosophers in this collection attempt to analyse this alleged confusion. Others, such as Charles Pigden and myself, have the temerity to question whether conspiracy theories (and conspiracy theorists) deserve their bad reputation.

I will begin with some questions of definition. This may seem a dry and insignificant business. But it is important to deal with it before moving on to the more strictly philosophical issues. Clarity about definition is important, because there is reason to think that people are sometimes talking at cross-purposes when they discuss or advert to conspiracy theories. The natural place to begin any discussion of the meaning of the expression ‘conspiracy theory’ is with a discussion of the meaning of its component words.

What is a conspiracy?

Two things seem to be essential to a conspiracy. First, a conspiracy necessarily involves a group of agents acting together. It is impossible to conspire alone. Second, a conspiracy is necessarily secretive. There is no such thing as an open conspiracy. These two features are suggested by the etymology of the word, which comes from the latin con (with) and spirare (to breathe). Breathing together is suggestive of whispering, and hence of secrecy. So a conspiracy is a group of agents acting together in secret.

Conspiracies are usually thought of as sinister. This characteristic does not seem, however, to be essential, and several authors in this collection cite examples of conspiracies that seem to be benign or at least harmless. It may be that we only think of conspiracies as sinister if and to the extent that we think of secrecy itself in this way.

What is a theory?

Equivocation over this concept is so widespread that we cannot hope for a definitive answer. According to one popular usage, theories are beliefs for which there is little or no supporting evidence. If we were to adopt this usage, it would follow that we should adopt a dismissive attitude toward conspiracy theories, simply on the grounds that they are theories. It is clear, however, that the more active critics of conspiracy theories take issue with the conspiratorial nature of the theories in question rather than with the fact that they are mere theories. Academic critics of conspiracy theories, in particular, cannot mean to be dismissive of conspiracy theories solely on the grounds that they are theories, since academics of all kinds are accustomed to taking theories very seriously.

Serious discussion of conspiracy theories, academic or otherwise, should be abstracted from the negative connotations sometimes associated with the word ‘theory’. Theories should be understood simply as postulated explanations. To say that something is a theory is to say nothing about its epistemic status. It could be certainly true, certainly false, or it could be anywhere along the spectrum between these two extremes.

What is a conspiracy theory?

The discussion so far suggests that a conspiracy theory is simply a conspiratorial explanation, and that an explanation is conspiratorial if it postulates a group of agents working together in secret, often, though perhaps not always, for a sinister purpose. This definition is consistent with our intuitive responses to many cases. It fits paradigmatic conspiracy theories, such as those according to which Lee Harvey Oswald did not acting alone kill John F. Kennedy and those according to which James Earl Ray did not acting alone kill Martin Luther King. Nonetheless it does not always fit the way the expression ‘conspiracy theory’ is used. In particular, there are theories that would not normally be thought of as conspiracy theories, even though they clearly fit this definition.

Sometimes all the competing explanations of an event will concur in postulating a group of agents working together in secret. In such cases it is perfectly clear that a conspiracy has taken place, though it may be unclear precisely who the conspirators are. Presumably all explanations of September 11th 2001, for example, will postulate agents working together in secret. Hence, when we label some, but not all, of these explanations ‘conspiracy theories’, we must be using a different concept. This concept seems to be captured in the following definition: a conspiracy theory is an explanation that is contrary to an explanation that has official status at the time and place in question.

Now this may seem a bad definition, since it makes no direct reference to conspiracy at all. Nor does it refer to any related notions, such as plots or secrecy. Nonetheless, to the extent that it is the job of a definition to report actual usage, it works better than the previous definition. Much of the debate about conspiracy theories assumes that a conspiracy theory will always be in competition with an official, non-conspiratorial version of events. When an official version of events itself invokes a conspiracy, it is unlikely to be thought of as a conspiracy theory.

I will not attempt to decide which of the above definitions is ‘correct’. That would require too much of a detour into the issue of whether definitions should be entirely descriptive, or whether they have legitimate prescriptive function. It is enough to note here that there seem to be (at least) two concepts of a conspiracy theory.

Despite their differences the extension of these definitions overlap considerably. The denial of an official version of events typically implies a conspiracy on the part of officials to keep the truth from the public.¹ That is, conspiracy theories in the latter sense tend to imply conspiracy theories in the former sense, although conspiracy theories in the former sense do not in general imply conspiracy theories in the latter sense.

For much of this book it can be assumed that conspiracy theories are conspiracy theories in both senses. That is, they are conspiratorial explanations that are inconsistent with official explanations of the time and place in question, whether or not those official explanations are themselves conspiratorial. Nonetheless it is important to keep the distinction between the two concepts in mind, since the political use of the expression ‘conspiracy theory’ often seems to involve an equivocation between them.²

The political use of the expression ‘conspiracy theory’

The bad reputation of conspiracy theories is particularly pronounced amongst conservatives, who tend to think of conspiracy theorizing as an activity of the extreme Left.³, ⁴ Those on the Left against whom this ‘accusation’ is levelled will often respond by denying that they are conspiracy theorists, a rhetorical move that reflects an acceptance of the conservative assumption that conspiracy theories are intellectually suspect and that belief in them is irrational. The following passage from Manufacturing Consent is typical of this kind of Leftist response:

Institutional critiques such as we present in this book are commonly dismissed by establishment commentators as ‘conspiracy theories’, but this is just an evasion. We do not use any kind of “conspiracy” hypothesis to explain mass-media performance.⁵

At least since Karl Marx, much Leftist political thought has downplayed conspiratorial, and more broadly intentional, explanations, and has emphasised explanations framed in terms of impersonal, usually economic, forces in their place. In chapter 2 of this collection, drawn from Conjectures and Refutations, Karl Popper gives Marx credit for being one of the first critics of the conspiracy theory. Ironically, Adam Smith, who is a hero to many of those who sneer at Leftist conspiracy theorists, postulates a conspiratorial hypothesis at the heart of his economic theory, namely that people ‘of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public’.⁶

Despite all this, conservatives are unlikely to be convinced by the Left’s denials that it is engaged in conspiracy theorizing, still less that they themselves sometimes engage in the same practice. A great deal of contemporary political debate consists in attempts by conservatives to portray those on the Left as conspiracy theorists, and attempts by those on the Left to refute the charge. Both sides assume that there is something wrong with conspiracy theories: that they are always or at least usually false, or that those who believe them or seek out evidence for them are being irrational. On the face of it, this assumption stands in need of some supporting argument.

Conspiracies versus cock-ups

Attempts to provide that argument begin with Popper. Popper has often been cited by critics of conspiracy theories, and his views on the topic continue to constitute an orthodoxy in some circles. In chapter 3 of this collection Charles Pigden presents the first explicit critique of this orthodoxy.

Popper and his followers usually accept that conspiracies occur. They might even be heard to say that they occur frequently.⁷ The problem, they say, with conspiracy theorists is not so much that they have an exaggerated view of the prevalence of conspiratorial behaviour, rather it is that they have an exaggerated view of how successful such behaviour tends to be. Popper and his disciples seek to replace ‘the conspiracy theory of society’ with ‘the cock-up theory of society’. For the purposes of this introduction I will confine myself to two observations about the cock-up theory.

First, as Pigden points out, it is not strictly inconsistent with the conspiracy theorist’s position. A failed conspiracy can play an important explanatory role, and an explanation in terms of such a failed conspiracy is still a conspiracy theory, on either of the definitions I have considered in this introduction, and on other definitions in the literature (see for example Brian L. Keeley’s definition in chapter 4). The success of a conspiracy is one thing, the success of a theory which postulates it is another.

Second, we must be careful not to set our standard of success too high. It may be that most conspiracies fail sub specie aeternitatis. From this perspective the conspiratorial behaviour that explains to a greater or lesser extent the creation of the Soviet Union was unsuccessful, because, in the long run, the Soviet Union failed. But this perspective seems unreasonable. From this perspective most human endeavours, conspiratorial and otherwise, are unsuccessful. If the futility of conspiracy is to be an interesting and important hypothesis, it had better not be reducible to the claim that most of what we do is ultimately futile.

It is sometimes claimed that support for the view that conspiracies tend to fail comes, not from philosophical argument, but from examination of the historical record. When we look at that record, it is claimed, we see that very few conspiracies are successful, even by realistically modest standards of success. So, for example, Machiavelli writes that ‘we know from experience that while there have been many conspiracies, few of them have succeeded.’⁸ More recently, Daniel Pipes writes: ‘Familiarity with the past shows that most conspiracies fail.’⁹

The problem with this position is that there is an inevitable selection effect operating on the available data. Consider an analogy. Proponents of IQ testing have sometimes claimed that there is a correlation between being a criminal and having a low IQ. The data on which this claim is based is, however, inevitably drawn from an unrepresentative subset of criminals—the ones who get caught, i.e., the unsuccessful ones. Similarly, since secrecy is essential to the success of conspiracies, the ones that we know about will tend to be the unsuccessful ones.

Quasi-conspiracies

Pigden mentions in passing the existence of ‘mechanisms which duplicate the appearance of conspiracy’.¹⁰ He calls such mechanisms quasi-conspiracies. Quasi-conspiracies are of considerable interest, because they represent an alternative to both the conspiracy theory and the cock-up theory. The existence of quasi-conspiracies is also, as we shall see, suggestive of a possible critique of conspiracy theorists. The theory of coordination games (games in which the interests of players coincide) provides some insight into the workings of quasi-conspiracies.

Coordination without communication is usually easy enough if the following three conditions are met. First, one particular combination of strategies will lead to an outcome that everyone involved considers best. Second, everyone involved knows this (i.e., it is mutual knowledge). Third, everyone knows that everyone knows this, and everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows this, and so on (i.e., it is common knowledge).

More surprisingly, coordination without communication can often be achieved even when it leads to an outcome that is not considered best by any of the people involved. The outcome merely has to be salient in some way that everyone will expect others to notice. This was a phenomenon first pointed out by Thomas Schelling. In one of his more striking experiments two people are told the place and date, but not the time, they are required to meet. In order to succeed they both have to stipulate the same time, ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of Contributors
• Foreword
• 1 An Introduction to the Philosophical Debate about Conspiracy Theories
• 2 The Conspiracy Theory of Society
• 3 Popper Revisited, or What is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories?
• 4 Of Conspiracy Theories
• 5 Living with the Conspiracy
• 6 Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing
• 7 Malevolent Global Conspiracy
• 8 Nobody Expects the Spanish Inquisition! More Thoughts on Conspiracy Theory
• 9 Conspiracy Theories and Official Stories
• 10 Appealing to the Fundamental Attribution Error: Was it All a Big Mistake?
• 11 Afterthoughts on Conspiracy Theory: Resilience and Ubiquity
• 12 Complots of Mischief
• 13 The Pragmatic Rejection of Conspiracy Theories
• Index