Between Deontology and Justice

Chinese and Western Perspectives

Genyou Wu, Yong Li

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000750515
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

In China, political philosophy is still a comparatively new academic discipline. While there is no such phrase as "political philosophy" in ancient Chinese texts, there are elements within them that could be considered part of that field. Central questions of Chinese ancient political philosophy include the legitimacy of the source of political power, the foundation of moral rationality for the use of political power, and the purpose of political activities. This book explores the ideas of rights, the foundations of law, transference of power, democracy and other topics as debated in ancient times.

Focusing on important political thinkers in Chinese history, such as Kongzi, Laozi, Xu Fuguan, Liang Qichao, and Li Dazhao, the book explains characteristics that are particular to China, such as the system of abdication, the general will of the people, and the society of Great Harmony. While making comparisons between Chinese and Western political philosophy, the book also discusses how to establish a Chinese modern state and how to promote Chinese culture today so that it can influence more and more people around the world.

The book will be a valuable reference for scholars of Chinese philosophy, political philosophy, and Chinese culture.

Part I

1 The theory of daoyi

A concise treatise on Confucius’s political philosophy and his argumentation about the legitimacy of political power

1.1 Why I chose the term “daoyi”

Throughout the history of China, rulers of every dynasty attached great importance to the question of the legitimacy of the foundation of their own political power. However, political practice is always different from the reflections in political philosophy. Political practice is concerned with how to obtain and reinforce political power, while political philosophy is more concerned with the source of political power and the question of legitimacy of the employment of power. A typical case is the debate on the legality of King Tang’s and King Wu’s revolutions against the tyranny of King Jie and King Zhou, which was debated between Yuan Gusheng (辕固生) and Huang Sheng (黄生) before King Jing of the Han dynasty (汉景帝). Huang Sheng held that King Tang and King Wu illegally killed their rulers, for they did not receive the mandate of Heaven, which was then believed to be the source of legality of political power. Yuan disagreed with Huang, and said,

“those kings that King Tang and King Wu killed were tyrants; at that time the people all under Heaven all wished that Tang and Wu could replace Jie and Zhou. Tang and Wu answered to their appeal and killed Jie and Zhou. The people of Jie and Zhou were not willing to be ruled by Jie and Zhou and all turned to Tang and Wu. Tang and Wu could not decline but accepted it and ascended to the throne; is this not the mandate of Heaven?”

Huang then said,

“hats, though worn-out, should be worn on the head; shoes, though new, should be worn on the feet. Such is the distinction between the upper and the lower. Though Jie and Zhou lost the Dao [the right ‘Way’ to rule], they were still the lords; Tang and Wu were sages, but they were subjects. Officials may correct the wrong words and deeds of the lords, but should respect them. Now Tang and Wu did not, and killed them because of their mistakes, took their power and faced south [a kingly gesture]. If this is not a politically unjust killing, what else could it be?”

Yuan Gusheng argued, “If you insist on this position, it also holds true for the case in which King Gao, the first king of the Han Dynasty, replaced the king of the Qin dynasty to take the position of a king, doesn’t it?” King Jing, who was in the royal line of King Gao, then put an end to the debate with the comment,

“for those who eat meat, they can be considered to have good taste, even if they have not eaten unusual cuts. For those who discuss, they would not be considered unknowledgeable simply because they have not discussed the revolution of Tang and Wu.”

Thereafter, there were no scholars who dared to discuss the question of the reception of the mandate of Heaven and the justice of exiling and killing [an unjust king] (学者莫敢明受命放杀者).¹

Huang Sheng and Yuan Gusheng’s debate involves a significant question in political philosophy: the legality and the source of the power to rule. Huang Sheng mainly emphasizes the formal legality of a political order. A king, no matter how evil he is, as the son of Heaven, should be obeyed and respected by subjects, just like hats and shoes should belong in their own places. Therefore, the revolutions of Tang and Wu were illegal with regard to political procedure, even though they were morally justified. The source of the political power of Tang and Wu was violence, not the appointment of Heaven, thus it is illegal. On the other hand, Yuan Gusheng emphasizes the endorsement by the hearts of people as the foundation of legality for any existing political power. The mandate of Heaven is nothing but the hearts of the people. As the highest ruler, Jie and Zhou lost the hearts of the people, thus the revolutions of Tang and Wu had actual legality because they fulfilled the wish of both Heaven and the people and obtained the highest ruling power by an uncommon means, namely, revolution.

Both sides seem to be rational. However, if we investigate more carefully, we find that their starting points in justifying political power are different. From the perspective of the idea of “minben” (民本, “people as the foundation” of government), the aim of politics is to protect the interests of the people, then the revolution theory is justified; from the perspective of the idea of “junben” (君本, “ruler as the foundation” of government), the power of the king is conferred by Heaven; in this view, revolution loses any political ground. The debate between Huang Sheng and Yuan Gusheng before King Jing of Han reflects the antinomy of these two paradigms of thought on the legality of political power. It is difficult to find any solution or commensurability between them. King Jing of Han was not a philosopher; he was aware that it is difficult to discuss this theoretical problem, so he put an end to the discussion on such an insoluble problem of political philosophy by his real political authority, so that thinkers thereafter would not dare to continue the discussion on such a fundamental question. But the question did not disappear simply because of the power of the king. The question of the legality of the king’s power to rule the people existed in real political practice. No matter how the existing ideology maintained the legality of the king’s power, it would be inevitable that his power would be eliminated if his government harmed the life of the people. The great pre-Qin Dynasty Confucian Xunzi compared the position of a king above the people to the boat above the water; as water can either support or submerge boats, so the people can support or topple the government of the king. Wei Zheng (魏征), a prime minister in the Tang Dynasty, repeated this comparison of Xunzi’s when he spoke to King Li Shimin (李世民). Both pointed out and acknowledged the close relationship between the people’s consent and the legality of the political power of the government.

The issue discussed by Huang Sheng and Yuan Gusheng is daoyi (道义, “legitimate Way”), and it has gradually become the foremost question in Confucian political philosophy concerning the legality of the political power of the government. The term “daoyi” has no equivalent word in English, and does not appear in Confucius’s Analects as a compound word. “Daoyi” is a term that has been used by modern scholars to discuss the question of legality of political power in Confucian political philosophy in the Qin and Han dynasties, and it is different from the terms pre-Qin Confucians used when discussing the same question.

However, even when they have not used the term, Chinese thinkers have long been interested in the issue of daoyi. According to the cultural tradition of the rituals of the Western Zhou Dynasty (c. 1045–771 BCE), all wise rulers should avoid “irritating both gods and people” (a phrase from the Guo Yu, 国语). In the middle and late Warring States period (403–221 BCE), the doctrine of “wu xing” (五行, five phases) developed by the School of Yin and Yang became significant because it provided abstract philosophical arguments for the legality of the transition of political power from one dynasty to another. The chenwei (谶纬, divination ideology) developed from the end of the Western Han Dynasty was to some extent meant for answering the question of the legality of transition of political power. In a new political atmosphere, the great Confucian Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒) in the Western Han Dynasty used strange phenomena in nature as signs to admonish the king that he had made mistakes in politics, thus starting a mystic tradition of Confucian political philosophy after the Western Han Dynasty. However, the mainstream of Confucian political philosophy (including Dong Zhongshu) is still rational in that it judged the legality of existing political power by the criterion of daoyi.

The theory of daoyi is a mode of political philosophy that mainly takes as its starting point the value system of cultural tradition of rituals and music in the Western Zhou Dynasty, and discusses the legality of the policies and activities of an existing political power. For example, Confucius says, “When the Way [dao] prevails in the Empire, the rites and music and punitive expeditions are initiated by the Emperor. When the Way does not prevail in the Empire, they are initiated by the feudal lords.”² Mencius says, “one who has the Way will have many to support him; one who has not the Way has few to support him.”³ Mencius admonished King Hui of Liang and said, “what is the point of mentioning the word ‘profit’? All that matters is that there should be benevolence and rightness [yi].”⁴

Dao (道, Way) and yi (义, rightness) appeared in parallel for the first time in the Great Treatise section of the Changes: “The nature [of man] having been completed, and being continually preserved, it is the gate of all good courses and righteousness [daoyi].”⁵ The words “daoyi” (道义) appeared together in the chapter “Law and Prohibition” (法禁) in the Guanzi: “virtuous actions are sure to be praised, daoyi is sure to be made clear”⁶ (德行必有所是, 道义必有所明). According to the dictionary Ci Hai (辞海), “daoyi” in modern Chinese mainly refers to the Way of humans and justice. Confucius used dao and yi separately; neither was used only as a concept to judge the legality of the highest political power, namely, the ruling power of the son of Heaven. Both were used as a concept to judge the rationality of the actions of individual scholar-officials or superiors (君子), and to judge the legality of the politics of the states ruled by the dukes. Confucius used “de” (德, virtue) to judge the legality of the power of the son of Heaven. For example, he says, “The Zhou continued to serve the Yin when it was in possession of two thirds of the Empire. Its virtue can be said to have been the highest.”⁷

The concept closest to “daoyi” is “daotong” (the transmission of the Way). Ever since Mencius, Confucians started to construct the idea of the transmission of the Way, even before the term “daotong” was in use. Mencius spoke of the ancient kings and sages, Yao (尧), Shun (舜), Yu (禹), Tang (汤), Wen (文), Wu (武), and Duke Zhou (周公), and lamented that the age he lived in was an age without a sage king. Mencius constructed a narrative of the “pedigree” of the transmission of the Way to articulate a paradigm of legitimate highest political power, but he did not abstract from it a political philosophy. Approximately since Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒), “dao” has been associated with the king’s highest powe...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Foreword: introducing Genyou Wu
• Preface: political philosophy and Chinese political philosophy
• PART I
• PART II
• PART III
• PART IV
• References
• Index