Multiparty Mediation in Violent Conflict

Peacemaking Diplomacy in the Tajikistan Civil War

Tetsuro Iji

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000691467
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Peace & Global Development
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book presents a conceptual and empirical analysis of the UN-led multiparty mediation in the Tajikistan conflict.

Multiparty mediation has been a significant research topic of international conflict management since the 1990s, but in-depth case studies on the peacemaking dynamics of violent conflicts are rare, particularly in regard to third-party roles. This volume addresses that gap in the literature by examining the multiparty mediation of the Tajikistan conflict, a largely forgotten but notably successful case of UN-orchestrated peacemaking in the post-Cold War era. It argues that several interrelated factors contributed to the "success" of the Tajik multiparty mediation: Russia, Iran, and other major interveners shared a common interest, and reached a broad consensus on the terms of settlement; the UN was widely accepted as a lead coordinator by other mediators, and succeeded in constructively engaging with them; as a consequence, there arose positive interconnections between different third-party roles. The book presents an analytical framework for understanding the complex interplay of these factors, not only to evaluate the Tajik case but also to help clarify policy implications for multiparty mediation in other cases of violent conflict, particularly civil wars.

This book will be of much interest to students of conflict resolution, civil wars, international mediation, the UN, Central Asian politics, and International Relations.

1 Introduction

Posing the problem

Mediation is a popular method of conflict management in international relations. It can be understood as an extension of negotiations in which a third party enters a conflict between two or more states, or other actors, to influence its course and assist in finding a mutually acceptable solution. Given the plethora of violent conflicts—especially internal ones—that erupted following the end of the Cold War, mediation has increasingly been considered relevant and appropriate as an alternative to resorting to the use of force fraught with destructive consequences (Greig & Diehl, 2012, pp. 2–6, 30–37).¹ In light of its frequent use and perceived value, international mediation began to attract considerable scholarly attention particularly in the late 1980s, and it has continued to do so into the present (e.g., Touval & Zartman, 1985b; Mitchell & Webb, 1988; Princen, 1992; Bercovitch & Rubin, 1992; Bercovitch, 1996, 2002; Greig & Diehl, 2012). Some of this attention has been concerned specifically with mediating internal conflicts (e.g., Assefa, 1987; Jabri, 1990; Stedman, 1991; Zartman, 1995b; Sisk, 2009).

Contemporary international mediation has often been multiparty in nature, involving various third-party external actors, such as states, international and regional intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and sometimes even individuals. At the turn of the century, in their seminal work on “multiparty mediation,” Crocker, Hampson, and Aall described the proliferation of mediators at the end of the Cold War as “less a matter of choice than a fact of life” (1999b, p. 666). More than a decade later, Lanz and Gasser (2013) characterized the situation as a “crowded field,” highlighting pressing issues of competition and coordination among an increasing number of mediators. The multiplicity or randomness of mediators’ engagement has been a general feature of international mediation and has remained so in the post-9/11 era (see e.g., Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2002, 2015; Vuković, 2016, for recent literature on multiparty mediation; Svensson, 2013).

What is important to note is that this very fact has had profound effects on the nature and effectiveness of international peacemaking. Bitter experiences with multilateral peacemaking in Rwanda (e.g., Jones, 2001), Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia (e.g., Touval, 2002), among others, made it clear that the rather unsuccessful practices in those cases were largely attributable to weakness, or a lack of cooperation and coordination among the various third parties involved. More broadly, in almost all situations involving multiparty mediation, managing the concurrent efforts of many heterogeneous mediators with disparate and possibly conflicting interests, priorities, and policy goals has proven especially challenging (e.g., Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 1999c).

Against this backdrop, the international mediation in the 1990s of the Tajikistan conflict, one of the post-Soviet conflicts, merits special attention. The Tajik conflict is relatively unknown; it received very little attention or publicity in the international community. In 1995, it was dubbed a “forgotten civil war” by a London-based international NGO (Jawad & Tadjbakhsh, 1995), and for the most part it has remained so. However, the Tajik peace process is a salient example of successful multiparty mediation involving numerous external state and nonstate actors. Russia and Tajikistan’s four neighbors in Central Asia, as well as Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, participated as observers in the negotiations between the Tajik parties that lasted from April 1994 to June 1997. The United Nations (UN) sponsored the negotiations, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) until December 1994 (noted as the OSCE throughout the text)—participated in an observer capacity. (The Organization of Islamic Cooperation, formerly the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), was also an observer, albeit not an active one.) The unofficial dialogue that took place within the framework of the Dartmouth Conference (a US-Soviet/Russian dialogue at the citizen level that started during the Cold War) was not part of the official negotiations, but it was an important private actor in the wider peace process. Throughout the mediation process, these states, international and regional organizations, and the NGO interacted rather cooperatively and they jointly helped move the parties toward settlement. As noted by Barnes and Abdullaev, “This exceptionally well-coordinated process deserves careful study to learn lessons that could be applicable in peace processes elsewhere” (2001, p. 11).

Barnes and Abdullaev also maintain that Tajikistan stands out as an exemplary case of negotiating and mediating internal conflicts:

In comparison with many of the internal wars of the late twentieth century, the inter-Tajik conflict is notable for its rapid escalation to war in 1992 and for its relatively quick conclusion through a negotiated settlement reached in June 1997.

(Barnes & Abdullaev, 2001, p. 8; emphasis in original)

Internal conflicts in sovereign states are often difficult to end through negotiation and mediation. The principal parties in this type of conflict—the government and the opposition—are generally asymmetrical in terms of power, resources, and legitimacy, which means such conflicts are not readily amenable to negotiated settlements. From the perspective of the incumbent government, mediator involvement in an internal conflict can be seen as impinging upon state sovereignty and assisting insurgents. Conversely, insurgents might regard external mediators as favoring the government. In addition, each party tends to deny the other’s legitimacy as it pursues a zero-sum outcome, aiming to achieve its unilateral goal through outright victory and the annihilation of the other side, as opposed to accepting a mutual compromise and agreeing to a joint-governance arrangement. The possibility of fragmentation on either side, and the resultant multiplication of parties, also inhibits negotiation and mediation in internal-conflict situations (Zartman, 1995a, pp. 3–20; Maundi, Zartman, Khadiagala, & Nuamah, 2006, pp. 4–10; Walter & Snyder, 1999, pp. 1–69). Since all of these elements of intractability were evident in the Tajik conflict in some form or another, its relatively rapid and successful settlement warrants close examination.

Although over two decades have passed since the June 1997 settlement, the Tajik peace process remains under-researched, and important lessons from that process have yet to be distilled and made available to a wide international readership. As such, the main purpose of this book is to provide a thorough overview and analysis of the international mediation process in the Tajik civil war, examining how it can serve as a case study of effective multiparty mediation in situations of violent conflict, particularly internal ones. In doing so, this study aims to elucidate the lessons and implications of the Tajik negotiations that should be remembered and utilized (as opposed to being “forgotten” by the international community) to broaden our understanding of the theory and practice of peacemaking in violent conflict, especially civil wars.

Before turning to substantive discussion, it is necessary to delineate the scope of analysis by qualifying the stages or phases of the third-party process, as well as the type and nature of third-party interveners to be examined in this book. To begin with, the book is primarily concerned with the course of negotiation and mediation leading up to the peace agreement of 1997—that is, how the Tajik negotiators managed to reach an agreement to settle the conflict with the help of external mediators. In the language of negotiation and mediation theory, this leads to a focus on the prenegotiation (pre-mediation) and negotiation (mediation) phases, although it is not my intent to understate the importance of the post-settlement (post-agreement) phase, in which the mediated agreement is implemented. It is widely understood that there are important connections between the first two phases and the last one (Eriksson & Kostić, 2013; see e.g., Papagianni, 2010). In line with such thinking, I succinctly cover the developments of the post-1997 period as part of the book’s conclusion.

The other qualifications pertain to the definitions of mediation and, as an extension of it, multiparty mediation employed in this study. The first should be based on the treatment of the involvement of unofficial actors, such as international NGOs. Crocker et al., in their aforementioned work on multiparty mediation, proposed two basic definitions of mediation: “as third-party-assisted negotiation and as a force for change of perception on both individual and societal bases” (1999a, p. 12). Leaning toward the former definition, the practitioner accounts presented in their volume mostly concern

multiparty mediation efforts of the track-one variety—involving official organizations—or of a variety that might be termed track-one-and-a-half, which would involve nonofficial organizations acting with the blessing and tacit or open support of the track-one—or the official—effort.

(Crocker et al., 1999a, p. 12)²

This means that unofficial conflict interventions of the purely track-two type fall outside the scope of analysis.

Bearing in mind the constraints of such an approach, the present book adopts a similar conceptual focus. With regard to unofficial interventions, this book primarily emphasizes the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, which was conducted parallel to the official negotiation process—with its quiet support—and was intended to contribute to it. It will also make reference to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which, at one point in the negotiation process, was instrumental in mediating agreement between the warring parties regarding the exchange of prisoners of war. However, international NGOs such as the Aga Khan Foundation are not covered in this book. While these organizations played an important role in responding to the humanitarian crisis in Tajikistan, they only had limited bearing on the official peace negotiations (Slim & Hodizoda, 2002, p. 526).

The second qualification regarding the range of third parties to be analyzed here concerns peacekeepers. In purely conceptual terms, peacekeepers are not considered mediators, who are assumed to play a political role, not a military one. In the Tajik case, however, some actors played dual roles. The UN, for example, sponsored the negotiations and also provided military observers. Russia, along with the Central Asian states, participated in the negotiations as observers while also providing peacekeeping forces within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Indeed, these two roles are inseparable, and the interaction between the UN and the CIS in the area of peacekeeping has important implications for the mediation process. Accordingly, they will be taken up in this book.

Analytical framework and plan of the book

In constructing the framework for a comprehensive analysis of the successful case of multiparty mediation in the Tajik conflict, I propose using Mitchell’s model of third-party roles as its foundation (Mitchell, 1993).

If one compares Table 1.1 with Mitchell’s original table in his seminal article (1993, p. 147), one will find that the former explicitly includes what is lacking in the latter, that is, possible candidates as players of some of the mediatory roles in the right column. The information there, which I have distilled from Mitchell’s rather preliminary discussions in his short case study of the Sudanese mediation in the same article (1993, pp. 148–155), is presented as an initial basis for further theory development. Indeed, in his later writing, Mitchell states that:

Table 1.1 Mitchell’s model of intermediary roles and functions

Intermediary role	Tasks and functions	Actors
Explorer/reassurer	Sounds out adversaries’ willingness to talk and consider alternative solutions; reassures them about the rationale for the talks	E.g., NGOs in the Sudan
Convener	Initiates peacemaking processes through appeals for truce, provision of venue, logistical support, and the legitimization of presence	E.g., church groups like the WCC (World Council of Churches) in the Sudan
Decoupler	Disengages external patrons from internal clients	Most easily fulfilled by traditional mediators at the interstate level—that is, other governments or international organizations (e.g., the UN in disentangling the Soviet Union and the U.S. from Afghanistan)
Unifier	Repairs intraparty splits among adversaries so they can become a viable negotiating and agreement-making entity	No specific reference
Enskiller	Provides adversaries with training in negotiation and diplomatic skills	E.g., various religious organizations in the Sudan
Envisioner (fact finder)	Offers new information, ideas, and possible alternative solutions that adversaries can utilize or adopt	Open to third parties with little leverage or muscle, such as third-party panels at problem-solving workshops
Guarantor	Provides adversaries with insurance against the possible breakdown of the process; guarantees settlement	No specific reference
Fac...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Acknowledgments
• Chronology
• Map of Tajikistan
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Tajikistan conflict and early peacemaking efforts
• 3 The inter-Tajik negotiations and multiparty mediation
• 4 Mediator interests, cooperation, and consensus
• 5 Coordination in multiparty mediation
• 6 Complementarity and interconnectedness
• 7 Conclusions
• Index