Religion and Hezbollah

Political Ideology and Legitimacy

Mariam Farida

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000458572
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Relazioni internazionali

This comprehensive and thought-provoking volume examines the role and function of religion in Hezbollah's political strategy in the context of contemporary Lebanese politics and global security.

The book demonstrates how Hezbollah uses religious mechanisms such as taklif shari (religious assessment), ijtihad (interpretation) of jihad, and fatwa (religious verdict) as political tools to mobilise the Shi'a in Lebanon and the Middle East and to build political support. The comprehensive content analysis scrutinised speeches of Hezbollah Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, from 2000 to 2013. The results provide and inform a wide-scoping discussion of Nasrallah's uses of rhetorical devices and context to imbue religious elements into Hezbollah politics to mobilise and motivate supporters. Additionally, a case study analysis of Hezbollah's intervention in the Syrian conflict is also included. This further demonstrates Hezbollah's strategic use of political pragmatism and religious rhetoric to link its political and military agendas and to transition the Party from a resistance group in Lebanon to a regional actor with a regional priority.

As such, readers are provided with new and interesting insights into Hezbollah's ideology and identity as a domestic and regional non-state actor, and the social mobilisation of Shi'a in Lebanon and the region. Providing a nexus between religion, politics, and security, the book will be a key resource for students and researchers interested in religious studies and Middle East politics.

1 Historical background

The emergence of Hezbollah

The history of Lebanon is laden with war, violence, and fragmentation. Since gaining its independence in 1943, the country has established a unique political system titled “confessionalism,” which entails a power-sharing arrangement based on religious communities. Despite the attempt at power-sharing, the country has experienced ongoing civil conflict for the past 15 years arising from religious differences combined with economic and political instability. Even 30 years after the civil war, Lebanese people still suffer from political and social segregation, and a stalemate among politicians. Lebanese Shi’ite communities are mostly concentrated in rural areas – particularly in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa areas – and they experience greater poverty relative to other communities. Indeed, they received little attention from the Lebanese government until Shi’ite leaders such as Musa Al-Sadr, and later Hezbollah, drew attention to their plight. Most residents in these areas reached out to the zo’ama (local leader) or Ulama (local cleric) to have their social needs met (Traboulsi 2007: 43–47). Since the Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon in 1982 however, Lebanon’s Shi’a began to assert themselves, including at the political level.

Hezbollah, or Party of God, initially emerged as an armed militia to free the southern parts of Lebanon from foreign occupation and to improve Shi’ite standing in Lebanon. It has subsequently presented itself as a legitimate political party. In May 2011, Sayyed Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, declared that “Hezbollah is a resistance movement that aims at liberating the occupied territories and is not a substitute for the government.”¹ This statement was intended to assure the Lebanese people of the Party’s intentions; however, the nature of Hezbollah still provokes great controversy today. Some Western governments have labelled Hezbollah’s armed wing a terrorist organisation, but most Arab States, and Lebanon particularly, continue to describe it as a legitimate resistance movement (Dionigi 2014).

The uniqueness of the Party is most reflected in its ability to successfully operate across multiple domains, namely, the civilian (da’wa) context of social welfare and religious education, as a military-resistance organisation (jihad), and as a key player in the Lebanese political system (Azani 2013: 899–900). In addition, Hezbollah is unique in the sense that it has proved to be extremely competent in its ability to downplay its application of religious ideals and principles while emerging as a prototypical hybrid militant-political organisation in domestic and regional jihad movements.

The marginalisation of the Muslim Shi’ite community in Lebanon reveals a snapshot of neglect and political disregard (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 35–80). Hence, the emergence of Hezbollah did not only stem from the Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation of Lebanon in 1982 (ostensibly to control members of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation who had settled in Lebanon and were carrying out attacks against Israel (Norton 2007b)) but also because of long abandonment and under-representation of the Shi’ite community in Lebanon (Traboulsi 2007: 110–130).

According to Norton (2007a: 475–491), the main catalyst in the development of Islamist groups in Lebanon came because of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. Lebanese Shi’ites and Iran have a long history of cooperation going back to the 17th century. Even before Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, a religious leader and politician, took power in Iran, there were some Shi’ite groups that were already politically active in Lebanon. For example, there were the Committee of Ulema of the Bekaa, “Islamic Committees,” and the Lebanese branch of the Iraqi Shi’ite Al-Dawa Party, for which Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah was the standard-bearer in Lebanon (Al-Agha 2011a: 54–56). In addition, the grand scale of Israeli aggression against southern Lebanon in 1978, where most of the Shi’ite population resided, gave Iran reason to support these small emerging Shi’ite groups. Moreover, the leaders of the Shi’ite groups became aware of the need to put together a well-organised party structure. As Qassem (2010: 11–40) explained, Shi’ite leaders agreed that Islam would be the guiding principle for this Party and that it would follow Khomeini’s model of Wilayat al-Faqih.²

This foundation represented the process in which Hezbollah would use a mode of operation, with ideological, practical, and religious dimensions, to serve its political objectives (Hamzeh 2004: 15–40). This included the grounding principles for the creation of Hezbollah based on resistance against the Israeli occupation and the supremacy of the Supreme Guide (Ayatollah Khomeini at the time) as the descendant of the Prophet and his Imams³ (Qassem 2010: 11–40). Given these founding principles, the leaders of the Shi’ite groups set a proposal for establishing Hezbollah. A committee of nine – composed of three senior representatives from the cells founded by the Committee of Ulema of the Bekaa, the Islamic Committees, and Islamic AMAL (Afwaj al-Mouqawma Al-Lubnaniyya⁴) – was responsible for submitting the proposal for approval by the Supreme Guide. Hence, after getting the blessing of Ayatollah Khomeini, “the different cells dissolved to form a single federating party that took the name Hezbollah” (Qassem 2010: 32).

Hezbollah formally announced its political programme in 1985 (Hamzeh 2004: 34–40). Since then, the Party has been able to acquire military and financial aid from Iran, via Syria, through “experts from the Guardians of the Revolution, who set up military training camps in the Bekaa Valley to train Hezbollah militants” (Hamzeh 2004: 44). At the time, Hezbollah was not the only Shi’ite group in Lebanon. The Movement of Hope (AMAL) was founded in 1974 and was for a time the largest and most powerful Shi’ite group in Lebanon (Traboulsi 2007: 109–130). However, Hezbollah could distinguish itself as a Shi’ite Party separate from AMAL. The need to distinguish one party from another stems from AMAL’s involvement in the Lebanese civil war and specifically, the “war of the camps” in 1985 against the PLO. This damaged their standing among the Shi’ite community because it resulted in a clash against Palestinian factions who shared the same fight against Israel. Hezbollah’s non-involvement in the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) increased its status within the Lebanese society. Unlike AMAL, Hezbollah presented itself as a party whose sole aim was to resist Israeli occupation and aggression against Lebanon – rather than to engage in violence over domestic matters – and this added to the Party’s credibility and legitimacy.

Hezbollah’s ideological principles are organised according to Khomeini’s Wilayat al-Faqih, which entails forming an Islamic State in Lebanon (Norton 2007b: 475–491). The following statement is taken from the group’s political platform, first published in 1985:

The solution to Lebanon’s problems is the establishment of an Islamic republic as only this type of regime can secure justice and equality for all of Lebanon’s citizens. The Hezbollah organization views as an important goal the fight against ‘western imperialism’ and its eradication from Lebanon. The group strives for complete American and French withdrawal from Lebanon, including all their institutions.

(Al-Agha 2011a: 39)

Thus, the acknowledgement of the supreme rule and authority by Wali al-Faqih⁵ constitutes one of the main attributes of Hezbollah’s ideology. Therefore, an understanding of the Wilayat al-Faqih structure is essential to this book’s investigation of Hezbollah’s political strategy.

Hezbollah is depicted by the West and more recently by the Arab League as a terrorist organisation with a specific intent (along with Iran) to destabilise the Middle East region (Sabah and Noueihed 2017). Notwithstanding the clear ideological platforms that underpin such claims, from 1982 to the present, the Party has positioned itself as a legitimate and arguably the only effective resistance group to Israel – in response to the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon – and has successfully integrated into Lebanese politics (first joining the Lebanese parliament, and then the government). Hezbollah is, however, a political group based on a platform of Islamic social and political ideology. Indeed, Hezbollah has retained its religious identity and does not shy away from its intellectual and ideological commitment to the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine.

There exists a wide funding network that supports Hezbollah’s position and ensures its continuity within Lebanese society. Sources of funding include zakat (Islamic alms), financial support from its ally, Iran, and donations from wealthy Lebanese businessmen and women abroad. Through the funds the Party receives, it has established a dynamic social programme and manages a nation-wide network of social, educational, and charitable programmes. These efforts, in addition to the long struggle against Israel, have helped Hezbollah gain the support of a wide sector of the Lebanese population, specifically, but not exclusively, the Muslim Shi’ite sect. Hezbollah has also gained recognition amongst some segments of society as the strongest political force in the country (Khatib et al. 2014: 105–111).

The unity of Hezbollah members is tied to the Shi’ite sect. The Shi’ite community’s faith and belief in the guiding mission of the Party has therefore helped it to grow stronger. Furthermore, Hezbollah has positioned itself as the only group capable of fighting the ongoing threat that Israel poses to Lebanon. Initially, Hezbollah did not need propaganda tools to attract members, as its target and mission were widely recognised as being to free Lebanese lands from foreign occupation. This had been enough to attract large numbers of young Shi’ites to join the organisation (Norton 2007a). However, Hezbollah’s formal recruitment strategy is a key to its success. During the 1980s, recruitment was relatively simple since the country was at war. Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s leaders were careful to choose the “right” people who were driven by their commitment and who had a comprehensive understanding of the mission, in addition to the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine.

Hezbollah’s entry into the Lebanese parliament and its emergence as a political party has embedded it into the fabric Lebanese society. The Party has proven, during its 30 years of existence, that it is able to maintain a solid organisational structure. Moreover, its continued ability to integrate into Lebanese politics stems from a religious pragmatism that resides in Shi’ite theology. Specifically, the Shi’ite endorsement of taqiyya⁶ to protect oneself facilitates Hezbollah’s use of religious tools such as ijtihad and fatwa to consolidate its position in the Lebanese political system via political pragmatism. Indeed, as is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Shi’ites had to adopt a dissimulation strategy in order to protect themselves from Sunni persecution. The notion of taqiyya entails that Shi’ites would not declare their true sect and would live under the authority of the local ruling until the return of the Twelfth Imam (Mahdi), from his disappearance, otherwise known as the Occultation period.

The extent and nature of Hezbollah’s employment of religion for its political gain is typically analysed through an examination of specific dates and developments that shaped the Party’s religious-political identity. There are extensive analyses of the Party’s religion/sectarian rhetoric to explain three major political decisions (Hamzeh 2004; Harik 2004; Khatib 2013). First, there were the 1992 decisions to take part in the parliamentary elections in Lebanon which shifted the Party’s identity from resistance group to legitimate political party. Second, there were the events of 2005 and 2006, namely, the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafic Hariri, and the war with Israel in 2006. This latter event represents a milestone in Hezbollah’s emergence as a political party as it faced the dilemma of potentially having to compromise its regional position and alliances to become a national party. Third, there were the clashes of 2008 with the Future Movement which presented similar challenges to Hezbollah’s domestic position and popularity.

As part of its secretive nature, Hezbollah has adopted a strategy of “reveal and hide.” This, in Hezbollah’s perspective, is essential for its survival in the face of continuous threats from Israel. However, this strategy has led to accusations against the Party that it is deceptive and untrustworthy (Khatib 2013). For example, Hezbollah was criticised by the March 14 bloc for using its weapons against Lebanese citizens and as a tool to pressure the Lebanese government during the 2008 clashes in Beirut.

Hezbollah and insurgent terrorism

Notwithstanding the assertion in this book that Hezbollah should be considered as a resistance group rather than as a terrorist organisation, the Party has explicitly been deemed by the West, some Arab countries, and numerous scholars as the latter. As such, it is worth briefly exploring the nature of their claim. Current explanations of insurgent terrorism are applied to Hezbollah as an insurgent non-State actor in Lebanon and the Middle East region more broadly. These theories often seek to establish a link between insurgent violence and economic hardship or marginalisation (McAllister and Schmid 2011: 249). For instance, theories of relative deprivation (e.g. Gurr 1986: 45–50) have posited a relationship between violent insurgence due to political frustration and a perceived gap between individual entitlement and the individual’s capacity to achieve one’s goals.

Terrorism is characterised as a form of asymmetrical conflict between the State and the insurgent group, but from the perspective of three possible types of asymmetry: power, status, and vulnerability (Stepanova 2008: 9–11). Power typically favours the State and the State almost always has a monopoly on legitimacy (i.e. status) at both the domestic and international levels. However, in terms of vulnerability asymmetry (i.e. ideological and structural disparities), this typically accrues to ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Historical background
• 2 Fatwa and politics
• 3 Hezbollah’s political pragmatism through ijtihad
• 4 Social mobilisation theory
• 5 Content and context analyses of Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013
• 6 Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian conflict
• 7 Conclusion
• Index